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## NOTES FOR A JOURNAL

MAXIM LITVINOV

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# Notes for a Journal

INTRODUCTION BY

E. H. CARR



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## MAXIM LITVINOV



THE Russian typescript here presented in an English translation purports to consist of notes dictated by Maxim Litvinov, partly from memory and partly from manuscript notes which he afterwards destroyed; it covers, with many gaps and interruptions, the period from 1926 to 1939; and there are a few brief and isolated entries for later years down to 1950. At the request of the publishers I have attempted to investigate the origin of the document with a view to ascertain whether, and how far, it is likely to be genuine. The paucity of authentic information about everything that has gone on behind the scenes in the Soviet Union since 1928, and the appetite in foreign countries for such information, has led to the publication in recent years of a number of memoirs written, or purporting to be written, by witnesses of these events or participants in them. These books have been of a variable, and sometimes highly dubious, character. Some have been unquestionably genuine, though the strong prejudices of the authors, or the desire to produce sensational stories, may detract from their value as first-hand evidence. Others appear to be simple forgeries, inspired either by political or by commercial motives. Others – perhaps the most numerous class – have a genuine substratum of fact, but have been written up or ‘ghosted’ by journalists or professional writers, who, in putting them into literary form to give them a popular appeal, have overlaid the facts with an enormous superstructure of fiction, thus offering an apparently insoluble puzzle to those anxious to extract the grains of truth which they contain. It is against this background that the Litvinov Journal, the most sensational work of its kind yet published (to whichever of these categories it may belong) must be considered.

When the first part of the typescript (down to the year 1936) was submitted to me last year, I visited Paris, whence it had reached London, in an attempt to obtain detailed and accurate information about its provenance. According to statements made

to me in the course of my investigations, the main entries were dictated by Litvinov in the later 1930's or early 1940's from notes made earlier by Litvinov himself in a personal cypher or an illegible handwriting. The greater part of them were dictated, apparently at different times and places, abroad; and the type-script was deposited in two copies with Madame Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm and a trusted friend of Litvinov. Only the concluding sections were dictated by Litvinov in the Soviet Union after his return from Washington in 1943. These were also handed to Madame Kollontai, then on a visit to Moscow from Stockholm. But when she read these sections, she found parts of them so compromising that she was afraid to take the risk of carrying them across the frontier. These parts she destroyed; and this was said to account for the fact that the sections for the middle 1930's are much briefer and less informative than the earlier sections. When Madame Kollontai finally left Stockholm for Moscow on her retirement in March 1945, she left the document in the custody of another person with the injunction that nothing should be published till after Litvinov's death. Litvinov died in January 1952, Madame Kollontai in March 1952.

The supposition that the journal consists of material dictated some years after the events described from notes made at the time, and not revised by the author, may explain some of its peculiar characteristics. A few of the items carry a specific date and read like entries in a diary; most of them have no other heading except that of the year to which they belong. Litvinov is said to have dictated hurriedly and nervously, frequently interrupting himself and abruptly changing the subject, sometimes instructing the secretary to leave a gap with the intention of returning and filling it later. These deliberate gaps are marked in the text by the word 'omission', other interruptions in the sequence of thought by dots.

The above account of the origin of the document was given to me, in part orally, in part in writing, by Russian intermediaries through whose hands the documents passed, and whom I interviewed in Paris. Answers have been furnished in writing to further questions put by me. But I have been unable to interview either the person to whom the notes are said to

have been dictated by Litvinov or the person to whom the document was entrusted by Madame Kollontai when she left Stockholm (who is himself said to have died since). In these circumstances, it has been impossible for me to establish the genuineness of the document, or the authenticity of the account given to me of its origin. The problem was further complicated after my return to London by the receipt of another instalment of the typescript which had not been previously available—the whole section from 1937 onwards. This section, like the latter part of the original typescript, was markedly inferior in interest to the earlier sections, and contained at least one gross error of fact such as could hardly have been committed by Litvinov himself. No explanation was forthcoming of the origin of this later section or of the reasons for its omission from the original typescript, which now forms Chapter Four of the work.

External evidence failing, the issue of the character of the document must turn mainly on the uncertain ground of internal evidence. The hypothesis of a complete forgery or fiction cannot be dismissed out of hand. If this hypothesis is correct, the motive has been commercial, not political. While particular statements in the journal may be regarded as favourable or hostile to the regime, the document as a whole serves no apparent propaganda purpose; the author appears as in many respects ambivalent in his judgments on the events described, and, in particular, in his attitude to Stalin. This gives the document, whether genuine or not, a certain value for the historian. If it is a fiction, it is a fiction written without *parti pris*, and much of it written by someone intimately concerned with party and with diplomatic events; many passages betray close and detailed knowledge which can be checked from other sources. That it is not marked by any depth of thought, that it contains many trivialities, some improbabilities, and some demonstrable inaccuracies, that it exhibits a strong tendency to 'show off' and, considering the position of the supposed author, an extraordinary degree of independence, does not necessarily constitute an argument against its genuineness. A few days after Litvinov's death the *Washington Post* in its issues of 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 25th January, 1952, published an interview stated to have been given by Litvinov to an American correspondent in Moscow,

Richard Hottelet, in July 1946 shortly before his retirement. In this interview Litvinov was strongly critical of the foreign policy then being pursued by the Soviet Government, and expressed anxiety about a possible clash with the Western Powers. Litvinov is said to have made no specific request that his remarks should be regarded as 'off the record', but it seemed obvious that their publication during his life time would have been highly damaging to him. The remarks attributed to him certainly displayed great boldness, not to say recklessness; something of this quality is required to explain a readiness to record in writing, even outside Russia, some of the entries in the journal. The authenticity of the Hottelet interview has not been called in question; and, if this is placed beside some of the passages in the present document, a marked similarity of tone and attitude can be detected. The conspicuous incoherence of the document, and the abrupt changes of subject, mood and style, are perhaps an argument in its favour. Whatever its origin, it cannot, I think, be doubted that a large part of it fairly represents Litvinov's outlook and standpoint during this period.

To disentangle the hypothetical substratum of fact from superstructure of fiction is, however, a difficult task. Certain passages suggesting foreknowledge of later events (e.g. the reference to Bukharin on page 101 and several references to Soviet-German relations hinting at the *dénouement* of 1941) would be easily explicable if one assumed that the former passage was in fact dictated after 1938 and the latter after 1941. On the other hand, any passages which could be proved to reflect knowledge of events occurring in or after 1945 would be conclusive evidence of a fake.

The most spectacular passage from this point of view occurs on page 30, where Mao Tse-tung appears in Moscow in May 1926 as a delegate of the Chinese Communist party, plays a prominent part in the discussion of policy with the Russian leaders, and is described as 'shrewd as a Hunan fox' and more than a match for Stalin in craftiness. Mao Tse-tung appears to have been a member of the Chinese Communist Party since its foundation in 1921; but he is not generally supposed to have played any noteworthy part in its affairs before 1927. Yet a quasi-official biography of Chiang Kai-shek shows that, during

the period of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance, Mao was sufficiently important to be placed at the head of the publicity or propaganda department of Kuomintang, and that he was dismissed from this post in this very month of May 1926 as part of a drive against the Communists and the Russian advisers following the incident of March 1926 (S. Y. Hsiung, *The Life of Chiang Kai-shek*, 1948, pp. 247-248). There is nothing in the wording of the passage in the Journal to suggest that it has been fabricated for any political motive, e.g. in order to show that Mao was from the first a faithful disciple of Moscow; and the remainder of the account of the discussions in the Russian party has an authentic ring. The most that can be said is that an otherwise unrecorded visit of Mao Tse-tung to Moscow seems in itself improbable, and that the tone of the passage strongly suggests that it was written subsequently to Mao's rise to power. This passage is the most puzzling conundrum in the document; and a study of it and other passages relating to China by Chinese experts might throw important light on the problem of its authenticity.

Another passage which *prima facie* excites suspicion is that recounting an alleged offer made by Benes to a Soviet agent in Prague in 1920 to cede Sub-Carpathian Russia to Soviet Russia. This reads at first sight like an *ex post facto* attempt to justify the cession in 1945. Unfortunately for this theory, the story already appears in a rather less detailed form in G. Bessedovsky's, *Na Putyakh k Termidoru*, published in Paris 1931, when no such motive can be imagined. It is not in itself improbable that in the summer of 1920, when Benes, in common with other European politicians, expected the imminent fall of Warsaw and the Sovietisation of Poland, he should have been willing to purchase Soviet good will by the cession of a territory which, from the Czech point of view, was always a white elephant. The account, whether or not it emanates personally from Litvinov, seems likely to be true. Other passages, notably the conversation with Trotsky and Yoffe in 1926 with which the Journal opens, and the conversation with Kamenev in 1928, show an intimate knowledge of party affairs; and the account of Litvinov's personal relations with Stalin, and such details as his jealousy of Maisky's greater success in western

diplomatic society, are, to say the least, plausible and revealing.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that numerous and extensive passages bear the mark of having been re-touched or invented for the supposed purpose of giving the document a popular appeal; and the tone and style of some of these differs so noticeably from that of the more serious passages referred to above that, whatever other conclusions may be formed, it is difficult to avoid the hypothesis that at least two hands have been at work on the document. Broadly speaking, the more serious passages, whether they are to be ascribed to Litvinov or to some other well-informed participant in public affairs, predominate in the earlier sections; in the later sections the hand of the gossip-writer becomes gradually more and more prominent, and in the last sections of all appears to take exclusive possession. The increasing interest in recounting petty personal scandals, the farcical account of events in the Paris Embassy in 1930, the references to an alleged Russian proclivity for stealing watches (reflecting gossip current all over Europe in 1945) and, finally, the emptiness and triviality of the entries from 1937 onwards seem to be characteristic products of this second hand. It is this last section which contains the gross error of misdating the trial and execution of Tukhachevsky and his fellow generals by one year (it is placed not in 1937, but in 1938, after the trial of Bukharin, Krestinsky and Rakovsky)—an error which could not possibly have been made by the competent and well-informed writer (whether Litvinov himself or some literary ‘ghost’) responsible for many of the earlier sections of the document.

In the course of time further evidence may be forthcoming which will explain the origin and character of this strange—and, if my hypothesis is correct—composite document; or it may long remain a puzzle for the historical detective. My present belief is that it contains a substratum of genuine material emanating in some form or other from Litvinov himself. But parts of it are certainly accretions added later by another hand or hands; and, while some of the accretions may be the authentic recollections of someone closely associated with Litvinov, others appear to be pure fiction. These uncertainties do not, however, deprive

it of its value as a picture of an outstanding figure in the Soviet foreign relations of the period. Even considered as a historical romance, it would be a work of considerable insight and imagination as well as of a high degree of literary talent.



Maxim Maximovich Litvinov (his original name was Meier Moiseevich Wallakh) was born in Bialystok, a predominantly Jewish town on the borders of Russia and Russian Poland, in 1876. His early career was much like that of the other young revolutionaries of the period. He joined a cell of the still largely unorganised Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party in Kiev, was arrested and served a term of imprisonment, and fled abroad in 1902. He quickly became a faithful follower of Lenin and a good Bolshevik. Returning to Russia, he worked as a party organiser in Riga and engaged in various forms of underground work, including the smuggling of arms into Russia. In January 1908 he was arrested in Paris as a receiver of bank notes stolen from the Russian State Bank in the famous 'Tiflis expropriation' of June 1907, with which Stalin was directly concerned. Litvinov was, however, neither brought to trial in Paris nor extradited to Russia, but simply deported. He went to London, where he worked as a publisher's clerk and became the principal Bolshevik agent. In 1916 he married Ivy Low, the niece of the well-known journalist and publicist Sidney Low; their two children were born in London in 1917 and 1918.

Litvinov's career up to this point was a clear indication of his value to the party and of the kind of role he could play in it. He was not a thinker, and never attempted either to make any contribution to party theory or even – like Stalin – to write popular pamphlets or articles on Marxism. He displayed no interest in party controversies or dissensions: having become a Bolshevik he was content to follow Lenin without scruple or question. He was an enterprising and energetic manager and organiser, who could be relied on to carry out efficiently any job assigned to him; and having travelled all over Europe on party affairs, he had an extensive practical knowledge of the principal European countries and languages. His association with the 'Tiflis expropriation' proved a significant episode. At

the party congress in London in the summer of 1907, which was attended by Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, the 'expropriations' were a subject of acute controversy and criticism; in the end the congress condemned the expropriations, and appointed a party commission to enquire into them under the presidency of Chicherin, then a Menshevik. The recollection of this affair was a lasting bond between Litvinov and Stalin, and a source of their common antipathy for Chicherin.

One of the first acts of the newly established Soviet Government in November 1917 was to appoint Litvinov as its representative (unrecognised, of course, by the British Government) in London; and one of Litvinov's first tasks was to negotiate the release of Chicherin from Brixton prison and his return to Russia. Litvinov was arrested and expelled from Great Britain in September 1918 as a reprisal for the similar treatment of Lockhart, the British Agent in Moscow. He was appointed a member of the collegium of Narkomindel (the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), and later Deputy Commissar under Chicherin. From 1926 onwards, when Chicherin's health began to fail, he was in effective control of Narkomindel, though he only received the substantive appointment on Chicherin's retirement in 1930. In his later years Litvinov was as faithful a follower of Stalin as he had formerly been of Lenin. As a westerner, he was sometimes outraged, as the journal suggests, by the ruthlessness of Stalin's methods. But the shock did not destroy either his admiration or his affection and never seems to have placed a serious strain on his loyalty. Each of the two men had a curiously unshaken confidence that the other would not turn against him. The journal often expresses disagreement with Stalin on concrete issues, especially in regard to Germany. But Litvinov, like Stalin, was a thorough-going empiricist, and disagreement between them never turned on grounds of principle. Hence reconciliation was easy when the policy changed. Litvinov was People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1930 till May 1939, when he was dramatically replaced by Molotov. After a long eclipse throughout the period of the Soviet-German alliance he re-emerged after Hitler's attack on Russia to become Soviet Ambassador in Washington, where he arrived in December 1941 on the eve of Pearl Harbour. He was recalled to

Moscow in 1943, and was then one of several Deputy Commissars for Foreign Affairs under Molotov till his final retirement in August 1946. He died in Moscow in January 1952, at the age of seventy-five.

Throughout nearly the whole period covered by the journal Litvinov was thus the effective head of Narkomindel, though Chicherin remained its nominal head till 1930. The main subject of the journal is foreign policy, and in this field three topics constantly recur.

The first is the organisation of the conduct of foreign affairs. It was well known from other sources that major decisions of foreign policy were taken at informal meetings of party leaders or in the Politburo (here called the Instantia), to which the head of Narkomindel was commonly summoned for the purpose of the discussion, sometimes accompanied by senior officials of the commissariat: this appears in the journal as the regular procedure. Disputes between Narkomindel and the foreign department (I.N.O.) of the G.P.U. (the 'near neighbours') or the military intelligence (the 'far neighbours') are a frequent theme; both these departments had their agents (or 'residents') attached to all Soviet diplomatic missions abroad. Complaints are sometimes made of decisions taken by Stalin over the head of Narkomindel, or even without its knowledge, on the strength of reports from the intelligence departments and carried out through those departments. All this is plausible enough: friction between the diplomatic service and the secret service and between the head of the government and the minister in charge of foreign affairs are common phenomena in most countries. Numerous passages in the journal relating to petty scandals in embassies are not in themselves incredible, but show obvious signs of having been written up for popular consumption.

The second topic which receives a great deal of attention is Soviet policy in the Far East. Apart from Mao Tse-tung's highly dubious appearance in Moscow in 1926, there is nothing in the account of Far Eastern affairs which contradicts commonly accepted views, and much light is thrown on the details of policy and on divisions of opinion between Soviet leaders. The effect of the document, if we accept its evidence, is to put back to the spring of 1926 the dissensions between the Russian party

leaders about Chinese policy which came to a head in 1927. The alleged discussion in the Politburo on 'the third Saturday in May' 1926 turned on an incident in Canton on 18th–20th March of that year, when Chinese communists, apparently with the connivance of the Russian advisers to the Kuomintang Government, attempted a coup against Chiang Kai-shek by seizing the gunboat *Chung Shan* (here erroneously called *Sun Yat-sen* – probably a confused recollection of the fact that Sun Yat-sen took refuge on this ship when expelled from Canton in 1922). This incident is well authenticated (recent accounts appear in O. M. Green's *The Story of China's Revolution* 1945, p. 98, and S. I. Hsiung's *The Life of Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 242–244), though it is not mentioned, so far as I know, in any published Russian source. But it is unlikely that the Russian advisers would have supported the coup without some party encouragement from Moscow; and many high members of the Russian party are known to have been opposed from the outset to the alliance with Kuomintang. That the question must have been discussed at this time in the Politburo seems certain, though the decision taken was evidently to gloss over the incident and continue the policy of support for Chiang Kai-shek. The substance of the record here presented, if not emanating from Litvinov, must have come from someone closely concerned in the affair, even if Mao's alleged presence and a few other details represent later accretions. It is, for example, unlikely that a recent forger or fiction-writer would have made Litvinov speak enthusiastically of Chiang Kai-shek, though this attitude was natural enough in 1926 or even in the middle 1930's.

The third theme is Germany. The journal represents Litvinov as considering the secret armaments agreement with Germany at the time of the Rapallo treaty as 'a mistake and a big one'; there seems to be no evidence of Litvinov's disapproval at the time, though it is well known that he took an anti-German line in the 1930's. But the sensational item comes at a later point in the journal. Throughout 1928 the German campaign to secure the evacuation of the Rhineland was in full swing. The decision to set up an allied committee on reparations (the Young Committee) was taken in September 1928; and a detailed agreement on the composition and functions of the committee had been

reached before the end of the year (the committee actually met in February 1929). The Soviet leaders, rightly foreseeing that an agreement on reparations was in sight, and that this might well lead to the evacuation of the Rhineland, were acutely disturbed by the fear, intermittently present in their minds ever since Locarno, of a combination between Germany and the West against them. In December 1928, according to the Litvinov journal, Stalin undertook a desperate and ingenious counter-move to avert this danger. The strongest supporters of a Soviet orientation in German foreign policy were believed in Moscow to be the German General Staff, formerly headed by von Seeckt (the real author on the German side of the secret military agreements) and now by von Hammerstein. It was to these circles that Stalin now turned. He instructed the Soviet military leaders – Tuchachevsky, Yakir and Kork are named in this connection – to let their German opposite numbers know that they would be prepared to co-operate with them against Communists and, at some time in the future, set up a military dictatorship in Russia which would offer Germany an unlimited market. Such a turn of events would be obviously in the German interest, whereas the overthrow of the Soviet Government by a hostile combination from outside would only have the result of setting up in its place a government under the patronage of Great Britain and France. This manœuvre was designed to induce the German General Staff to prevent Stresemann from entering into a bloc with the Western Powers against Soviet Russia; and it was believed to have succeeded in its purpose.

The interesting points about this strange story are two. In the first place, if true, it would provide striking evidence of the extreme fear of a German-Western combination against Soviet Russia dominating Soviet policy in Europe in the period between the two wars, though there appears to have been no time when such a combination was within the bounds of practical politics: it certainly was not in 1928 and 1929. Secondly, the story, if true, would throw a fresh light on the execution of the generals in 1937. Just as Krestinsky was condemned for dealings with the German Government which he had carried out on instructions from the Politburo, but which were represented at the trial as part of a ‘Trotskyite’ conspiracy, so – on this hypothesis –

the treasonable acts for which the generals were executed had in fact been committed by them, but committed on Stalin's secret orders. The story cannot at present be accepted simply on the evidence of the present document. But it can be added to the vast mass of speculations about the great purges of the 1930's and is by no means the least plausible of them.

Enough has been said to show that this document was, in spite of its speculative character, well worth publishing; and, though it contains passages which are certainly spurious, it was right to publish it in its entirety in order to give the critical reader the opportunity of judging it as a whole. It is impossible for the historian in the present state of our knowledge to use it unconditionally as evidence of facts. But, handled with caution, it still makes a useful contribution to our understanding of the conditions in which Soviet policy was framed and conducted in these years and of the attitude of those concerned.

E. H. CARR

#### NOTE

Brief notes on persons mentioned in the text and explanations of certain foreign terms will be generally found in the form of footnotes. Where such a note or term first occurs merely as a passing reference no footnote has been given; instead it will be found on the page where the relevant extract appears.

Biographical notes on the more important persons mentioned in the text (their first reference being marked with an asterisk), will be found on pages 278-292.

## Chapter One: 1926-1928

*Trotsky's final downfall – Russia's Eastern Policy – Stalin and Kaganovich on the Jews – Intrigues in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs*

1926. I ran into Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] at the house of a mutual friend. He is dissatisfied with his new job as head of the Chief Concessions Committee,<sup>1</sup> and also suspects Koba [Stalin]. He thinks he was appointed to the Committee purposely to compromise him in the eyes of young communists . . .

'I now have to deal with the most confirmed bourgeois,' he told me. 'It shouldn't be difficult to spread the rumour that Trotsky has sold himself to International Capital . . . Young people who see me so often on the Tverskaya sitting in a car with foreign businessmen could easily fall for such slanders . . . It's already being said that I'm on Averell Harriman's<sup>2</sup> pay-roll.'

I said to him, half-humourously, that in that case I could be slandered even more easily since I had to meet foreign diplomats every day. He scowled: 'You haven't found that man out yet,' he said. (He didn't name Koba, but that is how he always refers to him.) 'You couldn't put anything past him . . .'

He hesitated a moment and said, 'I spoke to Pilnyak<sup>3</sup> about Frunze's\* death. He assured me he has all the evidence about this dreadful "medical murder" . . .'

I told him at once this was nonsense: Pilnyak was simply after a sensational plot for his novel *The Moon's Shining Face*. But Davidovich [Trotsky] stuck to his guns: Koba was quite capable of sending his rivals to their death with the help of doctors from our clinic in the Kremlin, he said.

<sup>1</sup> Glavkontseskom, Chief Concession Committee. Government Department dealing with the granting and control of trade and industrial concessions to foreign concerns.

<sup>2</sup> HARRIMAN, William Averell, American administrator and industrialist who secured a manganese concession in the Caucasus. He advised President Roosevelt on railways during the New Deal and later became Ambassador in Moscow. President Truman's Special Representative in Europe 1948-50, Director Mutual Security Aid 1951.

<sup>3</sup> PILNYAK, Boris Andreyevich, *nom de plume* of B. A. Vogan, author of *Mahogany*, *The Volga Flows into the Caspian Sea*, *Tales of the Wilderness*, &c.

I couldn't help reflecting on the degree to which a political struggle could blind even such brilliant men as Davidovich . . . He kept on repeating it: 'That man wouldn't hesitate to become a Borgia after having already become a Machiavelli. We must be ready for anything — murders, poisonings, mass executions . . .'

He seemed to me to be off his head; I was very upset to see him in such a state, Trotsky, one of the most brilliant of our revolutionaries, the man whom Illich [Lenin] wanted to see at the head of the government.

. . . When Adolf Abramovich [Yoffe\*] came into the room talk became even more despondent. Abramovich, a doctor and a brilliant one at that, began detailing the despicable and sinister rumours of the medical auxiliaries and orderlies at the Kremlin clinic to support what Davidovich had just said. I shut them up, saying I wouldn't listen to such nonsense . . .

We talked about the future of the Concessions Committee. Abramovich says that all foreign businessmen would soon be forced to close down as the Trade Union Council had instructed its members to demand special rates from these businessmen, which would in effect mean a 300 per cent increase in wages. If their claims were not met, the doctor added, the workers were to strike and then seize control of the foreign companies . . .

'He wants to force me to support foreign businessmen against our trade unions,' said Davidovich. 'I won't do it . . .'

I wanted to prove to him that it was the specific task of the Concessions Committee to develop concessions as a means of furthering peaceful co-existence and co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and the surrounding capitalist world. But they would not listen to me. Both Davidovich and Abramovich gave the impression of men so obsessed with their party feud with Koba that they would swallow anything, even be willing to sacrifice important projects they themselves had advocated simply in order to win the political support of the younger communists . . .

Turning to the subject of young people, Davidovich said: 'I often receive representatives of Komsomol<sup>1</sup> organisations and of Young Communist cells in colleges and factories. They criticise me for not giving the signal for an open offensive against the high officials of the Communist Party's central committee

<sup>1</sup> KOMSOMOL. Young Communist League in the Soviet Union.

and the bureaucrats headed by Stalin and Molotov. Some of the military people in the provinces have been waiting a long time for me to make a decisive move. But I shan't go in for that sort of thing. I want to fight within the party organisation, at conferences, meetings, at the party congress . . . Maybe I can break the party bureaucracy through the ballot or at the elections of Party organs . . . There won't be any calls to insurrection from me, either in the provinces or in the capital. I shan't open the road to a third force which would eventually throttle the Soviet regime and hang us all in a row, me and that man too . . .

Abramovich was trying, however cautiously, to persuade Davidovich that Illich would not have been afraid to make any agreement or temporary alliance with anyone, provided that it would help him deceive the enemy. Illich regarded deceit as a trump card in the political struggle . . .

'You lack his unflinching resolution in the struggle, his steeliness, his determination to make use of any and every means,' he said. Davidovich interrupted him, told him that if he were right Koba would be the true successor of Illich, for Koba was the one man who used all the methods of an unscrupulous politician . . .

The discussion went on for a long time. I had not been in Russia at the beginning of the Revolution; and that perhaps explains why some of the facts seemed so fantastic to me. Apparently Davidovich said in 1917 that Kerensky was preparing himself to be a second Napoleon, that General Kornilov<sup>1</sup> had not escaped from a German prisoner-of-war camp but had been sent to Russia by the German High Command as a spy and saboteur – and other such nonsense . . . I began to realise that in my long absence from Russia I had become so detached from the realities of life there that I had failed to notice the complete moral disintegration which had affected the great ideas of international socialism, the complete moral collapse . . .

The conversation left a bad taste in my mouth, a feeling of helplessness in the face of destiny. It seemed obvious that an alliance between Stalin and Trotsky would have given a brilliant government to our country, a strong and united leadership to the party. The quarrel between these two leaders

<sup>1</sup> KORNILOV, L. Tsarist General, led an insurrection against the Provisional Government in August 1917.

involved no political principles. It arose simply out of incompatibility of temperament – the human tragedy of two persons who could not get on with each other, the human tragedy of two persons, one of whom must go . . . I fear that in this particular situation the departure of one of them will take a dramatic turn and cause dangerous internal weakening. Our common duty is to do everything in our power to prevent what seems an inevitable tragedy and, perhaps, civil war in our country.

The conflict between Koba and Trotsky is reminiscent of the relations between Poincaré and Clemenceau; but in France the opponents had to submit to a supreme arbiter: Parliament. We have no such arbiter in our country; despite the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, all power in Russia is personal. Ilich understood this when he suggested that the Central Control Commission should have supreme final authority.<sup>1</sup> But he realised this too late. The C.C.C. is nothing but a sham. Soltz\* does his job like a defaulting bank manager. As to Yaroslavsky,\* the least said about him the better; and the same goes for Shkiryatov,\* Badayev,\* and the other high-ups in the C.C.C. . . .

I left with a heavy heart. Surely everything must not be jeopardised simply because those two powerful figures, Koba and Davidovich, cannot work together in the leadership of party and country? . . . It wouldn't be the first time that history had played a dirty trick on our country.

*May – June 1926*

I met Schechtmann<sup>2</sup> who complained about the Godless and said they had ransacked two places of worship in Moscow. The Rabbi of Kiev has also been arrested on charges of currency speculation. What nonsense!

I promised to help, although I know how difficult it is. Koba doesn't like me to interfere in questions concerning the

<sup>1</sup> LENIN, ILICH and the C.C.C. Central Control Commission. Party body set up to enforce discipline and combat deviations from the official line. The reference is probably to a passage in Lenin's last article but one, *How to Reorganise the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection*. *Pravda*, 25th January, 1923.

<sup>2</sup> SCHECHTMANN, Rabbi of the largest synagogue in Moscow.

Jewish religion. Last time, indeed, he rebuked me severely and threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the Central Control Commission . . . I couldn't help smiling at the threat; Soltz, the head of the C.C.C., is the son of the Rabbi of Vilna.

I went to the theatre to see *Days of the Turbins*.<sup>1</sup> A wonderful play. It was amusing to watch the reaction of the audience when the Tsarist anthem was sung on the stage. A handful of spectators wept, including former Tsarist Generals now teaching at the Red Army's General Staff Academy.

It's said that Koba has ordered Artuzov<sup>2</sup> to make without delay a list of all the high-ups in government departments who are moved by the music of the Tsarist anthem. I happened to notice in the audience several 'plain clothes' types; they are probably Artuzov's men . . .

Met Yagoda.\* A strange, mysterious fellow, one of those adventurers thrown up in large numbers during the revolutionary period . . .

He told me that Felix [Dzerzhinsky\*] has had a heart attack and that his condition was serious. The struggle for his succession has already begun. Rudolph Mechislavovich [Menzhinsky\*] is tipped for the post. Yagoda wants to be given the I.N.O.<sup>3</sup> and would like his candidature supported against that of the runner-up, Trilisser.<sup>4</sup> Yagoda promises that, if he's appointed, all resident I.N.O. men attached to our diplomatic missions would be placed under the authority of the head of the mission . . .

Received a letter from Rakovsky,\* insisting on the recall of

<sup>1</sup> *Days of the Turbins*. A popular play of the time turning on the fortunes of a 'white' family in Kiev during the civil war ('Turbin' is the name of the family) written by Bulgakov in 1924.

<sup>2</sup> ARTUZOV. A native of Corsica, born in Bastia. His real name was Renucci. He came to Russia in 1917 and became a Party member. Chief of the K.R.O. – (Counter Revolutionary Department).

<sup>3</sup> I.N.O. The Foreign Department of the O.G.P.U. (for O.G.P.U., see page 48); its members, attached to all Soviet diplomatic and trade missions abroad, were known there as 'residents'. They supervised the other members of the mission, appointed by the Foreign Commissar, and also conducted their own espionage network. They were responsible only to their own chief in the O.G.P.U., to whom they reported directly.

<sup>4</sup> TRILISSE, M. A., Chief of the I.N.O. Shot in 1938.

Lev Borisovich Helfand,<sup>1</sup> the I.N.O. resident. Apparently Helfand has begun putting into operation his plan for the corruption and disintegration of Kutepov's white terrorist organisation.<sup>2</sup> Rakovsky\* fears this action may eventually be exposed and provoke a Press campaign which would compromise our diplomatic mission.

Phoned Alexeyev<sup>3</sup> and insisted on Helfand's recall. He refused categorically, called me an opportunist and a liquidator. What an insolent fool this pitiful big-mouth of a former left-wing Social Revolutionary is! I shall hand the matter over to Soltz.\* I was a Bolshevik when Alexeyev was still a babe-in-arms. I trust the C.C.C. will put him in his place for this impudent outburst.

Saw Tovstukha.<sup>4</sup> It would appear that the comrades in the Instantsia<sup>5</sup> are increasingly determined to carry out their idiotic plan for the immediate Sovietisation of the Chinese Revolution. They seem to think a Central Soviet regime could be set up in China within twelve or eighteen months – as soon as Chiang Kai-shee<sup>6</sup> has captured Shanghai or Nanking.

Chiang will then be removed, either physically or politically. The method of removal has not been disclosed – it is a secret known only to Borodin,\* Galen<sup>7</sup> and Prassolov.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> **HELFAND**, Lev Borisovich. A member of the O.G.P.U., was attached at the time to the Soviet Embassy in Paris. He is said to have engineered the abduction of General Kutepov.

<sup>2</sup> **KUTEPOV**, General, Leader of the Russian White Guards in France. This organisation was dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Soviet regime.

<sup>3</sup> **ALEXEYEV**. A high official of I.N.O. (the Foreign Department of O.G.P.U.) in charge of counter intelligence in Western Europe. Reported to have disappeared in 1936.

<sup>4</sup> **TOVSTUKHA**, Stalin's personal Secretary.

<sup>5</sup> **INSTANTSIA**. Colloquialism for the Politbureau of the Communist Party's Central Committee.

<sup>6</sup> **CHIANG KAI-SHEE**. Russian transliteration of Chiang Kai-shek, based on the Mandarin dialect. Chinese General and statesman, b. 1887. In 1925 he was C.-in-C. of Kuomintang Revolutionary armies in South China.

<sup>7</sup> **GALEN** was the *nom de guerre* of Marshal Blucher,\* who was sent with Borodin to Canton as military adviser.

<sup>8</sup> **PRASSOLOV**, alias Kepp, O.G.P.U. representative in China in 1926. Sent to France in 1927, he lost thirty million francs at Deauville. He was arrested, deported and subsequently shot.

I saw Yagoda\* again. He had a queer look on his face and hinted that they were going to arrest poor Florinsky<sup>1</sup>; adding that the business might end tragically for him.

Yagoda talked a lot about some plot on the part of old boys of the Tsarskoe Selo High School<sup>2</sup>. The plot came to light a year ago and the culprits were shot on the orders of the Judicial Troika<sup>3</sup>. Yagoda claims that fresh documentary evidence has now been found showing that twenty-five other people, including Florinsky, were also involved in the conspiracy. The association of former students is supposed to have served as a screen for the plot . . . The whole story may be the result of Yagoda's excess of zeal and efforts to achieve promotion . . . While he was talking about Florinsky, Yagoda referred to some 'unnatural habits', declaring, 'We have proofs. Some high officials in the Narkomindel<sup>4</sup> will be compromised . . .'

The case is supposed to have been taken over by Felix [Dzerzhinsky\*] himself, who does not play at these things. In Tashkent he liquidated several local high officials on charges which were never legally proved.

At the end of the conversation Yagoda gave me to understand that if we supported his candidature in the Instantsia and he were appointed first deputy and given charge of I.N.O. the Florinsky affair would be hushed up . . . A sinister fellow, this Yagoda . . .

Spoke to Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] about Yagoda's visit. He was furious and wanted to telephone Koba at once, but I persuaded him not to. After all, Florinsky is an old boy of the Tsarskoe Selo School. It would be easy to use him for settling accounts with us. He is my Copenhagen godson and I shall not let him down; on the other hand we can't afford to risk aggravating the conflict with Yagoda on such slippery ground . . .

<sup>1</sup> FLORINSKY, Mikhail. Chief of Protocol at the Commissariat for foreign affairs and a personal friend of Chicherin.

<sup>2</sup> TSARSKOE SELO SCHOOL. This was one of the best Russian Schools. Most of the boys studying there came from aristocratic families.

<sup>3</sup> JUDICIAL TROIKA. Political Court consisting of three judges; used extensively during the Purge period to pass severe sentences after summary trials.

<sup>4</sup> NARKOMINDEL. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Went to see Abramovich [Yoffe\*] and discussed the Chinese question. How shameful is this undignified acquiescence of Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] and Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] in the Chinese policy of the Instantsia! Its Chinese Commission is to be entrusted to Radek\*. It will have the task of working out within three months a plan for the seizure of the central power in China by the Communists and the left-wing of the Kuomintang . . .

The Commission has invited Georgi Vassilevich and Lev Mikhailovich to attend as advisers with consultative voting rights. The Chinese Communist Party is to be represented in the Commission by Chu Teh<sup>1</sup> and Mao Tse-dyung (or Mao Tse-tung; we have as yet no established rule for the transliteration of Chinese names). The Peking leader, Li Ta-chao<sup>2</sup> is also expected to attend. He is said to be a remarkable man – he is described as the Chinese Lenin . . .

Meanwhile we are running the risk of war with Japan as a result of the Instantsia's stupid adventuring. History repeats itself: the ghosts of Bezobrazov<sup>3</sup> and Abassa work hand in hand with the crook Volnyarsky; the spirit of Admiral Alexeyev<sup>4</sup> haunts the Kremlin.

The London die-hards, too, might cause us serious trouble if we set up a Soviet Government in Nanking or Shanghai. What an ideal opportunity to launch that anti-Soviet crusade which the Instantsia fears so much and does so much to bring about . . .

Peace is the thing we now need more than anything else. Koba understands this perfectly well, but is afraid of the opposition. He acts as if there was no danger of international

<sup>1</sup> CHU TEH, China's present Commander-in-Chief, 1954. Played a prominent part in the organisation of the Chinese Communist movement.

<sup>2</sup> LI TA-CHAO. A Chinese Professor of History. Belonged to 'May the Fourth Movement' against the terms of the Versailles Treaty. He was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Executed by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927.

<sup>3</sup> BEZOBRASOV, Alexander Mikhailovich, Tsarist officer and later Minister largely responsible for the Russian expansionist policy in the Far East between 1896 and 1904. He favoured the 'economic seizure' of Korea and Southern Manchuria.

<sup>4</sup> ALEXEYEV, Admiral E. E., Viceroy of the Russian Far East in 1903. His attitude was partly responsible for the Russo-Japanese war of 1905–6.

complications in China. Rebukes from Trotsky and Radek\*, who complain that the Chinese revolution is being shunted on to bourgeois side-tracks and that national revolutions of the Kemal type are slipping towards reaction, compel Koba to pose as a revolutionary . . . How foolish is this revolutionary pretence on the part of the Instantsia! . . .

Had a long and serious discussion with Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] and demanded the immediate convocation of the Foreign Affairs Board to examine our Chinese policy. We can't afford to remain passive while Radek\*, Borodin\* and company prepare to take such insane action . . . It is our duty to draw the attention of the Instantsia to the danger of serious complications, even war, in the Far East if Radck and Borodin continue their monkey tricks . . .

If war broke out the idiots in the Instantsia would soon put the responsibility on the Narkomindel and charge us with sabotage and treason. I must say that I have no wish to pay the penalty for other people's sins. Fedor Aronovich [Rothstein]<sup>1</sup> and Semen Ivanovich [Aralov]<sup>2</sup> share my views – or at least I guess they do . . .

Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin], as one might have expected, refused to take the responsibility of convening the Board. His cowardice and weakness in face of the Instantsia are simply revolting. In his place I should have resigned . . . His arguments do not appear convincing; he keeps emphasising the possibility of leakages, arguing that if Chiang Kai-shee became aware of our plans he would abandon his northern offensive and take a pro-British or pro-Japanese line. Thus we should lose China and suffer all the international consequences of such a loss.

I used to regard Georgi Vassilevich as more far-sighted in international affairs. I never thought him capable of advancing such childish explanations which would come better from a

<sup>1</sup> ROTHSCHILD, Fedor Aronovich. An old Bolshevik, resident in England where he established a reputation as a historian of Chartism; later returned to Russia and became Soviet Ambassador to Persia.

<sup>2</sup> ARAKOV, Semen Ivanovich. A former Social-Democrat. Served as Ambassador to Lithuania, Latvia and Turkey. Appointed member of the Foreign Affairs Board (Collegium) in 1925.

street-corner speaker than from the head of our Foreign Commissariat . . .

To what China did he refer? China today is neither a nation nor a state, but simply an agglomeration of provinces. Chiang Kai-shec rules in the south, Wu Pei-fu<sup>1</sup> in the centre, Chang Tso-lin<sup>2</sup> in the north. In Shantung there is Sun Chan-fang.<sup>3</sup> There are also some independent tupans [war lords]. Chiang Kai-shee sides with us, more or less; Wu Pei-fu with the British; and Chang Tso-lin and Sun Chan-fang with the Japanese.

If we supported Chiang Kai-shee honestly – and to the end – he would succeed in uniting China. There would then be a pro-Russian government of China and economic help would be forthcoming from the United States to develop the country. If, however, we replaced Chiang Kai-shee with communists and adventurers from the left-wing of the Kuomintang there would be a world war in which we should inevitably be involved and defeated. It is surely not difficult to understand this . . .

Saw Melnikov<sup>4</sup>. Radek\* has discovered a new hobby; to work out an official transliteration of Chinese names and words into Russian. Our dear adviser Mao is henceforth to be called Mao Tse-dun; Chiang Kai-shee will be Chiang Kai-shek, in Anglo-Saxon fashion; Chang Tso-lin will be known as Chdzan Tzo-lin, and so forth. Radek, it appears, aims at becoming Dean of the Eastern Workers' University. Koba – who has regarded himself as an expert linguist ever since he learned Esperanto in Batum prison – will also take part in Radek's linguistic endeavours. One would think that we had nothing better to do than study Chinese orthography!

<sup>1</sup> WU PEI-FU, Chinese General ruling in Central China. War Lord of Chili. Head of Peking Government fighting Sun Yat-sen. He defeated Chang Tso-lin in 1922 but was himself defeated by Chiang Kai-shek in 1927.

<sup>2</sup> CHANG TSO-LIN, bandit who became Manchurian War Lord. He ruled autocratically three provinces from 1918 to 1928. In 1926 he occupied all north-east China but had to withdraw from Peking two years later when the southern nationalists began their advance. He was killed by a bomb in 1928.

<sup>3</sup> SUN CHAN-FANG, Chinese War Lord who ruled near Shanghai.

<sup>4</sup> MELNIKOV, Alexander (Lifshitz). Cousin of Litvinov. Chief of the Far East Department of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Spoke again to Georgi Vassilevich on the proposed meeting of the Board. He fears that if there were a leakage Chiang Kai-shee will expel our advisers, and particularly Galen. I told him Chiang had no intelligence agents in our country and no means of securing information from us. All that was necessary was to shut up that good-for-nothing Borodin\* so he didn't blab – and Chiang would never find out anything.

I have at last got a decision from Georgi Vassilevich on convening the Board. Melnikov is to make a detailed statement. He is a businesslike sort of man and not inclined to be overawed by the Instantsia. The Board is to meet on 'the third Saturday in May'. Georgi Vassilevich has been very partial to such pretentious Anglo-Saxon formulae ever since he published his pseudo-historical study on the President and the Constitution of the United States.

Talked to Melnikov. He told me that he was completely engrossed in linguistic research for his report to Radck and Koba. He told me with a laugh that Chiang Kai-shee is not to be renamed after all. He will continue to be known as Chiang Kai-shee instead of Chiang Kai-shek because millions of pamphlets on *The Treason of Chiang Kai-shee* have already been printed in Russian for internal consumption. A song on the same subject has also been composed! If he were renamed it would involve the State Publishing House in considerable expense. And Koba after all is a realist. One must give him credit for that . . .



Melnikov sent me the lyrics of the famous song written after the incident which involved the cruiser *Sun Yat-sen*<sup>1</sup> on 18th March. I fail to understand how one can print such rubbish – much less compose a score to fit it.

<sup>1</sup> SUN YAT-SEN (1867-1925), Founder of the Kuomintang and President of the Republican Government in Canton in 1921. He had been provisional President of the Republic in 1912. The communist plot against Chiang in Canton in March 1926 and the seizure of the gun-boat *Sun Yat-sen* is described in O. M. Green's, *The Story of China's Revolution* (Hutchinson, 1945), p. 98.

*Rattles, fireworks, so much fun  
Chiang Kai-shee sits on a gun,  
We knock him on the pate  
And beat him up at such a rate.  
Wagglng his large backside  
He gives China a backward slide  
He fouls the air everywhere,  
What a reptile you have there . . .*

The efforts of the Hands-off China Society and of its special Committee of Komsomol ‘poets’ are much in the same spirit. All this reminds me of what we used to call in Bialystok a ‘lunatic asylum for juveniles’ . . .

Third Saturday of May. The Board met at last to discuss the Chinese question. A stormy debate with hotly contested arguments. Met Mao Tse-dun [Mao Tse-tung] who was invited to the meeting. He is clever and, as the Chinese say, shrewd like a Hunan fox.

I understand now how he succeeded in deceiving all the comrades in the Instantia, including Koba, who himself is as shrewd as a Georgian fox. But Mao seems to be craftier and will do in Koba any time he wants to . . .

Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] could do no more than dance to the tune of Mao, who declared that he did not need an interpreter as he spoke Russian well. One would have thought that he wanted to be courteous or to pay us a compliment. But in actual fact this Hunan fox spoke Russian, though in a way intended to make us understand only what he really wanted to drive home. He had no use for adverbs or prefixes in his Russo-Chinese dialect, which also ignored the rules of declension and conjugation.

. . . Every time he forgot, or pretended to have forgotten, a Russian word, Mao indulged in funny modulations of ‘ah—ay—ay—ec . . .’

Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] made valiant efforts to help Mao, but I soon realised that his knowledge of Chinese left much room for improvement . . .

There were some truly comical moments during Mao’s speech. When he forgot, for example, how to say ‘eloquence’ in Russian

he began to draw the signs representing this word in Chinese and showed them to Karakhan. The poor man looked at the signs for some time, shrugged his shoulders, and announced solemnly: 'This means wooden mouth . . .' Everybody laughed, including Mao. We had to resort to Melnikov, who explained the incident. It appeared that the word 'eloquence' is represented in Chinese by means of two signs: one meaning 'mouth' and the other 'skill'. But the sign for 'skill' resembles that for 'wood'. Hence the hilarity caused by Karakhan's mistake.

. . . The heated controversy lasted two hours. There was, of course, no possibility whatsoever of reaching unanimous agreement on this cardinal question. I suggested that Victor [Kopp]<sup>1</sup> should be sent to China to examine the situation on the spot and submit a report.

As might have been expected, Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] rejected my proposal. Victor is an opponent of Borodin's\* ventures. Mao also opposed my suggestion, declaring that Victor had the reputation of a Japonophile in the Chinese Communist Party. His arrival in China, according to Mao, would cause a hostile reaction.

I asked that the question be put to the vote. Rothstein, Aralov and myself were in favour of Victor's trip – Chicherin and Karakhan voted against it.

Kantorovich was assigned the task of editing the minutes of our debate, placing on record the decisions, and sending it all to the Instantsia. He was hardly pleased by this assignment . . .

. . . Spoke to Kantorovich. Georgi Vassilevich had asked him to gloss over our differences. I was indignant. We will wait to hear the decision of the Instantsia. I have been told that Koba used unprintable language about Radek.\* However, our party squabbles are compelling him to take most dangerous decisions on the Chinese question. This weighs heavily on him; but there is nothing he can do about it . . .



Florinsky has not been at the office for two days. He left his flat one morning and disappeared without a trace . . .

<sup>1</sup> KOPP, Victor, friend of Litvinov. He was the first Soviet Envoy to Germany. Soviet Ambassador to Japan in 1926.

. . . Georgi Vassilevich phoned Koba and Felix [Dzerzhinsky\*], asking them to find out what happened . . . They promised to assist . . .

. . . I have decided to write an official letter to the Instantsia on Florinsky's disappearance. We simply cannot tolerate such high-handedness. They arrest a member of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and do not even have the courtesy to notify us . . .

. . . Yagoda\* phoned unexpectedly. He claims that he himself does not even know exactly what happened to Florinsky. What a cheek that scoundrel's got . . .

. . . Florinsky turned up at his office . . . bewildered and disturbed. He affirms that he was arrested by the Ugroz<sup>1</sup> at a house used by a gang to hoard stolen property. His story is that he went there to buy a second-hand camera and was arrested by agents of the Ugroz who raided the premises unexpectedly. After being detained, he was taken to the Lyubianka prison and subsequently released on orders from Yagoda . . .

. . . Everybody at the Commissariat is indignant about Florinsky's arrest and Yagoda's tricks. But Florinsky himself continues to stand by his version of the incident, insisting that the arrest was accidental, and that while the Ugroz had carried it out, it was Yagoda who had released him . . . It would appear that Yagoda wants to pose as a benefactor of the Narkomindel staff . . .

. . . I am trying to understand the real reasons for Florinsky's arrest. I should have to see . . . [Translator's note: gap in the diary.] She is his permanent, trusted collaborator. I have access to her through . . . (omission) . . .

Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin]\* will go to Menzhinsky\* to seek an explanation. It is a vain effort . . .

. . . Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]\* has written from Germany on the subject of our Agreement of 24th April.<sup>2</sup> He thinks that the secret economic clause annexed to the Agree-

<sup>1</sup> UGROZ. Criminal Investigation Department of the Soviet Police, which deals with common crimes as opposed to political offences.

<sup>2</sup> The Berlin Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship was signed on 24th April, 1926. It provided that if either party were attacked by 'one or more powers' the other would 'observe neutrality for the whole duration of the conflict'. After the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Berlin Treaty expressed Germany's desire to live on equally friendly terms with Russia.

ment should satisfy Otto Wolff<sup>1</sup>. I cannot understand why Nikolayevich should be so concerned about that man Wolff. True, he used to negotiate the cheques of our Commissariat for Foreign Trade, but he charged a speculator's commission for his services. Around him are a gang of profiteers from among the émigrés who all negotiate the cheques of our Foreign Commissariat . . .



Another letter from Nikolai Nikolayevich. Says that General von Hammerstein<sup>2</sup> has been giving him dirty looks ever since the Gherda<sup>3</sup> affair. As if we could be held responsible for the imagination of that brainless character . . . Zanek had to pay dearly for his flirtation . . .

. . . Met Lazar Moiseyevich [Kaganovich]\* at the National [Hotel]. He looks fit and tanned and wears a striking sort of white shirt – the style worn by Yalta coachmen in the summer – and large trousers; a vestige of his work in Kharkov as Secretary-General [of the Party] in the Ukraine. Someone told him that he looked like the Cossack leader Khvilya of Zaporozhe in the painting by Perrin. He has since been wearing wide trousers in Zaporozhe fashion.

Moiseyevich is a clever man but, oddly, he sometimes fails to understand the simplest things: 'ataman' Kaganovich . . . it sounds like one of Klim's [Voroshilov]\* anecdotes . . . It would appear that Kaganovich learned even to speak Ukrainian. Admittedly he is very gifted and capable of picking things up quickly . . . No education whatever, but dispenses quotations from Marx at every turn . . .

<sup>1</sup> WOLFF, Otto. A German industrialist, married to a relative of Krestinsky.

<sup>2</sup> HAMMERSTEIN-EQUORD. Freiherr Kurt von, German General, member of the secret unit 'Sondergruppe R' set up by the German General Staff for potential co-operation with the U.S.S.R. (under Colonel Nikolai, former Chief of German Military Intelligence). Became subsequently Chief of the camouflaged German General Staff under the Weimar Republic. Chief of the Army's Western Department at the Ministry of War in 1939. He died in 1943.

<sup>3</sup> GHERDA, daughter of General von Hammerstein, who fell in love with Zanek, the Soviet military attaché in Berlin, and followed him to Moscow against her father's wishes.

. . . (omission) . . . We spoke of the Caucasus and our sanatoria there . . . Then we turned to Khatayevich . . . Kaganovich suddenly declared that he did not regard him as very suitable for the post of Secretary-General in Kazakhstan. 'He is a former member of the Komferbund<sup>1</sup> and must not be sent to the Kazakhs and Kirgiz . . .' I couldn't hold back any longer, and suggested that we should then reconsider our whole policy and, perhaps, introduce a *numerus clausus* in our party organs . . .

Kaganovich shrugged his shoulders, saying that it might become necessary to do that. Of course, not an official *numerus clausus* but 'a self-imposed limitation', and Jews should also 'avoid holding prominent positions in a country of secular anti-semitism'. I reminded him of what Ilich told Trotsky when he was trying to persuade him to become Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars<sup>2</sup>. Trotsky was reluctant to accept the post, pointing to his Jewish origin and arguing that the counter-revolutionary propaganda would make good use of the slogan: 'The Soviet Government is in the hands of Jews.' Ilich laughed and replied: 'They say in any case that we are all Yids . . . Even Muralov<sup>3</sup> is supposed to be a Jew . . . And those who are not Jews must be Lithuanians or Chinese . . .'

. . . Kaganovich made a wry face and snapped: 'Trotsky is to blame more than anyone else for the new wave of anti-semitism. His claims to the place of Ilich were simply criminal. In my opinion all Jewish members of the Party should be Trotsky's declared and convinced enemies, if only to show that there is no such thing as a Jewish clan and that we are all loyal to Stalin . . .'

. . . I reflected that he was reasoning like my uncle, a rabbi in Bialystok who always used to say before the Revolution that the only way to stop the pogroms in Russia was for Jews to become fanatical monarchists. But my uncle was the product of many

<sup>1</sup> KOMFERBUND. Jewish left-wing organisation.

<sup>2</sup> Trotsky and the Sovnarkom. This incident appears in Trotsky's, *My Life* (Thornton Butterworth, London, 1930), p. 292.

<sup>3</sup> MURALOV, Nikolai Ivanovich. A member of the War Council of the Republic during the Revolution and later one of the most prominent leaders of the Trotsky Opposition. He was arrested in April 1936 and banished to Siberia, having been previously expelled from the Party. Tried and sentenced to death in January 1937.

centuries of ghetto life while Kaganovich is a member of our Instantsia and a prominent leader . . .

It is curious how men's psychology fails to keep pace with changes in historical conditions . . . The trouble arises, of course, from the fact that the features bred by the 'pale'<sup>1</sup> continue to exist although many Jews have now moved to Central Russia. The so-called 'psychology of the Gomel Ghetto' is still a reality . . . It is not fortuitous that Kaganovich is a native of Gomel . . .

Naturally, in countries where the ghetto disappeared long ago there is no trace left of this psychology . . . It is preposterous to suggest that Disraeli would have reasoned like Kaganovich. And yet Disraeli emerged from what used to be called the ghetto of Portuguese Jews in London . . . I mentioned it to Lazar Moiseyevich [Kaganovich\*] but he did not understand. 'You, comrade Litvinov,' he told me, 'have preserved an adulation for British Imperialism . . . I think that you would have felt happier as a British Minister than as a Soviet Commissar; and it would have pleased you to receive a baronetcy, or, perhaps, the Order of the Bath . . . as to myself, I wou'd rather have the bath without the order . . . especially the sort of hot bath we shall prepare for all those baronets . . .'

How silly, vulgar and trivial his remarks were. Perhaps it was an allusion to my letter [of 1918] published in Milyukov's<sup>2</sup> émigré paper . . . I was then afraid that our regime would not last and that we should all end our lives on the scaffold at the hands of some White general. I did not want my children to know this . . . gallows in England . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Kaganovich spoke at length about the need to alter our notions radically . . . He must be told: 'Physician, heal thyself' . . . He prides himself with having reached the highest step in the party ladder, near Koba and in the company of Molotov . . . They say that occasionally he is even invited to the houses of Klim [Voroshilov]\* and Shkiryatov\* when they tell stupid anecdotes . . . He divorced his Jewish wife and married a

<sup>1</sup> 'PALE.' The compulsory settlement and concentration of Jews in some western districts of Tsarist Russia.

<sup>2</sup> MILYUKOV, P., leader of the Russian Constitutional democrats in Paris. He had been Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government.

Muskovite from a merchant family – one Bubnova who is, I believe, a relation of Abrikosova . . . He may eventually find himself summoned to appear before the C.C.C. for having baptised his child . . . Strangely, the assimilation of Jews in anti-semitic countries always take such ugly and funny turns . . .



I have suggested to Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]\* that he should invite von Hammerstein to Moscow. We could introduce him to Klim; and we need a good military adviser in Mongolia. We would pay him royally, though we are bolsheviks. That should appease the Kaiser's officer . . .

Dovgalevsky\* has written from Stockholm. He complains that we sell the same platinum simultaneously in Sweden and Switzerland. He asks us to stop selling to the Basle National Bank and also suggests negotiations with Amberg.<sup>1</sup> It is high time to find a new man. He is getting too fat at our expense and will soon send us all to hell, after doing us in properly as a parting present . . . Dovgalevsky does not shine as a commercial expert, despite his Jewish origins . . .



. . . Received Sabanin<sup>2</sup> who has had an argument with Lashkevich about our treaties with Lithuania and Afghanistan. I promised to raise the question before the Foreign Affairs Board. I don't like Sabanin with his smooth manners. Lashkevich drinks heavily but he is a sincere and conscientious worker. I am afraid Yagoda will get hold of him: he is a former student of the Law School . . .



. . . I managed at last to have a long talk with Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin].\* It involved visiting him at two a.m. because of his bad habit of working at night and sleeping till midday. I found him at the piano; Chopin is his favourite, and he has no use for any other composer. He claims that Chopin

<sup>1</sup> AMBERG, Swedish banker who was a friend of Dovgalevsky.

<sup>2</sup> SABANIN. An old Tsarist official who became legal adviser to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

was somehow ‘illegitimately’ related to the family of Count Chapsky – Vassilevich’s ancestors on his mother’s side . . . We started our long discussion only after he had finished playing Mazurka No. 53. As usual, he proffered friendship, declaring that controversies and squabbles upset him, and so forth. But when I attempted to talk about China he changed the subject and turned to the question of our Mission in Stockholm. He thought we should recall Dovgalevsky because the ‘near neighbours’<sup>1</sup> man in Stockholm might ‘do him in’ as a former member of the Bund<sup>2</sup>. Personally, I think that Dovgalevsky never belonged to the Bund. Regarding the Florinsky affair, he said he had seen Koba, who advised a direct approach to Felix [Dzerzhinsky]\*. He quoted Koba as having told him: ‘You must hurry, comrade Chicherin, or else you may miss the opportunity; comrade Dzerzhinsky has just had a stroke. The doctors fear the next one will be fatal . . .’ . . . Koba then told Vassilevich: ‘You know, comrade Menzhinsky\* will be stricter and it will be more difficult to come to terms with him’ . . .

Obviously, the Instantsia has already decided to appoint Menzhinsky in Felix’s place. It’s a pity: Menzhinsky is a hard man, embittered by his incurable illness. In this post he will be totally lacking in mercy and will surround himself with men like Yagoda. In addition he is even lazier than Georgi Vassilevich. He spends nearly all his spare time at the piano, but instead of Chopin plays a piece by Paul Dukas in which he hears the agonising moans of a strangled man . . . the future chief of our security certainly has strange tastes . . . I do not envy his guests at the Lyubianka prison when he takes over from Felix . . .



... I am in for a Party duty: to report to our cell on the international situation. I cannot stand these assignments imposed by Party discipline. As if I had nothing more important to do in the Narkomindel . . . Besides, it involves answering a lot of stupid questions from know-nothings . . . One of our diplomatic

<sup>1</sup> ‘NEAR NEIGHBOURS’ or ‘NEIGHBOURS’. Expression referring to the O.G.P.U. – the Soviet political security and espionage organisation (see O.G.P.U., footnote, p. 48).

<sup>2</sup> BUND. The Russian-Jewish Social-Democratic organisation.

couriers asked me, 'How long shall we tolerate the provocations of that monster Chang Tso-lin?' After my answer, couched in general terms, the questioner indulged in a lengthy speech on the need to Sovietise Manchuria without further delay . . . the result of Radek's propaganda . . . Zoia Mossina<sup>1</sup> then began to pull my report to pieces. Her criticism implied that I had 'alienated myself from the masses', 'evaded Party assignments', 'showed no interest in ideological work', and briefly that I am 'slipping along the path of class degeneration'. I have yet to find out whether this criticism is due to Mossina's personal excess of zeal or whether it results from a 'Party directive' given by comrade Molotov, with whom I clashed last week on the question of the employment of Party members in our diplomatic Missions . . .

Having thoroughly 'rubbed me with fine sand', to use Molotov's favourite expression, Mossina declared that the cell's executive had decided to give me the task of teaching English at the evening classes arranged for the members of our staff. This task has hardly pleased me, but there is nothing I can do about it; I will just have to go in for teaching . . .

. . . Victor [Kopp] has written from Tokyo reporting on his conversation with Shidehara,<sup>2</sup> who told him confidentially that the British had informed the Japanese Government of their intention to sever diplomatic relations with us. The British also suggested that they and the Mikado's Government should 'establish a unified policy in China to counter Soviet intrigues, even to the extent of resorting to extreme measures . . .'

Having acquainted Victor with this threat, Shidehara stated: 'We have no intention whatsoever of supporting St James's in its anti-Soviet policy. But I should like to call attention to the desirability of establishing a community of views between our Government and the Soviet Government on all questions relating to Manchuria, the [Soviet] Maritime Province and the Kamchatka' . . .

<sup>1</sup> MOSSINA, Zoia, official in the Code Section of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and an active member of Communist Party cell in the Department.

<sup>2</sup> SHIDEHARA, Baron Kijure. A Japanese diplomat. He had served in Britain, Holland and the United States and was Foreign Minister from 1924 to 1927 and from 1929 to 1931.

Victor asked Shidehara to explain why he had included the Kamchatka in his programme for a common policy. We had never had an exchange of views with the Tokyo Cabinet on the Kamchatka. Shidehara replied with a smile, 'It is a request from our Embassy in Washington'.

Victor's attempts to obtain a more detailed explanation on this subject remained fruitless. Shidehara avoided committing himself by resorting to the old Japanese device of giving evasive replies . . .

Victor thinks Shidehara's move was prompted by information supplied by the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

In view of another appointment having been arranged with Shidehara for next week, Victor requests me to inform him urgently if we have had any talks in the United States on the Kamchatka.

As a matter of fact, Victor should have approached Karakhan,\* his immediate superior, but he insists that I deal with the matter personally. Karakhan is noted for his indolence and procrastination and, besides, he is not inclined to keep Victor informed of his secret contacts: differences of old standing . . .

. . . Requested a search of the Narkomindel's archives and of various secret files. Turned to Mossina, who is in charge of the auxiliary department . . . It's all useless. Neither Melnikov nor Sabanin was able to give me any information on the Kamchatka. Odd . . .

Decided to abandon the search, thinking that Shidehara had been throwing dust in Victor's eyes. I was wrong: a note couched in a threatening tone was suddenly received from 'His Majesty's Government'. The blockheads had apparently decided to sever relations with us. It follows that Shidehara spoke the truth . . .

The British are dissatisfied about our trade unions remitting money to the striking British miners. Chamberlain [Sir Austen] adopted a sharp tone. As a matter of fact, we find it difficult to argue the case; formally, our trade unions are private organisations, but our State bank authorises the transfer of foreign currency in spite of the fact that we have banned private remittances. Therefore, it is an obvious case of connivance . . .

. . . I talked to Trilisser. His intelligence network in Britain

reported that Scotland Yard passed on to the Foreign Office all the minutes of meetings held by the British Communist Party. These were seized during a search in October 1925. The Foreign Office was preparing a Blue Book about these documents . . . Still, our I.N.O. has a good intelligence network: it is not so easy to penetrate the secrets of Scotland Yard and the Foreign Office . . .

Kantorovich called on me to make a report. I asked him to rummage among Georgi Vassilevich's [Chicherin] personal secret files dealing with the Kamchatka affair. He promised to do so but warned that these files were in a state of chaos. Georgi Vassilevich himself was never able to find anything . . .

I had a surprise telephone call from Yagoda. He demanded the immediate closure of the Narkomindel's hairdressing saloon and gave us twenty-four hours in which to do it. He said he had proof that most important state secrets were being discussed there. He hinted that the staff of the saloon, especially women, were under suspicion and warned that unless we closed the shop within twenty-four hours they would all be arrested and transported to Siberia, or given 'minus six'.<sup>1</sup>

I summoned the assistant manager of the hairdressing saloon . . . The entire staff were indignant about the closure. The Party cell and the trade union committee held a conference for several hours. There were heated arguments. They stated that the closure would deal a blow to professional discipline and would spite the socialist emulation campaign among hairdressers employed by the People's Commissariat. I advised them to see Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] . . .

. . . Yagoda came on the phone again. He informed me that the decision to close the hairdressing saloon had been rescinded. I had a short talk with him. He was obviously embarrassed . . . one would think that the closure was an important affair of state . . .

. . . Mossina came to see me. It transpired that Koba had personally ordered Yagoda to leave our hairdressers alone. Mossina is a friend of Nadia Alliluyeva's<sup>2</sup> who occasionally

<sup>1</sup> 'MINUS SIX.' Banishment from the six chief cities of Russia.

<sup>2</sup> ALLILUYEVA, Nadia. Stalin's secretary, who subsequently became his second wife.

visited our hairdressing saloon. I was not aware of this important circumstance . . .

. . . Nevertheless, Yagoda scored a partial victory: a purge of the staff by a three-man commission was ordered . . .

. . . Saw Kantorovich, who gave me fantastic details about the Kamchatka business . . . The files of Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] contain a letter from Aleksei Prigarin<sup>1</sup> in which he refers to his talk with the President of the Chase National Bank regarding the 'commercial lease of Kamchatka to an American financial concern'.

It appeared that in 1925 comrade Isai Yakovlevich Khurgin,<sup>2</sup> who was carrying out Koba's personal commission, opened negotiations in New York concerning the lease of part of the Kamchatka Peninsula to some American financial interest. Koba intended killing two birds with one stone: to secure our recognition by Washington, and obtain a banking credit of 500 million U.S. dollars.

Our former *chargé d'affaires* [Bessedovsky<sup>3</sup>] in Warsaw was detailed to assist Khurgin in his negotiations. It was decided to take advantage of contacts with several influential representatives of 'big business' who had obtained concessions from us. The affair went to the length of the Chase National Bank opening a special account, No. 116, for our State Bank. Its operations were not to be included in the Bank's general accounting.

In the summer of 1925 Khurgin and Sklyansky<sup>4</sup> were drowned. Khurgin's assistant, Prigarin, who was not acquainted with this affair, accidentally found notes on the negotiations regarding the lease, and sent them to Chicherin.\* The latter,

<sup>1</sup> PRIGARIN, Aleksei. Interim chief of Amtorg: i.e. the American Trading Corporation, a Soviet controlled and financed company founded in the United States in 1923 as an American firm. It was intended to carry out trade between the United States and the Soviet Union before the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

<sup>2</sup> KHURGIN, Isai Yakovlevich. President of Amtorg.

<sup>3</sup> BESSEDOVSKY, Grigori. Soviet diplomat of Ukrainian origin who left the diplomatic service while he was *chargé d'affaires* in Paris (1929) and sought political asylum in France. He had served previously in Tokyo and Warsaw.

<sup>4</sup> SKLYANSKY, E. M. An army doctor who became prominent in the Bolshevik armed underground. After the Revolution he was Trotsky's deputy at the Commissariat of War.

too, was not acquainted with the affair and asked Koba about it. Koba became apprehensive lest the opposition should learn of the business and use it for framing a charge of liquidating the gains of the October Revolution. He declared it had been done on Khurgin's personal initiative. The negotiations were broken off. Our former *chargé d'affaires* in Warsaw, who proceeded to Riga to obtain an American visa from Martens<sup>1</sup>, declined to go through with the formalities and was refused the visa. Everything was quickly hushed up and Koba was saved from the opposition . . .

. . . Obviously, the Gaimusho<sup>2</sup> had received belated news of these negotiations. The Japanese were seriously disquieted. The emergence of Americans on their northern flank would have presented a serious threat. One must admit that Koba's idea was sound. But, as usual, he wanted to put it through himself. Had it succeeded he would have gathered the glory. Had it failed, he would have found a scapegoat. The usual tactics of our Secretary-General . . .

. . . (omission) . . . This business of the lease of the Kamchatka to some American financiers aroused my interest. I wanted to know who was the real initiator, or rather who inspired the plan . . . (omission) . . .

A search of the Narkomindel archives revealed nothing new, but a chance find helped me to discover more about it. The whole thing, it appears, dated back to the time of the Genoa Conference in the spring of 1922. Before it was due to open, Illich insisted at a meeting of the Instantsia that he should go personally to Genoa to negotiate with the 'sharks of world imperialism', as we used to call at that time the representatives of non-Soviet powers. Illich's suggestion was rejected, all the members of the Instantsia with the sole exception of Koba having voted against it. They argued that the proposed trip involved great risks since an attempt on Illich's life was to be expected. Intelligence sources had reported that Savinkov<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MARTENS, at that time Counsellor at the United States Legation in Riga.

<sup>2</sup> GAIMUSHO. The Japanese Foreign Ministry.

<sup>3</sup> SAVINKOV, Boris, a well-known member of the Social-Revolutionary party who stood for violent political action. In 1922 he became the chief of an anti-Soviet terrorist organisation with Headquarters in Paris and Warsaw.

himself was planning to go to Genoa to kill Ilich . . . Some of our comrades outside the Instantsia were nevertheless in favour of the trip. But then Ilich suffered his first stroke<sup>1</sup> and doctors forbade all travelling . . . (omission) . . .

Ilich, who treated everything seriously, attached much importance to the proposed Genoa talks. First he wanted to meet Lloyd George, for whom he had a certain weakness . . . He wanted also to present his thesis on the possibility of Soviet Russia's peaceful co-existence with non-Soviet countries and intended to work out the political and economic basis for such a co-existence . . . Bonch-Bruevich<sup>2</sup> has kept some of Ilich's rough notes on this subject, including the record of his meeting with William Bullitt.<sup>3</sup> The latter had expounded to Ilich his plan of a compromise between us and the victorious powers of the Entente . . .

. . . Bullitt thought Paris and London would consider an agreement with us only if we paid off the old Russian debt as well as gave compensation for the nationalised property of foreign citizens . . . Ilich replied that this would be possible only if we received a new loan, for we were not in a position to pay, even if we wanted to . . . Bonch-Bruevich, who was present during the conversation, reported that Bullitt had put forward a compromise proposal; he wanted us to grant the Americans a really large concession for mining of gold and other ores in the Soviet Maritime Province and on the Kamchatka peninsula, with the privilege of extra-territoriality and without interference by our administrative authorities. He thought that if we did this American banks would be prepared to grant us a very substantial loan . . . (omission).

Ilich treated this proposal seriously and promised to study it.

<sup>1</sup> Lenin's first stroke did not occur till after the Genoa Conference in the latter half of May 1922, but he had been in bad health for some time.

<sup>2</sup> BONCH-BRUEVICH, Vladimir. Old Social-Revolutionary who became Lenin's Secretary. Communist ethnographer and historian. Wrote extensively in *Pravda* since 1912. Attached to the Council of People's Commissars as Secretary in 1920.

<sup>3</sup> The conversation with Bullitt was in 1919 and there are many accounts of it. William C. Bullitt, an American diplomat, went to Moscow on a confidential mission regarding possible peace terms. He later became Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (1933-6).

His work on N.E.P.<sup>1</sup> prevented his devoting time to the task. Incidentally, Larin's<sup>2</sup> Group has come out with another disclosure to the effect that Ilich had planned to mortgage our railways to obtain a loan from England. The allegation caused serious friction, and if Ilich had not fallen ill he would probably have gagged Larin and his group. But then illness struck him . . . The other members of the Instantsia were reluctant to risk their popularity by supporting the agreement. Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] insisted that we could not afford to grant the Kamchatka concession because then the Japanese would stay for good in our Maritime Province. He promised to abolish the trade monopoly. In reply Ilich announced sharply that 'Chicherin should be locked up in a lunatic asylum . . .'<sup>3</sup>

When Koba took over the post of Secretary-General he found the correspondence between Ilich and Larin in the archives of the Instantsia and asked Larin for an explanation. Thus the whole affair . . . (omission) . . . Some time before he left for America, Khurgin had a long talk with Koba and saw Larin, who told him the whole story of the talks with Bullitt on economic questions as well as Bullitt's suggestion that the U.S. should be made our economic 'manager' and banker . . . Khurgin, who was an enthusiastic man with plenty of drive, had probably fallen under the influence of Bullitt's ideas, the more so as he regarded Bullitt as one of the most capable men in the U.S.A. and forecast for him a brilliant future in diplomacy . . . I was unable to ascertain whether Bullitt had taken a direct part in the negotiations between Khurgin and Harriman, although his participation was highly probable . . . It is rather surprising that Georgi Vassilevich and others who took part in the first stage of the discussions did not deem it necessary

<sup>1</sup> N.E.P., the New Economic Policy adopted in the Soviet Union in 1921. Its effect was to bring back a certain measure of private trade and foreign investment as a temporary expedient to speed up recovery. It came to an end in 1928 with the introduction of the first five-year plan.

<sup>2</sup> LARIN, Y. (Lourie), a former Social-Democrat who became a member of the Council of National Economy after the Revolution. Well known for his study of German economy during World War I. Took part in the Soviet-German negotiations of 1918.

<sup>3</sup> CHICHERIN, G. V. This remark about him being put in an asylum appears in Trotsky's, *My Life*, p. 402.

to inform me or other comrades from the Narkomindel as to what was going on . . .

The explanation is, I think, that nobody wanted to accept responsibility for the initiation of negotiations with bourgeois circles in the West. The only exception was Ilich, who had unparalleled political courage and, far from forbidding people to argue with him and criticise him, encouraged both. Generally speaking, leaving aside its merits or drawbacks, this attempt should be recognised as one of the most important moves made by our government to solve the problem of a possible co-existence with the capitalist countries. The part played by Bullitt in that undertaking was considerable indeed, and his idea seemed attractive at the time . . . He could hope to tempt Ilich . . . (omission) . . . From the political point of view the help of American banks could have been acceptable at the time to our Party and public opinion, while any compromise on the payment of the old Russian debt was not. That explains why Bullitt's move was so successful; it could have achieved the full participation of the Americans in our economic life and also made normal our relations with the countries of the Entente . . . Pity . . . (omission) . . . I think Koba was sharing Lenin's points of view but was prevented from realising the plan because of the precariousness of his own position and the need to be on his guard against the intrigues of Zinoviev\* . . . As far as the practical implementation of the plan by Khurgin was concerned, it seems that the man was very energetic. The negotiations were shrouded in secrecy. The mere fact that the Japanese got wind of them so late shows how good were the security precautions, as Japanese intelligence in the U.S.A. has always been very efficient. However, they were unable even to find out that negotiations were under way; although some ten people, including bankers and industrialists were involved in them . . . (omission) . . .

. . . The Equitable Trust were also to take part in the talks. They wanted to set up a group comprising the Chase National, the National City Bank and the Equitable Trust to invest capital in Soviet Russia and exploit the Kamchatka. There were also some projects to create a navigation monopoly in our Arctic seas to be operated by a joint steamship navigation

company . . . The question was comparatively simple and easy at that time. Moreover Ilich was always afraid that the Japanese might seize our far eastern territories and thought that the presence of the Americans there would constitute an additional guarantee against that danger . . . At the time of Krasnoshchekov<sup>1</sup> there were some more talks on the subject . . . (omission) . . . All this ended in complete failure.

. . . I think we may make capital out of the failure of this venture. The Japanese do not know that we have dropped it. We could tell them that we are ready to establish a common line of conduct concerning their strategic interests in the Kamchatka and ask them, in return, for compensation . . .

. . . Schechtmann has called again. I told him I was unable to help him. He insisted that as a Jew I had no right to refuse assistance, even at the risk of unpleasant consequences to myself. A lengthy and tedious conversation . . .

. . . I gave in and decided to ring up Koba. He was furious and said, 'I don't think we are shooting enough of that Zionist rabble. We must draw up a decree for the banishing to Siberia of all Zionists as class enemies.' Koba also said that he had ordered Artuzov to prepare a full list of all Jews in the U.S.S.R. who were paying shekel<sup>2</sup> and that all these persons would be immediately sent to Siberia or given 'minus six'. I tried to explain to him that such measures would bring all the American Jews up in arms against the U.S.S.R. He replied that these Jews would always be against us because we were communists and atheists. He added, 'We shall explain that these sons of bitches were banished because they were fiddling foreign currency.'

<sup>1</sup> KRASNOSHCHEKOV, A. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the short-lived 'Independent Democratic Far Eastern Republic' established in the Trans-Baikal in April 1920. A Communist of Russian Jewish birth, he spent many years in Chicago in his youth, but returned to Siberia after the Revolution and became leader of the Bolsheviks in Irkutsk, where an all-party local 'political centre' wanted to establish a 'buffer state'. He helped to negotiate the agreement of January 1920, under which the Soviet Government recognised a 'buffer state', and was then appointed Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government to the 'political centre'. He was finally imprisoned for embezzlement in September 1923. See reference, E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. i, pp. 355–61, Macmillan, 1953.

<sup>2</sup> SHEKEL. Contribution to Zionist funds.

There is no need to state that we are applying repressive measures because they are Zionists. It is your job to explain this to the American Jews, if you wish to avoid a quarrel at any cost.'

. . . I was told that Menzhinsky\* was a rabid anti-semitic. He often attends gatherings at Klim's when he tells most inane anecdotes against the Jews concocted by that drunken brute Demian Bednei.<sup>1</sup> Menzhinsky\* is urging Koba to clear Moscow of Jews under the pretext of foreign currency offences. Koba too does not like Jews, but in my opinion he understands the absurdity of anti-Jewish measures. Lazar Moiseyevich [Kaganovich\*] once told me that Koba had explained to him at length the difficulty of making a Jew, even a Jewish workman, into a true communist and atheist because the Jews, he said, were typical petty bourgeois with the instinct of ownership developed over the centuries. Besides, they were permeated with the spirit of pantheism, although they abhorred the external symbolism of religion . . .

Lazar Moiseyevich was somewhat abashed; his Party file showed him of proletarian descent. In fact, his father owned a shoemaker's shop in the town of Gomel where he employed a few apprentices. A pity Koba didn't discuss the subject with me. I would have told him what I thought about it. It is strange that people with the hereditary instincts of petty bourgeois should have given Marx to the world . . .

Of course, Koba's anti-semitism is the sequel to the support given by the majority of Jews in our party to Trotsky and the opposition. But I have in fact noted that Koba felt some inherent hostility towards us. Grigori Evseyevich [Zinoviev\*] once remarked jocularly that he had a Marxist explanation for this phenomenon. There were two shoemakers' shops in Gori,<sup>2</sup> one owned by Koba's father and the other by a Jew from the town of Mtzkheta who had settled at Gori. Competition between the two shoemakers turned Koba into an anti-semitic . . . Of course this explanation is an over-simplification, but it contains a grain of truth . . .

<sup>1</sup> BEDNEI, Demian, *nom de plume* of Efim Alexeyevich Pridvorov, Soviet poet, pamphleteer and journalist, of peasant origin. His works, expressing the 'urge of the peasantry to join forces with the proletariat' were the object of a critical study by Karl Radek in 1921.

<sup>2</sup> GORI, Stalin's birthplace in Georgia.

Something odd is happening to my files. Somebody is obviously rummaging among them. I frequently find my papers in complete disorder. Is it possible that Yagoda has found a spy among the members of my secretariat? . . .

. . . I do not like comrade Maslova.<sup>1</sup> She frequently stays behind in my office after I have left . . .

. . . My suspicions regarding Maslova proved unfounded. I offered her a week's leave for health reasons. The disorder among my files continued during her absence . . . Who could it be? . . .

. . . All is now clear . . . That wretched Florinsky. He presents a pitiful sight; he can't look me in the face. I forbade him access to my office . . .

I had a talk with Koba regarding Yagoda.\* Koba was in excellent mood. He upbraided me for not being able to decide where I stood in the struggle between the opposition and the general line. 'Papasha,'<sup>2</sup> he said jokingly, 'you are heading for trouble'. I told him how necessary reconciliation was because our squabble with the opposition was damaging the country's international standing. He said this theory of reconciliation would not work in practice. 'It is a question of force between Trotsky and myself. It is either he or I. As to Zinoviev\* and Kamenev,\* I despise them for lack of principle in their tactics. I know that they have directed their supporters to dissimulate in order to remain in the Party, and to go for me in the event of international complications. These are the tactics of treachery; we shall have to strike first, before they can carry into effect their plan of treason . . .'

Speaking of Yagoda,\* Koba said: 'I know he is a scoundrel. But we dare not risk smashing the fragile apparatus of the G.P.U.<sup>3</sup> by removing Yagoda and his associates. This would be

<sup>1</sup> MASLOVA. Litvinov's Secretary at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> 'PAPASHA.' Lit. Daddy, Russian endearing colloquialism used in addressing old men. Also one of Litvinov's pseudonyms in the underground, originally given to him by Lenin in 1904.

<sup>3</sup> G.P.U. or O.G.P.U., initials of the State Political Directorate (Control), the Soviet political police and security force, dealing also with espionage abroad. Known until 1922 as the Cheka (Extraordinary Commission). Its functions were taken over in the 'thirties by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (N.K.V.D.), later renamed the Ministry for Internal Affairs (M.V.D.).

exploited by class enemies at home and abroad. We shall settle our accounts with Yagoda at the right moment.' He added, 'If you want to understand revolutionary tactics, read Schiller's *Fiesco's Conspiracy*. Revolutions always require Moors, but they go when they have served their purpose – they are sent to the gallows. Only you must not miss the right moment, or else they will send you to the gallows. I know precisely who is a friend and who is a foe. You, Papasha, grumble frequently, but I know that you will never be guilty of a stab in the back. I respect you and shall stand up for you. But we shall wage a life and death struggle with double-crossers. We carry a historic responsibility for the destiny of the country and of the revolution . . .'

... I gave much thought to my conversation with Koba. We are estranged now. Time was when we were intimately connected, but that was long ago. I confess that tears came to my eyes when he called me Papasha, my old nickname in the underground. I recalled the past, and felt as if I had shed twenty years of my age. Shipments of arms to Russia . . . My arrest in Paris, when notes of the Tiflis bank<sup>1</sup> were found on me. Intervention by Vandervelde<sup>2</sup> and Jaurès.<sup>3</sup> I always cherished the dream of bringing the Bolsheviks into the international socialist movement, not as foes, but as left-wing friends. Alas, Illich's fanaticism spoilt it all . . . In 1918 we were within a hairbreadth of achieving the victory of socialism on an international scale when Illich started his crazy scrap with Adler,<sup>4</sup> Kautsky,<sup>5</sup> Renner,<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> TIFLIS bank: see Introduction. Vandervelde and Jaurès were presumably interested to save Litvinov from extradition. Briand was then Minister of Justice.

<sup>2</sup> VANDERVELDE, Emile. Belgian Socialist, author of *Le Socialisme et l'Agriculture*, Brussels, 1906, and *Le Socialisme en Belgique*, Paris, 1903. Foreign Minister 1925–7.

<sup>3</sup> JAURÈS, Jean. Leader of the French Socialist party. Author of *Socialisme et Paysans*, Paris, 1894. *Discours Parlementaires*, Paris, 1894. In 1904 he founded *L'Humanité*.

<sup>4</sup> ADLER, Victor. Founder and President of the Austrian Socialist party. Died 1918.

<sup>5</sup> KAUTSKY, Karl. German Socialist. Personal friend of Marx. Author of *Die Agrarfrage*, Stuttgart, 1899, and *Die Sozialisierung der Landwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1919.

<sup>6</sup> RENNER, Karl. Austrian Chancellor and Socialist theoretician. Author of *Krieg, Marxismus und Internationale*, Vienna, 1917.

Renaudel<sup>1</sup> and the Scandinavians: a world carnage has become inevitable . . .



Victor [Kopp] has written me several outspoken letters and sent them by the hand of a trusted person. In them he reviled the Instantsia for all he was worth because of its China policy. I must write to him to be more careful. In the past he was among the intimate friends of Grigori Evseyevich [Zinoviev\*]. I believe Koba hates him, and Koba's hatred is dangerous . . .



There has been a most unpleasant incident with the Italian Ambassador. He paid me a call and became trapped in the lift for two hours between the third and fourth floors. The lift had broken down and the engineer was out on a drunken spree. The Italian swore like a cabby, using the foulest language. I wonder who gave him Russian language lessons. Could it have been Yagoda's\* most charming secret agent, a former princess? . . . It looks as if Yagoda had given her private lessons. I went downstairs to soothe the Italian, and offered my apologies while the lift was being repaired. Pity this scene could not have been filmed, with him raving in the lift cage while I was apologising . . .

. . . Feodor Mikhailovich<sup>2</sup> brought me a present from Meyerhold<sup>3</sup> and an invitation to attend his jubilee play . . .

. . . Saw *The Forest* produced by Meyerhold. He is a stage-manager and producer of genius. There was unending applause, particularly from the younger members of the audience. What made him take up with this odd Zinaida Raich . . .

. . . It is said of her that she is one of Yagoda's\* people, but that she is now a frequent guest at Menzhinsky's\* intimate

<sup>1</sup> RENAUDEL, P., leader of the right-wing in the French Socialist Party. He supported the Second International and was in favour of intervention in Russia. Took part in the Strasbourg Congress in February 1920.

<sup>2</sup> Feodor Mikhailovich. There is no indication as to his surname.

<sup>3</sup> MEYERHOLD, Vsevolod Emilievich. Famous Soviet actor-producer and stage director. Manager of the Revolution Theatre, Moscow. Wrote *The Theatre* (1913).

parties where he plays his 'Music of the Strangled'. Yagoda, it appears, has threatened to settle accounts with her . . .



Dmitri Zakharovich [Manuilsky\*] has dropped in to see me. He is a crafty Ukrainian. He told me a lot of stories about Koba and Klim. He wound up by announcing that he wished to work abroad, and asked for an appointment in Paris. He had studied political science in France and speaks good French. It happens that Christian Georgievich [Rakovsky\*] wants to return home from Paris . . .



. . . Bad news. The Instantsia has decided to recall Victor [Kopp] and bring him before a Party Tribunal. I don't know what it's all about . . . A young Party worker from the Ukraine,<sup>1</sup> a member of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee, has been appointed to Tokyo. What a strange idea, to send a Ukrainian Envoy to Japan. I have my own candidate — Maisky<sup>2</sup> — but he was turned down because of some obscure incident involving his wife. I don't know what it's all about — it's a secret. Soltz\* remains as tight as a clam . . .



. . . Victor [Kopp] has been committed for trial before the Party Tribunal because of a quarrel with our Military Attaché in Tokyo. A sordid story. The wives made the husbands quarrel . . .

. . . What a terrible thing for Victor. It appears that the wife of the Military Attaché was acting on behalf of the 'far neighbours'<sup>3</sup> who were displeased with Victor. Where will such morals in our foreign service lead us to? . . .



<sup>1</sup> BESSEDOVSKY, see page 41, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> MAISKY, Ivan Mikhailovich, Soviet diplomat and historian. Journalist and revolutionary until 1917; Chief of Foreign Commissariat, Press Department, 1922; Counsellor to Embassy in London, 1925; Counsellor to Embassy, Tokyo, 1927; Minister to Finland, 1929; Ambassador to Great Britain, 1932–43; Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1943–6.

<sup>3</sup> 'FAR NEIGHBOURS.' Colloquialism referring to the Soviet Intelligence Service abroad, under the Commissariat for Defence. Intended mainly for military espionage, but gathering also political intelligence. It is officially known as RAZVEDUPR.

. . . A sensation in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: Georgi Vassilevich's [Chicherin] white poodle has vanished. The entire Narkomat<sup>1</sup> has been turned upside down in the search for the dog. Work has been suspended . . . For once Yagoda had nothing to do with it . . .



. . . The bureau of Party cells abroad informed me confidentially that Victor will appear before a board of the C.C.C.<sup>2</sup> as soon as he arrives in Moscow. I telephoned Gordon and told him that haste is good only when catching flies.<sup>3</sup>

Meyerhold called. He is going to Paris where he will meet Pitoeff<sup>4</sup> and Firmin Gemier.<sup>5</sup> He asked for instructions regarding the attitude he should adopt. I told him he should see 'Voks'<sup>6</sup> about it because I knew nothing about this idea of a modern international theatre, concerning which Gemier had written to him. Yagoda refused a visa to Zinaida Raich. She is not permitted to leave the U.S.S.R. I promised to call up Menzhinsky.\* It is common knowledge that Raich is Meyerhold's wife; their marriage was recorded at the register office. The situation is awkward . . .

. . . Chicherin's poodle was found at the flat of Zoia Mossina, Secretary of the Communist cell in our Commissariat. It's now a row between the Party and the Government. Pity Gogol is not alive.

Zoshchenko<sup>7</sup> would not do — a small town petty bourgeois story teller. Mossina said that the poodle had 'come' to her flat 'of its own free will and without compulsion' . . . Not a bad story. At the next meeting of the cell I shall put the question of

<sup>1</sup> NARKOMAT. People's Commissariat, i.e. Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> C.C.C., see p. 22.

<sup>3</sup> Russian proverb.

<sup>4</sup> PITOEFF, Georges. French actor of Georgian descent.

<sup>5</sup> GEMIER, Firmin. 1865–1933. Famous French stage director of the Odeon Theatre in Paris.

<sup>6</sup> 'VOKS.' The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with foreign countries, used as a propaganda organisation.

<sup>7</sup> ZOSHCHENKO, Mikhail Mikhailovich. Leading Soviet satirical writer and humorist, whose works are now banned. Expelled from membership of Union of Soviet Writers, 1946.

'freedom of will among animals, and dogs in particular'. We shall ask Nikolai Ivanovich [Bukharin]\* to attend the discussion, although his *ABC of Communism* is in disgrace because of some 'deviations'. But we shall nevertheless turn to him because he is still listed officially as our theoretical ideologist . . . What numskulls we have all over the place. Backwardness, stupidity and pettiness all round . . . And it is called 'The First Socialist Republic of the World' . . .



. . . Attended the cell meetings at which the case of Brodsky, member of the section for the Baltic States and Poland, was examined. Mossina charged him with 'gradually acquiring petty bourgeois habits, becoming a class degenerate and lacking principles in his sexual life'. She produced some yellow file containing 'statements' by Brodsky's neighbours at his hotel; he has bought a piano in the Khitrovo Market,<sup>1</sup> was smoking cigars, and spending each night with a different girl from among the typists in our Narkomat. The discussion lasted for three hours and wound up with a 'reprimand and caution' to Brodsky and a reprimand to every typist (there were five of the . . .)

. . . 1927 . . .

. . . Had a rest in the Caucasus in the summer and then went to Marienbad. Saw Benes in Prague and had a long conversation with him . . . He tried to find out if there were any secret clauses in our treaty with Slezhevicius.<sup>2</sup>

I gave an evasive reply. Benes smiled and said: 'You may rest assured that I am not complying with a request from Warsaw to ascertain whether you had an alliance with Lithuania directed against Poland. I have told Paris that the decision<sup>3</sup> of the Council of Ambassadors of 20th October, 1926, was a great political mistake. But after the advent to power of Voldemaras<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> KHITROVO MARKET. A sort of thieves' market in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> SLEZHEVICIUS, Lithuanian Minister. Reference to Soviet-Lithuanian Treaty of 12th July, 1926.

<sup>3</sup> Which again recognised Vilna as forming part of Poland, thus confirming the Agreement of 15th March, 1923.

<sup>4</sup> VOLDEMARAS, Lithuanian politician who became President with dictatorial powers, after overthrowing Slezhevicius.

and Smetona<sup>1</sup> you should annul the secret Protocol – if it exists . . .

Then Benes turned to our relations with London. He said he had an interview with Sir Austen [Chamberlain], who told him that Britain had no intention whatever of organising an anti-Soviet campaign. The British police raid on Arcos<sup>2</sup> followed the receipt of information that financial aid to our political friends was coming through the London office of this organisation. The White Book published on 26th May and the Note of 27th May severing relations also resulted from the affair. Sir Austen resisted the dunderheads, but was eventually forced to yield and break off relations with us. He was, however, waiting for a favourable moment to resume them, if we would guarantee not to interfere in British domestic affairs.

Received interesting news from Trilisser. The I.N.O. men in Geneva have bought for 50,000 Swiss francs the minutes of the conference<sup>3</sup> on the Russian question between Chamberlain, Stresemann, Briand, Vandervelde and Ishii.

Benes was telling the truth: Chamberlain opposed the idea of breaking off relations with us, and said he had no intention of organising 'A crusade against Bolshevism'. He asked Stresemann<sup>4</sup> to approach us with an offer to seek ways of co-operating between our economic system and that of the capitalist countries. Briefly, this sly English fox wants to trade profitably . . . The conference was said to have taken place in Geneva, on 15th June . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

. . . The I.N.O. information was fully corroborated by our diplomatic mission in Berlin . . .

<sup>1</sup> SMETONA, Lithuanian Prime Minister, regarded at the time as left-wing and pro-Soviet.

<sup>2</sup> ARCos. All-Russian Co-operative Society – a Soviet foreign trade organisation.

<sup>3</sup> There is a full record of this conference in the *Stresemann Papers* (edited and translated by Eric Sutton, Macmillan, London, 1935), vol. iii, pp. 161–3.

<sup>4</sup> STRESEMANN, Gustav. German statesman; Chancellor in 1923; Foreign Minister, 1923–9. Negotiated mutual Security Pact with France, the Locarno Pact, and secured Germany's admission to the League of Nations; sponsored Germany's adoption of Dawes Plan (1927) and Young Plan (1929).

. . . Our Mission in Warsaw reports it has been established that a Polish General Staff Officer was implicated in the assassination of comrade Voikov.<sup>1</sup> I requested them to recheck the report. It is inadvisable to risk complications on the strength of information not verified beyond doubt. Koverda<sup>1</sup> has allegedly received money from this officer for the assassination of Piotr Lazarevich [Voikov]. The affair is said to have been organised by Deterding.<sup>2</sup> I cannot believe that Sir Henri would have taken upon himself the financing of assassins . . .



. . . Naturally the news from Warsaw has been denied. Andrei Andreyevich [Andreev]\* wrote to me that . . . (blank) . . . the Instantsia has decided to instruct members of our Mission in Warsaw to shoot without warning at White Guards<sup>3</sup> entering our consulate in Poznanski Street under the pretext of making inquiries about repatriation. The decision was taken on Molotov's initiative in response to a personal inquiry from Arkadin.<sup>4</sup> I do not like our diplomats going straight to the Instantsia over the heads of the Foreign Affairs Board.

Benes suddenly asked me to meet him at Karlsbad. Our meeting is to be secret . . .

. . . Saw Benes. He is very worried. He said that France was preparing a press campaign against us, to be followed by the severing of relations. This is something more dangerous than the break with London because Rumania and Poland, France's vassals and our neighbours, may become involved. Benes said he had just seen one of his best informers, a Russian émigré journalist, who told him terrorist groups of White Guards in

<sup>1</sup> KOVERDA, Boris. White Russian who assassinated the Soviet Ambassador in Warsaw, P. L. VOIKOV. Now in the United States.

<sup>2</sup> DETERDING, Sir Henri. Anglo-Dutch oil magnate. Became director general of the Royal Dutch Oil Co. in 1902. His claims to oil interests in Russia which his company bought from the Rothschilds in 1903 were denied by the Soviet Government in 1920. Later he became an active political opponent of the Soviet Union and a supporter of the Nazi movement in Germany. Died in 1939.

<sup>3</sup> WHITE GUARDS – Russian anti-Soviet forces who, after the revolution, formed an émigré organisation.

<sup>4</sup> ARKADIN, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw in 1926.

Paris were planning frontier attacks if relations between France and the U.S.S.R. were broken off. Benes' informer is on the staff of a Russian republican democratic newspaper in Paris. Benes insisted on our taking preventive measures – otherwise the danger of military complications would become inevitable. He spoke with a break in his voice, declaring that although Czechoslovakia was an ally of France, she considered her duty as a Slav nation towards Russia to be more important than formal alliances, and would therefore never take part in any attacks on the U.S.S.R. He recalled his dramatic conversation with Mostovenko<sup>1</sup> in the summer of 1920, when our troops were closing in on Warsaw. He had then said that as soon as the Red Army reached the Carpathians, Czechoslovakia would cede Ruthenia with the town of Uzhgorod to us . . . I pressed his hand and thanked him warmly. He promised to take advantage of all his connections with left-wing Russian émigré circles to obtain information that might prove of interest to us. I suggested that he should communicate through . . . (omission) . . .

Bad news from Paris. The *Echo de Paris* has launched a campaign to break off relations with the U.S.S.R. The *Matin* came in, too. Coty<sup>2</sup> has begun sniping. He is backed by Weygand<sup>3</sup> and the General Staff. Some Polish and Rumanian military missions are in Paris.

Received information from Benes. Brilliant intelligence. We are now as good as I.N.O.

Benes passed on to me the record of an interview between the Czechoslovak envoy and Poincaré,<sup>4</sup> the Prime Minister of France. The Quai d'Orsay is evidently looking for an excuse to break off relations . . .

It has found it. Christian Georgievich [Rakovsky]\* signed an

<sup>1</sup> MOSTOVENKO. Soviet Ambassador in Prague in 1920.

<sup>2</sup> COTY, François (1874–1934) (real name, Francesco Giuseppe Spoturno), French right-wing industrialist and newspaper owner who financed anti-Soviet and anti-Communist groups, including the French Royalist publication *Action Française*. Owned *Le Figaro* and edited *Ami du Peuple*.

<sup>3</sup> WEYGAND, Maxime. Chief of Staff of the French Army until his deportation to Germany in 1942.

<sup>4</sup> POINCARÉ, Raymond. President of the French Republic from 1913 to 1920; Prime Minister in 1912, 1922–4, 1926–9.

appeal from our opposition calling on the Communist parties of foreign countries to rise against their governments in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. . . . Apparently Georgievich wanted to make sure that he would be expelled from France. I must admit that his action was harmful. As an Ambassador he had no right to give cause for his recall and, possibly, for a severance of relations.

Poincaré demanded Rakovsky's recall from Paris. The Instantsia decided to comply with the request and to send urgently to Paris, as *chargé d'affaires*, the first Counsellor from our Embassy in Tokyo.

The 'neighbours' have intervened in our affairs in Paris. They have a secret agent in France with extensive connections in financial and political circles. They want the Instantsia to allocate him 10,000,000 francs to organise a counter-campaign in the Press. Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] was categorically opposed to the suggestion and the Instantsia also turned it down. Arens<sup>1</sup> a personal friend of de Monzie<sup>2</sup> is to be sent as second Counsellor to Paris. Arens' cousin is in a special relationship with de Monzie . . .

Received Rubinin's<sup>3</sup> project for the settlement of our relations with France. He prepared it in collaboration with financial experts and Chlenov.<sup>4</sup> His suggestion is that we should offer to pay France Russia's old debt in sixty-two annual payments of 60,000,000 gold francs . . .

The Press campaign in Paris continues. Christian Georgievich [Rakovsky] is preparing to leave. Our *chargé d'affaires* has been urgently summoned from Tokyo. Divilkovsky<sup>5</sup> called on me. He is embarrassed . . . (omission) . . . Received a letter from Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin]. It seems to me that he does not realise the danger. He is opposed to paying the French . . . Vassilevich

<sup>1</sup> ARENS, Jean-Joseph. Soviet diplomat; Counsellor at Paris Embassy in 1928.

<sup>2</sup> DE MONZIE, Anatole. French politician, represented France on the Reparations Commission. Minister of Finance in 1925.

<sup>3</sup> RUBININ, Soviet economist.

<sup>4</sup> CHLENOV, Soviet international lawyer. Trade Representative in Paris.

<sup>5</sup> DIVILKOVSKY, Ivan. Soviet diplomat. *Charge d'affaires* in Tokyo. First Secretary in Paris, January 1928.

will spoil the attempt to settle our debt. He yielded to Mikoyan's\* influence and is attaching strings to the offer. He claims that the French should give us a five-year trading credit of 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 (paper) francs. This means scuttling the whole plan. Chlenov reported that Poincaré was not inclined to accept, and would be glad to find an excuse to refuse. The credit condition would give him the chance. Poincaré is under the influence of a group of businessmen who used to operate oil wells in Russia, particularly . . . (omission) . . . We cannot insist, because the French have never yet given long-term trading credits. Georgi Vassilevich won't allow that French banks have their own methods of doing business.

The 'neighbours' are nevertheless attempting to intervene in this affair. Katzenellenbaum<sup>1</sup> has sent a report concerning his agent, who is attached to our bank in the Avenue de l'Opera. He suggests the entire matter should be entrusted to our bank and to this agent. I do not trust the man; and we certainly cannot leave such an important political operation in the hands of irresponsible persons. Strange, Koba seems to support . . . (omission) . . .

Christian Georgievich [Rakovsky] is pressing for the early arrival of our new *chargé d'affaires*. He said he had been to see de Monzie on his estate near Cahors. de Monzie insisted on our making an early offer to settle the debt and suggested that we should pay the first instalment without waiting for Poincaré's reply. He assured Rakovsky that the Chamber of Deputies would force Poincaré to accept our terms if we made the first annual payment and published our offer. Senator Dalbiez, de Monzie's deputy in the commission dealing with the debt, also shared this view. Both were enthusiastic and spoke of the historical moment which would occur in Franco-Soviet relations if we paid the Tsarist debt. The Bourse has livened up. A Russian banker is buying . . . (omission) . . .

It is reported that he is Katzenellebaum's agent and that the entire transaction was devised by the 'neighbours' in order to build up their currency reserves. The devil take it . . . It had never occurred to me that their organisation was interested in

<sup>1</sup> KATZENELLENBAUM. Secret agent of the G.P.U.

financial operations. It is Rudolf Mechislavovich's [Menzhin-sky\*] idea. He claims that the British Intelligence Service also engages in such operations, and that this is quite in order . . .

Christian Georgievich left Paris without waiting for the arrival of the new *chargé d'affaires*. He handed over to Divilkovsky.

The Radical-Socialists will not permit Poincaré to break off relations with us. They threaten to resign. A historic meeting of the Cabinet with Doumergue<sup>1</sup> took place at Rambouillet.<sup>2</sup> Some young Minister, a Radical-Socialist, was particularly resourceful. Divilkovsky said he was in charge of Agriculture and was a coming man . . .

Relations will not be broken off. I hear from Moscow that Koba no longer intends to pay the first instalment. Neither does Poincaré intend to accept our offer. This curious alliance of Koba and Poincaré will spoil the whole affair. Pity!

I returned to Moscow. Met Christian Georgievich, who told me a number of interesting things about the French situation. The left-wing of the Chamber would have never allowed Poincaré to break off relations with us. As regards Briand, that fox was wagging his tail in every direction under the influence of Berthelot,<sup>3</sup> who is in turn under the influence of the bankers. He promised much – provided the debt was paid . . .

The new *chargé d'affaires* received instructions directly from Koba. It is disgusting . . .

Received a letter from Chlenov. He reports that the French banks are unable to give us a five-year trade credit – one year at the most . . .

Mikoyan\* and Sokolnikov\* are torpedoing the agreement. Koba is with them. They are insisting on a five-year agreement . . .

Chlenov had an interview with de Monzie who was indignant about our continued insistence on a five-year trading credit. He

<sup>1</sup> DOUMERGUE, Gaston. President of the French Republic from 1924 to 1931.

<sup>2</sup> RAMBOUILLET. Summer residence of the French Presidents.

<sup>3</sup> BERTHELOT, Philippe (1866–1934), twice General Secretary (Permanent Under-Secretary) of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Close collaborator of Aristide Briand.

said we were making agreement impossible and stressed that we should pay the first annual instalment without further delay . . .

Our bank in Paris is speculating on the Bourse in Russian securities. A down-trend . . .

(Omission.)

The whole affair is off. Koba declared that the Instantsia has refused to approve the first instalment unless there is general agreement for a settlement. Berthelot informed our *chargé d'affaires* that Poincaré had categorically rejected the request for a five-year credit.

Our *chargé d'affaires* saw . . . (omission) . . . The 'neighbours' made a large profit on the operation . . .

A disgraceful affair with one of our ballet stars . . . (omission) . . . I wonder when these disgusting escapades of Rudzutak's\* and of his secretaries will cease . . . There is talk of orgies at the Villa October and . . . (omission) . . .

I saw Soltz.\* He threw up his arms in despair. The Instantsia has ordered Molotov to take charge of the Villa affair at once. What scoundrels! Couldn't they have chosen another name for this Villa with its orgies? It's a disgrace . . .

Badayev\* called me up on the 'phone again. This old fool is very keen on getting a job for his niece at the Paris Embassy. He wants her to have 'rank and standing'. She looks like a cook in Okhotny Riad.<sup>1</sup> I shall have to write to the *chargé d'affaires*. Let him get rid of her as best he can . . .

Chlenov wrote to me asking for the immediate recall of Navashin<sup>2</sup> from Paris. Navashin, he said, was involved in some queer business with . . . (omission) . . .

I have known of Navashin's goings-on for some time past, but he is under the protection of Artuzov and Katzenellenbaum.

Our bank is being turned into an instrument of the 'neighbours'. All this will end up in a row. The 'neighbours' want to secure Kemp's<sup>3</sup> return to Moscow. He is apparently in their

<sup>1</sup> OKHOTNY RIAD. A market in Moscow known for its cheap restaurants.

<sup>2</sup> NAVASHIN, Soviet economist and head of the Soviet financial organisation in Paris. Assassinated in the Bois de Boulogne after he had broken off relations with Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> KEMP. Soviet diplomat attached to the Paris Embassy in 1927.

way. As regards the second Director . . . (omission) . . . his apartment in Rue du Regard has now become . . . (omission) . . .

Our *chargé d'affaires* in Paris has written asking us to refer to the Instantsia the question of repriming the Director of the Moscow Office of the State Bank, who had been sentenced to be shot for embezzlement. Henri Torrès<sup>1</sup> is supporting the request. It transpires that Chlenov secured through Torrès a free pardon for Rakosi,<sup>2</sup> or something of the kind. Koba had asked Torrès personally. I do not like such interventions by our diplomats. We cannot assume responsibility for the decisions of various court and out-of-court cases . . .

Mossina came to see me accompanied by Artsibashev, senior cipher clerk. They brought a deciphered cryptogram of Herbette's.<sup>3</sup> Mossina told me confidentially that henceforth all cables sent in code by the French Embassy in Moscow would be deciphered without difficulty . . .

Florinsky called at my home. He was radiant. After a prolonged conversation he hinted that he was the person who had made a photostatic copy of Herbette's code. The Herbettes are treating Florinsky as their best friend. He accompanied them on picnics and various out-of-town trips. I told him I was not happy about such behaviour. He was the Chief of Protocol and should not have behaved like a common spy. He replied that he hoped his *Tsarskoe Selo* past would, as a result, be consigned to the limbo of forgotten things. I don't think he will make it. Whoever gets into Yagoda's clutches will not find escape easy. We shall see . . .

The 'neighbours' are pressing for the removal of Sandomirsky on the ground that he used to be an anarchist . . .

There is complete chaos in the Balkans Department (omission) . . .

<sup>1</sup> TORRÈS, Henri. French journalist and lawyer; Socialist politician; was active in the adoption of the Non-Aggression Pact between France and Russia.

<sup>2</sup> RAKOSI, Matyas. Hungarian Communist leader. Associated with Bela Kuhn's revolt in 1918. In 1925 he was sentenced to eight and a half years' imprisonment. Exiled in the Soviet Union 1940-44. Prime Minister of Hungary 1949-53.

<sup>3</sup> HERBETTE, Jean. French Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., December 1924.

Maisky had hardly reached Tokyo when a squabble began. A strange fellow. In London he could not get along with Rozen-goltz.\* The 'neighbours' suspected him of having passed on to the British some information on Arcos. Nonsense. Dovgalevsky wants Maisky's wife to leave Tokyo. She (omission) . . .

Saw Soltz.\* He called on Friday evening. We spoke Yiddish, lest our conversation be understood. Soltz complained that Koba demanded that the C.C.C. should carry out a merciless purge of the Party on the basis of 'Molotov's dossiers'. Molotov had already sent in some 500 such dossiers. If this goes on we shall soon have nobody except Molotov left in the Party . . . Poor Soltz told me he only just escaped trouble because his sister was in the habit of preparing stuffed fish<sup>1</sup> on Fridays. A neighbour, a Jewish Komsomol from Kiev, warned him and threatened to write to Shkiryatov.\* Soltz told me in strict confidence that the central control commission of the Georgian Party had submitted to the C.C.C. the case of a Georgian opera singer who was openly speaking of her liaison with Koba. When in Moscow she stayed at the Metropole next door to Shlikter's<sup>2</sup> suite. The Georgian Control Commission were asking for instructions. They were afraid to deal with the matter . . .

I frequently read Herbette's decoded cryptograms. He has been unjustly accused of being pro-Soviet. He is an intelligent man and has a perfect understanding of Russian affairs. He often recommends to Berthelot decisions very favourable to us. If Herbette had been English I would have assumed that he had himself made it possible for Florinsky to photograph the code in order to show his friendly attitude to us – or to deceive us. The British have been past-masters at these tricks since the time of Pitt . . .

I cannot understand what is the matter with Briand. He is adopting a hostile attitude and . . . (omission). Benes puts it down to the influence of a lady from Coty's circle. The lady has received a tidy sum from Coty for working on Briand . . .

Strange news from Warsaw. Ukrainians have been received

<sup>1</sup> A dish popular among Jews in Russia.

<sup>2</sup> SHLIKTER, Alexander, native of Kiev. After the Revolution he became Soviet Minister to Austria and then Minister in the Government of the Ukrainian S.S.R. Later exiled in the West.

by Pilsudski. The 'neighbours' have reported the arrival of Makhno<sup>1</sup> in Bukovina and the formation there of a unit 1,000 strong for raiding the Podolsk province . . .

A row over *Storm over Asia*. The script was by Brik<sup>2</sup>. It has had to be shelved because of her husband. Mayakovsky<sup>3</sup>, who is in fact her second husband – threatened to have it out with the big men of the film industry . . .

*Storm over Asia* is to be called *Genghis Khan's Descendant*. I saw the film. It is magnificent. Brik made a brilliant job of it . . . (omission) . . .

Received full confirmation of Soltz's information . . . Apparently Koba's singer was admitted twice to a clinic for operations. Koba does not want children.

Alliluyeva made a stormy scene and threatened to commit suicide if he did not discontinue this liaison. I received instructions from Molotov personally regarding the appointment of the singer to our consulate at Kandahar. He does not mention her duties. She is a Party member . . .

Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky\*] has reported that Hindenburg had something unpleasant up his sleeve. A declaration is to be made that Germany demands the evacuation of the Rhineland. It is not known when Hindenburg will make his declaration, but Meisner suggests that it may be in a speech on 1st January . . .

Kemal is taking up a hostile position . . . (omission) . . . In his latest conversation he spoke of Batum and complained that we had failed to honour Lenin's promise. He forgets that without our aid the Greeks would have gobbled him up hand and foot and he would have been hanged from the gallows in a Constantinople square, outlawed by Sultan Mohammed . . .

I consider it superfluous to flirt with Kemal. One must definitely . . . (omission) . . .

Koba called me on the 'phone. He asked me to let him have a

<sup>1</sup> MAKHNO, Ataman Nestor. An anarchist leader who commanded a large band of rebels in southern Russia during the Civil War.

<sup>2</sup> BRIK. Soviet film director.

<sup>3</sup> MAYAKOVSKY, Vladimir. Soviet poet. Member of the Bolshevik Party since age of fourteen; identified with futurist school; committed suicide in 1930.

shorthand record of Georgi Vassilevich's [Chicherin's] speech in Genoa. I don't understand why he should want this record . . .

Molotov rang me up. He wants to go with Zhemchuzhina<sup>1</sup> to Austria for a rest. He asked to have a diplomatic courier's passport in the name of 'Nikolaev'. I cannot understand this mania for travelling under assumed names . . .

Had a long talk with Adolf Abramovich [Yoffe\*]. His disease is incurable. He was furious with Trotsky for his lack of resolution and for having missed his opportunity. Listening to him I recalled Koba's words, 'It is a question of power between myself and Trotsky. It is a matter of who will prevail'. Adolf Abramovich said the same thing. He told me outright that members of the Opposition would soon be shot as anti-revolutionaries. 'I shall not live to see that moment,' he added. 'I shall leave this world when I see fit . . .' He seems to be on the eve of some decision . . .

The funeral of Adolf Abramovich at the cemetery of the Novo-Devichi monastery. Banners, speeches. The Opposition came with their slogans. Nobody interfered with them, but I noticed that their names were being taken down and . . . (omission) . . . Yagoda turned up in full-dress uniform. I do not understand why they should use this cemetery for the burial of suicides who had held responsible positions. Lutovinov<sup>2</sup> was the first . . . I looked at Kropotkin's<sup>3</sup> tomb with its modest monument inscribed: 'From everyone according to his ability, to everyone according to his needs'. Shall we ever realise this . . . or . . . (omission).

Received a letter from Chlenov reporting on his trip to Madrid and his agreement with the Spanish 'Camps'a<sup>4</sup>. It must be said that he has accomplished his task brilliantly. The 'neighbours' also contributed to this success. Chlenov

<sup>1</sup> ZHEMCHUZHINA, Paulina (Mme Molotov). Former Chief of the Soviet textile and clothing industry; alternate Member of Central Committee of Communist Party until 1941.

<sup>2</sup> LUTOVINOV, Y. One of the Bolshevik leaders in the early years of the Revolution. Committed suicide in May 1924.

<sup>3</sup> KROPOTKIN, Prince Piotr A. (1842-91), famous doctrinaire of modern anarchism, author of *Field, Factories and Workshops* (Swan Sonnenschein, London, 1901), and *The Conquest of Bread* (Chapman & Hall, London, 1906).

<sup>4</sup> 'CAMPSA.' Spanish oil purchasing commission.

reported that they have succeeded in organising something in Tangier . . .

Our cell is having another of its usual squabbles. The wives whose husbands are not diplomatic couriers are accusing the wives of diplomatic couriers of wearing silk stockings and reviving bourgeois tastes . . . Disgusting . . . Is it possible that envy and not the urge to rise to a higher level is the mainspring of the class struggle? . . . If that be so, why should the proletarians be called on to liberate mankind and make it happy? . . . If men remain envious nothing will be ever achieved . . . Now it is silk stockings; in a classless society something else will form the object of envy. Envy is a qualitative but not a quantitative concept . . . (omission).

. . . I feel that I find complete satisfaction only within my family, with my children, otherwise . . . (omission).

The year is drawing to an end . . . (omission) . . . I may be going with my children to the Caucasus . . . It would be (omission).

4th January, 1928. Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky\*] has sent a detailed account of the reception given by Hindenburg to the Diplomatic Corps. Reports of a demand for the evacuation of the Rhineland have been confirmed. The old Marshal, too, emphasised the point in his address. I have asked our *charge d'affaires* in Paris to find out the reaction of the Quai d'Orsay . . .

It is reported from Paris that Briand intends to make a statement in the Senate rejecting the request for the evacuation of the Rhineland and that his stand will be supported in London.

January . . . 1928. Stresemann's offensive continues. He delivered a speech in the Reichstag threatening to wreck the Dawes Plan<sup>1</sup> if there is no evacuation. Stresemann deserves credit for the shrewdness of his manœuvre; the Americans will support him . . .

The insolence of Rudzutak:<sup>\*</sup> he enticed my lady secretary away with the promise of a bigger salary. I shall complain to the C.C.C. . . .

A scandal in the Arts Theatre. The actors are said to have

<sup>1</sup> DAWES PLAN, 1927-8. Plan to rectify the German Reparations, stressing the advantages of a final settlement. Its purpose was later achieved in 1929 by the Young Plan.

made a collective complaint against one of their colleagues who kept Yagoda regularly informed on all the details of everyday life at the Theatre and intimate affairs of actors and actresses. Soltz\* wanted to take action against Yagoda, but Molotov directed that he should be left in peace . . .

Voks asked us for information about some doctor from Marienburg, who has invented, to quote his own words, a *perpetuum mobile* and is ready to put it at the disposal of our Government; but he wants . . . the Order of the Banner of Labour. Comrades at the Voks do not seem to know that the *perpetuum mobile* is an absurdity . . .

Apparently there are still people seeking Soviet honours. Chlenov reports de Monzie dropped him a hint that he would be very happy to receive a Soviet decoration . . .

Our Rome Embassy mentions a similar hint by the Duce himself . . . Mussolini wearing the Order of Lenin . . . what an idea . . .

Apparently, de Monzie attached great importance to this decoration nonsense. He had a long talk on the subject with our *chargé d'affaires*, who told him it was not done in our country. de Monzie pointed out the case of Amanullah Khan, who had been awarded one of our orders. I was against the idea of decorating Amanullah, but Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] insisted. To his mind, Asiatic monarchs were nearer to us than European bourgeois-parliamentary ministers . . . Humbug . . .

29th January. Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky\*] reports on his conversation with Stresemann, who is to make a speech tomorrow in the Reichstag. He will demand the evacuation of the Rhineland. Nikolai Nikolayevich believes that Briand promised evacuation long ago. It's absurd. Briand is too old and experienced a fox to have given such a pledge . . .

Abramov writes from London that the British will shortly make a statement to the effect that evacuation is not feasible. I think this information is accurate, although Trilisser has a different report from the 'neighbours' agent . . .

February, March, April . . . The 'neighbours' proved right: it has been announced in the House of Commons, that the British are ready to sign a joint agreement on the evacuation of the Rhineland; the result of Wall Street pressure . . .

A series of scandals in nearly all our embassies. Scenes with

jealous wives, affairs with typists and secretaries, smuggling by diplomatic couriers. The Bureau of foreign party cells wants to send a special commission to purge our missions abroad. I protested: the whole thing might end in a big scandal if such stories and gossip ever found their way into the pages of émigré newspapers, particularly in Berlin. Hessen of the *Rul*<sup>1</sup> is in possession of information and details on all our scandals. It may result . . . (omission).

It seems to me that we ought to revise our system of selecting officials for posts abroad, as well as (omission).

In Afghanistan, for instance, Raskolnikov's wife was running some kind of orgies with diplomatic couriers, to which she invited the fifth wife of the Emir. The affair nearly ended with the assassination of our diplomatic courier Sirin. There is complete licentiousness everywhere, particularly in countries where our people lead isolated lives. After all, you can't lock people up in rooms like animals in cages and try to make them into monks; otherwise . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Divilkovsky also reports that both Russian émigré newspapers in Paris are in possession of the most detailed information on life inside our Embassy and Commercial Representation. At times they know things which even the Head of our Mission does not. Divilkovsky believes that the 'neighbours' had a hand in it and that . . . (omission) . . . This incident makes it clear that some information was passed by the 'neighbours' agent to a journalist who had become his informant on émigré affairs. The idea was to improve the journalist's reputation with his newspaper and facilitate his access to the editor so that he might be able to procure more information, especially on oil deals. Similar tactics were used in the case of the other newspaper in order to gain access to Milyukov and his circle. I am indignant about the creation of small-time Azevs<sup>2</sup> among the émigrés by supplying to them information about the domestic affairs of our offices abroad. It is inadmissible that the 'neighbours' should at their own discretion reveal our diplomatic and other secrets to émigrés without my knowledge or consent. I intend to raise the

<sup>1</sup> 'RUL.' Russian émigré paper of the extreme right, published in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> AZEV. Tsarist secret agents who worked also for the Social-Revolutionaries.

whole matter at the highest level and secure a change in the tactics employed by the 'neighbours' in this sphere of operations . . .

. . . Conversation with Trilisser. He is an old and honest revolutionary but he fully supports the 'neighbours' in their criminal tactics. It is strange how a departmental psychology can develop; having become a prominent Chekist,<sup>1</sup> Trilisser adopted the same lack of principles, the same criminally indiscriminate means as say, Yagoda. He cannot understand that such tactics will completely demoralise his men and eventually turn them into professional security officers of the *Okhrana*<sup>2</sup> type, like Rachkovsky.<sup>3</sup> He took offence. 'We are protected by the armour of our revolutionary aim,' he said. 'We cannot be wounded under such an armour . . .' What nonsense, what dangerous short-sightedness . . .

Police provocations remain police provocations. Sooner or later they will turn against those who first adopted them . . .

Conversation with Sandomirsky. This former anarchist is not brilliant but he is an honest worker. The 'neighbours' bait him unnecessarily . . .

Oumansky<sup>4</sup> reports that the problem of evacuation and reparations has been included in the agenda of a forthcoming meeting of the League of Nations. A commission of experts is to be formed. The Germans want representatives of the United States to be included on the commission. London and Paris will naturally do their best to prevent this; the United States is not concerned with German reparations, but wants dividends on capital investments in Germany. Eventually both London and Paris will have to agree to a revision of reparations. Stresemann manœuvres skilfully . . .

Solf<sup>5</sup> has told Maisky that Stresemann is ready to act in

<sup>1</sup> CHEKIST. A member of the Cheka, the Soviet political police (renamed the O.G.P.U. in 1922).

<sup>2</sup> OKHRANA. The Tsarist security police.

<sup>3</sup> RACHKOVSKY. Famous chief of the Okhrana.

<sup>4</sup> OUMANSKY, Constantin. *Tass* representative in Switzerland and head of diplomatic espionage in Europe. Later (1939-41) Ambassador to Mexico and the United States. Killed in an air-crash in 1945.

<sup>5</sup> SOLF, H. German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1918; later German Ambassador in Tokyo.

complete accord with our enemies in London and Paris provided that he receives satisfaction on the issues of reparations and evacuation. I consider the situation serious. Until now Locarno has been a dead letter; but should there appear an anti-Soviet line-up brought about by complete unanimity between Germany with our Western enemies, we shall have to spend a large part of our budget on armaments. Piatakov's<sup>1</sup> project remains wishful thinking. We must prepare a diplomatic counter-offensive. I intend to approach the Instantsia . . . (omission).

. . . Saw Nikolai Alekseyevich<sup>2</sup> today. He has come from Kharkov to discuss the situation in the Donbas<sup>3</sup> with the various Narkomats on behalf of the Ukrainian Central Committee. He was greatly upset. He has had a long talk with Koba who told him in great confidence that the Instantsia had already decided to banish Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] to Alma-Ata. The order will be carried out by the 'neighbours'. The reason given is that he has been taking part in counter-revolutionary activities . . . We were both extremely upset . . . It seemed completely unbelievable, almost monstrous, that Trotsky should be banished as a counter-revolutionary . . . Only six years ago any man coming out with such an accusation would have been sent to a lunatic asylum or . . . shot as an *agent provocateur* . . . The times have changed . . . I should still like to make sure, perhaps . . . (omission) . . . Yes, there can be no further doubt. The decision has been taken . . . We can only wait now . . . They say that Yagoda is extremely disturbed; he fears that a number of his collaborators may refuse to participate . . . They think that Trotsky will resist or that his followers may try to rescue him by force, as they did with Smilga . . . His house is already surrounded by guards, but they let everybody pass . . . Trotsky's son is displaying much energy. They say he is openly threatening armed

<sup>1</sup> PIATAKOV, Yuri Leonidovich (Georgi). Director of the State Bank and then deputy Commissar for Heavy Industry. Former President of the first Soviet Government in the Ukraine in 1918. A follower of Trotsky, he was charged with treason and executed in 1937.

<sup>2</sup> This refers possibly to Nikolai Alexseyevich Skrypnik. He was a Ukrainian Communist who sought real autonomy for the Ukraine within the U.S.S.R. He committed suicide in 1933 after he had been attacked as a Ukrainian chauvinist.

<sup>3</sup> DONBAS. Donetz Basin.

resistance if his father is banished . . . In our Narkomat all talk is about his forthcoming banishment. The majority do not believe that Koba will risk it . . . (omission) . . . I lifted the receiver and heard Lev Davidovich's voice . . . So his telephone has not been cut off yet . . . He joked: 'Prepare a statement on my banishment for our embassies' . . . He asked me if there was any news about his daughter Zinaida . . . I replied that there was none . . . Alas, yesterday I received a telegram from our embassy in Berlin: she hanged herself on receiving news that her husband had been shot in the Urals . . . How strange and tragic is the destiny of this man, his family and his close collaborators . . . Beginning with Glaser<sup>1</sup> and . . . (omission) . . . A man needed a great deal of endurance to . . . He has tremendous self-control in personal matters, but none in political . . . Poor Adolf Abramovich [Yoffe] often told me that. He could not understand the 'antinomy', as he called it, between the drive which Trotsky displayed during the first period of the Revolution and his 'Hamletism' during his struggle with Koba, when he could have turned the wheel of our history in his own favour . . . All that was needed . . . Of course, it is difficult for somebody, who was not in it, to judge, but . . . (omission) . . . During the Civil War he used to say that personal bravery was the function of political courage. He demanded that Zinoviev\* should be brought to trial for his flight from Petrograd at the time of the Yudenich campaign. He insisted on the shooting of Panteleev.<sup>2</sup> He . . . (omission) . . . All this is incomprehensible. There is some sort of split personality in the man. I have been told that Trotsky's political courage was 'inducted' into him by Lenin, and that as soon as Lenin died Trotsky turned back into an ordinary 'Hamletian intellectual'. But somehow this explanation does not satisfy me . . . At any rate, he withdrew into himself after Lenin's death and after the majority of the Instantsia had followed Koba, Zinoviev\* and Kamenev\* . . . His only

<sup>1</sup> GLASER (or GLASSER) was Trotsky's secretary. See reference to his suicide in Trotsky's *My Life* (Thornton Butterworth, London, 1930). It occurred in September 1924.

<sup>2</sup> PANTELEEV. This was a famous affair used against Trotsky by his enemies – the shooting of a communist officer for desertion and cowardice in the civil war. The full reference to it can be found in Isaac Deutscher's *Trotsky*, vol. i (Oxford University Press, London, 1954).

attempts at fighting back have been in his oral pronouncements and newspaper articles . . . There has been no serious effort on his part to organise his followers, as Ilich or Koba would have done in his place . . . Will he risk now when . . . I do not think so . . . (omission) . . .

So everything is finished . . . He has been banished . . . There was no attempt at armed resistance on his part . . . All he did was to refuse to leave his flat . . . Passive resistance . . . Like another Mahatma Gandhi . . . The revolutionary fighter has turned into a common vegetarian, as our people put it . . . I am glad that the business has passed without bloodshed, but at the same time I share the disappointment of all those people who valued his revolutionary dynamism so highly . . . The 'neighbours' men carried him out on a carpet like an outsize puppy . . . I am told that he scuffled, protested, shouted, threatened with the verdict of history . . . It all looked ridiculous: Trotsky speechifying while sitting on a carpet and being carried by G.P.U. men from his home to a large and magnificent motor car — Menzhinsky's\* personal car . . . His son, Lyeva, ran along and shouted: 'Comrades and citizens, Comrade Trotsky is being taken into banishment. Protest with me against this infamous deed of the Thermidorians. Protest, comrades and citizens . . .' I have been told that Koba gleefully patted Yagoda\* on the back and proposed that he would be awarded the Order of Lenin for his organisation of the deportation . . . The Order of Lenin for deporting Trotsky to his place of banishment . . . History has rarely seen such paradoxes . . .



. . . (omission) . . . And if all this had been . . . (omission) . . . Abram claims that Koba gave a secret order that in case Trotsky offered armed resistance they should not fire at him, but temporarily give up the operation and report to the Secretariat of the *Gensek*<sup>1</sup> . . . (omission) . . . His family has also been banished to Alma-Ata. He has been granted a monthly pension. The State Publishing House has been ordered to stop paying him royalties for his books . . . (omission). In all the Narkomats there is unending talk of his banishment. Nobody does any work.

<sup>1</sup> **GENSEK.** General Secretary, i.e. Stalin, at that time.

Several foreign envoys have tried to broach the subject with me. The Instantsia has suggested that they should be told that the banishment is an administrative measure applied to a private citizen, as Trotsky no longer held any office, having been removed from the Concessions' Committee. A ridiculous answer. As if Trotsky could be turned into a 'private citizen of the U.S.S.R.' . . . (omission) . . . The Poles are particularly insistent. You might think that he was their special friend. At the reception given by the Polish Ambassador all the talk was about the impending disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and our forthcoming civil war. *Der Wunsch ist Vater des Gedankens*<sup>1</sup> . . . I declared that Trotsky would live at Alma-Ata as Marshal Pilsudski had lived at Sulocjowek before he carried out his last year's *coup d'état* . . . The Polish Ambassador laughed and said: 'Now you see that you are repeating what we all keep saying: that Trotsky will attempt to return to Moscow as Napoleon returned from Elba . . . The only difference being that instead of embarking on some ship and crossing the sea, he will bestride a camel and cross the Kara-Kum desert . . .' A stupid and cheap joke . . . The Poles are anti-semites . . . Pilsudski excepted, it is true. I once happened to discuss the Jewish question with him. He told me point-blank that he despised anti-semitism, that 'socialism of blockheads and cretins' . . . It is a pity that Klim [Voroshilov\*], Koba and others do not know this old aphorism on anti-semitism . . . Conversations about Trotsky . . . (omission) . . . Abram is preparing to leave with an expedition to explore the Pamirs. Larissa<sup>2</sup> will accompany him, despite Radek's violent outbursts of jealousy. They say that Koba has personally entrusted Abram with the task of talking to Trotsky and proposing to him that he should go abroad . . . I have received a confidential letter from the *Gensek*'s Secretariat, signed by the son of a bitch, Mekhlis.<sup>3</sup> They ask me to find out quite unobtrusively the chances of obtaining for Trotsky a visa for any country whatever. Those are the words they used: ' . . . for any

<sup>1</sup> The wish is father to the thought.

<sup>2</sup> LARISSA (REISSNER). Former wife of Raskolnikov, Radek's mistress since 1923.

<sup>3</sup> MEKHLIS, Lev Mikhailovich. One of Stalin's most trusted lieutenants. Chief Political Commissar of the Red Army. Died on 14th February, 1953.

country whatever' . . . A telephone call from Koba. He asked me whether I had received Mekhlis' letter. He said: 'You will greatly oblige me personally if you get him a visa. You understand that otherwise he will come to a bad end . . . I do not want our Revolution to devour its own children . . .' The cynic . . . Executions are already in full swing . . . He simply fears Trotsky's death and the possibility that terror might be used against himself. He is afraid that some member of the Instantsia or the Sovnarkom might . . . All people visiting Koba's office have lately been searched with increased thoroughness. Even the People's Commissars are required to leave behind all weapons before entering his office.



. . . A curious incident. It is reported that the Instantsia received a request from Trotsky. He asked for permission to buy a shot-gun and another hunting rifle, because he intended to go lion-hunting – to hunt the celebrated Semirechensk lions . . . His request was granted . . . Klim is reported to have said: 'Let him hunt. Maybe the Semirechensk lions will eat up our Kherson Lev . . .'<sup>1</sup> This poor joke is all too suggestive of anti-semitism. The struggle against Lev Davidovich has raised in our midst a wave of the foulest sort of anti-semitism. In our Narkomat they are busy spreading the most stupid stories about me, Karl Radek,\* Zinoviev,\* Trotsky . . . (omission) . . .

. . . An old story . . . There is much talk about the circumcised sons of the Jewish members of the Central Committee . . . Somebody has invented the tale that Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich has had his son circumcised . . . The C.C.C. recently decided that any Party member performing any kind of religious rite would be expelled from the Party. The well-known G.P.U. member, Mironov, has been expelled for having his newly-born son circumcised. But Koba is not a clever tactician in vain. He has referred to Soltz\* the case of Bubnov whose son was baptised in the Paraskeva-Pyatnitsa Church in Okhotny Ryad. To expel Bubnov was impossible: he is a member of the Central Committee. Add to this circumstance his explanation that his wife –

<sup>1</sup> SEMIRECHENSK LIONS – an obvious pun on Trotsky's name Lev – Leo (n.) meaning 'lion' in Russian.

she is the daughter of the merchant Abrikosov – had the baby baptised during his absence and without his knowledge . . . The case was closed with a reprimand and Bubnov's compulsory divorce: *Zags*<sup>1</sup> announced that Bubnov was divorced, although he had not asked for a divorce . . . Abrikosova has continued to live unperturbed with him since the announcement of the divorce . . . We have received replies – negative ones – from ten countries, to which we applied for a visa for Lev Davidovich . . . Our Ambassador in Rome reports that Mussolini gave him a curious reply: He would agree to let Trotsky enter Italy on condition that he lived on the . . . Lipari Island in complete isolation. Sounds like one of Lev Borisovich's [Kamenev\*] jokes . . . (omission). A telephone call from Koba. He asked me whether we could depend on Mussolini's offer. Does he seriously contemplate getting rid of Trotsky by placing him under the care of Mussolini's police? . . . Or is it the result of Lev Borisovich [Kamenev] studying the tactics of Machiavelli?<sup>2</sup> It is not in vain that he is said to be ready to make peace with Koba at the expense of Trotsky . . . It is reported from Paris that Berthelot told our *chargé d'affaires*: 'Give me a couple of months and I'll get a visa for Trotsky. I'll get the freemasons to help me' . . . Of course, some consideration in return for the visa is indicated, but Koba won't mind that; he will place any order with France, even buy scent from Coty himself or allow Bishop Neveux to resume his activities. If only Trotsky were given a visa to enter France . . . But I don't really think Berthelot will manage to get a visa. Poincaré would never give Trotsky a visa, even if he were supported by the leading masons of the Grand Orient<sup>3</sup> itself.

. . . (omission) Koba sent for me and asked me to find out as soon as possible what was Trotsky's position in the Grand Orient during his stay in France. He said the 'neighbours' had submitted a report to him on the subject, but he wanted to check their date . . . The conversation made a curious impression on me: is it possible that the 'neighbours' have intervened in this affair and that an attempt is to be made to involve

<sup>1</sup> ZAGS. The Soviet Registry Office.

<sup>2</sup> KAMENEV wrote an essay on Machiavelli which was published in 1928.

<sup>3</sup> GRAND ORIENT. French Masonic Lodge.

Trotsky in some masonic conspiracy, as had been done in the case of Florinsky and the Tsarskoe Selo Old Boys' conspiracy?

. . . (Omission.)

I had a visit from Yagoda. He said he had received instructions concerning freemasonry and wanted to run over with me information that came from an important agent of the 'neighbours' a man who held a high position among the freemasons of the Grand Orient . . . I asked him to pass the information on to me . . . The conversation with Yagoda left me with the impression that he wanted to make certain of having 'witnesses'; he is obviously protecting himself against any eventuality. Should the Opposition come to power again, he could say he had been acting against Trotsky only under pressure . . . So it means that if Yagoda is acting with artifice, Trotsky still stands a chance . . . It becomes clear why Koba is anxious to send him abroad as soon as possible . . .

. . . I read the information supplied by the 'neighbours'. I had never taken any interest in freemasonry and what I discovered, since it was all new to me, was of the greatest interest. Trotsky apparently held a ninth degree office - Selected Master of Nine. A small rank . . .

. . . I was summoned to a meeting of the Instantsia where Yagoda presented a report on Trotsky's masonic activities. He implicated also Rakovsky\* who, he said, had held the twenty-fifth degree of Knight of the Steel Serpent, some masons from Kiev, who had been exiled to Siberia for their 'contact with Morkotun', and Pilsudski, who held the thirtieth degree of Knight Kadosh, formerly known as the degree of Illustrious Knight Commander of the White and Black Eagle. A wholly incredible muddle . . . Klim was being witty: 'If he is elected master of nine, he must be returned to the Politbureau: there are nine of us now'. A discussion followed. Koba surprised me by his thorough knowledge of the subject. He had obviously done some researching. He asked Yagoda, a little slyly, about masonic degrees. Yagoda got muddled and spoke of the degrees of the Scottish Ritual. Koba said, 'You are obviously not familiar with this subject. The degree of the Scottish Ritual, which at one time numbered twenty-five, became thirty-three degrees in the Grand Orient on the 22nd September, 1804. The

Grand Orient took eight additional degrees from the Lodge at Charleston, U.S.A. An example, of course, of American exports to Europe . . . Molotov was asking questions about masonic activity in the U.S.S.R. and whether there had been any attempts at anti-Soviet activity on their part. Rudzutak\* asked similar questions. The discussion wound up with a resolution that Trotsky's connection with secret Soviet masonry should be ascertained . . . One might indeed say that the affair began with a toast, and ended with an epitaph. They wanted to show up Trotsky's contacts among freemasons abroad simply in order to obtain a visa for him and get rid of him; but they ended by giving instructions to the 'neighbours' to rig up a case against Trotsky and the freemasons, accusing them of conspiracy against the U.S.S.R. . . . It is surprising how an important institution such as the Instantia can spend its time on trivialities . . . Of course, it is sometimes not a trivial matter at all. But it is necessary to have some data. You cannot begin with such an irrelevant report as Yagoda's . . . Disgraceful . . .

. . . (Omission.)

. . . Received a letter from our Embassy in Ankara. Kemal said he saw no objection to granting a visa to Trotsky, but warned that he would have to stay at the Embassy or Consulate of the U.S.S.R. . . .

. . . I had a talk with Koba. He was dissatisfied. 'Kemal is a scoundrel,' he said. 'The offer smacks of provocation' . . . I said there was no hope of getting a visa from other countries . . . He retorted that our diplomats were 'cobblers' and that they should take lessons from the English: the English would have managed to get a visa . . .

In the end he said, 'We shall probably have to accept. Let him go to Kemal' . . .

. . . X came to see me. She showed me a note from Mikhail Ivanovich [Kalinin]\* asking me to let her have a diplomatic passport. She is going with her husband to Vienna. I had to tell her that I couldn't let her have such a passport and suggested she should have a service passport. She was terribly angry. 'Who do you suggest I go to bed with to get the diplomatic passport I was promised?' . . . An arrogant and stupid woman. Poor Mikhail Ivanovich has still got trouble in store on her account.

I can't understand this mania our old men at the top have for actresses and ballet dancers. Apparently the party aristocracy is bent on perpetuating the traditions of the old social aristocracy. It was understandable for Anatoly Vassilievich [Lunacharsky]<sup>1</sup> to start a liaison. He is an old æsthete and an admirer of the theatre. But Mikhail Ivanovich is a former locksmith with an illiterate peasant wife from the Tver province . . . It is said that Koba's liaison continues and that his relations with Nadezhda Alliluyeva have become very strained. Molotov, too . . . (omission) . . .

It seems to me that the Instantsia should have taken its own members in hand first instead of . . . (omission) . . . It sets a bad example to young people . . .

They have, at last, got rid of that drunken brute Damian Bednei. He wrote some stupid and obscene doggerel about Koba; he'll never become a big-shot in the newspaper world again . . .

. . . Damian Bednei's lampoon is going the rounds. People are making copies and passing them on to friends. It's a disgusting piece of caddishness.

Koba is not mentioned directly, but Damian had him in mind when he referred to the 'Red Knight in a Panther Skin'. This is an allusion to the Georgian opera, *Knight in a Panther Skin* in which Koba's actress friend played the lead . . . I could never understand why our comrades, Illich included, took an active interest in Damian . . . As far as I am concerned I think his verse more fitting for being scribbled on walls than published in newspapers. His claims were simply atrocious. He was drawing fees from every source and earning twenty times my salary . . .

It looks as if the opposition are going to make capital out of this business. They are prepared to take advantage of anything as long as it is directed against Koba. It's revolting. I do not like

<sup>1</sup> LUNACHARSKY, Anatoly Vassilievich. Soviet Revolutionary writer, Commissar for Education, 1917-29; reformed the Russian educational system; wrote *Religion and Socialism* (Wilmersdorf, Berlin, 1911), *Culture and the Working Class* (Moscow, 1919), *History of West European Literature* (Moscow, 1930), and the fairy tale *Vasilica the Wise* (Kegan Paul, 1922).

Koba and consider his policy pernicious, but advantage should not be taken of these sordid examples of Damian's art . . .

The cell held a special meeting devoted to *The Red Knight*. All those found reading Damian's scurrilous verse will be tried by the Party Tribunal as enemies of the general party line. It is not clear what the Party line has to do with Damian's pornography. We are always exaggerating!

Kantorovich reported that someone had sent him a hand-written copy of one of the chapters of *The Red Knight* by post. It is the most pornographic chapter of the lot and full of filth. Kantorovich thought it had been sent by a personal enemy in order to provoke him . . . (omission) . . .

It is reported from Berlin that the German Ambassadors in London, Paris, Washington, Tokyo, Rome and Brussels would soon be sending notes to the governments to which they are accredited demanding a speedy solution to the reparations question. I am drawing up a memorandum for the Instantia on the subject . . .

. . . The 'neighbours' have also intervened in the affair . . . (omission) . . . If their agents are really in possession of such information why didn't they pass it on last year? It's only an empty boast . . .

Semen Ivanovich [Aralov] is an old friend of Kemal's. He must be instructed to ask Ankara to state without equivocation whether or not they want to drop our agreement. We paid a high price and are entitled to expect an open-hearted and friendly attitude. True they need the London Stock Exchange and the Paris Bourse. Nevertheless . . . (omission) . . .

Koba's idea of disrupting Rumanian-Polish relations is interesting. He is right: their alliance is nothing but reinsurance of the frontiers. The Poles robbed us in Volynya, Podolia and Byelorussia. The Rumanians are petty thieves. They stole Bessarabia from us. A strong call to order will be enough to recover it all when we have regained our power. The French wouldn't fight us for the sake of Poland and Rumania. As long as we are weak we shall have to go through a difficult period. We have to do some manœuvring and at least stop Bucharest and Warsaw from abetting the aspirations of the White Guards on our frontiers. If the Poles are isolated from the Rumanians

neither party will risk . . . (omission) . . . It is obviously easier to deal with the Rumanians. Koba is right. We should cede the northern part of the Hotin District to them and arrange for a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Of course, under Rumanian police supervision the plebiscite will go against us, but it will provide a good pretext for further action. When we become strong again, we shall recall that the plebiscite was conducted under police pressure and shall demand the return of the whole of Bessarabia. In the meantime, our readiness to arrive at a peaceful solution will weaken their hostility . . .

Reports from the 'neighbours' regarding the formation of an émigré corps, 100,000 men strong, under the command of [General] Kutepov is utter nonsense. Nobody would provide the wherewithal for such a venture, not even Deterding.

Besides, the purely technical difficulties would be too great. Nevertheless, the Instantsia wants to reinforce our troops on the frontier. Reliable units from the Volga are to be transferred in addition to Yakir's<sup>1</sup> corps. God looks after him who looks after himself . . .

Our *chargé d'affaires* reports from Paris that there is evidence regarding the formation of an émigré corps; but he is basing it on a conversation between Navashin and Sir Henri [Deterding]. Of course, Sir Henri was never guilty of brightness, but I don't imagine that he would reveal such secrets to an official of our Bank. On the other hand, Navashin is playing an odd game. I have never liked him; he could be acting as agent for two or even three parties. When I first met him in Copenhagen I realised that . . . (omission).

Navashin's masonic connections are bluff. These are not Navashin's but Morkotun's who is now our enemy and . . . (omission) . . . If Navashin is playing a double part in this dangerous game, we may suffer some most unpleasant consequences. Sir Henri may be led to wrong conclusions by some of his reports, allegedly emanating from Moscow and then . . . (omission) . . . It is inadmissible that the 'neighbours' should be engaged in such a dangerous game . . . (omission) . . . it is easy

<sup>1</sup> YAKIR, I. E., General. Former Chief of the Army in the Ukraine. Commander of the Leningrad Military District. Executed in 1937 on a charge of treason.

to create complications abroad, but to localise them is another matter . . . (omission) . . . We are still too weak to meet these complications with armed force against the countries involved. The whole game is senseless and criminal . . . (omission).

December 1928. Maisky reports from Tokyo that the Japanese Government has received a confidential communication from London regarding a joint policy with Britain on reparations. The British are evidently exercising pressure on Paris and are gathering allies against the Quai d'Orsay. The Dawes Plan will probably be given a first-rate funeral and then . . . (omission).

I asked Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky] to watch Stresemann carefully. Anything may be expected from him. We must mobilise our connections among military circles and industrialists to strike at Stresemann should he actually want to link up Germany with some anti-Soviet bloc. We must expand the programme of our purchases in Germany in order to secure very strong ties in the Ruhr and . . . (omission).

A telephone call from Koba's Secretariat. They asked when Lev Borisovich [Kamenev\*] was due in Moscow. A little later came an unexpected call from Olga Davidovna<sup>1</sup>. She was in Moscow, having arrived with her children from the Caucasus. She, too, made inquiries about his date of arrival . . . I could not understand it: there was no report from Rome concerning Borisovich's leaving. I suggested that a telegram should be sent to the Mission . . . A reply came back in the evening – 'Leaving tomorrow' . . . I don't understand what it's all about . . . (omission) . . .

The secretary mentioned nothing in his latest letter . . . Mystery . . . Looks like one of Koba's schemes . . . (omission) . . .

Olga Davidovna looked harassed. She has been upset by the exile of her brother. There has also been some trouble over Razumy; it seems that he escaped from Siberia and is now publishing articles abroad. She is blamed for it; but after all . . . (omission) . . .

She spoke at some length of her intention to divorce her husband. He has not written for three months. I said jokingly, 'He doesn't write to me either, and I'm more his boss than you are. I can dismiss him.' She laughed. 'He'll be pleased. He was

<sup>1</sup> DAVIDOVNA, OLGA. Kamenev's wife.

very fed up at having to go there. He said, "Is it possible that I shall have to meet that clown frequently?" You know, he can't stand Mussolini . . . He once said to me, "Benito was a decent man only on the day he was born. During the war he was quite happy taking money for his work from agents of the Entente" . . . It's true he saw Mussolini only once, when he presented his Letters of Credence to the King, although Mussolini used to send him frequent invitations for the sake of their old acquaintanceship in Switzerland before the war, when Mussolini was married to his Russian wife . . . It's said she developed a great passion for Lev Borisovich . . . He has a way with women . . . He refused to keep in touch with Mussolini in spite of my insisting that he should do so. Things did not turn out too well: Yurenev<sup>1</sup> was excessively zealous, while Kamenev went to the other extreme . . . The Italian Ambassador once told me they were very dissatisfied with him . . . (omission) . . .

He came to see me straight from the train, joking as usual. 'Straight from the ship to a ball,' he said. He wanted to know what the news was about the opposition. I replied that he was in a better position to know than I was and told him that Koba had asked when he was going to arrive. He made a wry face. 'I would have given much to be able to avoid seeing him,' he said. 'It will be difficult to avoid a quarrel.' He did not explain what was afoot but promised to come to my house for supper . . .

Had a three-hour talk with Lev Borisovich. I always knew he was charming, but I never thought he could be so delightful as he showed himself that night . . . He would not listen to anything concerning the activities of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. 'What sort of an Ambassador am I? A man of no consequence. It is simply that Koba had to push me into some far away place. He still wants to protect me and save me from Yagoda.' I laughed. 'If he had wanted to, he could have protected you easily enough. Yagoda is a worm, a reptile and a scoundrel. He will do nothing against Koba's wish' . . . He shook his head, 'I am now studying Machiavelli's book, *The Prince*. The Prince is often forced to submit to his subordinates. He commands and he submits . . . It is a complicated affair, dear Maxim Maximovich. Read Machiavelli, and then you

<sup>1</sup> YURENEV. Soviet Ambassador to Italy before Kamenev.

will understand' . . . I put a straight question to him. 'Why has Koba recalled you from Rome to Moscow?' He shrugged. 'Koba, too, is Machiavelli; but in a Georgian edition' . . . He was silent for a whole minute and then said: 'He is offering to sign a Kellog-Briand pact between us . . . He wants to appoint me president of the Supreme Council of National Economy to put through the coming five-year plan. In return he demands that I solemnly abjure Trotsky and damn him publicly . . .' He stopped and I did not succeed in finding out the most important point . . . (omission) . . . He avoided talking about the Opposition. Of Trotsky he said: 'I begin to think he is suffering from delusions of grandeur. He really thinks he can't be expelled from the U.S.S.R. as Lomonossov<sup>1</sup> could not be dismissed from the Academy of Science . . . How does he get that way? He is a sham Marxist . . .' He laughed as he spoke these words culled from our jargon . . . 'A true Marxist, such as Ilich, would never have had such ideas . . .' 'What about Koba?' I asked . . . 'Koba' . . . he became thoughtful and then said: 'Koba realises that he can be expelled from the U.S.S.R. and that's why he is keeping Yagoda at his side so that he should not be so expelled; this is precisely what I have been telling you about Yagoda and Koba . . . Koba the Archangel, and Yagoda his sword' . . . I laughed and remarked that he was still the wit he had been in the past, to which he replied: 'My only regret is that I shall not be among those who remain to write Koba's political biography . . . A pity . . . You see, he will become a man of destiny, a great figure who will occupy a permanent place in the world's history. He will take his place in history as a nail enters the wall . . .' He laughed at the comparison and said: 'I startled him during our talk today: "You know, Koba, you resemble Machiavelli, you . . ." And then he interrupted me, became angry and started reviling the opposition. He spoke, too, of slander . . . I said: "Don't get so worked up over nothing, Koba. You think I'm comparing you with Niccolo Machiavelli, the Florentine Chancellor. Nothing of the sort. I was referring to Zinovi Machiavelli, the artist from Florence. He was fifty years older than the Chancellor and left a few remarkable paintings. *The*

<sup>1</sup> LOMONOSOV, Mikhail Vassilevich, 1711-65. Famous Russian scientist, poet, man of letters.

*Mother of God and the Infant Jesus*, one of them, is in London. The big Mother of God is holding a small child . . . It's the same with you, Koba: there is big Koba sitting and holding the small, quite tiny, socialism; this socialism is almost invisible, nevertheless it is there . . . It is there in one country only" . . . He laughed and slapped me on the back. He said it was a pity I wasn't on his staff. He said he was surrounded by a solid mass of nincompoops. We shared reminiscences, spoke of our meetings in our youth in Tiflis, Baku, Batum, arrests, Siberia, Yasha, Philip, comrades who had perished in the Taiga [virgin forests in Siberia]. He turned sentimental . . .

"Then he started shouting again and cursing the Opposition. He said that he had proof that the possibility of his assassination was being discussed. For the time being, he said, he was leaving them alone; but should it become necessary he would show that he was not a squirrel in the Taiga to be hunted with impunity. "I shall crush like flies anyone who tries to use a gun or bomb against me; I shall crush them all, to the last man. It is not a matter that concerns me personally. I am insignificant, but I have been put there by the Party. Whoever opposes me opposes the Party, the working class, the Soviet state . . . There is no room for mercy . . . You have had your chance as well as I; we fought it out at Party congresses . . . The man chosen must lead . . . I have been chosen. Therefore, truly disciplined Party members must submit . . . Loose talk about appointments, manipulation and the like is nonsense; Ilich, too, had to appoint secretaries to fill posts. As regards manipulation, elections to congresses is a matter of adroitness. Our Party has always held formal democracy in contempt, even in its own internal affairs . . . Ilich was very clever in the way he dealt with people before elections to congresses. He would get his own people in and keep out outsiders, vociferous big mouths, trouble-makers, Makhaevites and blockheads from the *workers' opposition*. I follow his example. Had you been in my place – and you will remember that I offered it to you when you resigned once – you would have acted in the same way. Had you not done so you would not have been a bolshevik but a wet rag; and as a revolutionary not worth a farthing . . . Do you understand?"

'I had difficulty in interrupting him. I said it was not right to

be carried away and to turn against Party comrades the terrible machine of terrorism created for the struggle against the class enemy . . . I said that only Napoleon and persons aspiring to be Napoleons considered it admissible to use methods of mass terror to protect their life and position against those who opposed them . . . I recalled Napoleon and the execution of the Duc d'Enghien which had compromised him unnecessarily . . . He flared up again. He said that after the attempt on Illich thousands of hostages were shot and I was among those who had voted for terrorism. He added that the shooting of the Duc d'Enghien did not compromise Napoleon; on the contrary, it showed him capable of defending himself and had the effect of embarrassing Pitt and his followers. He added that the Opposition was already prepared to follow anybody, even Curzon, Chamberlain or Churchill, if only they could get rid of him . . .' (omission).

I spent a long time with Lev Borisovich discussing a number of subjects. The only subjects he avoided were those concerning foreign policy, as if to give me to understand that he had no wish to stay in Rome for any length of time. I asked him point blank about it. He said he would have been glad to return to the U.S.S.R. and accept a chair at the Marx-Engels Institute or even work as librarian. He said he was afraid that Koba might send him to Mongolia. I was surprised. He said he'd been told that Molotov had already suggested to the Instantia that he should be sent as political representative to Ulan Bator . . . He laughed . . .

Somehow, imperceptibly, we turned to anti-semitism. He pricked up his ears. It seemed as if this subject was distasteful to him. In fact, he looked like a real Great Russian and a Muscovite. The construction and pronunciation of the language he spoke were faultless, particularly his soft, full, pronunciation of the letter 'o', in the Novgorod manner. It was difficult to believe that he could be anything but a one hundred per cent Great Russian. His surname alone gave him away, but many people did not know it, assuming that his Party pseudonym was also his real surname . . . I was telling him of Klim's entourage and of his stories . . . He made a wry face and said: 'These are Trotsky's imaginings. He is suffering from a morbid Jewish

sensitivity in searching for anti-semitism. If anybody criticises him he must be an anti-semitic. After all you can't force people to like or dislike Jews. It's their private affair so long as they limit their anti-semitism to their private life . . . and don't let it invade the sphere of administrative relations' . . . I tried to prove that anti-semitism in private life was only the eructation of state anti-semitism . . . (omission) . . .

He stubbornly maintained that one should not exaggerate, call up spirits, create legends. Of course, anti-semitism existed in Russia. It resulted from many years of anti-Jewish propaganda and inequality of rights under the Empire. All this was being lived down and would soon pass. He added that there was only one way of solving the problem speedily and radically and that was to sponsor mixed marriages between Jew and Gentile. He said that in 1922 he suggested that the Instantsia should draw up a project for sponsoring and encouraging mixed marriages, but Illich and Trotsky would not hear of it. 'It falls within the sphere of personal relationships, in which the state should not interfere,' said Trotsky. Illich supported him . . . At that time everybody thought that anti-semitism would die out . . . (omission) . . .

Our conversation lasted for many hours. I hadn't had such a pleasant talk for a very long time.

## Chapter Two: 1928-1931

*Stalin's German policy – Plots and counterplots – Consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship – N.K.V.D.'s activities abroad*

In the end Stresemann would not risk opposing the army, the industrialists and the bankers. The Instantsia authorised Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky] to play all his cards in this most important diplomatic task. Some of our most outstanding military leaders – Tukhachevsky,<sup>1</sup> Kork<sup>2</sup> and Yakir are to be sent to Berlin to establish contact with the German generals.

Putna<sup>3</sup> is at present in Tokyo. He will be recalled and sent to London. Our army leaders received instructions from Koba personally. I made an attempt to find out what they were but he maintains an enigmatic silence. Obviously, Koba has demanded full secrecy. I don't like it; the foreign policy head should have been acquainted with such instructions. But I shall outwit Koba. Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky] will be informed of the conversations between the military leaders through Pfalz-Fein's<sup>4</sup> entourage.

The year is closing on a sad note. Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin\*] will probably leave us soon. His health is deteriorating. I shall have to take over the People's Commissariat. I do not relish the prospect. I would have preferred to resign and take up some academical activity, but Koba would not listen . . .

I find Koba's talk of contacts 'to order' between our army men and the Germans most distasteful. Fate certainly plays

<sup>1</sup> TUKHACHEVSKY, Mikhail, Marshal. One of the most brilliant Red Army Commanders. Organiser of the Soviet Parachute Force regiments. Chief of Staff of the Red Army and Deputy People's Commissar for Defence. Executed in 1937 on a charge of high treason.

<sup>2</sup> KORK, A. I., General. Former young Tsarist officer who joined the Soviets and distinguished himself in the Civil War. Commander of the Soviet War Academy in Moscow. Charged with treason and shot in 1937.

<sup>3</sup> PUTNA, Vitovt, General. Served as military attaché in Japan and Britain. Executed with other army leaders in 1937.

<sup>4</sup> PFALZ-FEIN. Russian nobleman of German descent who turned his Askana-Nova estate in Southern Russia into a huge preserve for rare and wild animals and tried unsuccessfully to breed horses with zebras. Lived in Germany after the Revolution.

some curious tricks. By a twist of history the Party standing on the extreme left, our Bolshevik Party, had to come to power thanks to contacts with the Prussian militarists, had to maintain power with the help of those contacts and to continue to flirt with the heirs of Frederick the Great . . . It was even . . . (omission) . . .

He knew of Ganetsky's<sup>1</sup> activity in Stockholm . . . I heard then for the first time of Ganetsky's and Radek's contacts with the German Embassy in Berne and with a German Attaché in Stockholm. Illich's tactics somewhat surprised the Scandinavian. 'He has remarkable political courage, if he is not afraid to jeopardise his reputation by authorising Radek to attend these meetings while the war is still on,' he said. We spoke of Ganetsky – not a particularly respectable person – and I explained to the Scandinavian that Illich had a personal debt, a debt of honour towards him. Once when Nadezhda Konstantinovna [Lenin's wife] was seriously ill Ganetsky had sent money for her treatment . . . As to Ganetsky, he was a small-time speculator, known for his fantastic deals with middlemen acting on behalf of the Germans, who were buying up everything for sale in Sweden . . .

Parvus,<sup>2</sup> of course, was much more dangerous than Ganetsky. Parvus made a fortune in deals with the German General Staff, buying up arms, food and metals throughout the world – yet he kept intact his relations with the German left-wing social-democrats. He was also on good terms with the Swiss left-wing parties having played some part in organising the Zimmerwald and Kuenthal conferences during the war. There is no doubt whatever that it was Parvus who suggested to Ludendorff<sup>3</sup> the

<sup>1</sup> GANETSKY. Representative of the Russian Bolshevik Party and later of the Soviet Government in Denmark. Acted as Liaison with the German General Staff. Helped to arrange Lenin's passage through Germany in the sealed train in March 1917.

<sup>2</sup> PARVUS-HELPAND, A. L. (known also under the pen-name of Molotov). Russian-Jewish Revolutionary who made his home in Germany and distinguished himself as an economist, publicist and Marxist doctrinaire. He helped and advised exiled Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin and Trotsky.

<sup>3</sup> LUDENDORFF, Erich von. German General. Chief of Staff to Hindenburg. Died 1937.

idea of granting Ilich a permit to pass through Germany. In any case, he always boasted that he had played a historic part and that, thanks to him, Russia was the first country in the world to establish a revolutionary socialist Government . . . The Scandinavian told me of Parvus's account of his first meeting with Ludendorff at General Headquarters. Ludendorff was not at first taken with the idea of Ilich's passage through Germany. He was afraid this might add fire to the campaign for peace waged by the left-wing social-democrats. He was also worried about reports in the press of the Entente which said that the revolution in Russia would lead to an intensification of military operations against Germany by the revolutionary Russian Army . . . The decisive factor which determined Ludendorff to authorise the passage of our comrades was the entry of the United States into the war, which became inevitable after 3rd February, 1917, when diplomatic relations were broken off with Washington. Ludendorff was anxious to finish the war before the mass participation of American troops. He wanted to balance the disparity of forces in the West by eliminating the Russian Army from the war . . . Objectively, we played the part of a bacillus introduced in the East . . .

It is not pleasant to realise these things, but after all he laughs best who laughs last . . . It was Ilich who laughed last, not Ludendorff . . . It is said that he could not forgive himself for authorising our comrades' journey. After Germany's collapse he said he had made a mistake.

The Russian Army would have disintegrated in any case under the strain of war, but at the time of the crisis in the autumn of 1918, the German left-wing elements would not have had before them the example of the Bolshevik Government in Russia; Germany's collapse could have been deferred, and this could have led to a negotiated peace . . . Groener<sup>1</sup> thought otherwise. He considered Ludendorff's move in the East showed a streak of genius, but he was unable to take advantage of the situation in the West . . . (omission) . . . After Rapallo, von

<sup>1</sup> GROENER, Wilhelm. Quartermaster General of the German Army in October 1918 who advised the Kaiser that further resistance was futile. He was Minister of Transport from 1920 to 1923 and Army Minister from 1928 to May 1932. Died in May 1939.

Maltzan<sup>1</sup> introduced to me von Hammerstein, von Seeckt<sup>2</sup> and Admiral Raeder.<sup>3</sup> They immediately offered to organise the Russian production of armaments, shells and submarines, to circumvent the Versailles treaty. I hesitated, but Illich, Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] and the Instantsia accepted the offer with alacrity. I regarded it as a mistake, and a big one. After Rapallo there was no danger of intervention. There were no Anglo-French troops to intimidate us. Churchill's *cordon sanitaire* was an empty threat and the Baltic States were glad to accept my offer of peace. We have helped German militarism to revive, and now it cannot be stopped. It would be difficult even to slow down the rate of its revival . . . Koba's game with the generals is a dangerous one . . . should the Germans be counting on finding accomplices among us, we shall only raise a storm on our Eastern<sup>4</sup> border . . . Koba's idea that Poland is a buffer state between us and Germany is profoundly mistaken . . . The buffer is doomed . . . It has been proved historically that an independent Poland cannot exist between Russia and Germany; she will be a vassal either of Russia or Germany . . . *Tertium non datur* . . . An independent Poland is a temporary product of a weak Germany and a weak Russia . . .

Pilsudski<sup>5</sup> once told me he was well aware of this and that Poland had to risk war in 1920 in the hope of creating a federation of Poland and the Ukraine and thus neutralising the danger of a powerful Russia in the future. He said it would have given him greater pleasure to lop off from Germany East Prussia and Brandenburg, with the ancient Polish lands of Pomerania and

<sup>1</sup> MALTZAN, von. Chief of the Oriental Section in the German Foreign Ministry. Ardent advocate of recognition of the Soviet Government.

<sup>2</sup> SEECKT, Hans von. Chief of the German Army Command from March 1920 to October 1926. Had been Chief of Staff, Eastern Front, in 1915-16. After retiring from the German Army in 1926 he became military adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek (1932-5). Died in December 1936.

<sup>3</sup> RAEDER, Erich. Grand Admiral of the German Navy. Chief of Naval Command, 1928-35, C.-in-C. of the Navy, 1935-43. Sentenced to life imprisonment for war crimes in October 1946.

<sup>4</sup> Translator's note: Russian text says 'Eastern' – it should probably read 'Western'.

<sup>5</sup> PILSUDSKI, Joseph. Polish statesman – President of Poland from 1926 to his death in 1935.

Silesia, than march on Kiev . . . But soundings in London, Paris and Washington had yielded negative results. Marshal Foch was the only one to support the idea . . . The British declared that if Poland took such action they would brand her as an aggressor . . . They would not even yield on Silesia when Polish insurgents seized part of it in 1919 . . . Foaming at the mouth, Lloyd George spoke of the injustice of taking their land from the Germans and giving it to the Poles . . . To Pilsudski these were former Polish territories, which had been Germanised for five centuries but irrigated with Polish blood . . . Strange, too, is our passion for the Germans . . . When Ilich was composing his letter to Pilsudski before our war with Poland started, I tried to persuade him to agree with Poland at the expense of Germany. He threw up his hands in horror . . . ‘Germany is our hope in the West,’ he said. ‘Revolution in Germany would place the Soviet power on such a secure foundation that the victory of world revolution would be assured . . . Your project is utter madness. Objectively, it is treason . . . Pilsudski is a most dangerous petty bourgeois and a puppet in the hands of the Entente. We shall dig our own grave if we strengthen the Poland of the nobility . . .’ I admit that Ilich disappointed me. I did not think he would decide this all important question by using the arguments of tub-thumping orators at meetings . . . (omission) . . .

I read the notes of a talk between Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky] and von Seeckt. von Seeckt could not have been more candid. ‘We need a free hand in the West,’ he declared, ‘and a secure flank in the event of war with France. Give us this guarantee and we shall give you a free hand in the East. Do what you please with China, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Manchuria. We shall support you if you clash with Japan. The Western parliamentary democracies are rotten to the core. Russia and Germany could divide the world . . .’ Pity Ilich had no time to read the correspondence between the ex-Tsar Nicholas and the ex-Kaiser, published by our State Publishing House. He would have found there a letter from the Kaiser saying exactly the same thing. He would have learned that after meeting Edward VII the German Emperor signalled from his ship: ‘The Admiral of the Pacific Ocean greets the Admiral of

the Atlantic Ocean . . .' The Germans wanted to deceive both us and the British by selling what they hadn't got in the East . . I consider that as long as the Prussian junkers control the destinies of Germany no understanding between ourselves and the Germans is possible . . Our recent negotiations with the German military leaders simply serve to strengthen the Prussian overlords and are a source of mortal danger to us . . Only because the foxy Stresemann is telling fairy tales in Paris to the gullible Briand, and because Briand believes the Germans will leave Alsace-Lorraine in peace and attack us . . No German industrialist or banker would support such a scheme, even if Stresemann decided to come to an understanding with the West and turn against us . . (omission) . . I have decided to submit a detailed memorandum to the Instantsia. Even if they ignore it, it will nevertheless be available to posterity. When disaster overtakes us and the Germans again rush into battle, let it be known that I bear no responsibility . .

There is yet time but speed is essential. We must build a dam against the militaristic *Sturm und Drang* which threatens us . . von Hammerstein is a fool. He proves Heine's contention that man has a right to stupidity, but the Germans are abusing that right . . This latest conversation with Kork shows . . (omission). Idle talk about fleets of zeppelins for the destruction of Paris and London . . Raeder promises to build two hundred submarines in five years at our Nikolaev shipyards and one hundred on the Baltic. He is asking half of them for the Germans, for their aid and consultation . . Quite a price . . But as the saying goes: To you the roots and to us the tops . . We can buy patents at a price, pay technicians and engineers large salaries, and even then it would cost us only one tenth of the price asked by Raeder . . The Germans do take us for unmitigated fools . . (omission) . .

von Seeckt is leaving for China shortly. Koba insists on seeing him and talking to him. I am against the idea. It is not certain yet if von Seeckt will remain loyal to the end . . He is the person most disposed towards us among the army leaders, but it wouldn't do for the Secretary-General of the Communist Party to see such an arrant militarist . . Koba turns down every suggestion that he should meet an Ambassador . . 'It is not

done,' he says. 'I am a private person, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party.' Yet here he is insisting on meeting a German general. I have often mused on this passion our leaders have for the Germans . . . I have spent a long time in England, I . . . (omission) . . . Is it only because Karl Marx was born in Germany? Yet he was buried in London . . . and (omission). Or is it a heritage from Peter the Great's time, to take it for granted that the Germans can do everything? . . . That their technicians and organisers lead the world . . . I have seen the English and their technical skill, and regard it superior to the Germans . . . not to mention the Americans; real modern technical skill and the ability to organise production belong to the United States, not to Germany . . .

1929

Have received a letter from Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]. Now I understand why Koba has ordered our military people not to divulge his instructions . . . If our military leaders ever thought of talking, the Opposition would be provided with a terrible weapon against Koba . . . Naturally . . . (omission) . . . one must not accuse Koba, for . . . (omission) . . . I nevertheless consider that such instructions may sometimes rebound against their author . . . Koba is a true disciple of Machiavelli . . . Our military people have told their German counterparts that they are prepared to collaborate with them against the Communist Party and that at a chosen moment they could seize power and set up a pro-German government in the U.S.S.R. Therefore nothing should be done against the present Soviet Government, and Stresemann's plans for the creation of a unified bloc against it should be thwarted. The overthrow of the present Soviet Government would lead to the setting up of a new government under the wing of France and England, while a military *coup d'état* in the Kremlin would bring a pro-German government into power and ensure for Germany the inexhaustible markets of a Russia ruled by a military dictatorship . . . The Germans, it appears, have swallowed the bait. There is now no longer any need to fear Stresemann; the Army will prevent him . . . (omission) . . .



Reports from Teheran say our friend, Teimur Tash,<sup>1</sup> has compromised himself irretrievably. The Shah intends to . . . (omission) . . . Davtyan<sup>2</sup> thinks all necessary measures should be taken well in advance in the Russpers<sup>3</sup> and Caspian industries. The caviar affair<sup>4</sup> must not be repeated, for the Shah is capable of ordering the arrest of the directors of Russpers, and then most unpleasant things would happen . . . The Persians complain that thanks to Teimur Tash and his wife we have received many privileges in return for bribes and other things . . . The Khoshtarya concession<sup>5</sup> will be annulled for good. The Kevir Khuriam Company has lost all justification . . .



. . . Solovyev called during my absence. He wanted to see me very badly . . . (omission) . . . Reports from Paris say Gulbenkian insists on our fulfilling our obligations . . . Petrofina is also

<sup>1</sup> TEIMUR TASH. Persian Minister of the Court from 1926 to 1932 and one of the most influential Persian politicians at the time. In 1927 he opened negotiations with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

<sup>2</sup> DAVTYAN, Yakov. Soviet diplomat in Teheran. He had served as First Counsellor in Paris in 1925.

<sup>3</sup> RUSSPERS. Russian-Persian Oil Company set up for the exploitation of oil deposits in Northern Persia. Its operations were discontinued at an early stage.

<sup>4</sup> After the October revolution the Persian Government refused to recognise the claims of the Soviet Government to a concession for fishing sturgeon in the south Caspian Sea, which it had granted to a Russian firm (Lianazov Brothers) in 1867. Although the Russians continued to exploit the fishing grounds on a limited scale, the Persians' refusal to recognise the concession (alleging that the Russian firm had been nationalised) and other factors, strained relations between the two countries and resulted in 1926 in a complete Soviet economic boycott of Persia. But in the following year (1927) the two countries concluded a twenty-five-year agreement on fishing rights in the south Caspian (and other disputed economic questions) which, although not as favourable to the Russians as the original Lianazov concession, gave them a substantial share of the caviar to be found in the area. For detailed references to the subject see *Russia and the West in Iran* by George Lenczowski (Cornell University Press, New York, 1948) and *Soviet Economic Policy in the East* by Violet Conolly (Oxford University Press, London, 1933), pp. 63-4.

<sup>5</sup> KHOSHTARYA concessions. A concession secured by the Russian Government for fishing sturgeon in Persian waters. The Kevir Khuriam Company had also a fishing concession.

pressing . . . I do not understand how Piatakov could promise the same things to different people . . . (omission) . . . The Petrofina people are right: they have priority. I could never understand why Piatakov preferred Gulbenkian. It would have been much more effective to organise a joint company for the exploitation of oil in the Khorasan province with the French or Belgians than with Gulbenkian . . . Now all this business has been irretrievably lost . . . Khoshtarya's licence will undoubtedly be declared void . . . We have missed a rare opportunity . . . To secure the right of exploiting the oil resources of North Persia will not be so easy . . .

A pity . . . The Instantsia has met to discuss the situation on the Chinese Railway . . . Reports from Harbin make it clear that the possibility of Chang Hsueh-liang<sup>1</sup> openly seizing the Railway cannot be ruled out . . . Some action is called for, but Karakhan\* is afraid . . . I don't think the Japanese will interfere . . . We have divided Manchuria into spheres of influence since the days of the Motono-Izvolsky Convention.<sup>2</sup> What more do they want? . . . Without mentioning the fisheries and other concessions we have granted them in Sakhalin . . . And the goldfield concession on the Zeya . . . That successor to a Mukden bandit needs a sharp rap over the knuckles, otherwise he will become too unruly . . . Then military action would become unavoidable . . . Chang Hsueh-liang will not risk a conflict with us after the murder of his father by the Japanese . . . He knows that the Japanese will not interfere at present . . . Blucher\* could squash Chang Hsueh-liang's generals like flies . . .



A lengthy conversation with the German Ambassador on the subject of the six-months anniversary of the signing of the

<sup>1</sup> CHANG HSUEH-LIANG. Son of Chang Tso-lin; succeeded his father as C.-in-C. in Manchuria, but placed himself at the service of the nationalist regime in 1929 and later became a general in Chiang Kai-shek's Army. He went over to the Communist side in 1936 and kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek for two weeks (December 1936).

<sup>2</sup> MOTONO-IZVOLSKY. The so-called Kyakhta Treaty of 1915, named after the Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky.

Kellogg Pact.<sup>1</sup> I made fun of all the hopes Stresemann placed on this woeful agreement . . . I told the German that without disarmament all prohibitions on making war were futile . . . I gave him to understand that as far as the Germans were concerned, they had nothing to lose from disarmament, except the chance of gaining equality, since the Versailles Treaty forbids them to arm in any case . . . The Ambassador agreed . . . Gossip about Koba having quarrelled with Alliluyeva . . . She has left him and now lives in the National [Hotel]. He has visited her . . . He has tried to persuade her to return . . . All because of that Georgian singer . . . A telephone conversation with Mikhail Ivanovich [Kalinin]\* . . . Asked me to do him a personal favour: to issue a diplomatic passport to some girl from the V.Ts.I.K.<sup>2</sup> She is travelling to Paris . . . For stockings and powder, naturally . . . Where does he get these girls? Especially at his age . . . They say he visits a Komsomol hostel on the excuse of keeping in touch with the young people, the Party members of the future who will take over from us. One of those trips ended in a slapped face for our President of the Republic – a girl slapped him because he stroked her blouse . . . All the same it is rather embarrassing when he pretends to be . . . (omission) . . . They run some sort of amateur theatricals at the hostel, and Mikhail Ivanovich also takes part in them. I heard that at one of the Instantsia meetings he was caught in the act of learning some minor part for one of these amateur theatricals . . . Not in vain do we have a saying: ‘As soon as a man’s beard goes grey, the devil enters his heart’ . . . The strangest thing about it all is that Koba apparently encourages Mikhail Ivanovich in his pursuits, but demands circumstantial and detailed reports on them from some agents of the ‘neighbours’ living in the hostel. He has in his possession several photographs showing poor Mikhail Ivanovich in attitudes unbecoming to the President of V.Ts.I.K. If Mikhail Ivanovich ever thought of going over to the Opposition, then . . . (omission) . . .

<sup>1</sup> KELLOGG PACT – for the renunciation of war by the Great Powers, signed in Paris 1928. Named after Frank Kellogg, United States Secretary of State from 1927 to 1929.

<sup>2</sup> V.Ts.I.K. All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

We are certainly in for a period of scandals. This time, in my opinion, the initiative comes from Koba. He was told that the Opposition intended to use Demian's scurrilities and the affair of Nadya Alliluyeva against him. Two days later Comrades Bukharina and Rykova applied for divorces and produced the most compromising proof against Bukharin\* and Rykov.\* The head of *Zags* received an order from the Chairman of the Moscow Soviet to examine both cases as soon as possible. The case will be heard in camera, but an order has been given that a detailed record of the proceedings should be supplied to the Instantsia. Now Koba is well armed in case he should be attacked on the score of his private life and party ethics. He will reply with an immediate counter-attack . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Met Anatoly Vassilievich [Lunacharsky]. He told me that there are several groups of spiritualists in Moscow. They meet in the flat of Rozengoltz's\* wife, who is an ardent spiritualist, and spend their time table-lifting. In charge of all this business is a certain Osipov from the 'neighbours' Secret Department. Osipov is seventy years old and an expert in the deciphering of cryptograms. He used to work in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry. An old spiritualist . . . Anatoly Vassilievich's wife attends their meetings. It appears that they evoke there certain . . . Soviet spirits. They also evoke Karl Marx's spirit and . . . Lenin's . . . Osipov is undoubtedly an old counter-revolutionary, as Ilich's spirit unexpectedly recommended the dissolution of the Soviet regime. All present were shaken by this extraordinary declaration; Rozengoltz's wife even fainted with emotion and declared that she would pass on the strange message to her husband. Anatoly Vassilievich laughed until tears poured down his face. I also laughed, but advised him to stop his wife from attending the seances, since the matter might end with Yagoda discovering a 'conspiracy of spirits' against the Soviet regime, with . . . Lenin taking part in it . . . Anything can be expected from Yagoda; and Osipov, who may not be quite so stupid as he appears, may be an *agent provocateur*. Russia has always been a country of endless possibilities, and under the Soviet regime the possibilities have even multiplied . . .

Oumansky passes on some interesting details of differences of opinion over reparations. He got them from one of Owen Young's<sup>1</sup> secretaries. Young will play the part of arbiter. He called Schacht a 'financial crook' after Schacht's report to the Experts' Committee. According to Young an agreement will be reached, but it will be impossible to preserve all the details of the Dawes Plan: it will be necessary to make concessions to the Germans. Young wants to divide the payments into two periods: the first of thirty-seven and the second of twenty-two years; altogether fifty-nine years. During the first period the Germans would pay from 1,700,000 to 2,100,000 marks a year, the amounts progressively increasing. During the first period they would fully cover the Allies' war-debt payments to the United States. To satisfy the French, Belgians and Italians, Young will propose cutting the English share to nineteen per cent and increasing those of the French, Belgians and Italians . . . Oumansky thinks Young's proposals will be accepted. In my opinion, he is wrong . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

The arguments in the Experts' Committee have now been going on for three months . . . Taking everything into account, we are still protected by Koba's scheme to have our military people combine with their German counterparts, but it now seems to me that Oumansky was right: an agreement will be reached, and then the Allies will automatically agree to evacuate the Rhineland and co-operate fully with Germany. But Stresemann cannot hold out for long: the military party will turn him out. Groener had prepared a detailed report on Stresemann's 'betrayal' for Hindenburg's benefit. It must be admitted that Koba is a first-rate tactician . . . (omission) . . . Of course, we need not worry, but for how long? If Stresemann resigns, the military party will take over, and then Groener and Co. will begin to exert pressure on our military people and demand . . . (omission) . . . Koba is a first-rate tactician, but I do not regard him as a specialist in political strategy. He is capable of carrying

<sup>1</sup> YOUNG, Owen. American lawyer and business magnate. Author of a plan for settlement of German reparations in 1929. Previously connected with the Dawes Plan.

out brilliantly a manœuvre over a short period, but he does not realise what the long-term consequences of his manœuvre will be. He has succeeded in protecting us against Stresemann through his scheme with the military people; but where will the process of the remilitarisation and revival of German power end? Nobody can foretell that, and it is possible that in avoiding one danger we may bring upon ourselves another, a much more terrible one . . . After all is said and done, Weimar Germany as part of an anti-Soviet bloc is less dangerous than a reborn militaristic Germany seeking contacts in our military circles . . . How will it all end? . . . (omission) . . . Koba is a master of political mimicry, but he forgets his Marx: one cannot deceive whole classes. I have been told that a new return to Soviet patriotism is in preparation. Impossible to tell what it signifies: a serious change or the continuation of Koba's scheme with the military clique. One can expect anything from him: he is capable of declaring himself military dictator, of disbanding the Instantsia, of having the majority of its members shot, and of establishing a military dictatorship – in anticipation, of course, of the favourable historical moment when it will be possible to revert to the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Koba's genuine ambition is to become the leader of world Communism, to prove to Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] that he has surpassed him, and that he, and not Lev Davidovich, is Lenin's successor and continuuer of his work. Koba possesses boundless political flexibility and an iron hand. He believes that it is possible to control any class or group of people by the use of force – brutal physical force. His prescription: physically destroy the leaders, and deceive the masses who have been left in an amorphous state by the lack of leadership. Will he succeed? Will he manage to control the new groups which he himself is creating in the course of his political manœuvres? According to our old Marxist prescription, the thing cannot be done . . . We shall see . . .



The setting-up of the Bank for International Settlements has been agreed. It is a date of the greatest historical importance: from now on the United States has secured for itself hegemony

in world finance. The Bourse de Paris and the City have become the vassals of Wall Street . . .



6th June, 1929. Have received an interesting letter from Oumansky. He reports the existence of a draft agreement produced by the Experts' Committee which will be initialled tomorrow. The reparations payments have been divided into two parts: conditional and unconditional. The unconditional payments – 660,000,000 marks yearly. An international conference will meet at The Hague in two months' time to ratify the new plan, which has been christened the Young Plan . . . Long conversations with the Italian and German Ambassadors. The Italian insists that Italy cannot sacrifice her reparation payments in order to further Briand's political aims. The German threatens that Germany may stop paying altogether.

As Kozma Prutkov<sup>1</sup> says, 'Stupid is the man who thinks the unembraceable can be embraced' – or something of this kind . . .



July – August – September 1929. . . . I have been reading the provincial press. What poverty, what boredom fill its columns! One might think it was printed to act as a soporific. Nothing of any interest – not a single line, not a single word . . .

. . . Saw my friend from Samara. He is preparing to leave for the Far East, for Khabarovsk. He has told me terrible details of what is happening in the countryside. A mass action against the kulaks<sup>2</sup> is in full swing. Women and children are being driven out of their cottages. Many are sent without discrimination to the Urals and Siberia. If this goes on, the peasants will soon get hold of their pitchforks . . . We must be extremely careful along our frontiers: we mustn't have any complications . . .



<sup>1</sup> PRUTKOV, Kozma, fictitious writer to whom a group of authors attributed pithy sayings.

<sup>2</sup> KULAKS. Well-to-do, land-owning peasants.

. . . Saw Yakir. He had been to Paris and seen his brother, an old émigré, as well as a woman acquaintance from Kishinev, a Bessarabian Communist. He told me he'd been asked questions about Trotsky . . . Yakir travelled under his own name, but his visit passed completely unnoticed by the Paris press although he is one of our best known young army commanders. When he visited Germany, the local press followed all his movements. Strange that France, Russia's recent ally, should be so little interested in our army and its leaders . . .

The 'neighbours', unlike the Paris press, did take notice of Yakir's visit to Paris. They have written to me from Paris to say that the local 'neighbours' followed all his movements very carefully. The wife of the 'neighbours' chief even managed to flirt with him, so as to be able to accompany him wherever he went. A detailed report on all his meetings, conversations and contacts in Paris has now arrived. In some restaurant in the Rue Fondary, kept by a Bessarabian Communist, obviously the same woman about whom Yakir spoke to me, our army commander had a quiet chat with some Tsarist general, who did not even know to whom he was talking. He also visited Kuprin's library, which is opposite the same restaurant, and attended an émigré meeting . . . I do not understand why Yakir had to be shadowed: he is a member of the Central Party Committee and more reliable than our 'neighbours' chief in Paris, a former Social-Revolutionary . . .



. . . The Hague conference opened yesterday. Briand took the tenor's part. Stresemann supported him. Oumansky reports that Snowden is preparing a violent speech, and that Chéron<sup>1</sup> will be no less violent. He believes that the Anglo-French conflict will continue with its present acerbity and that the Americans will support the French against the English. I do not understand where he gets his information. His usual source has left for Italy . . .



<sup>1</sup> CHÉRON, Henri. French Minister of Finance in 1928–30; Minister of Justice in 1934; died in 1936.

. . . A conversation with the German Ambassador. He thinks that the Germans will emerge victorious from the Hague conference . . .

. . . Oumansky reports a complete break between the English and the French at The Hague. Chéron, in his opinion, is a man of exceptional energy and grit. He obviously wanted to pay me a compliment: he claimed that Chéron had a profile like mine – I don't see in which way we resemble each other. I have never seen him! . . . Snowden<sup>1</sup> has taken the bit between his teeth. Germany's small creditors – Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece – are with him. Germany is awaiting the outcome of the Anglo-French dispute. I am told that Stresemann is gleefully rubbing his hands, but that his health has deteriorated so much that he is unlikely to live for more than another two years . . . Briand personally supported Chéron against Snowden. Briand's logic is of the arithmetical kind; if one state disagrees with the point of view of five other states and refuses to give way, then it bears the responsibility for the crisis. Snowden, on the other hand, believes in the 'reasonable minority' theory. 'It often happens that the truth is on the side of the minority,' he says. 'One state may be right against five . . .' Nobody knows who will define the 'reasonableness' of the 'minority'. This reminds me of Illich, who always used to speak of an 'active and rational minority'. Snowden is a great friend of Christian Georgievich [Rakovsky\*]. When Christian was our ambassador in London, he expounded at great length Illich's revolutionary philosophy and his 'reasonable minority' theory to Snowden. If the Paris press knew of those Snowdenian conversations . . . (omission) . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

. . . Frightening news again from the countryside. Nikolai Ivanovich [Bukharin\*] has called Koba a Genghis-Khan. I know Koba: he will never forgive Ivanovich for having called him that. Nikolai Ivanovich will pay dearly . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

<sup>1</sup> SNOWDEN, Philip. British Labour Party leader and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1924 and from 1929–31.

. . . Mass arrests are being carried out in Moscow. The arrested are mostly members of the Komsomol, but there are also old Party members. Many are being deported to the provinces and Siberia for terms of hard labour. A merciless purge is being carried out in the higher educational establishments. My secretary, a Komsomol girl, has been arrested. I tried to telephone Koba, but he rebuffed me so harshly that I understood: we would soon be faced with a period of frightful terror. Koba's tone was threatening: 'We will not tolerate the interference of any person whatever in the task of defending the Party against its class enemies . . .' Yagoda has become all powerful. He is strolling about in his uniform and wearing all the decorations which Koba helped him to get. The arrests are in full swing. It is reported that those arrested are being submitted to pressure to make confessions. They frequently arrest whole families . . . This is horrible . . . I sometimes think of my own family, of my children . . . Sometimes I go back in my thoughts to the 1918 period, when Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] ordered that the families of Tsarist officers, who had fled to the South and the Caucasus, should be arrested. Adolf Abramovich [Yoffe\*] told me of a conversation he had with him, in the course of which he reproached him for these measures. 'We must be merciless in our struggle with the class enemy, or else we shall be smashed and physically destroyed,' Lev Davidovich replied. Koba is applying the same tactics against the Opposition. He considers them class enemies, because they are fighting against the decisions of the Central Committee and the Instantsia. In so far as the Central Committee represents the Party, Koba is formally right . . . But morally . . . In that aspect of the matter he is as little interested as Lev Davidovich was . . . All this is dreadful . . . This is where we have got after all the sacrifices we made on the altars of the Revolution during the Tsarist period . . . Blood and tears are everywhere. Even those weep who only yesterday were with us at Party meetings, voted alongside us, and together with us attended Illich's funeral. One must be made of iron or completely heartless, as Koba is, to be able to pass undisturbed by that hell. I am afraid of something else too: Koba will now select a new Party leadership, and all the comrades appointed by him will be as cruel and pitiless as

himself. To what will it lead us in the future? . . . What regime can be built on such a basis? Koba's socialism is actually assuming a Genghis-Khan character . . . I sometimes regret that I left England . . . It is true there was no other road and the Revolution appeared so luminous and so full of promise . . .



. . . Visited the *Gostsirk*<sup>1</sup> with the children. Yagoda was in one of the boxes wearing full uniform and surrounded by several of his henchmen. After the usual horses and clowns came the turn of the singer and his *chastushki*.<sup>2</sup> One of the verses was devoted to Yagoda:

*Do not swagger too much,  
You not-a-year-old Communist . . .  
Or in a jiffy Genichka Yagoda  
Will make you sing small . . .*

There was applause everywhere. It is said that Yagoda ordered the limerick from Mayakovsky, who wrote it at the same time as the advertisements he had been commissioned to write for Mosselprom<sup>3</sup> and Gosfarmatrest.<sup>4</sup> While he was drunk at the Praga Hotel, Mayakovsky declared: 'Today I wrote three advertisements in verse: one for Mosselprom, one for the G.P.U., and a third for Gosfarmatrest on the merits of perfected preventatives. I thus celebrated in verse Mosselprom, Yagoda and the gonococcus . . .' Mayakovsky is a boor, but he has great talent. And his poetry will live in the memory of the new revolutionary generation. His verse is quite a different matter from Bednei's literary efforts . . . They have written to me from Paris that Mayakovsky, who often visits that city on account of some woman, always walks about with a pocket-sized roulette board and insists that everybody plays with him. Our *charge*

<sup>1</sup> **GOSTSIRK.** State Circus.

<sup>2</sup> **CHASTUSHKI.** A characteristic form of Russian folk song composed on some topic of the day.

<sup>3</sup> **MOSSELPROM.** Moscow Agricultural Industries. Food producing and distributing organisation.

<sup>4</sup> **GOSFARMATREST.** State Pharmaceutical Trust.

*d'affaires* is allegedly his drinking companion and together they are supposed to be writing uncensored poetry . . .



. . . Sandomirsky was today searched in his office. We had to stop working. Never before had the 'neighbours' permitted themselves such an affront to the Narkomindel. Notwithstanding Koba's harshness, I decided to protest to the Instantsia. The thing is making us feel embarrassed in front of foreigners. Sandomirsky was taken away in the presence of everybody. It's impossible to understand what they want with him. He has never had any dealings with the Opposition . . .

. . . Our girl typists have gone mad over Vertinsky's<sup>1</sup> records. The diplomatic couriers are bringing the records in the diplomatic bags. Even during office hours they spend hours listening to that stupid music with its meaningless words intended for hysterical females. Today, while I was talking to the Afghan Ambassador, the sounds of a Vertinsky song came from the adjoining office. I had to mete out administrative punishment . . .

. . . The American banker Lamont, of the Morgan group, tried to make MacDonald restrain Snowden at The Hague. MacDonald sharply refused. Snowden received a telegram thanking him for his determined stand. France has lost the match at The Hague . . .



. . . The English have become greater 'Briandites' than Briand himself. They have made public their decision to evacuate the Third Zone by the end of the year. Briand will now have to haggle and accept a change in the date of evacuation, which at Versailles was fixed for 1935 . . .



. . . Had a talk with the German Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> He was

<sup>1</sup> VERTINSKY. Composer and singer of light songs much in vogue just before the revolution. Later exiled abroad where he continued working.

<sup>2</sup> DIRKSEN, Herbert von. He had been head of the Eastern department in the German Foreign Ministry (1925-8) and was Ambassador in Moscow from 1928 to 1933, when he was transferred to Tokyo. In 1938-9 he served as Ambassador to Great Britain.

delighted with the protocol of The Hague Conference, which was signed yesterday. The final ratification of the protocol has been postponed until next year, but basically the matter is closed. Germany has achieved a political victory. Stresemann has won, thanks to his manœuvring. In the Wilhelmstrasse he is being compared with Bülow. The Ambassador did not conceal the fact that the German military circles and big industrialists now wanted to get rid of Stresemann and follow the line of great-power politics. They consider Stresemann a 'small shopkeeper'. Besides, his health is hopelessly shaken. The Ambassador dropped a hint that Stresemann knew about our game with the military people and that he was very dissatisfied. He threatened to disclose our 'intrigues', to use his own expression . . . We must hope that he will soon either die or resign, for otherwise a great political scandal on an international scale would become unavoidable . . .

. . . A letter from Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]. He confirms the Ambassador's words. A violent agitation for the lifting of all the limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty is in full swing. The National Party demands the return of the eastern provinces and the Corridor. Hindenburg is preparing a public statement. The situation in Silesia is getting worse. Groener is obviously preparing to carry out Germany's re-armament in the shortest possible time . . . The Germans have forgotten nothing and learnt nothing. The military circles are once again raising the ghost of Prussian militarism. The big industrialists not only want the return of lost territories: they demand the full financial emancipation of Germany and the re-establishment of her full potential, including her colonies. The navy will be rebuilt . . . The threat it would present to us in the Baltic is obvious, although it could not measure up to the British Navy . . . It will be necessary to raise the matter with the Instantsia and . . . (omission), otherwise . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Hindenburg has published his declaration to the German people. The die is cast. Germany has again taken the road that leads to a revival of militarism. Another world war is inevitable . . . I fear that we shall be its first victims . . . The Instantsia is quite undisturbed. Koba considers that the Germans will first strike against Poland and that therefore there is no need for us

to worry. We must only go on building our industries at a devil's pace and be ready when another world war breaks out. Koba's coolness surprises me. Why is he certain that the Germans will attack the Poles before they attack anybody else? And what if they were pushed into an agreement with the Poles, an agreement whose costs we should have to bear? . . .

. . . Have obtained interesting information from the 'neighbours' concerning the Stahlhelm<sup>1</sup> and the Nazis. In both these organisations the 'neighbours' have agents, who have penetrated to the very top. Incidents on the Polish border and a repetition of the Oppeln murders<sup>2</sup> are being planned . . . The Ministry of State Aid for Prussian Junkerdom in East Prussia has become the centre where attacks against the Corridor and Silesia are being prepared . . . It is possible that Koba has more detailed information from the 'neighbours' and hence his calm . . . But it is also possible . . . (omission) . . . That would have been the peak of Koba's Machiavellism. The 'neighbours' agents inside the Stahlhelm and among the Nazis could, of course, . . . (omission) . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

. . . In my opinion, Treviranus<sup>3</sup> is directly connected with the 'neighbours' organisation. They know beforehand the content of his speeches directed against Poland . . . If the incidents continue . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

. . . The Turks have clearly betrayed us. Reports from London and Paris confirm that . . . Their ambassador in Paris belongs

<sup>1</sup> STAHLHELM. Steel helmets – pre-Nazi German military organisation.

<sup>2</sup> OPPELN MURDERS. A series of murders committed by 'Vehme', a German nationalist organisation operating against the Polish minority in German Silesia in 1919–21. They were intended to terrorise Poles living on the German side of the border and discourage them from agitating for the transfer of Upper Silesia to Poland.

<sup>3</sup> TREVIRANUS, Gottfried. Originally a naval officer he became a member of the German National Party and served in the Bruning administration from 1930 to 1932 as Minister for Occupied Territories, High Commissioner for Relief in East Prussia and as Minister of Transport. Escaped abroad after a Nazi attempt on his life and settled in Canada.

to the anti-Kemal opposition, but he has been sent to Paris for a special purpose. It is not in vain that Kemal is an eastern statesman . . . I spoke about it to Koba. He told me to increase our vigilance and, at the same time, make concessions to the Turks in small matters . . . I do not quite understand . . . It is interesting to observe the difference in Koba's treatment of Western and Asiatic statesmen. Koba is always more attentive towards the latter. This is perhaps a vestige of his former mentality, acquired while he was Commissar for the Nationalities . . . Besides, as regards the Turks, the situation is clear: they are openly striving to restore their old alliance with the English. That is the historical line of their policy and nothing can prevent it. All we can do is to weaken it. Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan]\* does not understand it at all. He continues to live in the past, when Frunze visited Ankara and Kemal assured him that Turkey had once for all broken off her links with England and would henceforth be on our side. That was true while we were weak, but now the Turks realise that in our policy we shall be forced to revert to old aims, and they are taking the precaution of renewing their insurance policy in London . . .



. . . A lengthy conversation with Molotov. He understands nothing at all about foreign policy. Rather strange in a man with his load of knowledge and erudition. He expounded to me his theory on the forthcoming collapse of capitalism as a result of a world-wide economic crisis, the symptoms of which were recently described by Varga<sup>1</sup> in the Gosplan<sup>2</sup> publication. Molotov considers that this crisis will be the last one, and that it will be followed by a cycle of wars and the complete destruction of capitalism. When I asked him to state when that was likely to happen, he tightened his lips and said: 'Well, let us say in ten, fifteen years' time . . .' I replied that it was nonsense, and he visibly took umbrage. In his capacity of Second Secretary

<sup>1</sup> VARGA, Eugene. Soviet economist of Hungarian origin. Has lived in Russia since 1920. One of the authors of the first Five-Year Plan. Director of the Moscow Institute of World Economics and Politics from 1927 to 1948.

<sup>2</sup> GOSPLAN. The State (Five-Year) Plan, and the Government department set up to draft it and control its implementation.

he has pretensions to the leadership of foreign Communist Parties and considers himself a great expert on world affairs and economics . . .



There's been more trouble in the cell. The chief of organisational work has been found in possession of Bednei's lampoon. Discipline among our diplomatic couriers has broken down completely because the 'neighbours' have absorbed them all into their network of secret agents with instructions to watch the members of our foreign missions. It is the job of these couriers to carry personal letters to the U.S.S.R. from abroad, thus by-passing the Post Office with its secret censorship. This gives the 'neighbours' a chance of making themselves familiar with the Opposition's correspondence, to which they attach considerable importance . . . (omission).

Koba asked me personally not to touch two of the diplomatic couriers, both drunkards and smugglers of stockings and of Vertinsky's gramophone records. I had intended transferring these two to other work. Koba said they were indispensable . . . Odd indispensability . . .

Our Consul-General in Constantinople wants a transfer to some other post. His work there has become impossible since Trotsky's arrival in Turkey. The 'neighbours' have sent a score of their agents to the country; and these agents are interfering in the work of the Consul-General, issuing orders, threatening to arrest him and to deport him to the U.S.S.R. I shall suggest to Koba that one of their most important members should be appointed Consul-General to put a stop to this impossible situation. I want to wash my hands of the affair; if the 'neighbours' are given an important assignment by Koba or the Instantsia let them deal with it themselves . . .

Arens has sent me a long letter. He insists on leaving Paris where he has quarrelled with our *chargé d'affaires*. Arens gave some details which must be verified. Drunkenness and brawling are rife among the staff. The *chargé d'affaires*, while he was drunk, tried to shoot the Commercial Attaché.

The morals of members of our commercial representation have gone completely. Drunken orgies take place at the home

of one of the staff members at Chaville. I cannot understand how one can sink so low.

I think our struggle with the Opposition must be at the root of this lowering of moral standards. Everything is now subordinated to this struggle and . . . (omission).

Dovgalevsky\* is always ill and away. He has a weak character, too. As for his wife, she is . . . (omission) . . . The whole affair is bound to blow up in a huge political row, in view of interconnected personal and political factors.

Molotov may go to Paris, but the Instantsia want to send someone less conspicuous in order to avoid publicity and press campaigns. They don't want to involve the 'neighbours' directly because of the same dangers.

Molotov is demanding drastic measures . . .

It's said that he's always backed up our *chargé d'affaires*; they have been old friends since 1920 when Molotov was Secretary-General in the Ukraine. Molotov now wants to . . . (omission).

I had a long talk with Koba and Molotov, who insisted that the Moscow Protocol<sup>1</sup> should become the basis of our foreign policy. It isn't really feasible; they can't realise that the Protocol represents only our adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and is an attempt to neutralise the fact that we weren't invited to sign it. It's only now that Molotov has realised the stupidity of his proposal that we should boycott the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The idea was suggested to him by our *chargé d'affaires*. Apparently Briand had a long talk with him in private after the disgraceful Paris business. Molotov had received a copy of this conversation, but no one bothered to tell me about it. Briand had offered to sign a separate Protocol with us which would confirm our agreement to put the Pact into effect. He explained that a separate protocol was necessary because there were no diplomatic relations between ourselves and most countries, and this might affect subsequent adherence to the Pact. He declared, however, that the protocol might later be declared an integral

<sup>1</sup> MOSCOW PROTOCOL. An agreement signed in Moscow in 1929 bringing into force the Kellogg-Briand pact for the renunciation of war between Russia and Poland, Rumania, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and the Free City of Danzig.

part of the Pact outlawing war . . . Molotov took on himself the responsibility of turning down this suggestion . . . How can foreign policy be conducted with such complete irresponsibility? Molotov is our evil genius . . . He . . . (omission).

I wrote a minute about my conversation with Boncour, in December 1927, and with Cachin on 20th March, 1928. Both conversations were highly interesting. Boncour gave me to understand quite clearly that France might revert to her old policy of having an alliance with us directed against Germany. Molotov declared that Boncour was a 'carnival minister of foreign affairs' because he would not take Mussolini seriously and had described him as a 'carnival Cæsar' . . . (omission).

Opinions on Mussolini differ, but it is not for the Second Secretary of our Central Committee to defend Mussolini against Boncour . . . Strange that our comrades feel a solidarity with dictators, even with Fascists, as opposed to parliamentary regimes . . . (omission) . . . When the Kellogg Pact came into force on 24th July the Moscow Protocol was already signed by six of our neighbouring states, although it had been considerably curtailed by the proposed North Baltic bloc. Admittedly Koba's tactics in regard to Rumania bore fruit; having no diplomatic relations with us, the Rumanians were the first to sign the Protocol. It turned Koba's head, and he imagined to be a state Chancellor; but that scoundrel Laidoner<sup>1</sup> said in an interview that the Moscow Protocol gave us no guarantees on our frontiers . . . I shall have to write a detailed report to the Instantsia and explain to our simpletons, particularly Molotov, that the situation is not so simple and brilliant as they seem to think . . . I realise that they would have liked to see our frontiers fully safeguarded at a time when they were robbing the peasants and building Koba's Genghis-Khan socialism in the country . . . I don't see any guarantee, and shan't be afraid to tell them so. Molotov will accuse me, of course, of a secret desire to sabotage the first five-year plan, but I shall do my duty to the country and the Party by telling the truth. If they are looking for accomplices, they won't find one in me . . .

<sup>1</sup> LAIDONER. Estonian army chief.

November – December 1929. It looks as if we are in for a period of acute international tension . . . The Protocol of 3rd October<sup>1</sup> healed our breach with Britain. MacDonald tried some tricks on us, but . . .

Dark clouds are gathering in the Far East . . . We cannot view with equanimity the escapades of the Bandit of Mukden.<sup>2</sup> This son of the old bandit has got it into his head that he can get away with anything. We had to say nothing as long as his activities were confined to certain provinces, but the time is now drawing near when we shall have to rap his knuckles sharply. I fully support Klim's suggestion that we should send our troops into Manchuria . . . Molotov and Koba are opposed to it. They are afraid of Tokyo's reaction to the movement of our troops. Again I recalled the Motono-Izvolsky agreement which was confirmed by our agreement with Yoshizawa<sup>3</sup> in Peking. Everything east of Harbin falls within our undisputed sphere of influence. The Japanese are not very fond of the Mukden bandit. Debuchi<sup>4</sup> suggested to our *charge d'affaires* in Tokyo that he could facilitate an attempt on his life if we agreed to such a course. We declined, of course, but it showed the lines on which the Japanese were thinking. It means that they do not consider him indispensable and that we can permit ourselves . . . It only remains to prepare the military side of things carefully. Klim made a secret trip to Chita<sup>5</sup> to consult with Blucher.\* Blucher was certain that we could destroy the Chinese in the first border encounter. They have no troops worthy of the name. The White Guard auxiliary forces are small and riddled with our agents. The 'far neighbours' are working better than our 'near neighbours' . . .

<sup>1</sup> The Protocol, signed on 3rd October, 1929, pledged Britain and the Soviet Union to refrain from assisting subversive propaganda against each other and listed questions to be settled by negotiation after the resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been broken off in May 1927; they were resumed in December 1930.

<sup>2</sup> Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin (see note, p. 28).

<sup>3</sup> YOSHIZAWA. Japanese Ambassador to China.

<sup>4</sup> DEBUCHI. Japanese politician.

<sup>5</sup> CHITA. An important military town on the trans-Siberian railway about half-way between Lake Baikal and Manchuli on the Manchurian border.

Sverchevsky<sup>1</sup> in Tokyo and Linde<sup>2</sup> in Shanghai have done some wonderful work . . . Nevertheless I am sometimes afraid that . . . The slightest mistake may lead to catastrophe at a time when the peasants are being expropriated. The 'neighbours' report from Stockholm that the Match King, Ivar Kreuger, has put aside a large sum of money to send Makhno against us with a large body of men. Obviously they are counting on our external difficulties . . . I can appreciate Koba's vacillations, but retreat is impossible unless we are to lose face in the Far East. The Japanese would then become arrogant and anything could be expected from their generals in Manchuria . . .

Heated and, sometimes, dramatic controversies are taking place in the Instantsia. Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] cuts a pitiful figure. He refuses to give clear-cut advice . . . Klim is a clever fellow. True, he loves a fight for its own sake, whatever its merits. He was the only one to declare that he would stake his head on the success of our military expedition . . . Molotov is more hesitant than the others. He acts as if his conscience were not clear. Klim shouted insults at him before the whole Instantsia. He is right: if you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the forest . . . Since we started on such a risky venture as the October Revolution we should not be afraid of secondary risks . . . Koba is cautious, but his is the caution of a statesman. He does not want to begin anything without being one hundred per cent certain of success. That is characteristic of him. The upshot was the adoption of an odd resolution. It was decided, in principle, to punish the Mukden Bandit; but Klim is to go to Chita to decide on the spot when the time is ripe for putting this decision into effect. Nevertheless the Instantsia could have afforded the luxury of assuming responsibility for a final decision without giving it to Klim . . . This was a touch of Koba's Machiavellism: he is afraid of the Opposition, and washes his hands in case of unpleasant consequences. Klim is not the least bit afraid of responsibility, but if things went wrong and he knew that there was trouble waiting for him on his return to Moscow, who knows what he would do with our crack troops in Chita, Khabarovsk and Vladivostock at his disposal?

<sup>1</sup> SVERCHEVSKY. Soviet *charge d'affaires* in Japan.

<sup>2</sup> LINDE. Soviet representative in China.

I have known Klim since the Stockholm Congress.<sup>1</sup> Ilich said of him, 'He has the n.c.o.'s bravery in his soul; Marx somewhere in his mind; and a revolver in his hand'. Anything is possible with such a fellow. Trotsky was ill-advised to quarrel with him about Tsaritsin. Koba could never have gobbled him up if Klim had been on his side against Koba . . .

The die is cast. Klim has left for Chita . . . I received a telegram from Nikiforov.<sup>2</sup> The Mongols have been mobilised and sent to the lakes . . .

The Consul-General in Tokyo has reported on his conversation with the Japanese industrialist Suzuki. He said the Japanese would not interfere provided our troops did not cross the meridian fifty kilometres east of Hailar.<sup>3</sup> I immediately passed this on to Koba. He was delighted. 'We can now rap Chang's knuckles,' he said, and transmitted the news to Klim at Chita . . .

. . . Klim sent me a touching telegram. He thanked me, saying he would always back me if anyone ever thought . . . Obviously he had Molotov in mind. I can't think why anyone would be plotting against me: I have already asked to be relieved of my post . . . If we act with lightning speed, all will be well. All the same, I am rather anxious . . .

Blucher\* is a good man. The operation was over quickly and ended in the complete rout of the son of the old bandit and his troops. Klim telegraphed that he can occupy Harbin in two days. When our troops approached Bukhedu station the Chinese scattered without facing our bayonet charge and Ataman Semenov's White Guards withdrew without giving battle.

Koba recalled Klim to Moscow by telegraph. 'We must get him away from there at once, otherwise he'll take it on himself to bring back as captives not only Chang Tso-lin but also the Mikado from Tokyo . . .' As I watched Molotov's face I could see he was put out by Klim's complete success . . . It's awful when personal scores are settled through matters of vital interest to the country.

The Foreign Affairs Board has been in session for two days and the text of the Protocol which we shall sign with the Chinese

<sup>1</sup> Russian party congress in 1906.

<sup>2</sup> NIKIFOROV. Soviet diplomat in Outer Mongolia.

<sup>3</sup> Important market for Mongolian cattle.

is being drawn up. It will be signed in two stages, at Nikosk-Ussurisk<sup>1</sup> and at Khabarovsk. It provides for the restoration of the *status quo* on the Chinese Eastern Railway, but we are not asking for any new privileges from Chang as a result of our victory . . .

I have been summoned to the Instantsia. Molotov is beaming with delight, asserting that his prediction of a world crisis has been brilliantly confirmed. He submitted a long report on *How Crises Develop*. I can't understand why I was invited to attend. Many a time I am not invited, even when the Instantsia discusses questions of foreign policy. I am invited, however, to listen to Molotov's dissertations, which remind me of the student papers of our underground days . . . It's strange that Molotov is still the same man as he was before the Revolution. Neither experience gained in our work nor the great responsibilities of a statesman have affected him. He does not develop, whereas Koba is growing into a person of some stature. I guess it would go ill with all of us if Molotov ever replaced Koba.

. . . Reports come from all quarters of campaigns directed against our 'dumping'. Some clever fellows have decided that we sell our goods cheap to aggravate the world crisis. How absurd! Had we been able to sell at twice the price we would gladly have done so. But this is impossible because of the crisis, and we can buy machinery only in exchange for the goods we sell. Our share in world trade is less than two per cent . . .

The 'neighbours' are flooding the Instantsia with tales of preparations for an anti-Soviet crusade. Koba is inclined to lend a willing ear to this nonsense. He is mature enough to realise the absurdity of such reports. This is so much loose talk on the part of various shady characters, who are milking such fools and adventurers as Kreuger of their money . . . The 'neighbours' also want to improve their status, particularly Yagoda. He has his troubles with Akulov.<sup>2</sup> Akulov is an honest worker, but

<sup>1</sup> NIKOSK- USSURISK. An important railway junction about a hundred miles north of Vladivostock.

<sup>2</sup> AKULOV, Ivan Alexandrovich. Deputy Chief of the G.P.U. in the early 'thirties. Later also Prosecutor-General of the U.S.S.R. (1934). Secretary of the Central Executive Committee, 1935. Former Chairman of the Ukrainian Trade Union organisation.

Yagoda is three times cleverer. Some time ago I met an old friend of Akulov's whom I have known for ten years. He told me that Akulov intended to resign; the 'neighbours' organisation is now completely under the control of Yagoda and his cronies.

I was summoned to the Instantsia and told in strict confidence that the 'neighbours' would shortly undertake a very delicate operation in Paris. It concerns the leader of the White Guard activities . . . I am afraid it will end in a political scandal . . .

I had a most distressing talk with Koba about my brother's business. After all, nobody can be guaranteed against such eventualities. My brother was led astray by scoundrels . . . Koba accused me of having written to my brother in 1918 certain personal letters which have now appeared in the émigré press. How could I know in 1918 that my brother would become involved in such a sordid affair in 1930? I told Koba that but for his good fortune in being an only son, he might have been involved in a similar affair . . .

I was summoned to the C.C.C. where this numskull Shkiryatov\* told me that the C.C.C. investigator, Morosov, will take charge of the enquiry into my brother's promissory notes. He also said some explanation about the affair would be expected from me. I protested. As an old Party member I should have been spared such interrogation by the investigator of the C.C.C. Shkiryatov replied that the Instantsia had approved the opening of the investigation . . .

Some petty informer, an émigré journalist in Paris, has passed to the 'neighbours' a batch of letters supposed to have been written by me to my brother in 1918. They are an obvious forgery. My brother wrote to me often when he was attached to our Trade Office in Berlin, but I never replied in writing. I had talks with him when I was abroad. I pointed out to Yagoda that this informer was probably playing a double game. Yagoda promised to investigate . . .

Klim, whom I saw, told me he had asked Yagoda to stop the campaign against me . . . Yagoda is worried; he telephoned to say that the 'neighbours' agent in Paris had been instructed to investigate the question of the forged letters . . .

Yagoda called. He was embarrassed. The investigation showed that the Paris informer was, in fact, playing a double game and was in contact with the persons who were responsible for the affair of my brother's promissory notes. It is possible that the forged letters were intended to cause my resignation or arrest, thereby confirming that our Government had recognised the authenticity of the notes and was applying sanctions to the culprits – to me in the first instance . . . Yagoda was so embarrassed that I begin to wonder whether he had not instigated the whole affair by means of an informer in Paris. He hates me. Besides, what a feather in his cap it would be to catch the Foreign Commissar out in such a way . . . That might mean a reward of one or even two decorations . . .

Navashin seems to be playing a strange part in this affair . . . (omission) . . . He is to give evidence at the enquiry. I telephoned Klim. He told me not to worry; a warning would be issued to Yagoda.

Received a letter from Chlenov. He is an old and true friend. He told me he had met someone who knows my brother's lawyer. It appears that the scoundrels who got my brother involved have already succeeded in extracting money from the lawyer . . .

A sensation: Kutepov has disappeared. What good do all these things do to the 'neighbours'? They seem to think that an anti-Soviet crusade would be frustrated if a White Guard general vanished. The 'neighbours' ought to have lessons in Marxism, but the main thing is to send this careerist Yagoda packing. I can just imagine the rumpus in the Paris press. What a story; better than one thousand three-headed calves . . .

Called at the Instantsia. Strange! When I entered the secretary's office I met Yagoda as he was leaving. He seemed preoccupied. Koba was fuming. He apologised for having summoned me and said the question had been postponed and I might withdraw . . . What question? . . . I do not know . . . What a stupid game of hide-and-seek with the man directing the country's foreign policy . . .

My brother has been acquitted by a jury in Paris. I am afraid the promissory notes will now have to be honoured . . .

I was summoned to the Instantsia. Yagoda was there. I was

wrong in assuming that they wanted to discuss the Kutepov affair. Yagoda asked for an urgent hearing of the report from his agent in Vienna . . . I was forced to listen to some quite incredible nonsense . . . A Hungarian Countess, described by Yagoda as one of his most prominent informers, had sent documents stolen by her from Colonel Vidal, who is said to be the Vatican's unofficial agent in Austria. I do not know Vidal. I wonder if the clever Countess has not produced forged documents for a considerable reward. It's quite obvious that some lunatic has given free reign to his imagination in the production of these documents. They included a project for the organisation of a world anti-bolshevik alliance, complete with a joint general staff, to wage war against us. Yagoda was annoyed when I shrugged my shoulders, and declared that he vouched with his life for the reliability of his informer, a relation of Cardinal Pompilli . . .

Koba, too, declared that despite its muddled character the document was obviously authentic and measures should be taken. He thanked Yagoda . . . I had a talk with Klim\* after the meeting. He said: 'Papasha, you do not know yet the baseness and stupidity of which the doomed classes are capable. You have lived abroad too long and have been hobnobbing with all manner of scum . . . You cannot conceive them capable of anything. I, too, think that for once Yagoda's information is worth listening too' . . .

I asked him, as our C.-in-C., what forces would be required to organise this crusade. He shrugged and said: 'It is quite possible that they might start with a venture similar to that of Chang Hsueh-liang, but once it starts it will be difficult to stop it. We are busy with internal affairs and may have trouble. There lies the snag, whether this Colonel Vidal is sane or not. How can we mobilise when three-quarters of our men receive letters from their villages telling them about the horrors which result from collectivisation?' . . .

I decided to take advantage of this opportunity for a heart to heart talk with Klim about everything that was going on. He told me frankly that he disapproved of many things, but there was now no other way out: either we can build up our heavy industries and our armament industry within some ten years —

that is before Germany has had time to rearm and the inevitable world war breaks out – or, as a backward farming country, we should fall victim to that war . . . I felt Koba had won him to his side and that henceforth he would back him to the end, whatever happened . . .

11th February. Our papers give front-page prominence to the text of a message sent by Pope Pius XI to the Vicar-General of Rome. The name of this Vicar was Pompilli . . . Pius XI calls believers to a ‘crusade by prayer’ against the U.S.S.R., where religion was being persecuted. Yagoda will be pleased . . .

Both Yagoda and Koba called me on the ‘phone today. Both were jubilant over Pompilli’s message. I asked for the text of this message from the Tass office in Rome. I want to study it because our press workers, in their hunger for sensation, are inclined to take liberties with their translations into Russian . . .

My uncle, a Rabbi in Grodno, has called for a fast as part of the struggle against the Soviets. Truly, the world is going insane. The most crazy intelligence supplied by the informers of the ‘neighbours’ could now seem credible . . .

There ought to be a general constructive policy to meet such general insanity. It is inconceivable that the world should be doomed as a result of a series of world wars. I refuse to believe it. I do not want to think that my children should fall victims to the war madness . . . (omission) . . .

The crisis is becoming more acute. A conference of bankers from forty-eight countries has been called at Washington, to discuss measures for dealing with the crisis. Anderson<sup>1</sup> made a statement . . . Molotov sent me a letter and the terms of reference of this world conference of bankers . . . He asked me to call on him the next day for a discussion . . .

Molotov explained the general line he would adopt in his report to the Instantsia. Nonsense . . . (omission) . . .

Our generals have broken off their contacts in Germany. Koba has instructed Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]\* to

<sup>1</sup> ANDERSON. This reference is probably to Sir Alan Garrett Anderson, G.B.E., K.B.E., who was a director of the Bank of England, of the Suez Canal Company and of important railway and shipping companies. He was also Conservative M.P. for the City of London.

establish personal contact with von Seeckt. He no longer trusts our military leaders. I had warned him . . . (omission) . . .

. . . March 1930 . . . Helfand came to pay me a visit. He was our Second Secretary in Paris and left France after a press campaign which followed the abduction of Kutepov.

. . . The fellow makes a good impression. He is tall, intelligent, has fine features, good eyes and expresses himself well. He is dissatisfied with the 'neighbours' and with his department. They want to get rid of him because he is compromised and cannot be sent anywhere abroad. He asked for a transfer to us to do purely diplomatic work. His wife, born in Riga, wants to live abroad. I liked him, and told him I would contact the Orgbureau.<sup>1</sup>

The staff office have sent me Helfand's dossier. He hails from Pereyaslavl in the Poltava region, the son of a second guild merchant and an ex-secretary of Trotsky at the Narkomput.<sup>2</sup> He was expelled from the Party because of his 'non-proletarian origin', but was taken back at the request of the 'neighbours', who had found him a place at the K.R.O.<sup>3</sup> While in Paris he quarrelled with Vassily Sharmanov, who was representing our 'far neighbours'. Sharmanov, who was our Consul-General at that time, accused Helfand of having married an émigré woman. Helfand's wife, Sofia Shats, was a native of Riga and they were married there. According to her passport she was a Latvian citizen and not an émigré . . . The dispute resulted in a victory for Helfand. He, in turn, accused Sharmanov of conniving with a lawyer to falsify a will. Sharmanov was called to the U.S.S.R. and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

Our staff office agreed that it was impossible to employ Helfand abroad . . .

A second visit from Helfand. We had a long talk. I asked him about the Kutepov business. He shrugged his shoulders and answered: 'I did not take the initiative in that affair'. When I asked him why the press was so persistent in attacking him, he answered that his activities as the K.R.O. representative were

<sup>1</sup> ORGBUREAU. The organisational bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

<sup>2</sup> NARKOMPUT. The People's Commissariat of Communications.

<sup>3</sup> K.R.O. Counter Revolutionary Department.

known practically to everyone. He used to interview émigrés who came to the Consulate or the Embassy. He also directed the Repatriation Organisation and was the editor of the Organisation's news sheet. It was he who arrested a Cossack woman when she came to the consulate at 25, Rue Laverrière and tried to kill the consul . . . I told him frankly that I would find it difficult to use his services unless I knew, at any rate generally, what part he had played in the disappearance of Kutepov. Otherwise a diplomatic scandal might result . . . 'If we appoint you a Secretary or Counsellor,' I told him, 'and then someone started publishing reports about the part you played in Kutepov's disappearance, we might be unable to avoid a big scandal . . .'

'You must understand, Maxim Maximovich,' he replied, 'that I am not in a position to disclose any details of the affair. You can have them from Artuzov or Yagoda. They can tell you, if they want to, whether there is any danger in sending me abroad' . . . (omission) . . .

I had a long conversation with Artuzov. I knew he was an adventurer, but I had never realised that he was such a cynic. He spoke Russian with a strange accent. Sometimes I thought it was a French accent, sometimes it seemed to resemble an Italian one. I was told he was a native of Corsica, born in Bastia, his real name being Renucci. He came to us in 1917 and became a party member . . . Concerning Helfand he said, 'He was one of our best men. I am sorry we cannot use him abroad.' When asked why, he answered, 'He has failed. We can't give him any more secret work . . .' 'And what about non-secret work?' . . . Artuzov smiled and said, 'He who was not caught red-handed cannot be considered a thief'. Like many foreigners, he liked to use Russian proverbs and popular sayings.

I then asked whether it was possible for our enemies to expose Helfand by producing irrefutable proof of his guilt. Artuzov answered, 'No, never . . . He took no active part in that affair.' . . . I saw Helfand again and told him of my conversation with Artuzov. He thanked me for my efforts. We found out, too, that we were somehow related . . . Helfand said, 'Now, since you have failed with Artuzov, I can tell you that I had nothing

to do with people who could be compromised'. He sat still for a while and added: 'The whole case is now closed for ever. Some of the agents among the émigrés had their fingers in it, but they won't talk. If they do, they will be killed by members of Kutepov's organisation. Two of these agents are well-known White generals. The third is a White ex-minister. They had no direct part in the abduction. They acted only in the preparatory stages. The job itself was done by our agents, who were sent from here to France. They have returned to the U.S.S.R. and there is no likelihood of their going abroad again . . . The people who planned the job in Paris didn't know me. One of the generals and the ex-minister were in touch with I.N.O. The second general was acting for Razvedupr.<sup>1</sup> The only people they knew were comrade Yanovich and comrade Mikhailov from the Razvedupr. If they admit anything, I shall not be implicated. There is no danger . . .' We talked for a long time. Helfand was well versed in French affairs, has good connections and speaks French well. I noticed that he returned from time to time to the Kutepov affair without being asked . . . I think it made a profound impression on him and he couldn't get it out of his mind. 'I can well remember the two months which followed the affair,' he said. 'There was much anxiety at the Embassy. We were expecting an attack by terrorists from the Kutepov organisation. Dovgalevsky\* became ill from fear. Every night, dressed in white pyjamas, he walked in the garden like a ghost. Ten men armed with pistols were constantly on watch. One sat on the roof like a man in a watch-tower. Three days after the abduction, we saw lights at No. 81 in the Rue de Grenelle. Up to that moment the house had been uninhabited. Orders were immediately given to enter the house from our garden. Six Embassy employees with pistols in their hands jumped over the fence – known to us as "Bessedovsky's fence".<sup>2</sup> It was found that burglars had broken into the house. When they saw our men in the garden they took fright, thinking the police were after them. They put out the lights and escaped into the street

<sup>1</sup> RAZVEDUPR. Soviet Military Intelligence.

<sup>2</sup> BESSEDOVSKY'S FENCE. In 1929 Grigori Bessedovsky, then *charge d'affaires* in Paris, made a dramatic escape by jumping the fence which surrounded the Embassy garden.

by an entrance next door . . . We didn't notify the police; we didn't want any questions asked about our men being in someone else's garden . . . On the following night we heard knocking on the wall between our house and No. 77. There was some kind of religious institution there. Dovgalevski declared that someone was trying to set a time-bomb. He woke up Berthelot, asked for immediate police assistance and for a search to be made at No. 77; it was found later that nuns were nailing a crucifix on the wall . . .

' . . . There were other interesting events. The émigré newspapers wrote at length about our cellar, alleging that we had buried Kutepov's body there or that he was alive and imprisoned there. This cellar, which was a big one, communicated with the cellars under the Italian Embassy. One passage also led to the catacombs near No. 79, Rue de Grenelle. It was Dovgalevski's idea that émigrés might enter the cellar through the Italian Embassy or by way of the catacombs. From there they would find it easy to come up into the Embassy proper and butcher all the employees — including Dovgalevsky himself. Dovgalevsky gave orders to forestall this move; three men were posted in the cellar. Unfortunately, quite a lot of wine bottles were stored there. The watchmen got drunk out of boredom and suddenly shooting started during the night. They reported afterwards that they had heard noises coming from "the Mussolini building" and thought that the Whites were coming. I interviewed them and they admitted quite openly that they were drunk and started shooting to frighten Dovgalevsky. Meanwhile, however, Berthelot's sleep had been disturbed once again by Dovgalevsky. The outlook changed when the high commissioner of the Paris police, Chiappe, found out the truth and told Berthelot, who then asked not to be called at night without reason. Later on there was an inquiry to find out who had told the police about our domestic affairs, and two of our employees, a driver and a gate-keeper, both French communists, were dismissed. One of them, however, happened to be the brother of the secretary of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. The affair went further, reaching the Control Commission of the Comintern. The French Central Committee threatened us with the withdrawal from our employment of all

French communists if we persisted in refusing to take back the two dismissed men. There was nothing to be done; we took them back . . .

' . . . At the beginning of February the situation deteriorated to such an extent that it became necessary to place two machine-guns on the roof of the Embassy and in the window of the attic. We had been told that a unit of White Guards, one hundred and fifty strong, under the command of former Captain Krasnopolksi, was preparing a direct attack on the Embassy. We did not trust the French police, thinking they would not defend us if such a mass assault took place. Chiappe, however, paid us a personal visit, posting large contingents of police and republican guards in the Rue de Grenelle area. The attack did not materialise . . .'

. . . (omission) . . . I was very interested in Helfand's stories. Dovgalevsky had never sent me detailed information on the subject.

. . . I told Helfand I would ask for his appointment as head of the Central European Department; he thanked me warmly . . . Before we parted I said, 'Then, in your opinion, there is no danger of that ill-starred affair bringing some kind of international scandal?' He shook his head and answered, 'There is no danger. Kutepov will never be found. He has disappeared, a hundred metres down . . .'

I never discussed this affair with Helfand again. I was told later that he avoided all discussion on the subject with his colleagues and used to leave the room whenever the name of Kutepov was mentioned . . .

I can't understand why Koba has so much confidence in von Seeckt and believes him to be pro-Soviet. It must be again the work of some woman informer of the 'neighbours', but this time of the 'far' ones. Under Groener there was a particular species of 'has-been' who tricked us well and kept supplying us with intelligence fabricated by Groener himself. I have never placed much confidence in this bedroom espionage, in which our 'neighbours' love to indulge so much. Yagoda employs these ladies largely for his own enjoyment . . . (omission).

von Seeckt is writing a book on 'Germany between the East

and the West'.<sup>1</sup> I have been shown a photographic copy of his manuscript. von Seeckt regards war with Poland as inevitable and thinks this war will bring about a conflict on Germany's Western borders. From these premises he concludes it is essential for Germany to ensure firmly the security of her rear by means of a long-term agreement with us, involving also economic co-operation. This is the Reichswehr's official view and no German Government wishing to have a militarily powerful Germany can depart from this policy . . .

Koba has read with much interest a Russian translation of von Seeckt's manuscript. He is very pleased. The Instantsia has decided to instruct the chiefs of our industry and finance to establish contacts with von Seeckt's entourage. Anastasi Ivanovich [Mikoyan]\* has been assigned the task of supervising these contacts. The 'neighbours' have been given strict instructions to keep out, lest their interference should cause failures . . . It's again Koba's secret 'high policy'. Fortunately he is leaving me in peace and doesn't insist on my participation in this policy. He seems to think that I may 'sabotage' it. Indeed, I should have been glad to foil these intrigues. I can foresee only unpleasant consequences . . . (omission) . . .

Yuri Leonidovich [Piatakov] has complained to me that he was presented with the text of a personal letter, drafted in the Instantsia, but purporting to have been written by him to a big industrialist of Hugenberg's<sup>2</sup> entourage. He had to sign it, but they left him neither a copy of the letter nor a written request to sign it.

If the German industrialist should ever publish this letter and a political scandal should result, Koba will put all the blame on Yuri Leonidovich . . . I would never have agreed to sign such a letter without a written order from the Instantsia. Koba is aware of this and he didn't involve me in his secret intrigues . . .

Met Berzin\* who is quite perplexed. He told me, strictly confidentially, that one of our military men involved in the contacts with the Reichswehr received 500,000 marks from

<sup>1</sup> SEECKT, von. This book – *Deutschland Zwischen West und Ost* – was published in 1933 in Hamburg.

<sup>2</sup> HUGENBERG. Leader of the German National-Conservative Party before the Nazis. A big newspaper owner.

Groener's secret funds and deposited the sum in his bank account in Vienna. The 'far neighbours' learned about this accidentally and informed Koba. But instead of taking action against the guilty officer, Koba demanded the immediate recall of the 'far neighbours' agent who had exposed him. On arriving in Moscow, the agent was arrested at the Byelorussian-Baltic station and disappeared without a trace. Berzin was ordered to make no attempt to find him. He . . . (omission) . . . and affirms that he is one of his best agents. He doesn't know what to do and has asked me to intervene. I refused. The whole story is too obscure. One cannot rule out the possibility of Berzin himself being . . . (omission).

Dovgalevsky\* reports that Briand has a project for the creation of a 'European Federal Union' with a Parliament – the 'European Conference' – and an Executive Committee – the 'European Committee'. On 17th May Briand officially transmitted his project to twenty-seven European countries . . .

Briand's project caused great anxiety in the Instantsia. Koba requested me to report on the situation . . .

Briand did not invite us, on the ground that the U.S.S.R. is 'not a European country'. But this is only a formal excuse. The comrades in the Instantsia will now get even more panicky. Molotov says that Briand is preparing a 'holy crusade' against the U.S.S.R. . . .

I reported to the Instantsia on Briand's new project. We must try hard to be invited. Briand will be forced to give in. Dovgalevsky has had a long talk with Berthelot, who is dissatisfied with Briand's moves. His view is that this game with Germany is dangerous and that France would benefit if we were invited. It is strange that Berthelot should have decided to criticise his chief so sharply. Berthelot believes that our participation in the 'Pan-Europe' would balance Germany's influence and provide France with the opportunity to play the part of an arbiter. Otherwise Germany would soon become the leader of the 'Pan-Europe' at the expense of France . . .

Our Rome Mission reports that Mussolini has sharply rejected the Briand project and abused its author. In the course of a conversation he told our diplomatic representative that he was shocked about the U.S.S.R. not being invited . . . I think he is

simply afraid of the inclusion of the Danubian and Balkan countries into the 'Pan-Europe'. He regards these countries as part of the Italian zone of influence . . .

London is also opposing the 'Pan-Europe'. Britain's fear of French hegemony on the Continent is part of her traditional policy. The British are a strange people; the danger of a terrible new armed conflict looms over the world and they still live in the days of Disraeli, and even of Pitt . . .

Briand is completely under the influence of Painlevé who surrounds himself with some disreputable Russian émigrés – various profiteers and speculators. These . . . (omission) . . . as well as our former diplomat, who has long been friendly with Briand. They used to have drinking bouts at Briand's private flat in Avenue Kléber, to which he often brought some actresses, and . . . (omission). Dovgalevsky should be asked to develop his contacts, but I am afraid he is too indolent and sick for that. We should appoint Vladimir Petrovich<sup>1</sup> in his place. He displayed much energy in Ankara and he should be able to improve the situation in Paris. Our trade representatives also cannot establish real contacts. As I expected, the rumpus about Kutepov dealt us a blow and compromised our diplomatic mission . . . (omission) . . .

Read an interesting communication from the 'neighbours' on their connections . . . (omission) . . . They placed one of their best informers at 52, Avenue Kléber,<sup>2</sup> and got a full list and interesting details on . . . (omission) and others of our former . . . (omission) . . .

There are also curious details on the contacts of our former diplomat with the Cossack General, Makhno, and the Match King, Krueger. These include an account of their luncheon at the Prés Catalan in the Bois de Boulogne, at which they discussed Makhno's raid on Podolia. The 'neighbours' assure us they have connections in Rumania, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and that Makhno's detachment will not be allowed to leave Bukovina. They now have there some 1,000 wood cutters who will be armed with automatic revolvers, light machine guns,

<sup>1</sup> POTEMKIN, Vladimir Petrovich. Became Ambassador to Paris and later Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> KLEBER, Avenue, 52. Private flat of Aristide Briand.

and a few heavy machine guns. Krueger believes in the 'snow-ball' process; he expects that when Makhno's men reach our territory they will be joined at once by masses of peasants and a large-scale insurrection will result . . . (omission) . . .

But there are no such assurances from Poland. Pilsudski is reported to have said in a private conversation that he was ready to repeat the 'Kiev Expedition' with the remnants of Petlyura's<sup>1</sup> Ministers and Generals. I cannot forgive our Commissariat for Foreign Trade their stupid refusal to sell our aspen to Krueger for his match syndicate. He had offered us a long-term loan and several other facilities. His hostility springs entirely from our silly refusal. We must consider whether we can restore the situation and get right with him again . . . (omission).

There is complete chaos and confusion in our Party circles as a result of the latest Government reshuffle. More changes are expected in the composition of the Sovnarkom.<sup>2</sup> Arrests are being carried out among members of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Anastasi Ivanovich [Mikoyan]\* doesn't stand up for his staff. His logic is simple: any supporter of the Opposition is a 'son of a bitch'. I have lost some of my most valuable people and I cannot take the same attitude, but there is nothing I can do about it. Shkiryatov\* is not joking: he warned me that he wouldn't tolerate my interference and that . . . (omission) . . .

The 'Pan-Europe' plan has been submitted for examination to the European Commission of the League of Nations. Our delegation will be invited. Briand is continuing his intrigues: our delegation will be admitted to sit only on the Economic Sub-Commission . . .

London reports preparations for a naval conference. Britain can no longer keep pace with the United States in the field of naval construction. A new rapprochement between London and Tokyo is probable. The Washington Conference torpedoed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The London Conference may prepare the ground for a new agreement . . . (omission) . . . Our Naval

<sup>1</sup> PETLYURA. Ukrainian Nationalist and anti-Soviet leader, who had organised anti-Jewish pogroms before 1917. Concluded a pact with Pilsudski in 1920, as a result of which Poles occupied Kiev. Assassinated in Paris by a Jew.

<sup>2</sup> SOVNARKOM. Council of People's Commissars – the Government.

Attaché thinks the United States will be allotted the same displacement as Britain in cruisers and destroyers. Japan will also receive parity with the Anglo-Saxons in the tonnage of submarines. Considering the dispersion of the British fleet, this means that . . . (omission).

March 1930. The London Conference is in full swing. The general pattern of the agreements is already apparent. The British want to preserve at any cost at least a symbolical superiority in battleships. They will get a lead of 16,000 tons. 'There is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous' . . .

I can't understand what goes on in the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Moysei Ilich [Frumkin]<sup>1</sup> is not to be found in his office. One of his secretaries has vanished without a trace. His technical assistant, a woman, has also disappeared. Could he really be . . . (omission) . . . I can't remember whether I ever wrote to him about that meeting. There could be an unpleasant sequel . . .

Telephone call from Koba's secretariat asking me to call urgently . . . Koba received me more than courteously. He spoke for some time about the past and our days in the underground . . . Then he asked suddenly whether I had corresponded with one Ivan Zaitzev from the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. I shrugged my shoulders. He smiled: 'I thought as much; you have been slandered . . .' I didn't understand what it was all about . . .

Moysei Ilich has turned up. He came to see me and told me . . . Ivan Zaitzev was the secretary of a secret opposition group pledged to terrorism. They had planned nothing more nor less than to arrest Koba and the Instantsia and to elect a new Moscow Committee of the Party. A list of new members of the Instantsia and the Sovnarkom, including Moysei Ilich, was found in their possession. He was to be Secretary-General. Nothing more . . . The thing was childish and the oldest of the

<sup>1</sup> FRUMKIN, Moysei Ilich. Vice-Commissar for Foreign Trade since 1928, having also held that post from 1924 to 1926. An old Bolshevik and member of the armed underground in 1906, he was accused by Stalin of 'opportunist, right-wing deviations' at the November 1928 Plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee. Removed from office in 1930, he was again appointed to the Commissariat for Foreign Trade two years later.

conspirators was twenty-five. When interrogated after his arrest, Zaitzev named me as one of the members of their 'future Central Committee' . . . All were deported except Zaitzev, who stated that they had decided, in the event of Koba putting up resistance, to . . . (omission) . . . He was executed on orders from the Judicial Troika . . .

In spite of it all, I am glad the young know that I was with Illich in the old days of revolutionary struggle . . .

A period of plots has begun. I was told today of some meetings at the flat of Syrtzov.<sup>1</sup> What a conspiracy! Three men gathered together – two of them Yagoda's secret agents. Syrtzov is a gifted and noted worker, a member of the Orgbureau<sup>1</sup> and a candidate member of the Instantia. How could he engage so lightly in Opposition work? . . . I was invited to give a short talk on foreign affairs in Syrtzov's office. They clearly wanted to 'milk' my talk for arguments against Koba . . .

I had a long conversation with Syrtzov and rebuked him for his light-heartedness. A man holding so responsible a position as that of President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation and member of the Orgbureau, should know better than to get himself involved with a lot of rabble, among whom there are so many secret agents of the 'neighbours'. Syrtzov began to cry. He said he could no longer remain indifferent to the extermination of the peasants and that a terrible famine was inevitable as a result of the disappearance of cattle, sheep and fowls. 'Please understand, Maxim Maximovich, they are destroying Russia, our country. If the slightest trouble should occur at our frontiers a general revolt will be inevitable. Then Russia will crumble, she will be dismembered, humiliated for centuries. We must do everything in our power to avert this and to remove the Secretary-General who is leading our country and our Soviet regime to destruction . . .' I was astonished by his pessimism but at the same time it gratified me to see that there is still an idealistic ferment left in our Party, that there are people ready to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the Party's . . . (omission) . . . I tried to quieten Syrtzov . . .

<sup>1</sup> SYRTZOV. A member of the Orgbureau and Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars of the Russian Federation. Said to have committed suicide.

. . . Dovgalevsky\* reports on his interviews with Briand, Berthelot and Tardieu. Nothing very exciting. Tardieu appears to be grooming himself for the part of 'saviour of the Motherland' and is already prepared to establish contacts with us, in anticipation of assuming the role . . . Briand mumbles in his usual monosyllabic manner. His success in politics astonishes me . . . I have never been able to read his speeches to the end. There could hardly be emptier utterances. Berthelot is no fool. He thanked us for authorising his godson to cross Mongolia with the Citroen expedition. He promised something but I am afraid he will not keep his word. He is an old and experienced conjurer . . .

They sent me a report on the family of our Consul-General in Athens, Konstantin Ligsky, who was a good friend of Amfiteatrov.<sup>1</sup> Ligsky committed suicide when he heard of . . . (omission) . . . He was his great personal friend and feared that the 'neighbours' . . . (omission) . . . The family was refused a pension. It's an injustice. I shall insist . . .

. . . As might have been expected, the 'spiritualists' have been arrested . . .

. . . Went to see *Lyubov Yarovaya*. A good play but out-dated. Saw also *The Singing of the Rails* at the Trade Union theatre. Excellent! I now go often to the theatre. One must relax and I am beginning to feel the strain . . .

Received a most voluminous report from Tokyo. It would appear that the Japanese are planning something pretty dirty. I mentioned the danger to Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*], but he doesn't want to believe it. Among other pointers is the fact that General Koiso<sup>2</sup> is precise and consistent in his speeches. He is the War Minister's man and has access to the Palace. Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan] claims that Shidehara is still keen on a rapprochement with us. Mikhailovich doesn't seem to understand, however, that they are preparing a complete change of décor in the Tokyo Government and that Shidehara will be

<sup>1</sup> AMFITEATROV. Writer and satyrist. Before the Revolution he was exiled to Siberia, where he wrote *Nikolai Abmanov* (from 'abman' – to cheat) a pun on the Románov family. Died in Italy.

<sup>2</sup> KOISO, Kuniski. Japanese General, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, 1932; C.-in-C. in Korea, 1935–8. He became Prime Minister in 1944.

ousted . . . The Japanese are definitely turning to the policy of the Tanaka<sup>1</sup> Memorandum and propose to drive on Mongolia . . . (omission) . . . I shall have to draw Koba's attention to the danger. The special Far Eastern [Army] will have to be strengthened as much as possible as the [Japanese] military caste are fully capable of attacking us and Mongolia at their own risk and peril. It's strange that Lev Mikhailovich refuses to see it . . . (omission) . . .

Melnikov has been removed. He was the only one who understood the position and . . . (omission) . . .

I will have to raise the question of the training of our diplomats. The number of our trained staff is insufficient . . . (omission) . . . and what we do get through the normal channels are often useless . . .

Met Sasha<sup>2</sup> who was in a good mood. He told me that Molotov is taking the ideological side of the Comintern more and more under his control. Dmitri Zakharevich [Manuilsky]\* is cynical and lazy; Solomon [Lozovsky]\* is also indolent. Piatnitsky\* deals with finance and technical affairs. Molotov attends all the meetings of the inner Praesidium and delivers long speeches; he earnestly regards himself as a great theoretician. He keeps calling for an 'ideological rearmament', but nobody knows in what direction . . . (omission) . . .

Obviously, after Nikolai Ivanovich [Bukharin\*], Molotov sounds like a stammering student or even like one using a crib; for Koba diligently prepares his utterances with him. Koba is the real theoretician . . .

As was to be expected, poor Syrtsov's 'plot' has ended with the arrest of all those involved in it, including Syrtsov himself. It's somehow strange that Yagoda should arrest the President of the Council of Commissars of the Russian Federation and so crystal-pure a Party member as Syrtsov . . . I fear we shall see more such arrests . . . I have been told that . . . (omission) . . . The whole affair seems childish. It all boils down to the fact that

<sup>1</sup> TANAKA. Japanese General and statesman, whose memorandum to the Emperor advocating Japanese expansion in Asia ruled the country's foreign policy until the end of World War II.

<sup>2</sup> WALLAKH, Alexander (Sasha). N.K.V.D. official. Second cousin of Litvinov.

Syrtzov got in touch with his opposite numbers in the other Soviet Republics with a view to voting against Koba, Molotov, Kaganovich\* at the next Party Congress . . . This was the whole 'plot'. I hope Syrtzov will not be too severely punished.

Syrtzov and his friends have been deported to the Narym region . . .

The year is ending and . . . (omission) . . .

. . . 1931 . . . The 'neighbours' have sent me an interesting report from their agent in Tokyo, which includes an account of recent discussions in the Japanese Cabinet on the questions of Manchuria and Mongolia. The Japanese are worried about our Five Year Plan and its provisions for the development of Siberia and the Far East. General Koiso submitted a report proving that by 1935 we should be in a position to sustain a war against Japan, relying only on our Far Eastern army and the industries set up east of the Urals . . . I don't like all this. Karakhan\* doesn't seem to realise the implications of the Japanese militarists' policy! Only a few days ago he was arguing with me that Shidehara's statement to our diplomatic representative on 7th January reflected the real views of the Japanese Government. But after all, Shidehara only said he was 'happy to note the growth of trade relations between our two countries', and there isn't much significance in that . . . What is more important, however, is that Shidehara and his friend, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, are unpopular with the military clique who have influence at Court . . .

It may be, of course, that the Japanese will turn on Manchuria instead of attacking us; but even in that case the danger would remain great. After Manchuria would come the turn of Inner Mongolia, then that of Outer Mongolia, and eventually our far rear flank, west of Lake Baikal, will be seriously threatened . . .

Spoke with Klim\* [Voroshilov] on the situation in the Far East. He was in a gloomy mood and said 'those swine on the general staff at Tokyo are planning to attack us'. He mentioned an interesting report on the situation sent to Koba . . . I know nothing at all about it, nor does Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] . . . What strange methods of conducting our foreign policy. I shall have to write to the Instantsia about it . . .

Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky\*] is clearly in disgrace . . . I fear an extensive purge of the Narkomindel staff . . .

I have decided to work out in greater detail our attitude on the question of disarmament. What we have done so far is obviously insufficient and does not create a serious impression. We must join constructively in the work of the Disarmament Commission. The clamour for all-round and total disarmament is clearly unrealistic as long as countries like Japan rearm as fast as they can. And also Germany . . . (omission). The Instantsia have not yet realised that there is no sense in keeping up our propaganda for total disarmament everywhere. We should work out something more realistic. But what . . . Klim still wants to have his plan accepted. It is preposterous . . .

We have received an official invitation to attend the meeting of the League of Nations' European Commission . . . (omission). Will have to put up a fight in the Instantsia. They do not sparkle with intelligence. Koba understands the position, but he sometimes gives in for fear of Klim and Molotov. It is amusing to see him in this situation. All this results from internal difficulties . . .

The purge of the Narkomindel has begun. Shkiryatov is in charge of the operation . . . (omission). I can't stand him. He is a fool and an anti-semit.

I'm not against reducing the number of Jews in our diplomatic corps, and even at headquarters, but surely it cannot be done wholesale and indiscriminately? Those who have non-Russian names could be removed first. But men like Maisky, for example, should not be affected. Admittedly, his real name is not Russian, but he has been known for such a long time under his pen-name of Ivan Maisky . . . (omission). Shkiryatov babbled some hints about the chiefs of the Narkomindel. He obviously had me in mind . . . But he didn't dare speak openly . . . (omission).

Had a long talk with Koba, who agrees with me. Referring to Shkiryatov, he said, 'make a fool pray to God and he will smash his forehead'. He added, however, that for reasons of expediency, arising from the situation at home and abroad, it would be necessary to cut down drastically the number of

Jewish diplomats . . . Yet he couldn't help passing one anti-semitic remark – 'the trouble is that one Jew makes more noise than ten Gentiles . . . that is why they are so conspicuous'. I told him I heard the very same remark from the police officer who arrested me in Bialystok. He laughed. 'Well, Papasha, not everything police officers used to say in Russia was silly . . .' He then told me at some length that there were comrades who did not like my being at the head of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs . . . 'Some say you have an accent . . . there's no harm in that; I speak Russian with a Georgian accent . . . But your Maisky told me once that the English, too, do not always understand you and that they have to bring an interpreter from . . . what is it called? . . . that district of London' . . . This made me laugh, although I thought it did not quite become Maisky to tell such jokes. I told Koba it was wrong to pretend he had forgotten the name of 'that district' in London: 'During the Fifth Party Congress in London we shared a bedroom in that district for more than a fortnight, from the 12th to the 30th April, 1907 . . .' Koba complimented me on my memory and remembered that the district was called Whitechapel. He also recalled some details of his stay in London . . . I remember I got rather fed up with him because he wanted to see all the sights of London, and especially the area of the docks at night. One of these excursions could easily have ended tragically for us. We got involved in a brawl with some drunken sailors who were fighting about girls. I remember Koba put up a good show, laying out two of the sailors with perfect knock-out blows, although he knew nothing at all about boxing. I came out of the affair with broken glasses and a torn jacket. I reminded Koba of the incident and noticed that it gave him pleasure. 'Of course I remember. You defended me very gallantly, Papasha, although your skill in the use of your fists was nil . . .' We talked for a long time of the past, and several times during the conversation he refused sharply to take telephone calls from Klim and Molotov . . . As he was seeing me off at the door he put his arm round my shoulder and said: 'I've already told you, Papasha, and I am repeating it . . . whatever may happen, I shall not let you down . . .' I thought involuntarily how charming he could be when he wanted to . . . or when he considered it useful . . .

Long communication from Paris. Laval has formed his cabinet.

31st January, 1931. The Instantsia is perturbed. I don't see why. Briand remains in the Cabinet, and nothing has changed. For some reason Koba fears that Laval will come to an agreement with the Germans and has asked me to prepare a report for the Instantsia as soon as possible. His knowledge of foreign affairs doesn't seem to be really profound . . . The Catholics cannot stay in power in Germany much longer . . . Hindenburg will not stand for . . . (omission) . . . and nothing will come of all the attempts to reach an understanding . . . Anyway, the Catholics are not dangerous to us.

There is a new scandal at the Bolshoy Theatre. But this time it's ballerina . . . (omission) . . . I didn't know Klim also went in for that sort of thing . . . Strange . . . The girl was married to the chief of the 'neighbours' secret section. Could it be that she was planted on Klim? These suicide attempts smack of the ridiculous . . . A great rumpus in the cell. Comrade Mossina has been said to have deviated, or fallen out of step, or to 'lack faith', or something like that. The truth is, however, that her rival for the position of cell secretary, Ivan Zhuravlyev, has found a protector in the Central Committee – Molotov . . . He is Molotov's cousin. All this nepotism and clannishness is a disgrace. What will Nadejda Alliluyeva say, whose Party name is Maria Alexeyeva? Won't she put pressure on Koba? At any rate, a day for the election of the cell secretary has already been fixed and canvassing has begun . . .

Nobody is getting any work done. Everybody is talking about the election of the cell secretary. How disgraceful! . . . The typists and female staff are solidly behind Mossina; she used to get various privileges for them and stand up for them when they were quarrelling with their husbands . . . so much so that there was a standing joke about 'the Amazonian Kingdom of the Narkomindel' . . . It now looks as if the Amazons will be sent to hell . . .

(Omission.) All sorts of slogans have been put up on the walls. I have ordered them to be removed: foreigners come to see us here and some of them have a good knowledge of Russian. It is hardly desirable that they should read on the wall next to my

office some statement by Zhuravlyev accusing Mossina of 'encouraging abortions' . . . The diplomatic couriers also support Mossina . . . An 'outsider' has appeared on the scene: the diplomatic courier, Negrelov. The foreign cells' bureau recalled him from Mongolia because of some mysterious incident in a 'dantzan'.<sup>1</sup> He has a protector in Moscow, Bogomolov<sup>2</sup> of the Central Committee's registration section . . .

The election ended in scandal. The officials counted 156 votes for Mossina, 187 for Zhuravlyev and 45 for Negrelov – a total of 388 votes. But the registered number of those present was . . . 315 . . . Thus the 'dead souls' voted, as they say in our country . . . The two officials who counted the votes were both friends of Zhuravlyev . . . He claimed that some comrades 'walked in' during the voting and had no time to register. The incident will be reported for investigation to the Party's district committee. Meanwhile Mossina is to remain 'temporary secretary'. The women in the Commissariat are jubilant. The 'dictatorship of the Amazons' has been preserved . . .

Dispatches from Vienna speak of preparations for a customs union with Germany. Everything is being arranged in secret; they want to confront the world with a *fait accompli*. The 'neighbours' have an informer who is close to the Chancellor, and we shall be kept informed . . . The question is whether it is worth while disclosing details of the preparations in our newspapers . . . Perhaps we should keep silent . . .

Molotov summoned me urgently. I thought he wanted to discuss something important. It turned out that he was interested in the election of the cell secretary. He questioned me at length as to who might have been guilty of interfering with the ballot-box, and whether it was not a provocation against Zhuravlyev. Since the interference proved to be in Zhuravlyev's favour, how could it have been provocation against him? . . . Molotov's logic is rather original . . .

. . . (omission). Melnikov is right, of course. Japan is preparing

<sup>1</sup> 'DANTZAN.' Convent of lamas in Mongolia, robbed by the Soviets of rich carpets and treasures. Those who took part in these expeditions were called 'Dantzanspchik'.

<sup>2</sup> BOGOMOLOV, Dmitri Vassilevich, had been Soviet Ambassador in China. Shot in 1938.

to seize the whole of Manchuria. Our K.V.G.D.<sup>1</sup> will be gobbled up by the Japanese . . .

Stormy debate in the Instantsia. Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan\*] reported on the situation and Koba kept interrupting him most rudely. He said, 'whoever gave you this information ought to be shot as an *agent-provocateur* or double-crossing Jap spy'. The report was certainly vitiated by some obviously false information supplied to Karakhan by our consulate in Harbin. Koba doesn't think the Japanese are making up their minds to attack us. Klim [Voroshilov]\* takes the opposite view, and upholds it energetically. The 'far neighbours', who have an excellent informer on the General Staff, gave him this information. He insists that the Japanese army units are feverishly preparing for armed clashes with us in Manchuria and Mongolia, and that these preparations are being kept secret from the majority of the Japanese Government . . . I still think these preparations result simply from some plan for the capture of Manchuria and Mongolia, especially since Klim's information on the strength of these troops and the type of their armament does not for one moment prove that they envisage war with us. So far they have landed mostly infantry and field artillery. This would do for fighting Chang Hsueh-liang but not our Far Eastern army with its picked units. Koba has expressed the correct view – that the Japanese generals are trying to play a trick on their own government. They are moving infantry to deceive Shidehara. As soon as their infantry on the continent is strong enough and has crossed Manchuria they will attempt – 'There's no harm in trying,' he said – to drive on Mongolia . . .

Klim suggested sending troops to Manchuria to prevent the Japanese seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway. Koba told him abruptly, 'We should be giving a blank cheque to the military party, giving them the opportunity of pushing the Mikado into war with us under the pretext that we were trying to capture the Manchurian Southern Railway and occupy Mukden. There must be no preventive movement of our troops to Manchuria . . . Let us wait patiently: if they cross the Motono-Izvolsky line

<sup>1</sup> K.V.G.D. Chinese Eastern Railways.

into Mongolia we shall rap their fingers and withdraw. This defeat would be a serious blow to the prestige of the military party and at the same time we should not be giving them grounds to accuse us of trying to seize Manchuria; in this way war with Japan could be avoided . . . ‘We can’t afford to be dragged into an all-out war with Japan. Any move which might cause such a war is a provocation or an act of treachery . . .’ Koba is certainly right. It would be madness to have a war just because of the Chinese Eastern Railway . . . But I fear the armies, both ours and the Japanese, might get too deeply committed to their armed clashes; it would then become impossible to localise the fighting . . .

The Instantsia has decided to recall Blucher\* to Moscow. Koba wants to work on him personally . . .

We are now putting the finishing touches to our disarmament plan. Boris Efimovich,<sup>1</sup> with whom I have been working on this project, is a brilliant lawyer and has a perfect grasp of the world situation. Koba is aware of this and often calls him into his office to discuss questions of international law. He does this without asking or informing me; but as it isn’t a matter of principle I don’t propose to raise the issue . . .

Another long and pointless talk with Molotov on the election of the cell secretary. A waste of two hours. When I suggested to Molotov that the matter wasn’t all that important, he got cross and said the secretary of the Commissariat’s Party cell was called on to play as important a part as the Commissar himself. The holder of this post, he said, ‘stands in the vanguard of our class and revolutionary struggle against the capitalist encirclement of the U.S.S.R.’ . . . I don’t know how he can hand out such public meeting stuff to me. I am an older member of the Party than Molotov and than . . . (omission) . . .

Conflict between the ‘far’ and ‘near neighbours’. Both sides claim to have a photographic copy of the original Tanaka<sup>2</sup> memorandum. The ‘far neighbours’ copy was supposedly photographed by a close friend of Tanaka, Kuzuhara, whose

<sup>1</sup> SHTEIN, Boris Efimovich, held various diplomatic posts. Author of works on diplomacy and international law. Soviet delegate to the United Nations 1946–9.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote on p. 131.

wife is in the confidence of the General. That of the 'near neighbours' was secured by their agent in Tokyo through Viscount Goto, a former mayor of the city, whose niece is closely connected with the 'neighbours' . . . The funny part is that the two documents are almost identical but not quite . . . Koba has suggested an examination of the signature by experts. We have in our possession an original specimen of Tanaka's signature on a personal letter to our *chargé d'affaires* in Tokyo . . .

All 'neighbours' are confused. Both signatures have turned out to be forgeries . . . The 'neighbours' had paid good money for these fakes, especially the 'far' ones – nearly 10,000 dollars . . .

The party's district committee has given a judgement of Solomon: to order a new election for the post of cell secretary – but both Mossina and Zhuravlyev must stand down. Molotov will be furious. A friend of Stetzky's<sup>1</sup> is on the district committee . . . The new election campaign has already started. Negrellov – the 'dantzanshchik' as we call him – stands the best chance . . .

Took the family to the Children's Theatre. I enjoyed it immensely. I always relax with the children, it is my only recreation. I often think about their future and whether they will be able to adapt themselves to life here. I think that . . .

'There is something rotten in the state of Denmark' . . . A series of scandals, one worse than the other . . . It's a good thing that our press monopoly makes sure that nothing gets into the newspapers. Otherwise complete disintegration would result . . . Even so, public opinion, or what goes under that name, never stops rumour-mongering . . . especially the weaker sex, both those with Party tickets and without . . .

. . . (omission) . . . Klim's [Voroshilov] outburst was vulgar, but from his point of view he was right: he warned the Instantsia that if Yagoda continued to shadow him with his agents – such as the late ballerina . . . (omission) . . . He struck Yagoda with his stick in Yagoda's office . . . The incident is reminiscent of the behaviour of provincial officers under the Tsars. Koba was visibly annoyed. He cannot approve of such high-handedness with the chief of the 'neighbours'. On the other hand, he

<sup>1</sup> STETZKY. Soviet Economist. Marxist doctrinaire. A member of the Opposition.

doesn't want to quarrel with Klim . . . The army and . . . (omission) . . . Moreover Klim is his friend, but like Frunze is capable of the most violent outbursts. Koba suggested to the Instantsia that Klim should be given a three months' leave to rest and 'cure his nerves' . . . The Instantsia rejected Koba's suggestion with a majority of one. Mikhail Ivanovich [Kalinin]\* voted with Klim against the proposed leave . . . It's said that Koba was much upset by the vote . . . but if so he didn't show it. His self-control is amazing. This, I think, is his strength and the secret of his victories . . . Eventually he will become an absolute dictator, more omnipotent than Illich . . . Illich's dictatorship was of the heart; that of Koba will be of the fist . . .

Shortly after the vote in the Instantsia *Krokodil*<sup>1</sup> published a cartoon, 'Age Courting Youth'<sup>2</sup>. It showed an old man, with a likeness to Mikhail Ivanovich, sitting half dressed on a divan with a young woman on his knees . . . They say that Mikhail Ivanovich had a heart attack when he saw the drawing . . . It was the work of Lev Mikhailovich [Mekhlis].

Mikhail Ivanovich will never again take the liberty of voting against Koba . . . (omission) . . .

Strange moves are taking place in the army. District commandants are being shifted like pawns from one command to another. A controversy is raging about mechanisation and motorisation . . . Tukhachevsky is taking the upper hand and Klim is supporting him. Gossip mongers in the army are talking of orgies at the Vozdvizhenka<sup>3</sup>. Tukhachevsky and Klim have the same . . . (omission) . . . The husband works in the mobilisation department of the General Staff. He has been moved to Rostov-on-Don to vacate the bed . . . It is sordid and revolting . . . Military circles are scandalised . . .

Koba's liaison with the actress was broken off after he had been told of her amorous adventures in Tiflis with Kinkhadze.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> **KROKODIL.** Soviet humorous satirical magazine.

<sup>2</sup> 'Age Courting Youth' – the Kalinin caricature is mentioned in Trotsky's *Stalin*, p. 388 (Hollis & Carter, London, 1947), the date being given as 1925.

<sup>3</sup> **VOZDVIZHENKA.** Street where People's Commissariat of War was situated.

<sup>4</sup> **KINKHADZE.** Chief of Georgian heavy industry, then Foreign Minister of Georgia.

She aspired to become a film star . . . Has been banished to Tashkent . . .

Koba has a new passion: the sister . . . (omission) . . . Perhaps she will tone down his anti-semitism . . . (omission) . . . Lazar Moiseyevich [Kaganovich\*] is said to be shocked by the affair. His sister is very fond of power . . . (omission) . . . There are rumours about young . . . If Koba found out there would be a tragedy. He is temperamentally unable to share anything . . . either in public or private life . . . (omission) . . . This may be an Asiatic feature which we cannot understand. He is quite capable of killing a rival by his own hand. All we need is such a scandal . . . Budenny<sup>1</sup> was simply a drunken n.c.o. when he killed his wife . . . Koba is different . . . If Alliluyeva keeps up her scenes in public, he may . . .

Zhemchuzhina goes about with a lot of make-up. We are not used to this sort of thing. Even Lev Mikhailovich [Mekhlis] has had something to say about it. Molotov is furious. 'Those who say that only women of the world – and of the underworld – used to make up in Tsarist Russia are not real Russians,' he says. 'Country women in Russia have always used make-up on their faces . . . The Soviet regime must make cosmetics available to every working-class woman' . . . How absurd . . . Ilich said the Soviet regime plus electrification would make socialism. According to Molotov, socialism means raddled women workers in factories . . . One can see that he has never been abroad and doesn't know anything . . . not even Russian history.

In the days of Peter the Great, soldiers' wives and soldiers' girls – as prostitutes were then called – used to be conscripted into state factories. A foreign traveller, a Dutchman, recorded that he had never seen, in any country, so many pretty and made-up girls as he had in Russia . . . Perhaps this is not fortuitous. We speak more and more of Peter the Great. The new line is to liken him to Koba. 'The Transformer.' Ilich would turn in his grave if he heard this . . . Lev Mikhailovich [Mekhlis] has had several conferences with writers. It was he who originated the slogan about Koba being 'the leader of genius'. He now wants to commission a historical novel which would

<sup>1</sup> BUDENNY, Semen Mikhailovich, Marshal. Leading Soviet cavalry expert. Commissar for Defence in 1940.

compare Koba with Peter the Great . . . What will it all lead to? . . . I fear that it will make us drift into the most unrestrained chauvinism and boastful nationalism, worse than before the Revolution . . . Koba doesn't realise that classes cannot be deceived. He thinks himself strong enough to adopt any disguise, and discard it at any moment. Such a technique works for a time, but not indefinitely. One cannot constantly neutralise or destroy social groups which have been artificially created, groups which are useful at a certain moment, but harmful as soon as that moment has passed . . . Such super-Machiavellism isn't feasible . . . And Koba is not immortal . . . Strange man, this Koba; a mixture of Marxism with the most blatant 'Nechayevism'.<sup>1</sup> It was not without good reason that he ordered the removal of Nchayev's dossier from the archives of the court. Krylenko<sup>2</sup> told me about the episode. He himself handed over the dossier to Koba. Justifying Ivanov's assassination, Nchayev had declared, 'The revolutionary leaders were defeated until now because they posed as highly moral people. Their enemies made use of immoral methods against them and thus beat them easily. I want to show that the leaders of the Revolution must be thoroughly immoral to win the battle. They must learn to lie, deceive, simulate, to stab in the back, resort to poison, daggers, bullets – and calumny. The enemy must be dishonoured before being killed' . . . Illich resorted to such methods, but he could never go so far as to use them against comrades in the Party. Koba will not hesitate . . . I often think about the future. As the head of our foreign department I think I can take a wider view. Our country is only at the beginning of its renaissance. What will happen if, after five or six five-year plans, Koba is still at the helm and applies his Nchayevistic philosophy in world affairs? . . . It's terrifying to think of . . .

Semen Ivanovich [Aralov] reports on his talks with Kemal . . .

<sup>1</sup> NECHAYEVISM, from Nchayev, one of the Nihilists at the head of the Moscow students in 1869. To train his disciples to violence, he made them assassinate a student, Ivanov. When charged with the crime, he said he wanted to build an *avant-garde* of violent revolutionaries.

<sup>2</sup> KRYLENKO, Nikolai Vassilyevich. People's Commissar for Justice, 1922–38. Joined the Revolutionary Movement in 1904 under the pseudonym of Abram. Was Red Army Commander in 1917–18 and later became private Secretary to Lenin.

Suritz<sup>1</sup> is very upset and complains that action was taken over his head. He doesn't understand that we had to develop very close relations with Kemal and that Semen Ivanovich, an old friend of Kemal's, was the only man for the job. Kemal is a Turk, and Turks remember friendship and old friends. They feel embarrassed by a *volte-face* . . . Briefly, Kemal has given a pledge that the Turks will sign a protocol with us which will supplement that of 17th December, 1929 . . . He said, 'As long as I live, friendship with the U.S.S.R. will be the main objective of my foreign policy' . . . Again he complained that we cheated him over the Batum question, but he said it in a rather jocular tone. He also asked for some territory to be ceded near Kars, but didn't press the point. Semen Ivanovich questioned him about renewing the alliance with Britain. He denied flatly that there was anything in it. 'We need money,' he said, 'and hence we shall pretend to be friends. But we shan't forget that the English wanted to scratch out Turkey from the map of Europe – and partly from that of Asia Minor too. My talks with Frunze will always remain among the pleasantest memories of my life.'

Semen Ivanovich told me the story of this mission of Frunze's<sup>\*2</sup> to Ankara. The signing of the agreement was celebrated with a grand, if original, ball: a ball without women . . . Frunze danced with Kemal's askaris, and Kemal with Red Army men from Frunze's bodyguard. There was a good deal of heavy drinking, but nothing improper. After the ball Frunze slept like a log for some twenty hours. Kemal sent presents to all the Red Army men with whom he had danced: ten ten-rouble gold pieces to every man . . . The coins bore the Tsarist emblem and the face of Nicholas II. Frunze was not so generous: he gave them ten Maria-Theresa dollars each. He had made a mistake, confusing Turkey with Abyssinia where these coins were still legal tender. But they were silver dollars and the Turks, who wanted gold, were offended . . .

<sup>1</sup> SURITZ, Jacob. Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1919–22; Norway, 1922–3; Turkey, 1924–34; Germany, 1934–7; France, 1937–40; Brazil, 1940.

<sup>2</sup> FRUNZE's mission. See E. H. Carr's *Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. iii (Macmillan, London, 1953).

I don't think Kemal can be trusted . . . He is an Asiatic, like Koba . . .

Our people in Vienna have reported again on the proposed customs union. The 'neighbours' have sent me a copy of the preliminary agreement between Schober<sup>1</sup> and Curtius<sup>2</sup>. They are remarkably well informed. The Austrians are crafty; they don't want to lose the French credits promised to them by Tardieu. Schober pretends he is only observing the recommendations on regional agreements contained in the French memorandum of 17th May, 1930 . . . He is crafty, but not very subtle. His manœuvre is quite obvious. The French will be furious and will try to torpedo the proposed Austro-German agreement, which, if concluded, would mean the collapse of their Danubian policy and of the whole system conceived by Tardieu. We, too, have no reason to rejoice . . . The Instantsia doesn't want us to interfere or to allow the publication of the documents in our possession . . . Vienna and Berlin work in the greatest secrecy, planning to present the world with a *fait accompli*. Koba believes the French will torpedo the agreement in any case and there is no need for us to incur the displeasure of pan-Germanic circles . . . I'm afraid he is wrong . . . Paris's reaction has been rather academic of late . . . Of course, it's possible that London will support the French in exchange for concessions on the naval rearmaments issue and for backing the British line . . . Quite honestly, I can't make up my mind . . .



. . . Had talks with the French and British ambassadors. I touched very cautiously on the question of a possible customs union between Austria and Germany which had been mentioned in the press. The Frenchman was seriously concerned. He said they would never allow a revival of Bismarck's Zollverein<sup>3</sup> and would resort if necessary to strong measures . . . He evaded

<sup>1</sup> DR SCHOBER. Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. Foremost Austrian supporter of the abortive Austro-German Customs Union of March 1931.

<sup>2</sup> DR JULIUS CURTIUS. A member of the German People's Party and German Foreign Minister from October 1929 to October 1931.

<sup>3</sup> ZOLLVEREIN. German Customs Union, begun by Prussia in 1818.

my question as to what measures they had in view . . . The Englishman was more cautious. He would not answer any questions at all, declaring that it was a matter for the League of Nations . . .

. . . Paris reports that the French Government intends to foil the proposed Austro-German customs union by invoking the Geneva Agreement of 4th October, 1922. By doing this the French hope to get the British on their side, since the Agreement was signed by all the countries of the Entente . . . But it isn't clear how strong their legal position will be; the Agreement prohibits a political or economic union between Germany and Austria . . .

Boris Efimovich [Shtein] has shown me the draft of our new disarmament plan, which provides for a proportional and gradual cut in armaments. I will submit it to the Instantsia for approval . . .

. . . The plan led to controversy in the Instantsia. Molotov wanted us to stand by our previous proposals for total disarmament. Klim [Voroshilov] argued against this. Koba stepped in to arbitrate. Eventually they decided that the draft should be amended, but they agreed to the principle of a proportional and progressive disarmament . . . I don't know why the Instantsia should use such crafty tactics with me . . . They could have said it bluntly . . .



. . . Luther<sup>1</sup> arrived secretly by air for twenty-four hours. He wanted to see me and Molotov. He suggested that we should expand our purchases in Germany and pay for them partly in gold and foreign currency; and also offered to open a foreign account for us at the Reichsbank. The real purpose of his visit isn't quite clear. Did he want to get our gold, or just to blackmail London and Washington with the possibility of an alliance with us before Curtius concluded the Zollverein with Austria? Hindenburg himself is said to be pressing Brüning<sup>2</sup> to bring about the Zollverein, threatening dismissal should he fail . . .

<sup>1</sup> LUTHER. President of the Reichsbank – a former German Chancellor.

<sup>2</sup> BRÜNING, Heinrich. Chancellor of the German Reich from 1930 to 1932. Leader of the German Catholic Centre Party.

. . . More arguments in the Instantsia. I protested against handing part of our gold reserves over to the Germans. The proposal was rejected. Luther left empty-handed . . .

4th February, 1931 . . . A long debate in the Instantsia on the text of our reply to the invitation to send a delegation to the European Commission of the League of Nations. Molotov again took an uncompromising attitude. He suggested that we should demand full equality of rights in the Commission and protest against the wording of the invitation – we had been asked to take part in the discussion of the third point on the agenda only . . . The date of the meeting was not mentioned . . . Koba made a conciliatory proposal: to accept the invitation but protest against its wording and demand equal rights at the meeting. His suggestion was accepted . . .

6th February. I sent our note in reply to the invitation of the League of Nations' European Commission . . .

Members of our staff have been arrested, including ten people from Mossina's auxiliary department. Mossina too is said to be compromised. It appears that the British have deciphered our coded cables. The 'neighbours' men in London reported that there was evidence of someone in our auxiliary department having passed information to agents of the Polish military attaché in Moscow; and that the Pole passed this information on to the British . . . The Instantsia is furious. Klim attempted to prove that London broke off with us as a result of the leakages. Nonsense. There was no need for them to read our secret cables to sever relations with us. They could read quite openly in our newspapers details of the sums raised in aid of the British strikers. I think the explanation is simply that some old Russian expert helped the British to break our codes. Our early ciphers and codes were worked out by Vinogradov, who had worked in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry. He died in 1925, and since then only the codes and nets have been altered. Vinogradov could have given some information to the Poles at the time. His mother used to live in Warsaw, and he often received letters from her . . .

. . . Kemal has kept his word: the Turks have signed the Supplementary Agreement. It means that they are still with us. But for how long? . . .

The arrested members of our staff are being interrogated.

Mossina has been summoned for an interview with Mikhailov. She thinks he is not normal. He made quite fantastic statements . . . Could he be an *agent provocateur* of the 'neighbours'? . . .

I was visited by Yuzhwitz, an investigator who specialises in particularly important cases for the 'neighbours'. He apologised for visiting me and was very polite, trying even to appear friendly. He said he had to ask me a few questions to verify statements made by those under arrest. He came to see me because he didn't want to summon me to his office. In short, European manners! He then asked me a lot of silly questions I couldn't answer, in particular questions about the character of the people who had been arrested. There is a cell for this purpose. There is also Mossina . . .

The elections in the cell passed off quietly. Mossina is depressed. Negrellov, of course, was elected. I'm glad; now it's up to him to deal with this matter of the suspects in the auxiliary department . . .

. . . Luther has again met our trade representative in Berlin. He offered to increase our credits, and asked whether I wouldn't care to travel to Berlin to meet Brüning. *Da ist der Hund begraben.*<sup>1</sup>

20th March . . . The bombshell has exploded. Schober and Brüning have come to terms. The customs agreement was signed by Schober and Curtius so as not to frighten the French with Brüning's signature. The French press is demanding the strongest action against the Germans, but they obviously don't want to antagonise the Austrians . . .

. . . (omission) I think events will now move rapidly . . .

. . . Saw the German Ambassador. He declared categorically that Germany would not be able to meet the usual reparation instalment due on 15th June . . .

. . . The 'neighbours' have sent me a most interesting report on Germany's financial position, prepared by Curtius' own department. The crisis is taking a dramatic turn. Capital is escaping abroad and the foreign currency deficit exceeds 30,000 million marks. I can now understand the Ambassador's statement . . .

Received a quite unexpected invitation from Molotov to go

<sup>1</sup> This is where the dog is buried.

and have tea with him. I can't see what he can want with me. He's never invited me before . . .

Received a communication from Persia. The Shah wants to push us away from the shores of the Caspian. He has had a tempting offer from some financial group in New York: a loan in exchange for fishing rights. Dollars for caviar . . .



Tea at Molotov's villa near Moscow. It was not easy to get there. The snow was beginning to melt and the road was full of humps and bumps. The springs of my Packard were severely tested . . . He received me quite pleasantly. Zhemchuzhina served the tea, but after that left us to ourselves. Molotov suggested a game of chess. I declined: he is too good a player. I told him so, and his face lit up with pleasure. 'It's my violin . . . or rather my baritone,' he said, trying to be witty. We spoke for some time about the staff of our auxiliary department. Molotov asked me several questions on the lines of those which Yuzhwitz had put to me. I think he must have taken charge of this particular investigation, since Yagoda is so obviously not interfering. He must be scared of making a *faux pas* and getting himself into trouble.

Molotov has a heavy hand, like Koba, and not the slightest flexibility. Serious trouble is therefore a distinct possibility . . .

He beat about the bush for some time and eventually asked me a straight question: Could I guarantee that Mossina 'did not conceal from the Party' the treachery of one of her staff? I replied that I could give no formal guarantee, but that in all conscience I had no reason whatever to suspect her of such professional disloyalty. He returned to the question, saying, 'Therefore you can't vouch for her. I thought as much.' I retorted that my guarantee was not necessary, since Mossina had been a cell secretary and it was up to the Party's district committee to vouch for her, not me. 'You are quite wrong,' Molotov said, 'as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and Second Secretary of the Party's Central Committee I am stating that you, the head of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs appointed by the Party's Central Committee, bear full responsibility, both from the point of view of the party and the state'. I

tried to change the subject, but Molotov had his claws into me and wouldn't let go. He kept harping on the same subject for more than half an hour. Eventually he said, 'I shall have to ask you to give it to me in writing, Maxim Maximovich. Would you confirm by letter what you have just told me, namely that you cannot vouch for Mossina?' . . . I tried again to evade this unpleasant formality, but he was adamant. Noticing my reluctance he declared, 'I wouldn't like to hand over this business to the Control Commission or the Central Committee. I would rather it were settled in the Party's Secretariat. Yossif Vissarionovich [Stalin] is of the same opinion. But we need your written answer.' . . . I think he mentioned Koba's agreement on purpose . . . It means that the 'outflanking' moves against Alliluyeva continue, and that the odds are on Rosa Moiseyevna [Kaganovich] . . .

. . . I must confess that I gave in under Molotov's hold. In any case, my stubbornness was futile . . . Don Quixotism . . .



. . . Received Molotov's question in an official letter. I instructed my secretary to answer in writing on my behalf. I must admit that I loathed doing it myself . . .

Alliluyeva came to see me. She told me Mossina had been banished to the Urals and reproached me for not having vouched for her. I suggested that she should have approached the Party's district committee, or Melnikov at the city committee. She replied that she'd had a long talk with Koba and asked him to intervene. Koba said in reply, 'Comrade Litvinov, her immediate superior, has refused to vouch for her. In these circumstances I cannot interfere . . .' She left crying. I had never seen her in such a state. She said that if anything happened to Mossina she wouldn't survive it. She had told this to Molotov . . . Strange case . . . The motive behind Molotov's intrigue is quite clear. Rosa Moiseyevna [Kaganovich] is said to have been very friendly with him in 1929 at Piatigorsk in the Caucasus, where they were both on a cure . . . If she has an affair with Koba too we shall have adopted that Australian aboriginal custom described in an ethnological study which I once read in London. Unfortunately there is also this young man who has nothing to do with the aboriginal customs at the Council of

People's Commissars . . . Besides, Koba is so jealous that . . .  
(omission) . . .

I wonder why Alliluyeva should stand so staunchly behind Mossina. Perhaps all this gossip about their relations . . .  
(omission) . . . The whole affair leaves a nasty taste . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

. . . German diplomacy is using the blackmailing technique in London. They are threatening the British that a German-Soviet-Italian bloc would become inevitable if the projected customs union with Austria were foiled . . . For once the French are unflinching. They fear the Mitteleuropa<sup>1</sup>; and in addition they don't want to give up the chance of renewing their influence in the Danubian basin . . . The question of the German-Austrian customs union has been referred to the League of Nations: a first-class funeral . . . Good work by the French . . .

Alarming news from Berlin. The Germans won't pay reparations. Brüning and Curtius are getting ready to go to London for talks with MacDonald and Henderson. How fortunate that the Conservatives are not in power; if they were, an agreement at our expense would be inevitable. Brüning admittedly is not very dangerous to us, but he will not last long. Those who will replace him, however . . . (omission) . . . The Germans will request a moratorium . . . (omission) . . .

11th June. The talks at Chequers ended two days ago. The 'neighbours' already have information on what has been going on. Their agent in London works wonders. His intelligence reports have been even more accurate since the Labour Party came to power. The Germans got nothing, as one might have expected. The Reichsbank's gold reserves are dwindling at a catastrophic rate . . .

Oumansky reports that the Bank for International Settlements is doing everything possible to save Germany from bankruptcy. This means that Wall Street has come into open conflict with the Anglo-French attitude of financial intransigence . . .

. . . A new bombshell . . . Hindenburg's cable to Hoover and Hoover's proposals on a German moratorium. Oumansky's

<sup>1</sup> MITTELEUROPA. German political doctrine claiming Central Europe as part of the German sphere of influence.

information was right . . . Germany's finances will be saved in spite of the Donatbank crash, another trump card in the hands of the Nazis to blame the Jews for all Germany's misfortunes . . . Other German banks are on the verge of bankruptcy. The big British and American banking concerns must now save their capital in Germany. The French have refused to discuss credits with Luther. They demand political guarantees. The Germans have turned down the demand. The request to drop the agitation for the revision of the Versailles Treaty infuriated Hindenburg . . . On 10th July Luther noted his complete failure in Paris . . . The International Bank has extended for three months the 100 million dollars credit. A drop in the ocean . . .



Met Varga, who spoke at length about the inevitable world financial crisis and its consequences . . . The United States is launching a fierce financial and foreign currency drive against Britain and France. The British gold reserves are melting away. Britain will have to abandon the gold standard and the countries linked with the City will take corresponding measures. The dollar will stifle the pound sterling in Europe but the United States will lose its own dollars, which will be in demand in all other countries to fill the gap left by the pound. The Americans themselves will thus slide into a period of financial and monetary constriction, with all its consequences for credit and industry. Varga thinks there is no solution open to capitalism other than war. But war requires soldiers as much as an omelette requires eggs. Varga cannot see where these soldiers will come from and hence he expects capitalism to 'throttle itself in the world crisis like a rat in a blocked hole'. The analogy is picturesque but hardly convincing, except to Komsomols or Pioneers<sup>1</sup>. First, there are enough would-be soldiers. Our comrades think only in metaphors. A new war need not necessarily develop immediately into a world war. Personally, I think it will break out in a comparatively small area and will gradually extend to other countries before becoming world-wide. But if such a war did break out, capitalism would certainly not be doomed to

<sup>1</sup> PIONEERS. Members of the Communist Children's Organisation.

disappear. Our own situation was even more catastrophic, but we managed to extricate ourselves. It was certainly not our socialism which was responsible for our doing so, as Koba would claim. That's stuff for children and fools. Koba himself knows this is rubbish needed only for propaganda and maintaining the morale of the younger generation. In actual fact, what saved us was our planned economy. This was understood long ago in the capitalist countries too. So far they have not yet made up their minds to control their economic systems; but the time will soon come when they will be forced to do so. When they are, the question of surviving the crisis will have been solved. Nowhere will it be more difficult to do this than in the United States. As soon as an economy planned or controlled from the centre is introduced, crises will be overcome without war. The danger now is not in the least from countries whose capitalism is long established, but from such countries as Germany and Japan which need both markets and raw materials. If no attempt is made to settle the question of markets and raw materials on a world scale there will, of course, be a danger of war caused by Germany and Japan. For the time being Germany is not armed. The main danger, therefore, comes from Japan. Hence, also, everything possible must be done to achieve an agreement between the nations and to bar the way to possible aggression on the part of the new birds of prey. If that were done there would be no war . . . There is another side to the question, which I have also been turning over in my mind . . . If a system of collective security were adopted and if the capitalist countries – particularly the United States – went over to a planned economy, the need for world revolution would disappear. It would then suffice to have the U.S.S.R. included, in good faith, in such a system. The world would, as a result, follow for a considerable period the path of evolution of the two types of planned economy – the Soviet and the non-Soviet – and this would lead eventually to their permanent co-operation. This is, of course, a very distant ideal, and much water will flow under the bridges of the Moskva, Thames, Spree, Seine and Potomac . . . But nevertheless it devolves on those who believe in the possibility of international co-operation to spare no effort . . .

. . . Spoke to Voznesensky.<sup>1</sup> He laughs at Varga's theories, and finds Molotov's even more preposterous. He described them as 'childish and dangerous ravings'. This son of a Vologda priest is a brilliant star in the dull firmament of our Party . . . His appreciation of the international economic situation has always been correct. He doesn't believe capitalism will necessarily stifle itself in the world crisis and the revolution 'resulting from the crisis', as Molotov tries to prove. 'I believe capitalism will disappear,' he said. 'That is why I am a member of the Communist Party. But I don't believe it will disappear according to the predictions of Karl Marx. Our revolution demonstrated the salutary effect of planned economy on a national scale. When economic planning becomes effective on a world scale the nineteenth century capitalism studied by Marx will disappear without any revolution. Admittedly there is a danger of war – the only development which can check the process of the conversion of capitalism into a system of planned economy. If this danger could be averted . . .

. . . (omission) . . . The comrades from the Instantsia will, of course, object. They will repeat over and over again that it smacks of liquidation . . . Nevertheless, the question must be answered once for all: is the Revolution to serve the ends of Socialism, or is Socialism to serve the ends of the Revolution? It was Lev Davidovich's weak spot that he placed his conception of a permanent revolution before the formulation of its aims . . . (omission) . . . What a pity that Voznesensky is not the Secretary-General of our Party . . . On the whole I notice complete disregard for our old Marxist principle, according to which the part played by individuals in history is of no importance . . .

<sup>1</sup> VOZNESENSKY. Leading Soviet economist, who became after World War II a member of the Soviet Communist Party Politbureau and Chairman of the State Planning Commission. He was 'purged' in 1948 and his views have often been criticised since then.

## Chapter Three: 1931-1937

*Crisis in the Far East – The Geneva Disarmament Conference – Suicide of Stalin's wife – Hitler's rise to power – The beginning of the Great Purge*

. . . Received from Melnikov the translation of an article written by X, an officer of the Japanese General Staff. Melnikov claims that he is expected to become a general and a great leader . . . I have read the article carefully. Ravings! All the same, how strange that there should be such differences in the world-outlooks of different peoples. The Japanese read his ravings very carefully and take them quite seriously . . . They call it a 'Japanese view of civilisation' . . . This drunken fellow fails to understand that the Chinese do not give a damn for his 'civilisation': they have their own civilisation – a genuine civilisation, centuries old, and not based on the monkey tricks of some Doihara . . . It was not in vain that Ilich used to say that army officers not only wear their caps askew, but their brains are askew too . . . This creature is a mixture of illiterate staff officer, petty adventurer, card-sharp and huckster, who wants to do the Chinese on the sly in the markets of Manchuria and Mongolia, and at the same time sell them the rotten goods turned out by the Mitsui trust . . .

. . . The German moratorium talks are dragging on . . . Paris demands unconditional payment of part of the reparations . . . The crashes on stock exchanges continue . . . Molotov and Varga are jubilant . . . We have a spate of lectures on the imminent collapse of world capitalism . . .

. . . 3rd July. The German Nordwolle concern has gone bankrupt . . . Dozens of bankruptcies . . . The banks are refusing payment . . . The Premiers' Conference in London has decided to appoint an expert commission to examine Germany's financial situation . . .

. . . 15th August. An extraordinary meeting of the Instantsia held at Klim's request. Lev Mikhailovich [Karakhan] is sick. Melnikov was asked to attend in his place. I attended in an advisory capacity. Melnikov presented the report on behalf of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs . . . Klim announced that our General Staff have thoroughly reliable information proving

that the Japanese are preparing to invade Manchuria, grab the Chinese Eastern Railway and then occupy Mongolia . . . The discussion was rather muddled . . . I found it interesting to observe the various members of the Instantsia. Koba clearly avoided giving his point of view until all the others had given theirs. He searched for some middle line in order to get his views accepted. He avoided formal methods of compulsion and pressure. The most outspoken of them all was Klim. He said what he had in his mind and, as he put it, 'I blurt out the truth — the mother of the working class'. He talks nonsense all too often, but sometimes there is much sense in what he says . . . Molotov kept sullenly repeating his theories but avoided explaining how they applied to the present situation . . . Koba told him several times, 'We are all familiar with your theoretical point of view. I ask you to keep to the point . . .' But Vyacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] obviously did not want to stick to the point. He shielded himself behind his ignorance of the 'concrete picture of the situation at the given moment in the given place' . . . Kalinin was foxing. I noticed that the old boy was not at all stupid, he understood the problem perfectly but did not want to take any responsibility . . . Kaganovich simply kept silent when it came to questions of international politics. He takes his lead from Molotov . . . Rudzutak\* often made two or even three diametrically opposed suggestions. Not in vain has Radek\* given him the name of 'Rudzu-thus-or-otherwise'<sup>1</sup> . . . Ordzhonikidze<sup>2</sup> is quite stupid and nobody even bothers to listen to him; he talks at great length and unintelligibly. As for Kuibyshev,<sup>3</sup> he is a very sensible man when he happens to be

<sup>1</sup> RUDZU-THUS-OR-OTHERWISE. In Russian *Rudzu-tak i etak* — a pun on the ending *tak*, which means so, thus.

<sup>2</sup> ORDZHONIKIDZE, Grigori Konstantinovich. His family belonged to the Georgian gentry. Chairman of the Party's Central Control Commission, 1926; member of the Politbureau and Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1930, and later People's Commissar for Heavy Industry. Died 1937.

<sup>3</sup> KUIBYSHEV, V. V. Son of a Tsarist army officer, he became involved in revolutionary activities as a medical student. Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, 1922-3; Chairman of the Party's Central Control Commission, 1923-6; Politbureau member and Chairman of the State Planning Commission, 1927. Died in 1935 and later alleged by Prosecutor-General Vyshinsky to have been 'medically murdered' on Yagoda's orders.

sober . . . That happens to him rather seldom . . . Also present were the alternate members, Pavel Petrovich [Postychev],<sup>1</sup> Vlas Yakovlevich [Chubar]<sup>2</sup> and likeable Seryozha [Kirov].\* Pavel Petrovich is a Siberian and he perfectly understands the problem. He spoke at length and very energetically. He demanded the immediate mobilisation of the Irkutsk and Trans-Baikal Commands. Koba was extremely displeased . . . ‘We must manœuvre, and not threaten’. He repeated this sentence several times . . . Then all the Instantsia members began to pronounce themselves in moderate terms against Klim and Postychev . . . Molotov suddenly announced that he would not vote. Koba snarled, ‘This is not a parliamentary talking-shop, but the Bolshevik governing organ . . .’ Molotov nevertheless persisted: ‘I have not been given the time to study the matter . . .’ Finally Koba moved that the matter be debated at the next meeting of the Instantsia . . . Melnikov gave everybody a copy of his report . . .

. . . A telephone call from Klim. He asked me to come to his country place, where I spent the evening. I found there several comrades from Kharkov, including Postychev and Chubar, as well as Seryozha, several comrades from Leningrad and two from Rostov-on-Don . . . The upshot was an ‘informal conference’ . . . (omission) . . . Klim was most amiable. He offered us borsch, which he had made himself, and then some kind of pirog,<sup>3</sup> made after a Lugansk recipe’, as he put it. The borsch was excellent. The pirog was abominable. We played gorodky,<sup>4</sup> Klim’s and Koba’s favourite game. I tried to get out of this stick-flinging game, but Klim laughingly compelled me to take part in it . . . I just managed to escape having my leg fractured by a stick thrown by Vlas Yakovlevich [Chubar]. He is a powerful man, and had I not moved away in time, my leg would have had it . . .

<sup>1</sup> POSTYCHEV, Pavel Petrovich. An old Bolshevik, former Editor of *Pravda*, candidate member of the Politbureau. Disappeared from public life in 1938 after being accused of ‘Ukrainian, bourgeois nationalism’.

<sup>2</sup> CHUBAR, Vlas Yakovlevich. Politbureau member 1935–8, liquidated in 1938.

<sup>3</sup> PIROG. A kind of pie.

<sup>4</sup> GORODKY. A Russian game resembling rounders.

... (omission) ... A long and confused conversation developed on the verandah ... Klim said that he was Koba's closest companion and collaborator, but that he disagreed with him on certain matters of international politics ... He said that we must immediately take the road of 'great power politics', if we didn't want to be swamped by the peasant mass in the Red Army ... Rudzutak\* supported him. He spoke of the urgent need to launch a propaganda campaign which would popularise the slogan of 'defence of the homeland' and exploit the appeal of Russian national aspirations ... Klim said that propaganda alone was insufficient. 'We must draw the claws and smack the filthy snout of the Japanese militarist scoundrels. There is no need to fear anything. Blucher\* is convinced that he can smash the Japanese as he has smashed Chang Hsueh-liang's gangs ...' (omission) ... I pointed out that it was impossible to take up an openly aggressive attitude towards Japan. We had no fleet. Even if we defeated them in Manchuria, they could still wrest from us the northern half of Sakhalin, Kamchatka and part of the Maritime Region. We could not risk ... (omission) ...

... On the whole, the evening was a dead loss as far as I was concerned ... Nor could I digest the Lugansk borsch and the pirog ... I was away from the office for two days ... Koba 'phoned me at home. He already knew of the evening at Klim's. He said sarcastically: 'Klim's political cooking is as indigestible as his Lugansk dishes' ... He asked me to tell him frankly, as a friend, what I thought of Klim's views. I replied that I was completely opposed to them ... 'Bravo, Papasha, I had no doubt that you would be ...' He asked me to visit him in his country house as soon as it was convenient for me ... 'At my place indigestible dishes are not served' ...

An evening at Koba's where I found more than a dozen people, including some who had taken part in the 'informal conference' at Klim's. Klim was not there - he had not been invited ... I was told that he was very cut up at the omission ... 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,' Koba said jokingly. 'He did not invite me ...' After the meal we walked in the park. I saw a new avenue of acacia trees planted by Koba himself. The saplings had been brought from the Crimea ... He explained in great detail the need to cross them with some cold-

resisting species which grow in the Northern Caucasus . . . He took us round the small zoological gardens he had set up for Svetlana and Vassily<sup>1</sup>. It housed a couple of foxes; a wolf from the Vologda Province; two bears – Mishka and Grishka – captured in the Kostroma Forests; a Siberian lynx; a number of squirrels in large revolving cages; badgers; a camel from Kazakhstan, a present from Philip; polecats; otters and beavers from the Urals . . .

Koba spoke at length of Zoshchenko's<sup>2</sup> latest story about a crocodile in the Moscow Zoological Gardens . . . Some 'enlightened Party member', a drunken worker, was spitting on a crocodile from the safety of a little bridge in spite of notices prohibiting the teasing of the animals. When taken to a militia station, he told the militiamen who took down his statement, 'He is a bastard, he devours human beings, and I am not even allowed to spit on him . . . what have we been fighting for? . . .' . . . (omission) . . . Vlas Yakovlevich [Chubar] remarked that Zoshchenko's pen needed curbing, because his stories often betrayed an openly anti-Soviet spirit . . . After the walk we had a long talk in the billiard-room. Koba was very animated. He joked. He said he intended taking a few months' holiday and was going to propose to the Instantsia that Klim should be appointed temporary Secretary-General . . . The conversation naturally turned to the situation in the Far East . . . Koba spoke in great detail of the need for 'maximum carefulness' so as to avoid being dragged into an international adventure and war. He said, of course, 'it is necessary to repel the Japanese, but in such a manner as to be able to disengage in case the conflict should spread . . .' Then he suddenly expressed the view that we must 'get rid' of the Chinese Eastern Railway in order to avoid further entanglements . . . He recalled that Ilich had already envisaged the necessity of selling the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese even before they had recognised us and then said, 'Why not sell them the railway, get money for it, and then when we have become sufficiently strong, declare that the sale was carried out under duress, and demand its return? . . .'

<sup>1</sup> SVETLANA and VASSILY. Stalin's children.

<sup>2</sup> ZOSHCHENKO. A leading Soviet satirical writer and humorist whose works are now banned.

Everybody present liked the idea . . . I could not recall Illich ever wanting to sell the railway, but I kept silent . . . To sell it would suit us greatly, as, if we decided not to go to war over it we might lose it anyway . . . We could get a good price for it, and then declare the transaction void . . . Had not the contract been signed under duress? A sufficient moral justification for breaking it . . . I noticed when leaving Koba that everybody present was on his side against Klim . . . He is an excellent tactician . . . (omission) . . .

Koba's proposals have been accepted by the Instantsia . . . Klim is crestfallen . . .



. . . Another scandal at the October villa, Rudzutak's summer place. One of his secretaries, Hermann<sup>1</sup> has been arrested by the Ugroz for wounding the Komsomol girl Molotkova while he was drunk. Rudzutak has demanded his release. The case will be heard in camera before a jury of the Moscow People's Court . . .

A theft in the Gosyuelir<sup>2</sup>. A thirty-five carat diamond belonging to the Kremlin treasury has been stolen. The 'neighbours' suspect the Afghan Ambassador of having purchased the stone.

. . . Molotov telephoned me. He wanted me to have the Afghan Ambassador called to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and threatened with a search of his Embassy if he refused to return the stone . . . I couldn't agree to this and I told him it couldn't be done. To do it we needed reliable information and material proof.

The diamond affair is taking a turn for the worse. The 'neighbours' now say that the Afghan is not involved . . . The Japanese have got the diamond. Allegedly one of their secretaries . . . Molotov goes on raising hell . . . He wants extreme measures taken . . . We are making ready to cede the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese, and now we are sure to quarrel with them because of some stone . . . Absurd . . . The 'neighbours' threaten to search every Japanese diplomat before he crosses the frontier to find the diamond . . . This is ridiculous, the

<sup>1</sup> HERMANN. He was shot in 1937.

<sup>2</sup> GOSYUELIR. State jewellery shop.

diamond must have been handed over by the Japanese to some diplomatic friend of theirs, and taken out of the U.S.S.R. a long time ago . . . A better watch should have been kept on the Gosyuelir premises in Neglinna Street . . .

. . . The 'neighbours' have shot the manager of the Gosyuelir, two book-keepers and two salesmen. Six other employees have been sent to Siberia. The matter is closed . . .

. . . Have been to a tennis match between Sovprom<sup>1</sup> and the 'neighbours'. It is astonishing how popular this aristocratic English game has become in our country . . . I would never have expected such . . . (omission) . . .

There is an upheaval on the editorial board of *Pravda*. Almost the whole of the staff has been changed . . . Several people have been banished to the Urals . . . The reason: an article about Koba, which contained a misprint allegedly caused by some secret members of the Opposition . . . Instead of reading 'Everybody was struck by his gaze', the sentence ran 'Everybody was struck by his nonsencse'.<sup>2</sup> It was a stupid move to have people banished for that. Nobody had noticed the misprint. I, for instance, never noticed it when I read Mekhlis's article . . .

The *Pravda* editorial board have now found the typescript of the article. The error was in the typescript . . . Now they will have to banish Mekhlis's typist for sabotage . . . (omission) . . .

Zhemchuzhina has a brother at Bronx, New York State. She would like him to be our unofficial agent with American banks . . . The Amtorg<sup>3</sup> did not object . . . Nepotism . . .

Another search in the People's Commissariat for Agriculture and in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade . . . (omission) . . . There is the beginning of some sort of Bacchanalia . . . They are looking for saboteurs everywhere . . . Everything is going to pieces . . . Yagoda is behaving like the hero of the age . . . He claims to have secured confessions from several highly-placed officials in the Commissariat for Foreign Trade . . . They were supposed to have been connected with a number of foreign secret services . . . Mainly with Warsaw . . . The Poles have always had contacts in our country . . . The nasty thing

<sup>1</sup> SOVPROM. Soviet Trading Corporation.

<sup>2</sup> The misprint consisted of a single letter, i.e. **vzdor** instead of **vzor**.

<sup>3</sup> AMTORG — see footnote 1, page 41.

about it is that people who have confessed are accusing others who have not . . . A very black picture has emerged . . . (omission) . . . The 'neighbours' tribunals have been reinforced with several members of the Central Control Commission for the forthcoming judicial proceedings . . . Hundreds of high-ranking officials of various commissariats will be shot as wreckers . . . Fortunately the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs does not deal with economic matters.

The way events are chasing one another is enough to make a man giddy . . . The English have abandoned the gold standard . . . Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, India, Canada, Egypt and Japan have followed suit . . . France is flooded by an influx of dollars which have taken the place of the pound . . . MacDonald is forming his National Government . . . Germany has rejected the idea of a customs union with Austria . . . Laval and Briand left for Berlin on 27th September.

Had a long conversation with the German Ambassador. He is pessimistically inclined. Hitler has a strong following in the Reichstag . . . In London Rosenberg<sup>1</sup> has found people favouring Hitler's rise to power. He has made them promises in the name of his chief . . . He has insisted on the implementation of the agreement to have the state of international armaments reviewed every ten years . . . He has argued with them that by abrogating Germany's reparations the English could get rid of German competition in South America, because Germany would no longer be forced to dump her goods there in order to earn the necessary foreign currency . . . A most successful kind of argument with Birmingham, Sheffield and Manchester businessmen . . . Halifax stands behind the group which wants an understanding . . .

Alarming reports from Tokyo. The critical moment is approaching . . . The Instantsia has sent Ordzhonikidze to Chita. Klim has left for the Urals and the Volga provinces. Both these regions will become the far rear in case of war with Japan . . . To provide for every eventuality, the Ukraine, Crimea, Byelorussia, Leningrad, Vitebsk and Moscow Commands remain our reserves in case of complications on our

<sup>1</sup> ROSENBERG, Alfred. The chief Nazi theoretician.

western border . . . The 'far neighbours' assure us that the Poles are negotiating a secret military alliance with Tokyo . . . Pilsudski . . . (omission) . . . General Koiso has replied to my letter. I think we should drop a hint in Paris: after all, they have an alliance with Poland . . . If they learn of the old Marshal's machinations, they will protest in Warsaw . . . At present the French fear German rearmament more than anything else. They need Poland. They will not permit Pilsudski to get entangled in some adventure for the sake of Japan . . . The Poles are asking for money in Paris. A good opportunity for exerting pressure on them.

Have received a letter from the director of our bank in Paris . . . (omission) . . . He writes that the Poles are negotiating a loan through a group of middlemen connected with the Rothschilds . . . (omission) . . . A Lithuanian-Polish timber merchant heads the group of middlemen . . . Endless machinations and stock exchange speculations . . . Rothschild refuses to provide the money . . . Matrimonial arrangements between a certain Jewish-Polish diplomat<sup>1</sup> and a relative of the Rothschilds intended to facilitate the granting of the loan . . . On the whole, a light opera transported to Paris from Nalewki and Krakowskie Przedmiescie<sup>2</sup>. Pilsudski . . . (omission) . . . I cannot help respecting the man. He is our most dangerous enemy, but one must admit that he has courage, understanding of what is happening, and an inclination to act in a determined manner . . .

Have informed Benes of the danger inherent in Warsaw's contacts with Tokyo. He formally instructed the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Paris to see Briand or Berthelot and demand that they should curb Pilsudski . . . The 'far neighbours' report that the talks between the Polish and Japanese general staffs, directed against us, have reached an advanced stage. They are already preparing a general plan for a synchronised mobilisation in . . . (omission) . . . We must act swiftly and decisively . . .

<sup>1</sup> Litvinov obviously had in mind Muhlstein, one of the secretaries in the Polish Embassy in Paris. It was common talk in Poland that he, a Jew, was tolerated in the Polish Diplomatic Service because of his personal wealth and his connections with the French Rothschilds.

<sup>2</sup> Nalewki – centre of the Jewish district in pre-war Warsaw; Krakowskie Przedmiescie – Warsaw's Whitehall.

Koba is very worried. He has been telephoning me several times a day. He has asked me to speed up and increase pressure in Paris through Benes . . . He also wants to thank Benes for his part in . . . (omission) . . . That 'far neighbours' agent decided to quit and took with him the ciphers and codes . . . As a result of our request, Benes ordered the police to arrest him on the charge of having rifled the Consulate safe . . . We promised to give him a public trial . . . The 'neighbours' shot him as soon as he crossed the frontier . . . Officially his death is due to typhus . . .

★ ★ ★ ★

Our Consul at Changchun reports concentrations of Japanese troops along Section 5 of the Chinese Eastern Railway . . . Our divisions are concentrating between the Baikal and Chita. The Khabarovsk Group is providing two half brigades as cover. A mixed brigade is deployed along the border . . . They will not catch us napping . . .

The storm has broken . . . 20th September . . . We already have reports on the opening events. The Japanese have occupied Mukden. Kirin, Changchun, Liaoyang have also been taken . . . Four Guards divisions and one artillery division are being shipped to the continent from Shimonoseki and Hiroshima . . . (omission) . . .

. . . The Instantsia meets every day . . . Koba holds frequent conversations by direct wire with Chita, Khabarovsk and Vladivostok . . . Several of our submarines have been dispatched to Sakhalin . . . All other matters have been put aside . . . We are not interested . . . The Far East draws all our attention . . . Our *charge d'affaires* in Tokyo saw Nagai . . . He asked him what were Japan's real intentions . . . Nagai enigmatically replied that he would enquire from the Kwantung Army Command . . . And so we are left in the dark as to whether the operation has been carried out with the blessing of the Tokyo government or whether it has been the independent work of the Kwantung Army Command . . . Koba is in a rage . . . He keeps demanding from the 'neighbours' – both 'near' and 'far' – immediate detailed information . . . Our reaction must depend on this information, and we have none . . . (omission) . . .

The League of Nations has received Alfred Sze's<sup>1</sup> complaint. The English and French are trying to wriggle out . . . They do not want to risk their concessions in Tientsin and Shanghai . . . The English subordinate everything to their interests in Hong-kong . . . (omission) . . .

I was present when Ordzhonikidze<sup>2</sup> delivered his report to the Instantsia. He had just arrived from Vladivostok . . . The meeting was stormy . . . Ordzhonikidze was jumpy . . . He said Blucher was a good commander, but there were suspect individuals on his staff . . . He feared that 'some sort of provocation' might be engineered in order to drag us into a war with Japan . . . Ordzhonikidze's face was blood-red. His nostrils were distended . . . His eyes shone with a strange light . . . He kept hitting the table with his fist. Koba told him: 'Sergo, you will upset my inkstand . . .' He shouted in a hysterical voice . . . Klim was also agitated. He had returned from the Urals, where he found everything in complete disorder. He demanded that the people responsible should be tried by court martial immediately . . . The veins in his temples went almost black. Klim's splendid mass of hair became tousled, his gaze evil and intense . . . Molotov spoke slowly and remained outwardly calm, but he stammered badly as he always does when he is nervous . . . Old Kalinin became excited and babbled on in his Tver dialect . . . Also present was Grigori Ivanovich [Petrovsky].<sup>3</sup> He had come from Kharkov. He spoke of excitement in Ukrainian nationalist circles . . . They looked forward to the outbreak of war. Balitsky<sup>4</sup> had got hold of secret letters sent by adventurers from the Polish-Petlyura group. They contained instructions concerning . . . (omission) . . . Petrovsky asked . . . (omission)

<sup>1</sup> SZE, Sao-Ke Alfred. Chinese representative on the League of Nations Council and delegate to the Assembly in 1931. Had been Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1923. Served as Minister in Britain, 1914-20, and Ambassador in the United States, 1935-7.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, p. 155.

<sup>3</sup> PETROVSKY, Grigori Ivanovich. President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukraine. Imprisoned in 1938. Released in 1953 and awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labour.

<sup>4</sup> BALITSKY, Apollinary. G.P.U. and later N.K.V.D. chief in the Ukraine. A friend of Petrovsky's, he was arrested during the Great Purge, shot in 1937.

. . . It was interesting to watch Rudzutak\*. He spoke calmly. There were tones of hidden malice in his voice . . . He shrugged his shoulders in a strange manner . . . I understand he has been doing it since the day when, as People's Commissar for Communications, he was involved in a rail accident at the Volnovakha Station. Kuibyshev was drunk . . . He was a disgusting sight . . . Seryezha [Kirov] spoke well and to the point . . . I think Koba will make him his right-hand man . . . He watches him sympathetically . . .

Gossip and rumours in Moscow. Everybody speaks of war. People are laying on stores of sugar and flour. At the Rapp<sup>1</sup> meeting somebody read stupid poems on the forthcoming war:

. . . *Troopers are raping Polish girls  
By the glimmering light of camp fires . . .*

I have tried to find out the name of the fool of a 'poet' who wrote it . . . At the same time it must be admitted that there is no panic or defeatism in Moscow . . . I am glad it is so: it proves that the U.S.S.R. has become a real and stable state . . . I am beginning to think that in the event of war they will fight like hell, and in that case . . . (omission) . . . The students of the higher educational establishments have decided that in case of war half of them would join up . . . How strange this hatred of the Japanese. That the students of our Soviet universities should dream of wiping out the shame of defeats suffered by Tsarist officers in 1904–5 . . .

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. . . Took the children to the state circus . . . The usual parade of clowns, horses, dogs and jugglers . . . A singer, not on the programme, suddenly appeared in the arena and sang *On the hills of Manchuria* . . . I remembered the old waltz of 1904 . . . 'Only Russia could survive such trying days . . .' It was strange to hear in the Soviet state circus such lyrics, written to cheer up the ordinary people of the Russian Empire in the dark days of defeat before Mukden and Tzusima . . .

The Council of the League of Nations adopted on 24th

<sup>1</sup> RAPP. The Society of Proletarian Writers.

October a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Manchuria within three weeks . . . What a farce! . . .

. . . On 26th October Japan issued a statement on the aims of her policy in China. It demanded that 'Japan's contractual rights be respected'. The Chinese have agreed to negotiate, provided the Japanese troops are withdrawn from Manchuria . . .

The 'neighbours' have supplied a most interesting report on the Anglo-Japanese Agreement for the division of China into spheres of influence. The Agreement, which is secret, is to remain in force for five years . . . It's now clear why the London Government doesn't seem to worry about the Japanese occupation . . . It's also clear that the occupation is the work of the Tokyo Government, and not the result of local initiative on the part of the Kwantung Army Commanders . . . I am nevertheless surprised that the British should have signed such an agreement, aimed as it is against the American policy of the open door in China . . . It indicates that dissatisfaction in London with American naval rearmament must be considerable. It's a most interesting development in world affairs . . . and also a most dangerous one. If the British start making an effort to 'balance' American naval supremacy they may join forces not only with Japan but with any country capable of fast naval rearmament – Germany, for example. The British may thus work out a curious political pattern: an understanding with the Japanese in the Pacific . . . with the French and Italians in the Mediterranean (the Empire's lifeline) . . . And possibly with the Germans in the Atlantic. I can now guess the general lines of British policy in the next five years . . . It's hardly reassuring . . . My idea for collective security will not find much support in Britain . . .

I asked to see Koba, and reported to him on Britain's foreign policy . . . He listened very attentively, interrupting me from time to time to ask for an additional explanation . . . Then he suddenly declared: 'From time to time the British try to bring about a new balance of power directed against their strongest naval rival. But this time the United States will soon catch up with Britain . . . This new British policy is obviously dangerous; it will inevitably result in war in those areas where Britain has

given would-be belligerents an undertaking to remain neutral in exchange for their participation in her system for a world balance of naval power . . . France will not fight. She won't attack anyone. Her policy has been stable and consistent since Versailles . . . But Japan, Italy, and also Germany as soon as she had rearmed and signed a naval agreement with Britain, can certainly cause war . . . And . . . (omission) . . .' At the end of our talk he added: 'However, as soon as hostilities spread and tend to develop into a world war Britain will undoubtedly join forces with the United States because of Canada and Australia. The loss of these Dominions would mean the end of the British Empire.'

. . . He paused for a while and then added, 'We must achieve at all costs a resumption of relations with the U.S.A. . . I think that for the time being our apprehensions about Japan are exaggerated. The Japs are not planning for . . . (omission) . . '

. . . November. Have been working on the draft of our third note to Japan regarding events in Manchuria. The question will have to be thrashed out in Tokyo. Nagai somehow seems to take a conciliatory attitude. But the point at issue is the Japanese withdrawal from Tsitsihar . . . Some mounted units have turned up in Hailar. They could be Mongols from Barga, or Semenov's White Guards, or Japanese cavalry men in disguise . . . The 'far neighbours' are alarmed. There is talk about the possibility of an attack on Mongolia along the Kerelen valley. Some bands of armed men . . . (omission) . . .

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Our *chargé d'affaires* had an interview with Nagai, who told him that the Japanese would evacuate Tsitsihar within a week. We shall see . . .

. . . We must nevertheless be prepared for any eventuality. We cannot afford to allow the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway . . . (omission) . . .

Shidehara is embarrassed. He mumbled something to our *chargé d'affaires* about events in Manchuria being the result of a 'regrettable misunderstanding'. Some misunderstanding! They seize Manchuria, enter Tsitsihar, drive on Hailar, and it's all a

misunderstanding! . . . Lytton<sup>1</sup> and his commission will probably never reach Manchuria . . .

The 'neighbours' inform us that the Minseito Government will probably resign. There are intrigues at the Palace. One of the Mikado's uncles received a very large sum from Mitsui.<sup>2</sup> The officers of the Chosiou clan want to replace the Minseito Government by one drawn from the Seyukai party . . .



I should have liked to know Washington's point of view, but there is no information on the matter. There is some friction between Washington and London, but it isn't clear who will get the upper hand . . . The 'far neighbours' report from Washington that Stimson<sup>3</sup> has decided to open an energetic campaign against London. The Americans may invoke the Kellogg-Briand pact and brand the Japanese as aggressors. Had Tokyo thought that possible they would have never attacked Manchuria . . . But obviously . . .

. . . (omission) . . . The 'neighbours' were right; the Minseito Government has fallen and the Seyukai people have come to power. This means that all Manchuria will be occupied this year . . .

Alarming news from Harbin, where an attack on our Consulate is being prepared. Colonel Nakamura<sup>4</sup> paid a visit to our Consul. He declared sternly that we were supposed to be hiding at the Consulate Chinese communists and terrorists who had blown up bridges on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The allegations are idiotic. We demanded proper protection of the railway line . . .

I shall have to refer the question to the Instantsia. The 'far neighbours' apparently sent a hundred Korean saboteurs to Manchuria . . . I can't think who can have taken such a stupid and criminal decision . . . Berzin\* called me on the 'phone. He explained that the Koreans had been sent to operate in Korea,

<sup>1</sup> LYTTON, Lord. 1876-1947. Author of the 'Lytton Report' condemning Japanese aggression in Manchuria.

<sup>2</sup> One of Japan's largest financial and industrial concerns.

<sup>3</sup> STIMSON, Henry Lewis. American Secretary of State, 1929-33.

<sup>4</sup> NAKAMURA, Colonel. Japanese Chief of Espionage in Manchuria.

near the Soviet border, and not 'to Japan'. It was by mistake that they had crossed into Manchuria . . .

The whole thing is incomprehensible. The Koreans should know the geography of their own country, at any rate better than Berzin and the fools who work for the 'far neighbours'. I didn't question Berzin about his reference to Japan. Presumably some people are being sent there. We shall overdo this game . . .

The 'neighbours' report that Stimson is drafting the text of a proposed joint Anglo-American note protesting against Japan's violation of the open door policy in China. I doubt whether the British will sign such a note. The Hoover-Stimson policy doesn't appeal to the British, who have always been indifferent to any moves aimed at preventing a division of China . . .



Another series of scandals in our Diplomatic Missions. Half of the Rome staff have to be recalled. The same old triangular affairs, squabbles, intrigues, careerism . . . A general moral disintegration, to use the expression now in vogue. If . . .

The 'neighbours' agent took the lead: he stole the second counsellor's wife. The wife of the military attaché ran away to Moscow with the senior cipher clerk, and refuses to return to her husband. The consul used to take trips to the mountains with the wife of the commercial representative . . . It looks more like Sodom and Gomorrah than like an Embassy . . . How can we stop it all? Is there really no way apart from shooting them? Menzhinsky\* already suggested this method, likening our diplomatic missions to outposts of an army in action. He wants to enforce discipline with an iron hand, and talks about capitalist encirclement, the class enemy, and the rest of it. Anyone who succumbs to moral disintegration is a potential traitor, and so on. It's all rhetoric . . . You can't compare diplomats to soldiers fighting in the field . . . All that is needed is to select better people . . . (omission) . . .

The bureau of foreign cells invited me to take part in their discussion on the renewal of our foreign service personnel. There was once more endless and futile talk on the need to make use abroad of workers and peasants, presumably taken straight from their factories and fields – and other such nonsense. Surely

these would-be diplomats must be taught at least to spell correctly before being sent abroad. We have already tried out such people and it ended badly. What we must do is to train new people in the background.

They must also be taught foreign languages. Then, and only then, may they be sent abroad; otherwise we shall get nothing but trouble and confusion . . .

I heard it said that Seryshev, an attaché who had been sent to Tokyo straight from the plough, drank from a finger bowl at an official dinner in the Imperial Palace. Our Ambassador nearly had a fit when he saw it . . . The wife of our commercial representative, walking backwards as she was leaving the Great Hall according to etiquette, bumped into a screen, fell over, and revealed more than a lady ought to . . . Yoshihito<sup>1</sup> left the Hall helpless with laughter and one of the courtiers ran for a camera to record the spectacle.

I mentioned all this at the meeting of the cells' bureau. They were annoyed and rebuked me, claiming that it ill-suited me as an old Party member to show contempt for the representatives of the working class . . . It's a silly argument . . . I am, after all, responsible to the Party for the work of our diplomatic missions, and we shan't get very far with such raw staff. They retorted by saying that our good diplomats were often found to be traitors. Again they threw in my face the case of Bessedovsky – a good, indeed a brilliant, diplomat but a traitor, a rogue, a drunkard, and the son of a merchant.

. . . As if we had no such cases among men from the working class! One would think that a proletarian origin is a guarantee of personal integrity and character. And how did Koba . . . I also told them I wouldn't encourage demagogic and would fight to improve the quality of our diplomacy by sound methods, not by loose talk and shouting . . . They remained dissatisfied . . . I could not care less . . . I am not going to chase popularity . . .

It's nearly the end of 1931. What does the future hold out for us? . . . The main danger is in the Far East . . . But I still don't think they will . . .

<sup>1</sup> YOSHIHITO, 1879–1926. One hundred and twenty-third Emperor of Japan, succeeded to the Throne in 1912.

We must make serious efforts on this disarmament question and work out in detail all the proposals I discussed with the Secretary-General . . . It's clear they will soon be forced to invite us to play a real part in this work [the disarmament conference] – and not only formally, as a means of deceiving public opinion and being able to claim that the Soviets, too, are attending . . . Of course, this is . . . (omission).

Rudzutak\* phoned to invite me to a reception. I don't know what the occasion is. True, he is the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Commissars. He asked whether he could invite foreign envoys, and if so, which of them. He did not say what it was all about. It is probably another affair with women – actresses, or something in that line . . . I shall say that I am too busy to come and that it is unnecessary to invite foreigners. All we need now is to finish the year with a drunken orgy and a scandal at the Serebriany Bor!<sup>1</sup>

4th January, 1932 . . . The Japanese have occupied Tsing-chow. The occupation of Manchuria is complete . . . On 10th December last year Lytton was authorised by the Council of the League of Nations to . . . But he never got there. The speed of British diplomats proceeding to unpleasant assignments has never exceeded ten kilometres a day. This tradition was first established by Pitt the Elder, when he travelled to the Rotten Borough of Old Sarum, which had returned him to Parliament . . . England is a country of traditions . . . (omission) . . .

In two days' time I shall have to report to the Instantsia on our disarmament project. I have been appointed head of our delegation. I must confess that this appointment means very little to me; I know that Koba will be making all the decisions . . . (omission).

I don't even know what line to take in conversations. The subject of the Comintern will take some explaining. Koba wouldn't commit himself to definite answers. He doesn't want to accept the responsibility . . . There is incredible confusion in the Comintern. Several hundred junior members of its staff are said to have been arrested already. It's a strange attitude towards 'the civil servants of the World Revolution'.

<sup>1</sup> Famous house of a Russian aristocrat, renamed the 'October' Villa and used at the time by Rutzutak.

Is it really a fact that all great ideas are destined to become distorted and turned into some kind of farce? . . . Strange is the destiny of man. I've never liked to indulge in introspection and I've had little time for 'the cursed questions of existence' . . . Everything seemed clear and simple . . . Marx and Engels had thought out and decided everything for us. All we had to do was to work out the details and implement the theory.

I remember reading in my youth Maimonides' *Guide to the Perplexed*. He had a brilliant mind, this Jewish Plato. I am beginning to think that his philosophy was more profound than Marx's . . . Had Maimonides lived in our country he would have certainly been banished beyond the Urals. Yagoda once gave it as his opinion that 'philosophers are the most harmful people'. Poor Yagoda! If he wasn't so illiterate he would have certainly heard of Skalozub's famous saying: 'The sergeant-major will take care of Voltaire'. However, Koba, too, is beginning to take an interest in philosophy. Illich's laurels do not give him peace . . . And Molotov follows suit . . . (omission).



Examination of the proposals to be submitted at Geneva. Koba was stubbornly silent. Rudzutak\* made some silly remarks and criticised my suggestions. He can't forgive my refusal to come to his reception at the 'October' villa. Seryozha [Kirov] came from Leningrad. His remarks were most sensible. The debate was long and dull and changed nothing of what had been decided long ago . . . Six hours completely wasted . . . It all results from Koba's insisting on the discussion, by the Instantsia, of details of our foreign policy. It is a tradition started by Illich, but the situation was different in his days. The responsibility is tremendous and now . . . (omission).

I just had to say: 'All this reminds me of the old student song: "We met and we decided, we met and we decided, we met and we decided to let things go their way!"' . . . Koba smiled, but Molotov frowned. 'This is the supreme body of the Party,' he said. 'We decide the fate of the country and of the revolution, the fate of the world proletariat. I protest against such frivolities . . .'

I attempted to answer, but Koba wouldn't let me. He summed

up the discussion by saying: 'Both Comrade Litvinov and Comrade Molotov are right. There are two sides to our work: to state the most that we hope to achieve, and to secure, in every given case, the minimum real achievement which is possible. The programme of minimum and maximum targets is the most outstanding discovery of Russian revolutionary Marxism. In this particular instance I propose we affirm our desire for general and total disarmament. If they reject this we can then submit a draft convention on the proportional and progressive reduction of armaments. We should accept as a basis the practical proposals of Comrade Litvinov. Comrade Molotov should be given the task of drafting the text of a declaration for Geneva, so worded as to make it understandable to the broad masses and capable of being used by the Communist Parties of the foreign sections.'

I received Molotov's draft, but couldn't possibly agree to use it as the basis of my speech at Geneva. It was far too transparent . . . Molotov apparently thinks all foreign diplomats and journalists are congenital idiots . . . I can't . . . (omission) . . .

Had a meeting with Molotov in his office – that of President of the Council of People's Commissars. A portrait of Karl Marx was hanging on the wall, next to that of Lenin. It was put up recently by Poskrebyshev,<sup>1</sup> that despicable Peredonov,<sup>2</sup> our 'minor demon'. What is the connection between Marx and the office of the head of our government? I respect Marx at least as much as Molotov does, but there are in our country no fewer than 120 million people who have not, and do not want to have, anything to do with Karl Marx . . .

Molotov was very dry. He said that the differences between the head of the government and the chief of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat were becoming extremely pronounced. I cut him short and declared that, if they wanted me to resign, I would go at once: I had no wish to cling to my post . . . He replied acidly, 'We are all under the authority of the Central Committee. When the time comes you will be removed' . . . We argued for some

<sup>1</sup> POSKREBYSHEV. Stalin's personal secretary and faithful servant; disappeared after Stalin's death.

<sup>2</sup> A character from a Russian early nineteenth-century novel.

time. He gave it as his opinion that we should take advantage of our presence at the Disarmament Conference to drive a deep wedge between the various capitalist countries. Otherwise, there was no point in going. He said we should make proposals likely to cause friction and discord, and not come out openly as peace-makers. 'We must stress in particular that Japan violated the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. We should support the United States, which is psychologically prepared for war with Japan because of China, but cannot take the plunge because of the attitude of Britain . . .'

I countered his arguments resolutely. Such tactics, I said, would drive Japan into armed conflict with us: we hadn't even got diplomatic relations with the United States and the Hoover-Stimson clique was ready to deliver us up to anyone, even the Japanese . . . Molotov again declared that I was wrong and that the Republicans would soon be thrown out of the White House. He said, 'We must set the stage for the arrival of Roosevelt. War is inevitable. The next world war, wherever it starts, will be a war for a new division of the Pacific. That is the world-wide historical pattern of the twentieth century . . .' It passed through my mind that Georgi Vassilevich [Chicherin] has been putting across such views for a long time . . . (omission) . . .

. . . I was forced to act the part of a schoolmaster for a moment and give Vyacheslav Mikhailovich [Molotov] a lecture on foreign affairs. I explained to him that the United States couldn't start a war in the Pacific without British support. Britain would never go to war for the sake of China, where her main interests were commercial and not strategic. If the Japanese persuaded the City of London that Britain's trade interests were not threatened, no Anglo-Saxon coalition against Japan would materialise. Downing Street could even flirt with Washington from time to time, but this would not lead to anything. It would simply be the result of pressure from Australia and, to some extent, from Canada. That was all there was to it. Things would not go beyond that . . .

. . . Molotov listened to me with half an ear and tried to argue. Eventually he waved my arguments aside and said: 'Talking to you is useless. We shall have to discuss it in the Instantsia once again . . .'

There is alarming news from China. The Japanese are preparing to invade Central China along the Yangze-Kiang river, probably in the Shanghai area . . . The 'far neighbours' have received some brilliant intelligence reports from Tokyo. They have a highly-placed informer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The reports refer to a plan for the invasion of the whole of . . . (omission) . . .

Our Tokyo Embassy reports that the Gaimusho is working on a sensational note offering to stop military operations in Manchuria. I think it is just a smoke-screen . . .

. . . The Japanese simply want to clear the tension a little before invading Central China . . . It's a sign portending trouble rather than peace . . . (omission) . . .

I shall be leaving for Geneva in two days' time. The Disarmament Conference is due to open on 2nd February . . . (omission) . . .

I am very tired . . . I broke my journey to talk to . . . (omission) . . . I revised the final version of my speech, drafted by Molotov and approved by the Instantsia. It included some rather provincial wisecracks . . . It's embarrassing to think that I shall be regarded as the author of this speech . . . Such phrases as: 'The war has not been registered and witnessed by a notary-public' smell of Kazan and Perm . . . Not in vain was Molotov's uncle a notary . . . Of course, for the Anglo-Saxons . . . (omission) . . .

It feels strange to be in Geneva now. I remember my trips here before the revolution. I also remember my arrival in Paris on an unsuccessful mission given me by Ilich in Geneva . . .

Of course, the newspapers published my photograph, taken from the police archives, but they didn't insist on . . . (omission) . . .

The French are in a difficult position. They would like to co-operate with us to insure themselves against Germany, but Tardieu's position is somewhat . . . (omission) . . . The Radical-Socialists may come back to power in May . . . Herriot will then . . . If he decides to co-operate with us fully and sincerely, as he promised . . . Will he get? . . . The Socialists will be given the Foreign Ministry in his cabinet so that the decision will not be taken by Herriot himself but by Blum and Fauré . . . Neither

is reliable . . . Fauré hates us and, according to the 'neighbours', he is involved with some émigré lady . . . However, I don't think that . . . (omission) . . .

There's a lot of talk about Paul Boncour. He favours a rapprochement with us and . . . His appreciation of the situation is perfectly correct: a repetition of Kronstadt<sup>1</sup> is possible, but to bring it about France would have to abandon completely her previous policy of unconditional support for Poland and what it implies: anti-Soviet moves in the Baltic countries and encouragement to the Caucasian and Ukrainian émigrés . . . 'Prometheus' must be . . . (omission) . . .



The Petlyurists<sup>2</sup> and Georgian Mensheviks must not be allowed to build up their cadres in Poland with a view to attacking us at the first opportunity . . . Although supported by Poland, this movement serves the ends of Germany policy and as such it is anti-French . . . Boncour will succeed if he should . . . (omission) . . . Hitherto, Finance Minister Flandin has been directing French foreign policy. It often happens in France that Ministers have more control over departments other than their own . . . Flandin is London's man and this means that . . . (omission) . . . He is very clever but . . .

I went to see our old Carouge.<sup>3</sup> Nothing has changed along the banks of the river . . . The same houses . . . Everything in Switzerland seems to be frozen up, like the glaciers. I remember Illich and I talked about this once when we were on a cycle ride . . . I think Lenin had a soft spot for Switzerland. His character was, in fact, that of a typical Swiss petty-bourgeois. There was hardly any difference between him and Grimm as long as he lived in Switzerland. But when I met him in Moscow he was an entirely different man . . .

In Geneva I met an old woman shop-keeper who used to sell us tea, sugar and macaroni on credit. She still remembered us . . . I stopped the car to talk to her. She was moved to tears. She said Radek\* came to her in 1924, sent by Lenin to settle an

<sup>1</sup> KRONSTADT means presumably the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891.

<sup>2</sup> PETLYURISTS. Followers of Petlyuria, the Ukrainian Fascist Nationalist.

<sup>3</sup> CAROUGE. A district in Geneva, near the River Arve.

old debt of fifteen francs . . . His own debts, of course, Radek never paid. It was not without reason that we used to call him 'Kradek'<sup>1</sup> instead of 'Radek'.

There was some business about watches . . . But, with the exception of wealthy fellows like Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] and Adolf Abramovich [Yoffe] or ascetics like Ilich, who among our exiles was free from such behaviour? And it was almost invariably watches . . . Russians seem to be strangely partial to watches . . . In Poland we had no such predilection for these things . . . The first Chairman of the Council of Workers' Deputies, Khrustalev-Nossar, had to appear before a private court on honour in Geneva in 1908 on a charge of having pinched a friend's watch.

I think my decision to leave the exiles and take an office job in England, like any ordinary mortal, saved me from disintegration and from slipping down to the level of a Radek or Khrustalev-Nossar . . . Idleness can lead to . . .

This isn't petty-bourgeois wisdom, as Lenin told me when he rebuked me here in Geneva for giving up active revolutionary work, but just a sound appraisal of human nature . . . Ilich's character was more German than Russian. I remember once telling him half-jokingly: 'Vladimir Ilich, you always preach socialist revolution and the expropriation of the expropriators. But tell me, if you met Rothschild carrying a heavy purse, could you rob him yourself and take his purse by threatening him with a revolver?' He laughed and said: 'I don't think so . . . But if we came to power I should have no hesitation in ordering the nationalisation of Rothschild's banks and of his property. But this would have to be done legally, on the strength of a decree passed by the victorious people and their government. As long as the state has not been abolished, the proletarian state included, the rule of law is necessary or else everything will crumble and the most primitive instincts will be let loose.'

I have often thought of this twist of fate which placed a Westerner, Ilich, at the head of the Russian uprising with all its wild looting . . . Ilich himself was preaching to the masses: 'Loot what has been looted from you'. Of course, he meant that the

<sup>1</sup> KRADEK, from the Russian 'krast' – to steal.

new Government would provide a legal basis for this looting, but he didn't say it publicly in case the masses followed the anarchists, and not him . . . Radek\* once said that in Germany it would suffice to put up notices marked 'revolution strictly verboten' to make the order-loving Germans stay quietly at home. Ilich belonged to that breed which loves order, in spite of the fact that he carried out a revolution . . . (omission) . . . Endless conference with . . . My speech caused a sensation. I never expected such a reaction. Journalists and diplomats congratulated me. They also praised Molotov's efforts. It couldn't have been as silly as I thought, unless these people are even sillier than ours . . .

The Conference drags on needlessly. Henderson's first speech was so poor that I couldn't help wondering how they could have sent such a man to Geneva. Compared with him Molotov is like the Himalayas. It seems to me that the Labour Party could do with a few brilliant brains. Admittedly MacDonald is a great orator but . . . there is some talk about Noel-Baker and . . .

John Simon<sup>1</sup> is a very clever man. One can also see that he has background, education and tradition, as well as a good grasp of affairs. He is said to be connected with Garvin,<sup>2</sup> to be hostile to the U.S.S.R. and well disposed towards Hitler. Last December he had some dealings with Rosenberg in London. Rosenberg is said to have promised him something in the course of a private conversation at the house of Montagu Norman. Baldwin didn't receive Rosenberg, but perhaps Simon acts on behalf of the City in these matters. The English have about £60,000,000 frozen in Germany in long-term investments. If Hitler promised to repay it . . . (omission) . . .

The 'neighbours' have sent me here an account of Rosenberg's talks with Simon and Montagu Norman. It looks like a story invented by an expert from Druzhelovsky's<sup>3</sup> Russian émigré group in Berlin. But if the account is accurate, it is a serious affair. The German presidential elections are due in

<sup>1</sup> SIMON, Viscount. Foreign Secretary in the National Government in 1931.

<sup>2</sup> GARVIN, J. L. Editor (1908-42) of the London *Observer*.

<sup>3</sup> DRUZHELOVSKY. A Russian émigré who forged documents of the Comintern; shot by the G.P.U.

March. Hindenburg must win, but if the British support Hitler behind the scenes, then the German industrialists will also back him. The new Reichstag which will result from the general elections in June may then have a majority of nationalists and Nazis . . . I think the situation is very grave. The French elections are the only hope; but will Herriot and the Socialists be able to take a determined stand? . . . In the process of trying to save their money, the British will eventually make it possible for Germany virtually to annul the Versailles Treaty. If the French could only afford an independent policy . . .

A pity that Churchill is out of politics. His distrust of the Germans is of long-standing, going back to the Boer War. True, he turned against us with his *cordon sanitaire*, but that was long ago . . . At any rate, a Churchill-Herriot combination would be the most favourable. Unfortunately . . .

(Omission.) . . . I shall have to return to Moscow for some time and meet the Instantsia. They won't let me take a single step, and they keep expecting . . .

The 'far neighbours' have sent their version of the conversation at the house of Montagu Norman. They have an excellent and proven informer – an officer close to Pfaltz-Fein,<sup>1</sup> our 'ostrich Baron' of Askana Nova. Everything is now confirmed, and I can now understand why Koba is so worried . . . It means that Simon has swallowed Rosenberg's bait . . . True, the other Conservatives seem to be still hesitating but . . .

Had a talk with Dino Grandi,<sup>2</sup> who affirms that Mussolini remains opposed to German rearmament. The Duce, according to him, is prepared to co-operate with Britain and even with France, but only on the basis of naval parity with France. They will propose a one-year respite in armaments, except for navies, of course. They haven't got too much money . . . Paul Boncour declares France to be favourably inclined towards a full restoration of the Franco-Russian Alliance and mutual guarantees against Germany. He gave the impression of a man who is prepared to go a considerable distance . . . (omission) . . .

<sup>1</sup> PFALTZ-FEIN, see footnote 4, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup> GRANDI, Dino, Count. Italian Foreign Minister, 1929–32; Ambassador in London, 1932–9. Head of the Italian Delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, 1932.

Regarding the elections, Boncour was certain that the left bloc would win . . . He was only afraid of some possible move on the part of Tardieu during or just before the elections . . .

I didn't understand exactly what he meant by a 'move'. He then said it would be a good thing if the Communist Party didn't embarrass the left bloc. He didn't amplify this, but he dropped some more hints . . . He complained bitterly about Doriot,<sup>1</sup> whom he accused of revolutionary hooliganism. Saint Denis,<sup>2</sup> he said, had become an experimental ground for provocations on the part of Tardieu's police. There was evidence suggesting that Doriot was connected with some suspect Russian émigrés believed to be either anarchists or neo-fascists . . . I showed surprise, but all the same I shall have to report the matter to Moscow so that they can check up on Doriot . . . The Comintern is being purged but they are getting rid of the wrong people . . .

Never, it is said, has Koba been so furious. This business with Judas Stern<sup>3</sup> has really made him loose his temper and could be the signal for . . . (omission) . . .

The 'neighbours' agent attached to our delegation told me he had received details from Moscow on the attempt of 5th March. Judas Stern is a member of the 'neighbours' organisation . . . They say he is a Trotskyite or a Zinovievist . . . His own statements are contradictory . . . He is obviously unbalanced in his mind . . . He is also said to belong to the Jewish Socialist Party, 'Poale Zion' . . . It's all rather strange and suspicious . . . First he declared that by killing von Tvardovsky he wanted to provoke war with Germany so that the opposition could take advantage of it to get rid of Stalin and take control. Later he made a statement affirming that he fired because he knew Hitler would seize power in Germany and kill all the Jews. He therefore wanted to avenge the Jews 'in anticipation'. If it hadn't been for the tragedy of the attempt and its possible

<sup>1</sup> DORIOT, Jacques. French Communist leader who turned Fascist and founded the *Parti Populaire Français* in 1936.

<sup>2</sup> SAINT DENIS. Industrial town on the outskirts of Paris; a communist stronghold.

<sup>3</sup> STERN, Judas. He tried to kill the Counsellor of the German Embassy in Moscow, von Tvardovsky in 1932.

consequences, it would all sound like a tactless Odessa joke. But there is a touch of Yagoda\* in this affair, of his mentality and logic . . . I will have to . . . (omission) . . .



It would appear that after being sacked by the 'neighbours' Stern joined the 'far neighbours' . . . Arrests are now going on among Berzin's\* staff, and Yagoda is jubilant. He hates Berzin, whom he blames for his expulsion from the Latvian Communists' Club. Berzin had proved before the war that Yagoda was neither a Latvian nor a communist . . .

Yagoda is said to have spent a night in Stern's cell at the Lyubianka. He arranged for a champagne dinner to be served to them there, and even had some girls brought in later. By morning Yagoda had left the girls with the intoxicated Stern. A microphone was fitted in the cell and every bit of the conversation was recorded . . . I can well imagine what he would have said in his drunken state when he gave vent to his feelings. No doubt too he wanted to brag; he is only a youth . . . It all looks as if he had been a tool in somebody else's hands, but in whose? Could he really have been used just for settling accounts between Yagoda and Berzin . . .

Koba is reported to have cooled down suddenly. He had a long talk with Yagoda and listened to the record of Stern's conversation with the girls. The line now ordered by the Party is to declare Stern a Trotskyite and Zionist-Fascist. How can anyone in his senses print such nonsense? . . .

. . . (omission) . . . Met Ignat,<sup>1</sup> of the 'far neighbours'. He gave me some details about the Stern affair. The 'far neighbours', he said, have evidence proving that two days before the attempt Stern had a private meeting with Pilyar<sup>2</sup> in Moscow. The revolver found on him was of the type used by the 'neighbours'. True, he stated that he had not handed it back on leaving their service. But this is unlikely, since the 'neighbours' are usually very careful on this point and see that weapons issued by them are always returned when no longer needed for

<sup>1</sup> REISS, Ignat. Head of Soviet Espionage in Central Europe. Shot by the N.K.V.D. in 1937.

<sup>2</sup> PILYAR, Baron von Pilhau. Chief of G.P.U. in Byelorussia.

their service. They have a special man who is responsible for this. Berzin wants to refer the matter to the Instantsia.

The Instantsia examined Berzin's request and decided to turn it down on the ground that there was no new evidence. The meeting with Pilyar was apparently of a purcly personal nature. Pilyar had lent 500 roubles to Stern; he had known him a long time, having once worked with him in the same department . . . But why should Stern have contacted Pilyar and not? . . . (omission) . . . It is no secret that Pilyar was in touch with General von Bredow<sup>1</sup> – a sequel to Koba's old game with the German militarists . . . If Pilyar had something to do with it, then the motive for the attempt could be anything but Zionism or even Fascism . . . something of quite a different nature . . .

Now, after my talk with Brüning, everything seems clearer. Brüning was fuming, and accusing us of supporting the Prussian military castes . . . He said von Schleicher<sup>2</sup> and von Bredow were in close touch with our sccret organisations and that some sort of game was being played around Hindenburg. The Generals wanted von Schleicher as Chancellor to repudiate the Versailles Treaty with our assistance. Stern's attempt would enable Koba to show Germany that he means to crush with an iron hand any anti-German trend or manifestation in our country and that he is ready to side with Germany against France . . . And while this is going on, I, like a fool, carry on negotiations with Boncour and the French for the revival of Kronstadt . . . This is what is known as backing every horse in the race . . . Whoever shall prove the stronger and the more energetic shall be our ally . . . but I am not prepared to continue this comedy . . . I just don't want to. I shall have to request very precise instructions for my negotiations with the French . . . But I still can't understand why Koba was so furious at the beginning of this business with Stern and why he cooled down so soon. What could the 'neighbours' be doing? Surely Koba wouldn't tolerate such intrigues at their own expense . . .

<sup>1</sup> BREDOW, von, General. Head of the Reichswehr Military Intelligence in the late 1920's. Sometimes alleged to have supplied information to German communists for transmission to Russia.

<sup>2</sup> SCHLEICHER, von, General. Chancellor of the Reich after von Papen for a short time. Assassinated in 'blood bath' of 1934.

I have now received a clear explanation of the Stern affair. It appears that it was engineered entirely by the 'neighbours' for the sole purpose of striking at Berzin. Pilyar and Yagoda acted concertedly. After finding out the truth Koba realised that he could make political use of the incident in his game with Germany. He 'reprieved' Pilyar and Yagoda and had an agent sent to Germany to act as liaison between von Bredow and Pilyar. The agent was the German communist Kiepenberger. The man is now in Berlin where he negotiates with Bredow and Schleicher . . . I was wrong to suspect Koba of having staged this affair. But there was no good reason for him to make use of it. Nothing but harm can result from his moves. Our policy should be to continue the efforts for a renewal of the alliance with France . . . (omission) . . .

Hindenburg was yesterday elected President. Tomorrow, 15th March, he will have to decide on the choice of a Chancellor . . . Hitler has been nominated for the post and Brüning will be thrown out . . . (omission) . . .

von Papen's attitude is not very clear . . . I think he is more dangerous to us than Hitler . . .

Franz von Papen has cheated Hitler. He rather wants to become Chancellor himself . . . Brüning is trying to cling to his post but my reports indicate that he will not succeed. The old man hates him, and despises him as a Catholic. I have always told Koba that the old Marshal would never agree to have a Catholic Chancellor for any length of time. Koba, who has read some modern German history, tried to convince me that the Centre party had ruled Germany better than any other group. But he evidently forgot the outbreaks of the *Kulturkampf*. The military caste will never reconcile themselves to the idea of a Centre party Chancellor. It was only Germany's defeat which brought the Centre party really to power. But now we are witnessing the revival of German military power. So how could a Catholic Chancellor symbolise the repudiation of Versailles? . . .

The 'neighbours' affirm that Schleicher will come to power. Rubbish . . . not for the time being, at any rate . . . And there is no reason for us to rejoice about it . . . (omission) . . .



Uchida<sup>1</sup> goes out of his way to flatter us in his speeches . . . It's somehow embarrassing . . . (omission) . . .

Paris reports the assassination of Doumer. The murderer is one Pavel Gorgulov, an 'Armenian from Stavropol' . . . The attempt was carried out just before the elections . . . Could it be Tardieu's 'move' mentioned by Boncour in our talk on the French election prospects? The first reports, on the evening of 6th May, described Gorgulov as a member of some Anarcho-Fascist organisation. Yet handbills with the hammer and sickle were found on him. This description of him recalls a little that of the suspect characters connected with Doriot and his Saint Denis group . . .

For the time being, however, the adventurer Doriot is still a member of the French Communist party. They don't seem to be in a hurry to expel him although he preaches the most blatant form of anarchy . . . There is somebody who must be doing the work from behind the scenes . . . It's so easy to provoke anything with such adventurers and half-wits . . .

But who will then replace . . . (omission) . . .

Doriot's friend and associate is Henri Lauzère, who works for the 'neighbours' and travelled for them to Indo-China on a mission. There are several other characters of this type . . . At one time Doriot himself was begging Trilisser to give him special missions and was offering to make use of his group in France. After Trilisser had turned down his offer he began to work for the 'far neighbours' and was in touch with Uzdansky. I now know all this from Ignat [Reiss] who is a little worried about the whole affair . . .

Gorgulov was indeed born in Stavropol but he is no 'Armenian' . . .

The directive is to launch a campaign against General Miller and his organisation and to denounce them as the 'abettors and initiators of President Doumer's assassination' . . . I had long talks on this subject with foreign diplomats . . .

It's a strange set-up: Doriot is connected with both Tardieu's agents and those of the 'neighbours', although he himself works for our 'far neighbours'. Doumer was obviously the

<sup>1</sup> UCHIDA. Japanese Foreign Minister at the time.

victim of some conspiracy which made use of the half-witted Gorgulov . . . I have been told that the Masons too have a grudge against him. If Koba had known this he would have put the blame on 'Masonic-Trotskyites' rather than on General Miller.

At any rate, objectively, this affair suits us well. The White Russians in France are definitely compromised. The left bloc who have come to power will ban the Military Union<sup>1</sup> as a terrorist organisation, which it has been both under Kutepov and since his disappearance. In other countries, too, the émigrés will find fewer possibilities . . .

Even in Germany there is some screening . . . The Turks intend to expel all holders of Nansen passports<sup>2</sup> . . . At the time when we seek closer relations with the outside world the émigrés constitute a danger in those countries wishing to conclude various agreements with us. Their influence will not be neutralised and . . . (omission) . . .

The Commissions are hard at work but there are no results whatever . . . For all their efforts, the Germans will not get what they demand: a shorter term of service in the Reichswehr, the creation of a militia and the abrogation of the ban on offensive weapons . . . Hoover is coming to our assistance with his proposals to cut down land forces by one-third, but he doesn't want to reduce naval armaments . . . It looks as if no agreement is possible on the question of naval disarmament . . . (omission) . . .

30th May . . . Papen has replaced Brüning . . .

9th July . . . Germany is to redeem her reparations obligations for 3,000 million gold marks, under a 'final settlement' pact signed in Lausanne . . . The bonds are to be redeemed over fifteen years . . .



<sup>1</sup> MILITARY UNION. Russian émigré organisation in France.

<sup>2</sup> NANSEN PASSPORTS. Popular name for 'League of Nations Passports' issued to political refugees after World War I to enable them to travel freely in search of employment. Recognised by some fifty countries, these passports were introduced largely due to the efforts of Fridtjof Nansen, the famous Norwegian explorer and statesman who, after 1918, devoted himself to the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and became League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The first session of the disarmament conference has closed . . .  
(omission) . . .

The 'neighbours' have supplied a most interesting report from Paris on von Papen's talks with the French; Papen wanted to be the cleverer and craftier of the two sides but, as might have been expected, he came a cropper. Through a French intermediary he had suggested a secret provisional agreement on reparations and mutual Franco-German disarmament in exchange for the abrogation of limiting clauses in the Versailles Treaty. Herriot replied by informing the British about these proposals, which were indirectly aimed against the City of London; for, after concluding this agreement with France, Germany could grab with impunity the £60,000,000 belonging to British long-term investors in Germany, as well as American investments. Thus Papen would have also driven a wedge between the City and Wall Street on one hand and the Paris Bourse on the other. It must be said that as far as the French were concerned the offer was most attractive, for it implied a cash repayment of all French investments. But Papen failed to realise that although it is possible to divide capitalist Governments one cannot break the unity of their stock exchanges. No Soviet Komsomol who knows his political grammar would have made the mistake which cost the Reich Chancellor the failure of his plan. von Papen's hopes were dashed the moment Herriot communicated them to London. As a result, the British refused to support the German demands for the cancellation of their reparation debts. Italy also refused to back the Germans. Hence the sum of 3,000 million gold marks fixed under the Lausanne 'final settlement' pact . . . The main beneficiaries, but so far only on paper, were the City and Wall Street . . .



. . . (Omission.) . . .

I read the full text of Schleicher's speech in the Reichstag on 26th July. It's a plain threat to France . . . von Papen has made a statement on similar lines – presumably to take his revenge on Herriot . . . von Neurath has rejected the protest of the French Ambassador in Berlin . . .

1st August . . . The general election in Germany gave Hitler

230 seats in the Reichstag out of a total of 609. With Hugenberg's support he can have a majority in the chamber . . . The die is cast . . .



MacDonald has suddenly thanked the French for Herriot's loyalty. The London Embassy reports the preparation of a memorandum which would permit Germany to rearm . . .

November . . . Shocking news. Alliluyeva is dead . . . It's the only topic of conversation . . . I went to the Hall of the Columns<sup>1</sup> where the body was lying in state. Koba was also there . . . He looked tired, his shoulders were bent and he was pacing slowly up and down . . . Even his walk had changed . . . I had never yet seen him in such a state . . .

There are several versions of the way she died, including some fantastic ones . . .

At the People's Commissariat everybody is talking about Alliluyeva's death and remarking the strange fact that the funeral did not take place in the Kremlin but at the Novodievich Monastery, where she was buried next to the grave of the suicides Yoffe and Lutovinov . . . Some say that this is an admission on Koba's part that she committed suicide. Others say that, on the contrary, this was her last wish expressed in a letter to Koba. There are many rumours about the contents of that letter. Koba is said to have been seen in his office near the Illinsk gate, reading that letter again and again. He always keeps it in his pocket and is said to have shown it to several members of the Instantsia, including Klim, Molotov, and Seryozha [Kirov] . . .

Yagoda was summoned to him. They stayed closeted in his office for some time and the next day Yagoda left for the Urals. The most fantastic rumours circulate about this trip . . . On his return Yagoda was again received by Koba to whom he handed over a bunch of letters . . . These were said to have been given to him by the 'neighbours' in Sverdlovsk . . . (omission) . . .

Yagoda has again left for the Urals . . . Nearly a hundred members of an underground Komsomol organisation of 'Trot-skyites' are reported to have been shot . . .

<sup>1</sup> The big marble hall in the Trade Union House in Moscow.

Some foreign envoys have asked me about Alliluyeva's death. They wanted to send Koba messages of condolence. I gave them all the same formal answer: 'He is a private person and does not belong to the Government.' In spite of the dramatic circumstances I could notice a faint smile on their faces . . . After all they are right: he is a 'private person' but no one would risk incurring his displeasure . . . (omission) . . .

I have now been told the details of Alliluyeva's death. I had already suspected that it had something to do with Mossina . . . Alliluyeva's visit to my office made me think at the time that her friendship with Mossina would sooner or later end tragically . . .

Last May Alliluyeva travelled to the Urals to see Mossina, who had been banished there and was living with friends in Perm. It appears that when Alliluyeva told Koba about her proposed journey he made a terrible scene and asked her not to go. Nevertheless she went, but when she arrived in Perm, Mossina was no longer there: she had been deported to another place . . . Alliluyeva attempted to find out in Perm where her girl-friend had been sent, but she failed to get any information . . . She then went to the regional headquarters of the G.P.U. in Sverdlovsk. The man in charge was Linde Edmund, who turned out to be an old friend of hers from Leningrad. He was Medved's<sup>1</sup> deputy. Linde at first refused to disclose Mossina's whereabouts, but eventually he gave in to her revealing that on Yagoda's instructions she had been sent to Political Isolation Camp No. 7 in Kotlas. He refused to give her permission to visit Mossina, declaring that Camp No. 7 was under Yagoda's direct supervision. Important people from the Opposition were now being detained there. Linde added that Mossina would undoubtedly be tried by a Judicial Troika in October or November, on a charge of having taken part in the 'Rosenfeld plot'.<sup>2</sup>

When Alliluyeva protested that, having been banished to the

<sup>1</sup> MEDVED, S. Chief of the G.P.U. in Leningrad. Implicated in Kirov's assassination.

<sup>2</sup> ROSENFELD, Kamenev's nephew, was charged with attempting to persuade the Commandant of the Kremlin to arrest the Politbureau, including Stalin.

Urals, Mossina could not have possibly taken part in a plot in Moscow, Linde replied that 'participation is possible even from a distance' . . . He also gave her to understand that Mossina's life was in danger . . .

On returning to Moscow, Alliluyeva started pleading with Koba to intervene on Mossina's behalf. He refused categorically, declaring that he never interfered in Yagoda's work and that anyway Mossina was a Trotskyite and a traitor. There was no reason, he said, to use kid gloves with such 'characters'. At this point a stormy scene broke out between them at their villa. Alliluyeva went into the woods and did not return home at night. She was eventually found lying on a rug in some bushes. As Koba had given strict orders that she should be brought back at any cost, several men from his bodyguard carried her to the villa. In the night she had an attack of hysteria and Koba summoned Guétier and Pletnev<sup>1</sup> to her bedside. She refused to be treated and said she was going to commit suicide. Koba threatened to put her in a clinic for nervous disorders . . . Eventually he had to give in: he promised that the G.P.U. would transfer Mossina from Isolation Camp No. 7 to Isolation Camp No. 2, where prisoners were treated more leniently and had the right to correspond with persons outside . . . Alliluyeva said she did not trust Yagoda, and insisted that Mossina should be allowed to write to her to say whether she had actually been transferred.

... In August she received a letter from Mossina from Political Isolation Camp No. 2; Mossina thanked her for her help, said she was pleased with everything, and asked her not to write as she did not want to cause her embarrassment and trouble . . .

In September Alliluyeva unexpectedly received a letter, sent through a member of the secret Komsomol opposition organisation who had arrived in Moscow from Perm. Mossina had sent the letter to him through a warden who was also a secret Trotskyite. She said that her first letter was written at Linde's request. He had told her this was the only way to avoid trouble for her family and also to ensure her own safety. Mossina then gave her news about several mutual friends she had met at the

<sup>1</sup> GUÉTIER and PLETNEV. The official physicians of the Kremlin.

camp and asked Alliluyeva to do everything in her power to save the lives of some forty Komsomols accused of a conspiracy in Sverdlovsk. Their case had been referred to the Judicial Troika in Moscow . . . Mossina's correspondence with Alliluyeva became regular – two letters every month . . .

As a result, Alliluyeva began to press Koba still harder to 'save the youth' from the Troika's criminal executions. Violent scenes between them followed . . . Koba must have realised that somebody was secretly informing his wife of what was going on in the Urals . . . An investigation was ordered to discover 'those guilty of revealing important state secrets'. The 'criminals' who allowed the secrets to leak out, and their accomplices, were soon identified, including the isolation camp warden. The Komsomol youth who had acted as messenger was followed to Koba's villa and arrested there. It was established that he had been to the villa before and he was charged with 'attempted terrorism' . . . After several interrogations he is said to have confessed that he really intended to kill Koba if his comrades in the Urals were shot . . . It is possible that the confession was extracted from him under duress . . . One can expect anything from Yagoda . . . It's never easy to find out the truth in such matters . . . The dreadful octopus of terror has long ceased to submit to the will of those who gave it birth . . . The case was referred to the Judicial Troika, which wasted no time in dealing with it. The Komsomol and all his comrades were shot as accomplices. Mossina was also executed as the 'leader of the group' . . . All this took place at the end of October . . . Alliluyeva heard about the executions several days later from a woman friend, a doctor at the Party's central committee . . . She returned home to their flat in the Kremlin. Koba was at their villa, near Moscow . . . She rang him up and they had a long conversation over the telephone . . . Alliluyeva was crying, cursing, and saying that she had decided to die as she couldn't bear the shame of being responsible for all that was happening, of remaining near him, with him. She said Mossina's death had been a terrible blow to her, that he knew of it and shouldn't have allowed it to happen . . . He tried at first to quieten her and begged her to come to the villa. Then he said he would come to Moscow at once to prove to her that there was no other way . . . Alliluyeva said she could no longer

trust him, that she thought him capable of anything, even of ordering her execution.

Then she suddenly said, 'That's enough, I'm picking up the revolver . . . I know you are capable of ordering Leon to send his men here to seize me . . .' Within a few seconds a shot rang out. She had shot herself through the brain . . .

Koba telephoned at once to the Kremlin Commandant and five minutes later, on his instructions, they entered the room . . . Doctors were summoned from the Kremlin clinic. They could only certify death . . . An order was issued to maintain the highest degree of secrecy . . . But one of the doctors talked . . . Somebody stole a letter which Alliluyeva had left on the table for Svetlana . . . In it Alliluyeva is said to have told her daughter that she hated her father, that he was guilty of exterminating the best revolutionaries in the U.S.S.R. . . . Investigations were at once started to discover who had passed on the information . . . The doctor and the man who stole the letter were arrested and shot . . . The 'neighbours' man who listened in to the telephone conversation was also shot. He blabbed and the details of what he had heard came out. It isn't clear whether the 'neighbours' had been tapping Koba's telephone on their own initiative or with the permission of Mekhlis . . . The relations between Mekhlis and Yagoda are of a rather special nature. They have a common interest in the State Circus where they go together to visit the Truzzi sisters – the equestrian trick riders.

Koba has ordered Yagoda to send to Moscow without delay all the evidence on the conspiracy of the people in the Urals, with all the documents and correspondence. He told him he would be held personally responsible for the preservation of secrecy . . . and warned him that in the event of anything leaking out he would be tried by a tribunal under the presidency of Kuibyshev, who is Yagoda's arch enemy . . . Yagoda travelled several times to the Urals, bringing back the documents with him. He also searched for Alliluyeva's letters to Mossina and handed them all over to Koba, who is said to have been very much surprised at their contents. They included references to drunkenness, the moral disintegration of the higher Party hierarchy, the new ways of our Thermidor . . . Members of the

Instantsia were severely censured, especially Rudzutak . . . There were also details about his orgies at the October villa, which had been the talk of all Moscow . . . After reading these letters Koba showed them also to Klim, Molotov and Seryozha [Kirov]. He commented that before striking the final blow at the Opposition the Central Committee would have to be thoroughly purged, otherwise the wave of disintegration might engulf us all. He said that thieves, moral perverts, drunkards, embezzlers, and profiteers at the expense of the State would have to be exterminated mercilessly . . . A special bureau, attached to the Central Control Commission, would be set up to receive and examine complaints against high officials of the Party . . .

Rudzutak's position is shaken. He is no longer invited to attend the meetings of the Instantsia . . . (omission) . . .

The year is ending . . . A terrible year . . . It seems to me that the seeds of a future world war have been planted in the course of this year. The disarmament campaign is a dead loss . . . Our attempts to form a bloc against rising fascism in Germany are also coming to nothing. The agreement with France obviously cannot be realised in the form in which I had contemplated it. Tardieu said this to me in as many words at Geneva on the day he put forward his proposal for the setting up of an international army under the League of Nations. I had lunch with him in a small restaurant on Lake Geneva, and we talked for some time. He said quite openly that as long as the Comintern existed in Moscow no agreement involving an alliance between us and France was possible. He said that our hopes that the left bloc (which would conclude an alliance with us) would come to power in France were groundless. 'It would be nothing more than a scrap of paper as long as you remain the Government of World Revolution with the Internationale as your national anthem – the song with which the fire-raisers of the Commune set Paris ablaze . . .' I related this conversation to Koba. He just waved aside Tardieu's charge. 'If the French need us,' Koba said, 'and if they really decide to stand up to Germany they will have us, even with the Comintern . . . Their Christian King Francis I concluded an alliance with the Sultan . . . Tardieu is simply looking for excuses to strike a deal with Germany at our expense . . .' It's always the same story: at our expense. Of

course, we must be vigilant, but not to the extent of losing our sense of proportion . . . This is the way to overlook the real danger . . . Besides, I think Koba has already decided what to do. He puts his money on the German generals. He thinks they will get the better of Hitler and rule Germany . . . This is a terrible mistake . . .

Our reports from Berlin indicate that Hindenburg's entourage have already decided to put Hitler in power. Schleicher cannot last . . . German industrial and financial circles don't regard the Schleicher-Bredow group as desirable. But Koba thinks the old Marshal will be able to get them accepted . . . I don't see why . . . After all, some Blomberg or Fritsch would be just as acceptable to the old man as a Schleicher . . . The 'neighbours' have reported that von Papen distrusts Schleicher and is furious with him. He was quoted as having declared: 'I will see to it that Schleicher goes, even if it means replacing him with that big mouth from the Brown House'. Papen is not the President of the Republic but he has the support of the 'Harzburg Front',<sup>1</sup> the *Herren Club*<sup>2</sup> and the 'Industrialists' Club'.

Speaking in Dusseldorf in February Hitler promised the Industrialists bigger contracts than they had ever seen or dreamed of . . . if he became Chancellor.

Colonel Oskar<sup>3</sup> can do anything he likes with the old Hindenburg . . . And it isn't difficult to work on Oskar . . . Even our 'neighbours' have managed to get at him, through one of his ladies . . . They even have a photograph . . . (omission) . . .



Fritz Thyssen was the first to shout '*Heil Hitler*' at the Dusseldorf meeting in February . . . It means that big business has already decided to install the house painter in the Wilhelmstrasse . . . Undoubtedly they will have him supervised, possibly by Papen himself, but they will not be able to restrain him for long . . . Moreover, they will not want to . . . They will settle

<sup>1</sup> HARZBURG FRONT. An anti-communist alliance of right-wing militant organisations in the Weimar Republic, founded at Harzburg.

<sup>2</sup> HERREN CLUB, i.e. The Gentlemen's Club – a very select political club of upper class right-wingers.

<sup>3</sup> Hindenburg's son.

down as soon as the first orders begin to come through . . . No other Chancellor could keep the workers and the whole country so firmly under control as that hysterical house painter . . . It's clear that in the end it will lead to war . . . It's an ill-omen . . . Our people think Hitler's coming to power will necessarily involve Germany in civil war; that the social-democrats will stand up to Hitler, that our 'Red Front' will act, that there will be clashes with the Stahlhelm . . . But all this is wishful thinking: they will all be muzzled . . . The 'Red Front' has been manœuvring for so long against the 'Reichsbanner' that no united front with the social-democrats can come off at this stage . . . Such a united front in the struggle against the Nazis exists only in the imagination of fools like Molotov, Piatnitzky\* and Manuilsky\* . . . They wanted to distinguish themselves; to show the foreign communist parties that the quality of the international revolutionary leadership had improved since the removal of Zinoviev. They are pitiful bureaucrats – not revolutionaries . . .

After all, the particular banner or colour of demagogery is a matter of indifference to the masses. They care very little whether it's red, black, brown or green. The only important thing is to feed them, more or less, and to entertain them with meetings. A well organised police is all that's needed to keep the country obedient. It was Koba who once said, 'The first important move in the struggle for the support of the masses is to remove their leaders and render them harmless . . . The leaderless masses will follow anyone . . . provided he finds an attractive slogan . . . But this isn't easy . . .' Koba is a cynic but his knowledge of the masses is undeniable. No leader of our party, not even Ilich, has understood the masses better than Koba . . . Trotsky is but a novice in this field. He invents the masses instead of studying them . . . Lev Borisovich [Kamenev] was telling me that during their underground days in Tiflis in 1906–9 Koba often disappeared for two or three weeks . . . He used to live down-town with some queer types who looked like criminals . . . He used to feed in cheap eating houses with tramps . . . frequented markets, visited factories and the railway workshops . . . drank in low dives with workers . . . studied the people whom even Ilich believed to be revolutionaries and

whom he appreciated 'more than ourselves, poor intellectuals' . . . But Koba didn't care for Illich's approach. He had slept under the same roof with the people whom Illich idealised. To him they are only raw material which must be 'processed' by propaganda. Neither weakness nor . . . (omission) . . .

Propaganda now makes it possible to 'process' any people in any country, provided one has complete control of the press. If the Nazis come to power in Germany they will have no difficulty in bringing over to their side the rank and file of the communist party, which polled six million votes in the 6th November election – the election at which the Nazis lost two million votes. But they must hurry. Naturally, if they attempt to risk a violent overthrow of the Government, Schleicher would kill them off like flies with the Reichswehr's machine guns – as was done in Munich in 1923. I think therefore that what will happen in Germany will not be a revolution but a palace coup assisted by the old man and his son as well as by Papen . . .

It's the irony of history. Hindenburg is the only President who can afford the luxury of sacking von Schleicher and von Bredow and any other military 'von' . . . Marshal Tannenberg [Hindenburg] will be the instrument . . . (omission) . . .

There is panic and confusion in the Instantia and the Comintern. Lesser officials of the Comintern are being executed. Of course, all this is . . .

The cynics and the bureaucrats now completely dominate the . . . (omission) . . .

Thus ends this year in the history of Europe and the world . . .

I would like to take a month's cure at Marienbad, but I don't expect to be allowed to go . . .

January 1933 . . . The 'far neighbours' have supplied a most substantial report on the talks between Hitler and von Papen which took place on the outskirts of Cologne on 4th January. von Papen declared that he had in his pocket a letter signed by Hindenburg agreeing to replace Schleicher with Hitler, provided von Papen joined the new cabinet as Vice-Chancellor. The letter said the Nazis would have to be in a minority in Hitler's future cabinet; the vital ministries, including that of the Interior, would be under Papen's control. The report affirms that there is a clash in Hitler's camp between those favouring

the acceptance of these terms and those who want to reject them and work to seize power by revolutionary means. Hitler himself favours a compromise. He can't make up his mind to start a revolution against the 'old gentleman' – Hindenburg . . . Nevertheless, many prominent members of his party advocate a violent coup. The 'far neighbours' expect Hitler to accept von Papen's proposals . . .

The 'near neighbours' have now reported their conclusions on this subject. Their point of view is, of course, diametrically opposed to that of the 'far neighbours' . . . (omission) . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

30th January. Adolph Hitler has become Reich Chancellor . . . We are preparing for the second session of the Disarmament Conference . . . We are busy working out new proposals, but it's all a dead loss now. Our only chance is to act resolutely and quickly, but if we miss it . . . it will be too late . . . (omission) . . .

Our proposal on the definition of the aggressor is moderately worded. It will be submitted to the Conference on 6th February.

7th February. Hitler has given an interview to the *Daily Mail*. It's a clumsy attempt to deceive the British, but I fear they will fall for it . . . Another interview in the *Sunday Express* . . . Rosenberg too is plugging his stuff in the Western press . . . All these interviews are aimed against us. The suggestion is to form a united front and to organise a crusade . . . (omission) . . .

23rd March. MacDonald has made a statement in the House of Commons on the Rome negotiations with Mussolini for a Four Power Pact. Simon is backing him to the hilt. We are pinning our hopes on Winston Churchill. He is the only man who could frustrate this pact directed against the U.S.S.R. . . . (omission) . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

The 'neighbours' have sent me two interesting reports on Pilsudski's activities. The old man wants to play high. There is something of the gambler in him. In his youth he used to ruin himself at cards; now he wants to play a big political game. The Marshal suggested to Daladier that he should allow Polish

troops to enter and occupy East Prussia and seize Danzig at the same time. Pilsudski, who made the suggestion through the Polish Ambassador in Paris, said the Germans were already rearming secretly and that sanctions against them would be perfectly justified under the Versailles Treaty. He added that the Polish Army was now much stronger than the German, and the occupation of East Prussia could be completed very quickly. The Hitler Government would then fall and the Catholics would come back to power with the social-democrats, since the Nazis, von Papen and the military people would all be compromised. Hindenburg too might resign and new elections would be held. The social-democrat and Catholic Government would be returned because the impact of this great blow to German prestige would have made it possible for the two parties to join forces. It would then be possible to open negotiations with the new Chancellor for the evacuation of East Prussia — with the exception of Danzig, which Poland would keep as a reward for her contribution to the crushing of Prussian militarism. Pilsudski insisted also on some territorial adjustments at the expense of Germany in East Prussia and the Poznan area . . . Daladier turned down Pilsudski's suggestions. Presumably he feared the military operation would not go off so smoothly. In addition, it is reported that when Weygand was called to give his advice he resolutely opposed Pilsudski's attempt. Weygand's view was that Hitler's downfall would strengthen the Communists in Germany, and indirectly also in France. He feared we would take advantage of the Polish-German war in East Prussia to occupy Lithuania and the Baltic States and that we should become stronger as a result of Hitler's liquidation. He anticipated that the new German Government would seek an agreement with us to take their revenge on Poland, and that before long France would face the danger of having both German and Soviet troops ranged against her on the Rhine. Moreover, she would find herself virtually alone, as Britain had no land forces whatever to send to her aid . . . The 'neighbours' give it as their opinion that Daladier's negative reply to Pilsudski was also largely determined by France's financial difficulties. The Paris Bourse would experience the most catastrophic slump. Stock exchange circles have presumably put pressure on the military to

prevent Daladier from accepting Pilsudski's suggestions . . . Weygand has also a long-standing dislike of Pilsudski . . .

It must be admitted, however, that looking at it purely from the point of view of France's interests, Weygand was wrong. Poland had not asked for French military assistance. All she wanted was to be charged with taking the necessary military measures, provided for under the Versailles Treaty, as sanctions against Germany's failure to implement it. She would have waged this war on behalf of France, Belgium and other states . . .

The 'neighbours' also explained what prompted Pilsudski to take the initiative of suggesting sanctions against Germany. It appears that Paderewski arrived in Rome last January and was received by Mussolini. After Paderewski had played for him several pieces by Chopin, Mozart and Schumann, Mussolini declared in his usual theatrical manner that he wanted to show his gratitude for the pleasure the Pole had given him. Having made this point the Duce announced forthrightly that he knew Poland would be the first victim of Germany's rearment as the Germans wanted to seize the Polish corridor. Mussolini said he had passed on to Count Przezdziecki<sup>1</sup> an exact account of the conversation which the Italian Ambassador in Berlin had had with Hitler . . . Perturbed, Paderewski apologised to Mussolini for having to leave him, and drove immediately to the Polish Embassy to see Przezdziecki. He demanded that the Ambassador should leave for Poland without delay to report personally to Pilsudski. Przezdziecki went to Warsaw, where Pilsudski called him the worst possible name in his vocabulary for having failed to report in good time the information which Mussolini had given him . . . Przezdziecki, who belonged to an old family of Polish aristocrats, took poison on arriving home as he couldn't survive the indignity of having been insulted by the Marshal . . . This dramatic episode prompted Pilsudski to make his suggestions to Daladier . . .

Lord Hailsham, the British Minister of War, is reported to have declared that Pilsudski's proposals, of which he had been informed, were logical and legally founded . . . (omission) . . .

<sup>1</sup> Polish Ambassador in Rome.

Baron Aloisi<sup>1</sup> has repeated Mussolini's statement to the Polish chargé d'affaires in Rome . . .

The 'far neighbours' have supplied another report from Warsaw. They have a highly-placed informer in the Polish General Staff, a former Russian officer who is chief of a department . . . They give an account of Pilsudski's talk with General Rydz-Smigly in the presence of several General Staff officers. Pilsudski said it was now essential for Poland to evolve a new foreign policy and at the same time to change her strategy and mobilisation plans. Considering that neither France nor Britain had the intention of using force to prevent Germany's rearmament, this would become an accomplished fact within two or three years, when Germany was considerably stronger than Poland. This meant, Pilsudski said, that Poland had to trade her friendship now, when the Germans were still weak and when they would pay a good price. The basic aim of Polish policy should be to push the Germans eastwards against Russia, but in no circumstances should they be allowed to pass through Polish territory, as they would never leave the country again. Poland had to play the part of a benevolent neutral in the Germans' rear. When they smash the Russians and reach the Volga, having weakened themselves and lengthened their lines of communication, Poland would again suggest to France and Britain that they should strike at the German rear. In the last resort the Poles would find a pretext to strike of their own accord, and they would be supported . . .

Asked how the Germans would get access to Russia if Poland refused to let them pass through her territory, Pilsudski replied, 'They would drive simultaneously by two routes. In the north they would reach Russia through the Baltic states, having their flanks protected by our neutrality and their friendship agreement with us. In the south, through central Europe, Austria, Hungary and Rumania. Their main thrust would be in the south, to get the oil and grain. The northern thrust would be a diversion in the direction of the industrial Leningrad area and a

<sup>1</sup> ALOISI, Baron Pompeo, b. 1875. Chief of Cabinet at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the League of Nations Council from 1932 to 1936. He had served as Ambassador to Japan, 1928-9; and Turkey, 1930-2.

threat to Moscow. The Russians would have to keep large forces in the centre to protect their frontier with us. At any rate the Germans will not be able to start a war against Russia before annexing Austria, concluding an alliance with Hungary and neutralising Czechoslovakia. The passage through Rumania, together with the Hungarians, would present no military difficulty . . .’ Pilsudski was also asked what should be Poland’s policy if the Germans attacked her before attacking the U.S.S.R. He replied, ‘We would then have to fight to the last man. But I think that if our foreign policy is conducted correctly and intelligently the Germans will never attack us before invading the U.S.S.R. . . .’ Pilsudski then said Poland would take advantage of the German-Russian war to make a fresh attempt at creating a Polish-Ukrainian Federation based on full equality of the two nations. This, he added, was the only hope of guaranteeing for ever the security of Poland from both Russia and Germany and no effort should be spared to achieve this goal . . . (omission) . . .

I think that we shall now witness Pilsudski’s attempts to bring about an agreement with Germany . . .

My expectations that Pilsudski would try to conclude an agreement with Germany have materialised. Unfortunately . . .

The ‘neighbours’ agent has reported from Warsaw the opening of negotiations between Pilsudski and the German military attaché, General Schindler . . . The report has been confirmed by the ‘far neighbours’. Therefore, it is serious . . . I ’phoned Berzin, asking him to send me without delay all the information on these negotiations. He replied evasively. It would appear that he needs time to ‘process’ this information so as to eliminate any indication of its source . . . (omission) . . . In general the situation is becoming dangerous. We must press without delay our collective security plans. We must also reconsider all the silly Comintern projects and give up the adventures once and for all . . . I have asked Koba to raise these questions in the Instantsia . . . (omission) . . .

It would seem to me that the Instantsia is chiefly concerned with Trotsky’s reaction . . . Again this stupid struggle with . . . (omission) . . .



February 1936. Received an interesting report from Tokyo on the military coup against the naval leaders of the Satsuma clan. Several prominent admirals have been killed. The Mikado locked himself up in the Palace during the mutiny. Negotiations for a compromise are going on between the extreme wings of both parties – the naval and the military . . . No one knows yet whose side the Supreme Secret Council will take . . . The situation has been clarified: Koki Hirota<sup>1</sup> will be appointed Premier. He is a former small employee of Gaimusho and became Foreign Minister thanks to his connections with Prince Higassi-Kuni, the Mikado's uncle . . . Arita, the Foreign Minister, is our enemy . . . As regards Hirota, he is very impressed by the Agreement of 23rd March, 1935, on the transfer of the East Chinese Railway, and particularly by the Secret Protocol . . .



Rozengoltz\* invited me to his villa in Gorinka where we had lunch and a long talk . . .

He was in good spirits although two of his intimate friends were arrested in January . . . He suggested a game of tennis on his private court. He has a most wonderful court. I declined because of my age . . . He spoke for some time about Joseph Vissarionovich [Stalin] . . . His enthusiasm surprised me . . . He said he greatly regretted having belonged to the Opposition and that he would have liked the opportunity of a heart to heart talk with Joseph Vissarionovich but was not allowed to see him. Since the assassination of Seryozha [Kirov] no prominent member of the Opposition has been admitted to Joseph Vissarionovich . . .

We talked for a while about the prospects at home. He said he had had a long talk with Shkiryatov,\* who had made some threatening hints. Shkiryatov had told him that the Opposition didn't want to disarm and that extreme measures would have to be taken against its members. War was coming, he said, and a small anti-Party group could not be allowed to organise secret circles with defeatist slogans . . . I asked what these slogans were . . . Rozengoltz hesitated and then replied that he now had no contact whatever with these circles but that the Smilga people

<sup>1</sup> HIROTA, Koki, b. 1878. Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., 1930-2; Foreign Minister, 1932-6; Prime Minister, 1936-7.

had had a hand in it . . . When I pressed him to be more explicit he volunteered the explanation that there was a project to bring about 'clemancy' in the Party – that is, in the event of war breaking out and our armies being defeated, and the Secretary-General wanting to bring off a new Brest-Litovsk, to carry out a mutiny of the troops during the war and change the leadership, after 'shooting several leaders and Marshals', as the Greeks had done after their defeat in Asia Minor . . . I told him at once that objectively speaking such a plan amounted to the most blatant treachery and comfort to the enemy . . . He blushed and agreed with me but said he had been led astray on the authority of Trotsky, who advised such tactics in his bulletins from abroad . . . I asked him several questions about his friend Piatakov and other members of the Opposition. He said he was no longer meeting them, to avoid rumours and denunciations about a resumption of the activity of secret opposition circles . . .

At the end of the conversation he said he knew I often met Joseph Vissarionovich . . . He asked me to approach him on the chances of a post in the Party's Secretariat . . . I refused . . . Apparently this was the reason for my being invited to his villa . . . It was embarrassing and disgusting . . . (omission) . . .

Received an unexpected letter from Hermann,<sup>1</sup> who is in forced residence in Irkutsk. He asked to be sent foreign newspapers . . . It is forbidden . . .

Telephone call from Yagoda, who wanted to see me urgently . . . When I met him he had a strange and bewildered look . . . His former self-confidence had gone . . . It is said that Klim [Voroshilov] had a very stormy discussion with him . . . He talked a good deal about enemies denouncing him to Joseph Vissarionovich, saying that he was a secret member of the Opposition. His real offence, he said, was that he could not forget his former colleagues, such as Medved, who had been banished after the Kirov affair, and that he had helped their families . . .

Then he suddenly declared that there had also been numerous denunciations against me and that a communication had been received from Irkutsk to the effect that I had sent material for

<sup>1</sup> SANDOMIRSKY, Hermann. Former official at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. (See reference, page 61.)

the use of the secret Oppositionist group in that town . . . This material was being used for the publication of proclamations on behalf of the group . . . I immediately showed him the letter from Hermann. I told him this was obvious nonsense since Hermann had never been a member of our Party. He was an old anarchist, and it was preposterous to pass him off as a leader of the opposition group of former Marxists, whose efforts were directed at proving, by reference to Marx, the mistaken line of the Secretary-General . . . Yagoda smiled at this conclusion and said that he personally attached no importance whatever to these denunciations, but that Zakovsky<sup>1</sup> and Redens<sup>2</sup> had begun to take a hand in the business. As a result, the story might come to the ears of Joseph Vissarionovich. For this reason, to avoid any accusations of having lacked vigilance, he wanted to have from me a voluntary statement recording my explanations . . . I understood and complied with his request. He made a note of everything I said and then thanked me . . . I hardly know what for . . . In any case, I have decided to take the first opportunity of mentioning this affair to Joseph Vissarionovich . . .

. . . (omission) . . . Dreadful news from everywhere. Executions are going on. Several groups of opposition members have been shot in the Urals. The situation is particularly terrifying in Leningrad, where Zakovsky, an illiterate and debauched drunkard, reigns supreme. He himself shoots the victims and has declared that 'a chief of the N.K.V.D. must himself carry out the sentences'. He orders his subordinates to act in the same manner. It is said that Zakovsky hails from Odessa and is a former penal convict of the Orel prison. After the revolution he managed to pass off as a political prisoner and to make a career . . .

I met one of Muralov's cousins. Muralov himself is in a political isolation prison in Irkutsk where, it appears, he is teaching himself meteorology. He says he expects to be deported to the Bolshevik island in the Arctic Ocean. He claims that Joseph Vissarionovich has chosen this island on account of its name, expecting all the opposition members sent there to become one hundred per cent Bolsheviks . . .

<sup>1</sup> ZAKOVSKY. Deputy Chief of the N.K.V.D. under Ezhov. He was shot in 1938.

<sup>2</sup> REDENS. A high official of the N.K.V.D.

I saw Trotsky's former secretary, Drozdov. It's unbelievable that he should still be at large. Perhaps it's because he taught algebra to Svetlana . . . although they might have got him precisely for that . . . on a charge of attempting 'to gain the confidence of . . .'

A fresh scandal . . . Somebody wrote on the wall of a house in Kitai-Gorod<sup>1</sup>: 'Comrade Molotov spent three days in this house in 1912, on his way to Moscow. Anyone committing a nuisance here will be prosecuted. By order, Yagoda.'

. . . One hundred persons have been arrested on suspicion of being involved in the writing of the anti-communist inscription on the wall in Kitai-Gorod. It is said that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich demanded that Yagoda should find the culprits: 'on your personal responsibility' were the words he used . . . Poor Yagoda! I wouldn't care to have been in his shoes . . . Nemesis . . . But will Yagoda be the only victim? . . . Or will all those too, who condoned this disgraceful and disgusting reign of terror in Lyubianka . . . I have always been opposed but, after all, I didn't do much to fight it . . . (omission).

The 'far neighbours' report that secret talks are being held in Berlin between Japanese generals and German diplomats . . . Ribbentrop, who has been summoned from London, is conducting them . . . The 'neighbours' maintain that these talks are aimed at the conclusion of a German-Japanese pact directed against us . . . I do not believe it . . . It was only recently that Hirota told our Ambassador that Japan would on no account start a war against the U.S.S.R. . . .

. . . Arita confirmed Hirota's statement . . . Asked to elucidate what these talks were about, he replied with a smile: 'You will learn about it from the papers' . . . The White émigré press in Harbin carried articles on the Berlin talks . . . An 'Anti-Comintern Pact' is to be signed . . . It is obvious that these articles have been inspired from Tokyo to set our minds at rest . . .

. . . The Japanese obviously want to reassure us that the label, 'Anti-Comintern' bears no relation to us . . . (omission) . . . The 'neighbours' have supplied additional information

<sup>1</sup> KITAI-GOROD. An ancient trading quarter in Moscow.

regarding the pact, obtained through one of their 'doubles'. It talks of fighting those who are assisting the Comintern 'directly or indirectly' . . . Anyone can of course be attacked under this pretext . . . Even the City and Wall Street . . . In fact, we should not be concerned . . . After all, the Japanese could ask us to announce that we have no connections with the Comintern and leave us alone . . .

. . . This question must be examined carefully. Troyanovsky<sup>1</sup> has also reported that Cordell Hull and Roosevelt were asking insistently . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Naturally neither Joseph Vissarionovich nor Vyacheslav Mikhailovich will agree to . . . A telephone call from Liuba. She is a friend of Ditiatina's. Ditiatina has been shot . . . I presume that Leonid [Serebryakov]<sup>2</sup> and Yuri Leonidovich [Piatakov] will be arrested soon . . . They will then get to Rozengoltz . . . They have already summoned Grigori Yakovlevich [Sokolnikov] and told him that . . . (omission) . . .

. . . My visit to Geneva was unnecessary . . .

. . . April 1936 . . . The Council of the League of Nations is a depressing affair . . . I had a long talk with Paul Boncour about the war in Abyssinia. He admitted he had received instructions to drop sanctions . . . He was embarrassed . . . I had a long talk with the Abyssinian delegate. He looks like an Old Testament prophet . . . He showed me the text of the speech he was going to make and later publish in the form of an appeal from Haile Selassie. A pathetic speech . . . It is obviously a lost cause . . . The 'neighbours' have reported from London that even Eden held the view that no further sanctions can be applied . . . An early statement in this connection was to be expected and . . .

. . . I have returned to Moscow . . . A depressing atmosphere all round . . . The only talk is of arrests, searches and executions . . . One must have iron nerves not to . . . I attended a dinner at Rozengoltz's summer house . . . He is trying to gain Joseph

<sup>1</sup> TROYANOVSKY, Alexander. Soviet Ambassador in Washington, then Mexico.

<sup>2</sup> SEREBRYAKOV, Leonid Petrovich. Former Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1919-20, and later Commissar for Communications. Expelled from the Party in 1927; reinstated in 1930; tried and executed in 1937.

Vissarionovich's confidence through Klim. Klim and he are old friends . . . Klim was also at the dinner. He has aged perceptibly . . . His lips twitched. Rozengoltz was obviously trying to avoid the subject of the Opposition. Klim broached it himself . . . He launched an impassioned and disjointed speech . . . He said at length that a Party member had no choice; he had either to go with the Party to the end, contesting decisions only at Party congresses – or refuse to submit to the Party leadership elected at congresses, and go over to the counter-revolution . . . I pointed out mildly the possibility of a majority at congresses not, in fact, reflecting the Party's point of view . . . Klim shouted angrily that this was all nonsense. He said that even if there were a shuffling of persons, this did not mean there had been a change in the Party line, the programme and its statutes . . . He stressed that the Bolsheviks had always picked out delegates individually for congresses. This, Klim said, was an old tradition of Bolshevik parliamentarism. Trotsky, of course, did not understand this – and pardonably so. But it was unpardonable to old Party members, former leaders, like Zinoviev,\* Kamenev\* and others . . . He repeated several times the charges against Zinoviev,\* Kamenev,\* Muralov, Bakayev,\* Evdokimov\* . . . He pointed out that they would have to be 'cut off physically' . . . I was struck by this term . . . Obviously, executions are in the offing . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Alas, Eden, in a general statement to the Commons yesterday, declared that sanctions had produced no result . . .

. . . 20th June . . . An extraordinary general session of the League of Nations is to be called. Haile Selassie is coming to Geneva . . . (omission) . . . The 'neighbours' report preparations for an Austro-Hungarian agreement. Papen has succeeded in tricking and frightening Schuschnigg<sup>1</sup> . . . The agreement is to be signed within a week . . .

. . . The atmosphere in Geneva is more and more depressing. Haile Selassie and his representative both look like Biblical prophets, particularly the Negus, with his black beard and sparkling eyes . . . Had a conversation with Paul Boncour, who

<sup>1</sup> SCHUSCHNIGG, Kurt von. Succeeded Dollfuss as Austrian Chancellor in 1934. In February 1938 he was forced to accept a Nazi Minister of the Interior and a month later Austria was annexed by Germany.

said that the war had ended with the capture of Addis Ababa. Only military sanctions against Italy could help. But no French Government would start a war against Italy for the sake of Abyssinia. It will be necessary to incline gently to agreement . . . I pointed out that surrender to an aggressor would call forth fresh aggression . . . It was not only a question of Abyssinia . . . If an unjust compromise solution was arrived at it would poison the international atmosphere . . . New conflicts and aggressions would result . . . A new world war will flare up . . . Paul Boncour returned to his thesis that the people longed for peace and that it was impossible to force them into applying military sanctions against Italy . . . It would raise a storm of indignation and the Government would fall . . . Even Blum, he said, favoured agreement and opposed military sanctions which could lead to war.

I maintained that Germany was not ready to wage war and that Italy would surrender as soon as military sanctions were applied . . . General mobilisation was unnecessary . . . Mussolini would be brought to his knees by the presence of French troops on the Italian frontier and by the presence of the British and French fleets in the Mediterranean . . . According to information on hand, I said, the King was opposed to the Abyssinian venture . . . He would be pleased to remove the Duce as soon as military sanctions were imposed against Italy. Boncour argued . . . He said that right wing circles in France would never agree to Mussolini being overthrown and would do everything to poison the atmosphere in Parliament and in the country . . . Large-scale disturbances were possible . . . Italy had spent enormous sums on mobilising all elements in France who were sympathetic towards her . . . Public opinion was on the side . . . (omission) . . .

. . . 4th July . . . The League of Nations has rejected the application of sanctions against Italy . . . Therefore . . . (omission).

. . . 19th July. General Franco's rebellion has begun . . . Seville has been occupied by the rebels . . .

. . . 26th July . . . Italian and German warships have entered Spanish waters . . . Alas, I was right . . . Geneva's weakness has resulted in immediate intervention in Spain by Italy and Germany. We shall now see a full . . . (omission) . . .

. . . An argument started on the form of non-intervention and on the banning of arms exports to Spain . . . The Instantsia considered the adoption of an official position of full neutrality as recommended by Blum – but it was suggested at the same time that this decision should not be applied in practice . . . Our efforts are directed towards securing Portugal's neutrality. Lisbon will never agree, and will continue to supply Spain with arms. We shall then be free to act if necessary. The fact is that the Instantsia is not inclined to supply the Republicans with free arms . . . Joseph Vissarionovich wants to make money on . . . (omission) . . .

I was summoned to the Instantsia. There was some confusion there. The Trotskyites have started a strong propaganda campaign against Joseph Vissarionovich calling him liquidator and traitor to the Spanish revolution, abettor of Hitler and Mussolini . . . An attempt is being made to find ways and means to . . . (omission) . . .

Klim told me that the 'traitors will soon be tried and liquidated' . . . It means that rumours of a large trial pending were true . . . Molotov summoned me. The interview was formal. He announced that he would send me instructions regarding the need to prepare world public opinion for an important trial of traitors . . . Tragedy must be drawing near . . .

. . . August . . . I saw Yagoda\* . . . He looked embarrassed. He said that Joseph Vissarionovich was surrounded by rumour-mongers and slanderers, that there were reports which implicated every member of the Government . . . I listened, and replied, 'The slave who does not glean properly carries her own punishment' . . . He understood, and shrugged his shoulders: 'It is too late to think of the past. We are all dependent on the will of Mekhlis' . . . He gave me a peculiar look and said, 'I have information regarding Mekhlis. It will not be believed if I submit it. It concerns his contacts abroad . . .' I realised he wanted to involve me in some plan of his to compromise his enemies who are close to Joseph Vissarionovich. He gave me a searching look and said finally, 'Yes, the end is drawing near . . . I must prepare myself . . .' Alexeyev asked me to call on him . . . I excused myself, pleading lack of time . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Alexeyev came to see me and stayed for more than an

hour. He showed me a secret report from his agents in Hitler's entourage. He said that it came directly from the Fuehrer's personal bureau . . . It concerned the murder of Schuschnigg's wife and her chauffeur, and the theft of secret documents belonging to the Austrian Chancellor . . . These included a personal letter from Mussolini to Dollfuss. Schuschnigg found it after the assassination of his predecessor . . . In this letter Il Duce berated the Fuehrer for all he was worth, calling him liar, madman, sexual pervert . . . He encouraged Dollfuss and invited him to resist Berlin's attempts to annex Austria . . . He promised to send six divisions to the Brenner . . . The 'neighbours' possess a photostat copy of the letter, which was signed . . . Apparently Schuschnigg intended to hide it in a safe place and publish it if Hitler pressed for an Anschluss, thereby causing a quarrel between the Fuehrer and Il Duce . . . It would have been an international scandal . . .

. . . Alexeyev asked me if we were interested in having the photostat copy published . . . I promised to refer this to the Instantsia . . . it is not quite clear . . . Is it not a forgery – and a provocation as well? . . . The Intelligence Service has always been successful . . . (omission) . . .

. . . The question of the photostat copy of Il Duce's letter was discussed in the Instantsia . . . Joseph Vissarionovich would not allow a lengthy discussion. He declared it to be a British provocation . . . The 'far neighbours' were asked to verify the whole affair . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Boris Efimovich [Shtein] gave his views on the Montreux Convention of 24th July. He thinks that . . . (omission) . . .

. . . For the second night running I have not been able to sleep . . . The ill-omened trial has begun . . . A ticket was reserved for me . . . It was distressing to watch the defendants . . . Grigori Evseyevich [Zinoviev]\* has aged . . . His grey hair hangs down the back of his neck . . . He looks like an aged rabbi . . . Lev Borisovich [Kamenev]\* looks vigorous, but he, too, has aged . . . It is reported that Vyshinsky has warned Yagoda privately that he doesn't want him to be present at the trial. Ostensibly this is to avoid accusations that the trial has been engineered by the 'neighbours' . . . Silly, if it is so . . . I believe there are other reasons. I have been told that . . .

... (omission) ... I saw Mekhlis. He called on me saying he wanted to discuss how the campaign about the trial should be conducted abroad. Joseph Vissarionovich had asked him to see me. I did not conceal from him the difficulties under which I laboured ... He did his best to be pleasant and charming to me ... He has obviously been told ...

... He patted me on the shoulder in a friendly manner, spoke of his sympathy for me ... I tried to find out from him if there was any hope of saving the lives of the defendants ... He shrugged his shoulders and said the Instantsia had decided not to foist a decision on the Court ... Ulrich<sup>1</sup> will ... I understood that they did not want to take any formal responsibility, but that the lives of the defendants would not be spared ...

... I asked him for his personal opinion ... He wanted to avoid a direct reply, but was finally compelled to say that there was no hope ... Tears came into my eyes ... He noticed it and advised me not to attend the trials lest I should be seen in such a state by foreigners ... He suddenly said that several of the defendants had asked to see Joseph Vissarionovich in order to give him certain details personally ... Kamenev was the only one who saw Joseph Vissarionovich ... He stayed with him for more than an hour ... Vissarionovich later told Mekhlis that Kamenev was the only one deserving mercy ... I tried to find out from Mekhlis if mercy would be exercised. He replied evasively that both Ulrich and Vyshinsky were too insignificant to assume ... He added that after the death of Felix [Dzerzhinsky] the 'Dzerzhinsky executions' were never again resorted to ... In any case these could not be entrusted to such scoundrels as Yagoda ... He called him a scoundrel ... I realised that Yagoda's days were numbered ... (omission) ...

... It is all over ... The newspapers have reported the execution ... What an underhand way of doing things ... I cannot understand why the prosecution had to be entrusted to a former agent of British intelligence in Baku<sup>2</sup> ...

<sup>1</sup> ULRICH. President of the Supreme Military Tribunal, who played a prominent part in the purges of the late 'thirties.

<sup>2</sup> The Public Prosecutor at this trial was Andrei Vyshinsky, who became subsequently Soviet Foreign Minister and later Permanent Soviet delegate to the United Nations.

. . . The 'neighbours' have received some information from London . . . Blum is entirely subservient to London in this matter of war with Spain . . . The Republicans are not to receive arms from France . . . If this continues Franco will crush the Madrid government . . . Delbos is inclined towards an understanding with Italy . . . The Burgos Government is becoming the centre . . . (omission) . . . Negotiations are in progress regarding a ban on the export of arms to Spain . . . Il Duce has declared that Italy feels inclined to be a party to this understanding and would exert influence on Berlin, provided . . .

. . . This question of setting up a non-intervention committee will serve as an excuse for not taking any action . . .

. . . The Instantsia has discussed our attitude at length. Joseph Vissarionovich was inclined to a policy of complete neutrality . . . Molotov opposed . . . Klim supported him . . . They are afraid of Trotskyite propaganda in the Comintern . . . When will we finally lay this bogey? . . . (omission) . . .

. . . 10th September . . . The Non-Intervention Committee was formally inaugurated in London yesterday . . . We are taking part . . . Molotov demands that we take the first opportunity of giving aid to Caballero,<sup>1</sup> although we have no confidence in him personally . . . It is thought that our aid will oblige Blum . . . A stupid session of the Comintern Præsidium and Secretariat . . . I do not understand Dimitrov's<sup>2</sup> position. Joseph Vissarionovich is right in describing him as a poor Marxist version of an anarchist.

. . . Dimitrov is nervous. He maintains that we risk losing influence with the *Front Populaire* and in France, if we do not . . . It is unadulterated drivel . . . I have been invited in an advisory capacity . . . I said that the first task was to achieve international security and to give expression to it in the form of a convention in which France and Britain would participate. Such a convention would be impossible without Britain . . .

I have seen a report from the 'far neighbours'. They have an

<sup>1</sup> CABALLERO, Largo. Secretary of the Spanish Socialist Party and Prime Minister of the Republican Government, 1936-7.

<sup>2</sup> DIMITROV, George. Bulgarian communist, hero of the Reichstag trial. Leader of the European section of the Comintern. Became Prime Minister of Bulgaria in 1946. Died in Moscow in 1949.

informer at the Avis Hotel in Lisbon. Arms are going to Spain via Portugal. The 'neighbours', in their turn, have submitted a report about it . . . It includes precise data and figures of imports and . . . the names of ships from Italy and Germany . . . The participation of Portuguese banks in . . .

. . . The Instantsia again discussed the question . . . Prolonged debates. Joseph Vissarionovich is vacillating . . . He rarely does this . . . I cannot fathom the reasons . . . It is said that a Spaniard, a member of the Opposition, has been arrested. He came to organise terrorism against our Instantsia if we decided to join in with Paris and London . . .

Yagoda\* is no longer in charge of the N.K.V.D. . . . I met Ezhov.\* The impression he made on me was a repulsive one . . . He is a pygmy with the face of a murderer, a shifty look in his eyes and a perpetual twitching of the upper lip and left eye-lid . . . It is said that he once organised a kind of harem at the Secretariat of the Central Committee . . . That scoundrel Zakovsky has been appointed his deputy . . . He took some former criminals from Odessa with him . . . I can't understand how he can have been appointed . . . Rumour has it that Beria was suggested for the post, but Joseph Vissarionovich turned him down. He said that he could not find use for him yet . . . An odd statement . . .

. . . I would have sleepless nights if I were in Ezhov's place . . . A repetition of the story of the Moor, who can be disposed of after he has done his duty . . . Ezhov will eventually be made the scapegoat. He is young and does not know the past . . . and he is stupid to boot . . . And a sadist . . . Pathological perversion with a sexual basis . . . Such a chief for the 'neighbours' will purge the country as nobody else could . . . And there is no danger, because he is stupid and will not be able to take advantage of his position . . . Yagoda is different . . . He seldom goes to the People's Commissariat of Posts and Telegraph<sup>1</sup> . . . He continues his drunken orgies in the company of his former henchmen . . . They have all been appointed to that particular Commissariat . . . How can they fail to understand that they can

<sup>1</sup> After his removal from the N.K.V.D. Yagoda was appointed People's Commissar for Posts and Telegraph, a post he held for a short time until his arrest and trial on charges of treason.

expect no mercy . . . Joseph Vissarionovich has obviously decided . . . What self-control . . . He is said to have received Yagoda when the latter took his leave and to have thanked him for the White Sea canal.

. . . Mekhlis was sitting in an office next door – just in case . . . Yagoda was asked to hand over any weapons to the commandatura of the Central Committee . . . Strange, I have never been asked whether I carry a gun . . . I never did anyway . . . It follows that Joseph Vissarionovich has complete confidence in me – to the extent that he completely rules out the possibility of . . . It seems to me that I understand things better than the others . . . I often wonder why Lev Davidovich [Trotsky] failed to understand him, to find him out and to take timely measures in order to . . .

. . . As far as I am concerned, if I felt my turn had come to fall into Ezhov's clutches, I would follow Lutovinov's example . . . It is terrible when it becomes necessary . . . (omission) . . .

. . . Sergeyev<sup>1</sup> has called on me . . . He looks so much like his father . . . Arteme [Sergeyev] was an excellent example of Party worker . . . He knew how to die in time . . . For a revolutionary this is the most difficult problem to solve . . . (omission) . . . It seems to me that he is particularly interested in . . . It's quite normal, the adoptive son of Joseph Vissarionovich and Litvinov's adoptive daughter . . .

We have begun to supply arms to Caballero . . . There are constant swindles and scandals . . . The Republicans have been defrauded of more than 200 million francs . . . A full investigation will become necessary . . . This doesn't concern me directly but I cannot shut my eyes to . . .

24th October. Our note to the Foreign Office was delivered the day before yesterday. We demanded that the Republicans should be restored the right to buy arms and we listed a number of violations on the part of Portugal, Italy and Germany . . . (omission) . . .

The 'neighbours' have supplied a detailed account of the

<sup>1</sup> SERGEYEV, Arteme. Member of the Politbureau in 1921, killed in a railway crash in the Ukraine. His son was adopted by Stalin, but kept the name of his father. There was some talk of his engagement to Litvinov's adopted daughter.

agreement reached on 25th October between Ciano and Ribben-trop. I still think that the Axis is not all that solid . . . Especially in the Balkans and the Danube basin . . . In Spain, of course, there are no difficulties about dividing . . . German interests there . . . (omission) . . . I can't understand why we never published the photographic copy of the Duce's letter to Dollfuss . . . I believe it is authentic . . . Joseph Vissarionovich must have his own reasons . . . I tend more and more to believe that he didn't want to break off with Hitler for good by publishing the letter . . . He must have at the back of his mind the possibility of an agreement . . . It would be a crime on our part, a mistake and . . . It's not just that my own feeling towards the Fuehrer is one of hatred, disgust and contempt, as is claimed by . . .

Suritz has written to say that he wanted to see me personally . . . Obviously he doesn't trust the diplomatic bag . . . I think he must have smelt a rat . . . This story of the photographic copy of the letter . . . I want to have a frank talk with . . . (omission) . . .

The Instantsia is considering our future attitude in the League of Nations on the question of . . . We shall give our full support to Alvarez del Vayo<sup>1</sup> . . . (omission) . . .

I shall be going abroad soon and am not likely to be back before the end of January 1937 . . . (omission) . . .

I am glad that Washington decided to send us Davies.<sup>2</sup> Troyanovsky has supplied a full account of his talk with Davies at a lunch at our Embassy . . . He affirms that Davies understands nothing about our affairs but that he is full of the most sincere desire to work with us in complete co-operation and to carry out strictly Roosevelt's instructions . . . He will not take the liberty, like Bullitt, of . . .

I have always regarded Bullitt as our bitter enemy. He is under the influence of . . . Besides, his attitude has been far from correct. On the issue of Kerensky's debts and obligations he placed us in the most impossible situation. Naturally, the Instantsia is not altogether free from blame . . . But having

<sup>1</sup> VAYO, Alvarez del. Spanish Republican left-wing leader during the Spanish Civil War.

<sup>2</sup> DAVIES, Joseph Edward. United States Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 1936-8. Author of *Mission to Moscow*.

made a rash promise we should have kept our word . . . It's sometimes strange to observe Joseph Vissarionovich and . . . When it is a matter of a commercial debt they are correct to the point of being silly. Once they wanted to prosecute Stomonyakov,<sup>1</sup> who was then our commercial representative in Berlin, because he was one day late in paying a promissory note of our commercial office . . . But as soon as it becomes a matter of the State's debts they refuse stubbornly to pay up, even when they had promised to do so . . . In 1933 I received formal instructions from the Instantsia for my negotiations with Roosevelt on the debt . . . I signed the agreement . . . Subsequently our people discovered that we could do the Americans. Of course, one can usually find a loophole in the law . . . But surely, in international relations . . . I remember once telling Barthou quite frankly that the only way to achieve a full, permanent and sincere agreement with us was to allow us to derive very considerable advantages from international trade and then say in effect, 'You can either trade profitably or, if you don't close down the Comintern, go to hell' . . . Barthou laughed and thought I was joking . . . Naturally I spoke to him in a jocular tone, but I wasn't joking at all . . . All our Caucasian communists, including Joseph Vissarionovich, are really traders at heart and love to bargain . . .

Krestinsky\* and Rozengoltz\* will be in charge of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat during my absence . . . As regards Stomonyakov, he somehow cannot fit himself in here . . . He has been working here a long time but he still feels as if he were Commercial Representative in Berlin and not my third deputy in Moscow . . . He is an excellent worker but completely lacking in subtlety . . . A typical Bulgarian co-operator . . . He would have been better manufacturing rose essence in the Rose Valley or breeding cattle in Bulgaria . . . (omission) . . .

This terrible year of 1936 is coming to an end . . . 1937 will be even worse . . . Ezhov\* will take care of that . . .

<sup>1</sup> STOMONYAKOV, B. Bulgarian who worked as Soviet Commercial Representative in Berlin, and then as Litvinov's deputy in Moscow.

## Chapter Four: 1937-1950

*Russia and the West – The climax of the Purge – The Czechoslovak crisis – Litvinov in disgrace*

February 1937 . . . I returned to Moscow and found an atmosphere of total and unmitigated terror. Ezhov\* and Zakovsky have taken the bit between their teeth and rushed off . . . Everyone is terrified of . . . No one can feel secure from . . . Of course, Joseph Vissarionovich still keeps the reins of government in his hands, but if Ezhov keeps his post for a long time then . . . Who knows where this logic of annihilation can lead? . . . I am very happy that thanks to the help of Joseph Vissarionovich I succeeded in bringing my wife<sup>1</sup> back to Moscow. I had to argue that her presence was essential for contacts with the new American Ambassador . . . He has already arrived . . . Without my wife no receptions are possible . . . She felt quite well in the Urals and has become an experienced teacher of English . . .

Ezhov\* tried to . . . everything ended well . . . She couldn't bear the rumours about the death of Yoffe's\* wife and son, and also . . . There is much talk about the execution of Pyatakov, Serebryakov and the others. To everyone's astonishment Radek\* and Sokolnikov\* are still alive . . . No one can understand why . . . It's clear to me that Ezhov is preparing new trials, and that to save their own skins they will disclose all the details of the Opposition's activities and will compromise the remaining leaders . . . Radek is a very sinister character . . . He was the cause of Yasha Blumkin's execution after he had himself provoked him to establish contact with Trotsky. Blumkin was a typical intellectual anarchist . . . After he killed Mirbach<sup>2</sup> he began to regard himself as a historic figure. I don't know why he had such admiration for Trotsky . . . At any rate, so shrewd a scoundrel as Radek could not have found it very difficult to provoke so impetuous a revolutionary fool as Blumkin . . . He

<sup>1</sup> LITVINOV, Madame (*née* Ivy Theresa Low). She had been deported to the Urals in September 1936 after the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial, and was teaching English at the Sverdlovsk Lycée for girls.

<sup>2</sup> MIRBACH, Count. German Ambassador to the Soviet Government, assassinated by Blumkin in July 1918.

must have put into his head the idea of some act of terrorism . . . After Mirbach, Stalin . . . Not a bad formula . . .

Had a long talk with Shigemitsu.<sup>1</sup> The usual story about the prolongation of the fishing concession. The Japanese want to extend the limit of their territorial waters. We shall not agree to this . . . I spoke to him about the tension on the Manchurian borders and the provocations . . . He was confused . . .

The interview between Mikhail Ivanovich [Kalinin]\* and Davies has aroused much comment. Mikhail Ivanovich was priceless. He even picked his nose to show his peasant origins . . .

Barkov<sup>2</sup> complains he can hardly stand on his feet. Davies completely exhausted him with his requests to visit everything there is to see in Moscow. Barkov says Davies is very pleasant and amiable. He wouldn't mind a romance with Davies's daughter. I warned him that he would pay dearly for the slightest scandal, even to the extent of spending some time in Ezhov's\* cellars . . .

The 'neighbours' report from London that Eden will be forced to leave the Foreign Office. He will be replaced by that old hypocrite . . . It means that they have decided to go all out for an agreement with Rome and Berlin . . . (omission) . . . Suritz has arrived for a few days . . . I had a long confidential talk with him. I now understand everything. Joseph Vissarionovich works through Kandeliaki.<sup>3</sup> Astakhov<sup>4</sup> will be appointed counsellor. Suritz will be recalled, because he is Jewish, and will be transferred to Paris as Ambassador. Kandeliaki receives all his instructions directly from the Secretariat of the Central Committee, by special courier . . . I now have a full explanation of the story with Mussolini's letter . . . I am indignant about it all taking place behind my back . . . If they want to back two horses at the same time, let them do so, but they should still . . . (omission) . . . I can't see on what basis an agreement could be reached . . . Hitler will sooner side with

<sup>1</sup> SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru. Japanese Ambassador in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> BARKOV, Vladimir. Chief of the Protocol Division at the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> KANDELIAKI, David Nikolayevich. A Georgian communist, childhood friend of Stalin, who was then Soviet Commercial Attaché in Berlin.

<sup>4</sup> ASTAKHOV. Soviet diplomat who worked for the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact of August 1939.

London . . . I have decided to talk to . . . Molotov refused to dot the i's . . . He denied everything and wanted to know what had disturbed me . . . Who could have . . . Naturally, I concealed the source of my information. I told him that I had drawn conclusions from Schulenburg's<sup>1</sup> allusions. Molotov was annoyed. He believed my story . . . Apparently he fears that all this intrigue may accidentally be foiled. He would like me to arrange a lunch with him and Schulenburg. I turned down the suggestion categorically, declaring that it would be impossible to keep it secret from the diplomatic corps . . . There would be talk about the Soviet Premier having lunch with the German Ambassador . . . He understood and gave in. He said . . . (omission) . . .

5th February . . . Had yesterday a long discussion with the new American Ambassador [Davies] . . .

We talked about my stay in Geneva last December . . . Davies spoke a good deal about international trade . . . Then he turned to the question of the trial of Radek\* and Piatakov . . . I changed the subject; only a few days earlier he had irritated Neumann<sup>2</sup> with his questions . . .

Had several talks with Holsti.<sup>3</sup> He came to Moscow to tell us that Finland had decided to observe the strictest neutrality between us and Germany and that Helsinki was inclined to join the Scandinavian neutral bloc . . .

Had also a talk with Coulondre.<sup>4</sup> He is very much interested in the question of the Comintern . . . I don't see why: the Communist Party is legally organised in France and constitutes no real danger . . .

. . . (omission) . . . was summoned unexpectedly to see the Secretary-General . . . It would appear that Molotov told him of our talk . . . He was overwhelmingly amiable, as only he can be

<sup>1</sup> SCHULENBURG, von. German Ambassador in Moscow until July 1941.

<sup>2</sup> NEUMANN, Alexis. Chief of the third Western Division at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs; was also in charge of relations with Foreign Press correspondents.

<sup>3</sup> HOLSTI, Dr R. Finnish Foreign Minister at the time.

<sup>4</sup> COULONDRE, Robert. French Ambassador in Moscow, 1936-8; had been French delegate at the Franco-Soviet Conference, 1926; the Seven-Powers Financial Conference in London, 1931; and the Stressa Conference, 1932.

when he wants to charm somebody. As I was listening to him I couldn't help thinking of the concern he had shown for Piatakov during his illness in 1931 . . . He even sent him honey . . . And now he has handed him over to Ezhov without a qualm . . . He began by saying that he wanted to explain his point of view on our diplomatic manœuvring. He said that we were a threatened country and therefore could not afford to adopt any particular position to the exclusion of all others . . . He said, 'I continue fully to endorse your idea on collective security . . . Nothing has changed since we accepted this idea in the Politbureau . . . But you must admit that so far you have achieved nothing concrete. None of the pacts has yet been . . . Don't forget one thing: the key to security in Europe is in London. But the keys of London are now in Roosevelt's possession. No matter how much Chamberlain, Halifax and Co. may fool about with Hitler in their senility, it is Roosevelt who will have the last word. That is why, parallel to your efforts for collective security, you must not forget to work on Roosevelt, to draw him fully into the orbit of our policy . . . I don't like paying compliments, but I can say that you are the only man in the country capable of winning Roosevelt over to our side. I give you full freedom of action in this direction . . .' I then asked him about Kandeliaki. He smiled: 'Kandeliaki is an old friend of mine from the days of our underground work in the Caucasus . . . He was known to us as "the fox" . . . You needn't have any apprehensions about him; no one will ever catch him napping . . .'

Knowing that he liked such sayings, I said, 'I agree that Kandeliaki is a fox, but all the same, two heads are better than one . . .' He laughed: 'You are right . . . but there are two heads, mine and Kandeliaki's . . . Don't worry . . . We shan't get done down.' He added, 'At any rate, if serious and far-reaching negotiations are opened I shall keep you in touch . . . So far we have just been leading them on . . . This will only increase their cockiness and stubbornness, and by making them less willing to give concessions will foil London's attempts to reach an agreement with them at our expense . . .' (omission) . . .

Saw Steiger,<sup>1</sup> who told me of the latest tricks played by the

<sup>1</sup> STEIGER, Baron. He had been Chief of a Department in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Transferred to another Commissariat, he remained

'neighbours' on the . . . Ambassador . . . He is rather partial to ballerinas. They brought him a real harem . . . A microphone was placed in the bedroom . . . It appears that Ezhov\* listens in himself to check on the work of his subordinates. The Ambassador yelps like a rabbit when he enjoys himself with our ballerinas . . . The head of the N.K.V.D. listens in . . . So far it is the only case of collaboration between the N.K.V.D. and the capitalist world . . .

A tea party given by my wife . . . Lady Chilston<sup>1</sup> came as well as . . . (omission) . . .

Had a long talk with de Tellier<sup>2</sup>. He always annoys me with his requests for . . .

Davies invited me to lunch . . . We talked for some time. I told him the American Neutrality Law would be a great mistake and just the sort of thing Hitler wanted . . .

I saw Schulenberg. I tried to find out from him . . . It was useless. He was as close as an oyster, or he has instructions . . .

Molotov 'phoned. He wants to see the American Ambassador . . . He asked that I should also be present . . . I tried to get out of it, for it meant taking the part of an interpreter . . . It doesn't fit my official position . . . I had to agree . . . But I warned that I would bring along Neumann to interpret . . . (omission) . . . I found out from a reliable source that my deputies\*<sup>3</sup> are to be arrested soon . . . Ezhov\* has found evidence . . . I don't know what attitude to take . . . To warn them would serve no purpose . . .

My wife is to be ordered again to the Urals. She will be coming back every fortnight to receive Americans and Britons . . . What strange practices . . . Joseph Vissarionovich [Stalin] asked me on the telephone not to take offence at this measure taken by Ezhov. He said it was all necessary and that my wife would be safer that way . . . I have been told that Ezhov shot several people in his office with an automatic Mauser gun . . .

liaison officer between the Diplomatic Corps and the Kremlin, acting at the same time as secret agent of the N.K.V.D. He was shot in the purge of 1938.

<sup>1</sup> CHILSTON, Lady. Wife of Lord Chilston, British Ambassador in Moscow from 1933 to 1938.

<sup>2</sup> TELLIER, de. Belgian Ambassador in Moscow.

<sup>3</sup> Krestinsky and Rozengoltz.

The N.K.V.D. is more like a slaughter house than a Government department . . . Zakovsky raped . . .

The newspapers are full of Ezhov's photographs . . . He is already hailed as the glorious chief of Soviet Intelligence . . . He is being exalted by every means . . . I should think so . . . He arrested nearly all the staff of *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, including Bukharin\* . . .

. . . (omission). Had lunch with the Italian Ambassador . . . Futile and empty conversation . . . He praised the Duce . . . I am already nauseated by our Soviet glorifications . . . Moreover, one cannot compare the Duce with our leader of genius. It is not so much a matter of individual merits or gifts but of the particular country where the leader exercises his powers . . . Russia is not Italy . . . Everything that goes on here immediately has a world echo . . . But in Italy it's another matter . . . The 'far neighbours' have supplied some interesting dispatches, again on the subject of that Japanese General Tada . . . They now talk about nothing more or less than seizing the whole of northern China . . .

Our diplomatic representative in Tokyo reports on his talk with . . . The Japanese have definitely decided to conquer China . . . As regards Mongolia, they have two schools of thought . . . One . . . We can expect serious clashes . . .

The 'neighbours' are complaining about Duranty.<sup>1</sup> They maintain that he is almost openly engaged in espionage work. He is always interested in our gold production . . . He attempted to bribe some officials of the . . . I fear they may arrest him . . . I 'phoned . . . Molotov has promised to ring up Ezhov . . . I asked that in general all questions relating to American journalists should be referred to me . . .

Zakovsky telephoned me . . . I was surprised . . . He told me not to worry any longer about Duranty: 'We've fixed him,' he said in his vulgar way. 'We planted such a smasher on him about our gold production that . . . now he'll tell all his pals we have more gold than . . .' (omission) . . .



<sup>1</sup> DURANTY, Walter. Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*. Author of *I Write as I Please* (1935); *The Kremlin and the People* (1942); *U.S.S.R.* (1944).

Koba called me to discuss future relations with the United States. He said: 'We don't want merely to continue diplomatic relations on the basis of the 1933 Agreement . . . No . . . We must establish the closest and most intimate relations with Roosevelt and his group and give them moral guarantees that we shall be on their side in the event of a decisive world conflict . . . Roosevelt is a man who takes a broad view in international affairs . . . He looks far ahead . . . He is no Chamberlain, with Birmingham tics and petty bargaining instead of a really broad policy . . .'

I asked Koba what were the moral guarantees he had in mind. He remained silent for a while and then said, 'We must understand a simple proposition. We are the representatives of the Russian State, the recipients of everything that has been done before our time. We cannot interrupt the historical process and begin a new policy, as if Ivan the Great, Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great had never existed.' After another pause he continued, 'Or Alexander Nevsky, who fought against the Teutonic Knights. We must make it clearly understood that we shall continue the old historical process, that our dispute with Germany will be settled on the battlefields and that if somebody else – say Roosevelt – also resolves to fight Hitler, we shall be on his side in that hour when the fate of mankind is at stake.' Again he paused, and then added, 'Please understand me! We must not act prematurely . . . The danger is extremely grave . . . We cannot afford to receive the first blow . . . the most terrible blow of that war-machine – the biggest the world has ever seen . . . If we did, we should be betrayed and finished . . . All these Chamberlains, Halifaxes and their like wait only for that moment to let us down . . . to make us the prey of German imperialism . . . They have less interest in us than in Togoland or the Cameroons . . . They would rather give away the Ukraine than sacrifice any of their colonies . . . We must be cautious . . .'

I gathered that he was hinting at Kandeliaki. But I didn't want to acquiesce in this game which, in my view, could lead to the most unpleasant consequences . . . I don't believe in the policy of backing two horses at the same time . . . Besides, I didn't think he was sincere with me, that this talk about the possibility of a betrayal on the part of Chamberlain really

determined his tactics . . . It seemed to me that there was something else at the back of his mind . . . I tried to find out . . .

'Please understand, Joseph Vissarionovich,' I said, 'if Hitler wins, we are finished . . . Others may be able to buy themselves out . . . they may come to some arrangement . . . they may divide the world among themselves . . . with us it's different . . . As soon as there is no danger of a second front Hitler will put us down . . . or he will eat us up . . . *Tertium non datur* . . .' The Latin quotation made him smile. 'You haven't forgotten your Latin,' he said, adding, 'Have confidence in me, *papasha* . . . don't be afraid . . . I can dupe anybody . . . even Hitler . . . In Tiflis market I always managed to get the better even of Armenian traders . . . and they are tougher to deal with than any Hitler or Chamberlain . . .' He stopped talking. 'How about Roosevelt?' I asked. He shrugged his shoulders. 'Generally speaking, we shall have to dupe Roosevelt as well . . . But with him it is a different question . . . With him we can strike a real, far-reaching and historic bargain . . . That is why we should cheat him only at . . .' (omission) . . .

Nevertheless, our talk satisfied me; it helped to clarify many things in my mind . . .

Had a long interview with the Belgian Ambassador. He talked a good deal about the desirability of a more liberal policy towards political opponents within the U.S.S.R. I can't understand what it has to do with him. After all, we don't interfere in their Flemish policy or other internal affairs. I was very cold with him . . . I told him it was the result of pressure by such individuals as Kibalcich<sup>1</sup> who succeeded in influencing Spaak<sup>2</sup> and getting him interested in these stories. Eventually I lost my temper and said that I had always been glad to assist him in every possible way, but that there was a limit to everything. Otherwise a situation might result . . .

<sup>1</sup> KIBALCICH (pen-name Victor Serge). Former Russian anarchist, later a Trotskyite living in France and Belgium. He had belonged to the left-wing opposition from 1923-36 and was arrested in 1928 and 1933.

<sup>2</sup> SPAAK, Paul Henry. Belgian Foreign Minister, 1936-8, then Prime Minister. First President of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Had a long talk with Davies. I told him the time had come to put an end to German and Italian intervention in Spain. He kept referring to an 'Eastern Locarno'. I didn't quite understand what he meant . . . He then tried to engage in a discussion on the advantages of bourgeois parliamentarism over the Soviet system . . .

Had a talk with Lord Chilston. I told him the anti-Comintern Pact was not directed against us but against Britain and the United States. He smiled mysteriously . . . He is said to be closely connected with Halifax . . .

Colonel Koznich<sup>1</sup> called to see me . . . I can't understand the 'neighbours'. Do they really need a scandal with Birk?<sup>2</sup> The Colonel wanted to tell me something about his conversations with foreign diplomats. He talked about the trial, saying that in his opinion all the defendants were really guilty and that our justice was the best in the world . . . He praised Vyshinsky as much as he could, and said he wished Estonia had such prosecutors . . . I was listening to him with impatience . . . Why should he tell me all this? . . . Could it be that the 'neighbours' instructed him to check up on my conversations with foreign envoys? . . . Everything is possible in our country, any silly idea or provocation . . . I had to answer him according to the rules . . . If it's a trap I shall not be caught . . . I am an old fox . . .

I saw Kennan<sup>3</sup> . . . Neumann came to see me. He looked scared. His wife is under arrest. She is a foreign communist. I don't know whether something lies in store for him too . . . I think we can expect some arrests in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs . . . I telephoned Molotov . . . He said he knew nothing about it . . . He suggested I went to see Ezhov\* . . .

Ezhov received me very courteously in his office. It was adorned with a large Kherossan carpet . . . stained in places. Ezhov is said to have shot several people in his office . . . He

<sup>1</sup> KOZNICH, Colonel. Estonian Military Attaché in Moscow, later Ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> BIRK, Ado. Estonian Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The N.K.V.D. compromised him in an affair involving a dancer.

<sup>3</sup> KENNAN, George. American expert on the Soviet Union who, as Mr X, was the first to suggest the post-war American policy of 'containment' towards Russia. At the time he was Counsellor at the United States Embassy in Moscow. He was American Ambassador in Moscow in 1953.

shook my hand . . . He said Joseph Vissarionovich had confidence in me . . . then he added that there were 'enemies of the people' in the Narkomindel as well as in other Commissariats . . . A silly formula, said to have been invented by Mekhlis . . . I tried to find out who were these 'enemies of the people' . . . He smiled enigmatically and then said, 'You know, even Joseph Vissarionovich does not expect to be notified of the names of persons to be arrested . . . The technique of our work does not permit this . . . Complete and unconditional secrecy is essential if we are to avoid . . .' Zakovsky entered the room . . . the collar of his shirt unbuttoned. He stretched out his hand. I had to shake it. It was loathsome . . . He said he would have liked to attend one of my diplomatic receptions . . . It's all I needed . . . Barkov had complained to me that . . . I tried to dissuade him by telling him they were boring functions . . . I left without having found out anything from Ezhov . . .

Tried to obtain permission for my wife to come to Moscow. Zhemchuzhina [Madame Molotov] is arranging a tea for Davies' wife at the Rublevka villa . . . It was refused . . . I asked Vera Moyseyevna<sup>1</sup> to come in her place . . . She cried . . . she didn't want to come. She said Nikolai Nikolayevich's [Krestinsky's] days were numbered and he would soon be arrested . . . She wouldn't explain where she had this from . . . He doesn't seem to be worried . . . I persuaded Vera Moyseyevna to come.

Had a long talk with Vera Moyseyevna, who told me about the tea party . . . It was held at the former estate of . . . instead of at Molotov's villa. For some reason a detachment of fifty N.K.V.D. men guarded the approaches to the house . . . Various fish and meat *zakuskys* were served . . . all ordered from the Bolshoy Moskovsky . . . Zhemchuzhina had huge cyclamens put on the table . . . She wanted to make an impression . . . The conversation could not have been sillier . . . Poor Vera Moyseyevna was seated somewhere in a corner, next to Stomonyakov's wife. Zhemchuzhina had asked for chewing gum to be sent to her from the Embassy. Presumably she wanted to give the American Ambassador a real treat . . . Davies' wife understood nothing of what was going on . . . The interpreters were

<sup>1</sup> MOYSEYEVNA, Vera (Krestinsky), wife of N. N. Krestinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

appalling . . . The tea had been arranged to establish close personal relations. It actually resulted in . . . (omission) . . .

9th June . . . Dark clouds are gathering over the Far East. The Japanese have attacked the Chinese garrison in Lukow-Zan. They attempted to seize the Marco Polo bridge . . . They were repulsed. Dmitri Vassilevich [Bogomolov] reported recently that he was expecting an attack on Shanghai . . . Instead of Shanghai it was the Peking area which was attacked . . . It's rather puzzling . . . The chief interest of the Japanese is in central China . . . the Yangtse-Kiang valley . . .

Ezhov\* 'phoned unexpectedly . . . He wants Dmitri Vassilevich to be recalled to Moscow without delay . . . He said it should be done very carefully, as he had been informed that . . . What nonsense . . . Dmitri Vassilevich [Bogomolov] began his diplomatic career in Vienna in 1922, together with Kotzyubinsky. But he is not a Ukrainian. He is a real Muscovite, who spent some fifteen years in Shanghai before the Revolution . . . He was the manager of a tea company. How can he be a 'Petlyurite', as Ezhov affirms . . . I shall have to recall him under the pretext of consultations . . . He would have come in any case . . . Presumably they want to arrest him at the railway station . . . The usual tactics used by Ezhov and Zakovsky . . .

Proclamations have been stuck on walls in the Baumann district . . . They demand the immediate . . . I think it's a provocation . . . Rumours are being spread about a military *coup d'état*. Foreign envoys have already mentioned these rumours to me . . . Why should we . . .

Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]\* and Rozengoltz\* no longer come to the Commissariat . . . They have arrested Karakhan,\* Doletzky,<sup>1</sup> Rudzutak,\* Mezhlauk,<sup>2</sup> Obolensky-

<sup>1</sup> DOLETZKY. Head of the official Soviet News Agency, Tass. Former Polish Revolutionary in Tsarist days. Visited Washington when Litvinov negotiated American recognition of the U.S.S.R. with Roosevelt. Disappeared from public life in 1947, when he was reported to have been arrested.

<sup>2</sup> MEZHLAUK, V. I. People's Commissar for Heavy Industry, former Chairman of the State Planning Commission; member of the Politbureau and regarded as one of Russia's ablest economists. He was reported to have been arrested in July 1937 but reappeared on the political scene after a short while. Disappeared again in 1938.

Osinsky<sup>1</sup> and Unshlicht.<sup>2</sup> It's clear that there will be a new trial. Why such a strange mixture of defendants . . . Zukermann<sup>3</sup> and Enukidze<sup>4</sup> have also been detained. This is why Ezhov needed Dmitri Vassilevich [Bogomolov] . . . It would be easy to get him . . . He is odd man out in the Party . . . He joined in 1920. Kotzyubinsky, who recommended him, has now been shot as a Ukrainian autonomist, a supporter of Petlyura and an agent of the Polish General Staff . . . He has confessed . . . It will now be easy to establish a 'link' between him and . . . The 'link' is Zakovsky's sinister invention . . . Vyshinsky has worked out something more subtle . . . He talks about 'closing the ring' . . . Mezhlauk will be used as a scapegoat for the failure of heavy industry . . . He too is vulnerable . . . He is the son of a Latin teacher at Kharkov High School. The father belonged to the 'black hundreds'.<sup>5</sup> Mezhlauk joined the Party in 1917 as an engineering student in Kharkov. His brother is also . . . Rukhimovich<sup>6</sup> was arrested at the same time. But he sided with Klim in Tsaritsin against Trotsky. It's a complete muddle. One can no longer tell who's who and what's what. It looks as if Ezhov and Zakovsky are beginning to extend the 'link' to Klim . . . and to other members of the Instantsia . . . So far they have not touched me . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

I saw Sasha [Wallakh] who told me horrifying things. Ezhov ordered the prisoners to be brought to his office . . . He humiliated

<sup>1</sup> OBOLENSKY-OINSKY, V. V. Prominent member of the 'Democratic-Centralist' opposition within the Party in the early 'twenties.

<sup>2</sup> UNSHLICHT, I. A former member of the Polish group in the Bolshevik Party. Had held several official posts, including that of Deputy Commissar for War in 1918.

<sup>3</sup> ZUKERMANN. Chief of a Department in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Intimate friend of Bogomolov and Enukidze.

<sup>4</sup> ENUKIDZE, Abel. A Georgian communist, he had held the posts of Commissar for Heavy Industry and Secretary of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Shot in 1938.

<sup>5</sup> 'BLACK HUNDREDS.' Russian extreme right-wing group, who used violence in support of their political aims.

<sup>6</sup> RUKHIMOVICH, Moyssei L. Red Army leader in the Ukraine during the Civil War. Elected to the Praesidium of the Eleventh Bolshevik Party Congress.

them and called them the worst names in the Russian language. He spat in their faces and struck them with the butt of his revolver . . . Then he had the wives brought in . . . There were horrible scenes . . . The women were undressed and threatened with rape . . . The eighteen-year-old daughter of . . . was actually raped . . . He had refused to sign a confession . . . Mezhlauk lost his self-control. He spat in Ezhov's face and was shot dead at once . . . in Ezhov's office . . .

Could it possibly be that Joseph Vissarionovich, Klim, Molotov and the others know nothing about these outrages? . . . It's unbelievable . . . Rumours circulate all over the town . . . How can one tolerate . . .

I think I would have signed anything if only to save my daughter from . . . Ezhov is a sadist and a madman . . . He employs a special agent for these jobs . . . a giant hunchback with a bestial face marked by small-pox . . . a syphilitic . . . It was he who raped . . . Sasha told me he had firmly decided to . . . He said he always carried poison on him . . . I think this is the best way . . . But the thought of the children . . . Joseph Vissarionovich also has children and is attached to them . . . How can he tolerate such horrors? . . . (omission) . . .

Vera Moyseyevna [Krestinsky] has been arrested . . . We have been instructed to tell foreigners that she is ill . . . Rosengoltz' wife . . . (omission) . . .

Had a talk with Sandler.<sup>1</sup> A subtle fellow . . . He would like the cancellation of Paragraph 16 of the League of Nations Covenant. He says he will take it upon himself to persuade the United States to join the League if this paragraph is repealed . . . Indeed, this would amount to the abandonment of collective security . . . and it would suit only Hitler and Mussolini . . .

I have been summoned to the Instantsia. Joseph Vissarionovich looked calm and collected. He smiled more often than usual. The man has nerves of steel . . . I envy him . . . Some of his closest friends have been arrested, such as Enukidze . . . They slept in the same bed in the underground printing shop. For six whole months they shared whatever scraps of food were to be had . . . And now . . . I think that Joseph Vissarionovich must

<sup>1</sup> SANDLER, Rickard Johannes. Swedish Foreign Minister. Had been Prime Minister in 1924-5.

have read my mind . . . Suddenly he said, 'We are revolutionaries, we belong to a special, hardened breed of people . . .' Klim and Molotov looked at him in astonishment . . . The question of the conclusion of an agreement with China was then discussed in detail.

. . . It was decided that it should be clearly worded in the form of a definite non-aggression pact . . . The Japanese should not be induced to think that we proposed applying sanctions to them . . . even if the League of Nations decided to apply them by a majority vote . . . China should see in it our full moral approval and support in her resistance to the Japanese . . . We shall be sending her arms via Mongolia . . . We must avert a compromise between Chiang-Kai-shee [Chiang Kai-shek] and Japan . . . There would be mortal danger to us if . . . I explained that such a compromise could be ruled out. Chiang Kai-shee was completely in the hands of the United States. He would never be able to pursue a pro-Japanese policy. Joseph Vissarionovich interrupted to say, 'Chiang Kai-shee is just as mortal as Chang Tso-lin<sup>1</sup> . . . we have received information . . .' I understood that he was referring to the latest report from the 'neighbours'. It mentioned a plan to poison Chiang Kai-shee with the help of Japanese agents in his entourage . . .

I was called to Ezhov's office. He was grim and looked angry. He said he had evidence of the preparation of a big plot by some of our diplomats abroad. Many of them would refuse to return to the Soviet Union. We could expect the publication of exposures. Then he said, 'We must bring them all back under some pretext or other and screen them right here . . . You must prepare this operation . . . it will be your responsibility . . .' A pleasant task indeed . . .

The Chinese Ambassador told me that Hiroto proposed to Chiang Kai-shee that Japanese troops would be withdrawn immediately if China joined the anti-Comintern Pact . . .

I called Davies and asked him to inform Washington . . . It was essential to warn the State Department . . . Davies did not seem to realise the danger . . . I said to him that if China joined this Pact it would mean the end of United States influence in

<sup>1</sup> CHANG TSO-LIN. A Manchurian war-lord who was assassinated in 1928.

the Far East . . . and the loss of the Pacific . . . He then showed more concern and asked me to give him all this information in writing.

I cabled Troyanovsky suggesting that he should speak personally to Roosevelt . . . Had a 'phone call from . . . The Secretary-General is gravely perturbed by the news . . . He said that if China joined the anti-Comintern Pact it would mean that we would soon be attacked in the Far East . . . He said his orders were to do everything possible to prevent the danger . . . I asked that Dmitri Vassilevich [Bogomolov] should be left at his post for another month . . . He agreed. He said, 'Tell Ezhov from me . . .'

Ezhov was fulminating . . . He replied that he would contact Joseph Vissarionovich at once and would demand . . . He shouted over the telephone saying he advised me not to interfere with . . . (omission) . . .

The Secretary-General's Office rang up to say that Dmitri Vassilevich must return to Moscow . . . It means that even he, Stalin, gives in to Ezhov . . . Poor Lev Borisovich [Kamenev] . . . I remember our talk about Koba and Yagoda\* . . . Now Ezhov has replaced Yagoda, but nothing else has changed . . . The Archangel and the Sword . . . The Sword now commands the Archangel . . . The newspapers are full of stories about the discovery of groups of terrorists, saboteurs, diversionists, spies, enemies of the people . . . Executions are taking place everywhere . . . Ezhov is hailed as 'our glorious security chief who implements the decisions of the people's leader of genius, comrade Stalin' . . . Some title . . .

. . . (Omission.) . . .

All members of the Opposition organisation in Khabarovsk have been shot . . . Trotskyites have been executed in Chita . . . In Komsomolsk . . . In . . . It's dreadful . . . It's the complete physical annihilation of the more active Opposition members and of all those connected with them, whether directly or indirectly . . .

My daughter went to the American Embassy. She saw the film *Moonlight Sonata* with Paderewski . . . She can't forget the impression . . . and says Paderewski is wonderful . . . Why did this pianist of genius have to go into politics? . . . He has a long

way to go . . . Poor Rayevsky<sup>1</sup> once told me of a comical episode in the squabbles between Paderewski and Pilsudski . . . The old Marshal was making fun of him, saying that in politics he struck the wrong note. There was some quarrel about the use of a bathroom at the Belweder Palace . . . Pity the Poles haven't a Gogol . . . It would make a brilliant sketch - 'The quarrel of the Belweder Ivan Ivanovich and the Belweder Ivan Nikiforovich'. Some ladies took sides in the argument . . . But Paderewski still had a sense of humour: when Clemenceau asked him to play something after Versailles, he dashed to the piano and played Saint-Saens' *Danse Macabre* . . .

The League of Nations is definitely washing its hands of everything . . . The Chinese complaint against Japan is to be referred to the Washington Nine Powers Conference. Thus the United States will be in a position to exercise influence on . . .

Troyanovsky has reported on the interview he had with Roosevelt just before he left. Roosevelt was pessimistically inclined and thought there was little hope of avoiding . . . He said the time had come to take preparatory steps for the creation of a coalition of peaceful Powers to strike at the aggressor . . . He added that the State Department would publish an official statement branding Japan as an aggressor . . .

Troyanovsky sent a copy of his report to the Secretary-General . . . I was asked by telephone to come along to his office. I can see no reason for such rejoicing . . . They don't seem to realise that it is not so easy to involve the United States in armed resistance to the aggressor. A statement is one thing and action is another. Of course, Roosevelt has already made up his mind on the issue of war, but the isolationists are extremely strong . . . It will be very difficult to overcome their opposition.

Again dispatches from Berlin. Astakhov leaps ahead . . . He's worse than Kandeliaki . . . I don't know whether he acts on directives or . . . Babarin<sup>2</sup> has also been sent there . . . He belongs to the Molotov clan . . . I have been told they want to suggest to the Germans some . . . And if London finds out about it . . . I am surprised that the Intelligence Service has not yet

<sup>1</sup> RAYEVSKY. Tass representative in Paris; shot in 1937.

<sup>2</sup> BABARIN. Soviet Commercial Attaché in Berlin.

got wind of our secret contacts in Berlin . . . The political danger is immense . . . All the work done hitherto for collective security will be jeopardised . . . All my efforts will have been in vain . . . It must be admitted that the only thing that saves us is the total helplessness of the British and French intelligence in Germany . . . But the possibility of a leakage cannot be ruled out . . .

22nd August . . . The Non-Aggression Pact with China was signed yesterday . . .

5th September. I was called to the Secretary-General and found him in a state of unusual agitation . . . He asked whether there was any indication that foreigners knew anything about our contacts . . . I replied that so far none of the diplomats had approached me . . . I told him again that I regarded these contacts as politically dangerous in the event of their being discovered. He said in a rather low voice, 'I know, but it is necessary . . . I have already explained it to you . . . we must insure ourselves . . .' He added, 'We will do everything possible to avoid leakages . . . If anyone attempts to . . . We shall find means . . . we shall settle our accounts with him, even if he goes to the moon . . . we will find him anywhere . . .' I had rarely seen him in such a state. Then he 'phoned Ezhov in my presence. He asked what measures would be taken. He shouted and threatened. He told Ezhov that he was responsible for putting the offender out of action. Those were the words he used: 'Put him out of action,' he said, 'or else whoever fails to carry out my orders will himself be put out of action' . . . Then he cooled down and parted from me in a friendly manner . . .

I have read about Ebelgardt's assassination near Lausanne . . . It's a strange affair.

9th September. Had a long talk with Sasha [Wallakh] . . . He explained to me . . . I can now understand the Secretary-General's anxiety. Reiss knew about all our negotiations. He had copies of the cables from . . . Babarin saw him in August in Lausanne . . . If he had disappeared with all these documents there would have been an unprecedented scandal . . . The Secretary-General is aware of his responsibility. Nevertheless, I can't understand how they succeeded in liquidating him . . . In Switzerland it isn't easy . . .

We are preparing for the Brussels Conference. It has been

decided that we shall take part . . . The directives have been issued . . .

5th November. The Conference opened the day before yesterday. I left . . . (omission) . . .

7th November. Italy has joined the anti-Comintern Pact . . . Things are moving fast . . . They now speak about the 'Axis' . . . The Comintern has already been forgotten . . . Hitler's Munich speech on the great world triangle . . . Fortunately Hitler is not very good at geometry or else he would have referred to hyperbolae . . . or rather to hollow hyperboloids . . . In this triangle only Germany represents a real, dimensional side, a force vector . . .

The 'neighbours' have supplied an interesting report from London about possible successors to Chamberlain and Baldwin . . . Baldwin left on 28th May . . . The report mentions several names . . . The main danger is Lord Lothian<sup>1</sup> . . . There are some suspect links passing through him directly to Hitler . . . Halifax and Londonderry are ideological appeasers . . . Montagu Norman is Schacht's personal agent . . . Balfour supplies metals to Krupp . . . Hoare and Simon . . . John Astor of *The Times* . . . Lothian's *The Round Table* has dropped all pretence . . . (omission) . . .

In France the Cagoulards' Plot has been discovered . . . Blum resigned in June . . . Chautemps is not prepared to fight to the end with . . . Delbos was at the Quai d'Orsay when Blum was Prime Minister . . . But he has now changed his views . . . There are rumours about Commère's trip to Berlin on a special mission . . . The 'neighbours' believe the Cagoulards had it in mind to overthrow the Government and bring to power a *Directoire* headed by Pétain . . . Chiappe, Weygand and Doriot would also have been included in the new ruling body . . . The danger was grave . . . One thing that isn't quite clear is the link with . . . At any rate, Hitler must have been making every effort to help this movement . . . As regards Mussolini, there are indications . . . Gringoire has conducted an open campaign on behalf of Rome . . . I still think that the secret contacts of our would-be diplomats like Kandeliaki, Astakhov, Babarin and

<sup>1</sup> LOTHIAN, Philip Henry Kerr, Marquis of. Liberal politician. British Ambassador in Washington, 1939-40.

the rest can yield nothing except scandals, and are liable to weaken completely those elements in Britain and France inclined to oppose Hitler to the end, even if it involved an alliance with us . . . One cannot take such risks . . . Between us and . . . Hitler will not fail to attack us . . . This is inevitable . . . We ought to understand this and prepare openly to meet the challenge instead of engaging in petty politics.



The year 1937 is ending . . . (omission) . . .



January 1938 . . . I have read an interesting report from the 'neighbours' on the talks between Goering and Lord Londonderry; while they were members of a hunting party. Goering openly suggested that Germany should abandon her naval rearmament programme in exchange for freedom of action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. Londonderry expressed his agreement and promised to influence Chamberlain . . . He would hardly have to exercise great pressure. Chamberlain is in any case inclined to . . . (omission) . . .

Bad news from the Far East. The Japanese are definitely preparing for a large-scale attack on our frontier. We don't quite know where it will start but . . . I think they should be warned . . . I have sent a report to this effect to the Instantsia . . . A joint session of the two Chambers of the Supreme Soviet has decided to proclaim a state of emergency in the event of an attack . . .

Vyshinsky called me to see him. What a disgusting Jesuit . . . He told me that the interrogations of Krestinsky and Rozen-goltz had revealed some lack of vigilance in our Commissariat and that it would be necessary to extend the investigations to . . . I protested. I said he would disorganise the whole department. He smiled sweetly, saying that was not his intention. On the contrary, he would have liked to give up his post of public prosecutor and join us. He hinted that he expected me to take the initiative in this direction. What a sordid bargain . . . It reminded me of Yagoda, with his offer of collaboration in 1926.

Men may change, but not their morals . . . Existence determines consciousness . . . according to Marx. Vyshinsky is even more revolting than Yagoda. He is more dangerous . . . A Russianised Pole with a mixed Warsaw and Baku accent. His father was a chemist . . . Yagoda was also a chemist. He had worked for a year in Yanuari Vyshinsky's<sup>1</sup> chemist shop in Zamkovsky street, Baku . . . How strange are the twists of fate . . . I told him there was nothing I could do to help him . . . Soon, I added, I might have to join Krestinsky\* . . . He protested, saying that the Instantsia and the Secretary-General thought very highly of me . . .

Grandi told Chamberlain in London that as long as Anthony Eden was in charge of British foreign policy . . . Chamberlain asked for Eden's resignation . . . The latter is said to have agreed . . . Britain is on her knees before the Duce . . .

The Instantsia has asked for an opinion on the advisability of appointing Merckalov<sup>2</sup> Ambassador in Berlin . . . They are playing a strange game . . . New Ambassadors are now appointed from the ranks of former senior officials of the N.K.V.D. Bogomolov,<sup>3</sup> a former head of the G.P.U. in the Donbass, was appointed counsellor in Paris . . . Dekanozov<sup>4</sup> will be . . .

Yurenev is finished. As regards Astakhov . . . he is still better than Merckalov – who, however, will not let himself get involved too deeply as he knows that he doesn't understand much. But if Astakhov remains *chargé d'affaires* much longer anything is possible; he will sign anything, even an alliance with Hitler. If Reiss had not disappeared . . .

Italian and German aircraft have carried out savage bombing raids on defenceless Spanish towns. Submarines have made piratical attacks on our ships. We are forced to accept this

<sup>1</sup> VYSHINSKY, Yanuari. Father of Andrei Vyshinsky.

<sup>2</sup> MEREKALOV. Soviet diplomat who helped to negotiate the Soviet-German pact in 1939.

<sup>3</sup> BOGOMOLOV, Alexander. Soviet Ambassador to the Allied Governments in London (1943–4), France, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in 1950.

<sup>4</sup> DEKANOZOV, Vladimir. A former Georgian Security official, last pre-war Soviet Ambassador in Berlin. Executed with Beria in 1954.

situation. After all, we had to intervene in Spain because of the fear of agitation on the part of Trotskyites. The Instantsia fears accusations of liquidation – accusations that we have let down the Spanish Left. This is absurd; questions of policy must be decided according to the demands of the State, and not from the point of view of . . . I am against the shooting of Trotskyites, but I am also against taking any notice of those who are accused of treachery . . . The logic of internal party struggles . . . Too many false steps have already been taken.

Report on the struggles between chemical combines. Imperial Chemical Industries and I.G. Farben against Dupont de Nemours . . . London and Berlin are co-operating in Czechoslovakia. Kuhlman goes the same way as I.G. Farben, France also. They want to take away the Aussig factory from Dupont . . . Aussig is in the Sudetenland, which means that Chamberlain will support Hitler in the event of . . .

In France the situation has been more complicated. The struggles between the metal trusts . . .

Vickers are closely linked with Krupps . . . They want to force Schneider-Creusot to sell their shares in Skoda, Assap, Avia, Constructiva, Bansk . . . The French are resisting, but it is said that in principle Schneider-Creusot have already . . . We must watch carefully . . . The diplomatic positions will be determined by . . . Chamberlain is Birmingham's man, but he is also . . . The Instantsia takes the view that there is no hope whatever of . . .

The Bank of Central Europe is also . . .

For once I am in full agreement with the Instantsia. Of course, we are under a moral and political obligation to do everything in our power to support Benes . . . Titulescu<sup>1</sup> was telling me that he . . . In his last letter Benes was complaining that our support was not sufficiently active . . . This caused an outburst of indignation in the Instantsia. Klim declared that Benes was an *agent provocateur* acting on behalf of Roosevelt . . . In that case we are all *agents provocateurs* working for Roosevelt or Dupont de Nemours . . . and if . . . It's just silly to assume that Roosevelt

<sup>1</sup> TITULESCU, Nicolai. Rumanian Foreign Minister and Representative at the League of Nations. Negotiated with Litvinov the resumption of diplomatic relations between Rumania and U.S.S.R.

plays the stock exchange game in this matter . . . The would-be Marxists like Klim just use catch-words . . . He also made fun of me on the question of the air pact . . . Joseph Vissarionovich supported me, but not very resolutely . . . I can't understand why he is so much afraid of Klim . . . All the others he . . . It is rumoured that Klim will have to resign shortly . . . Timoshenko<sup>1</sup> and Budenny<sup>2</sup> would take his place . . . How can anyone think of Budenny for this post? . . . Klim would be appointed chairman of the Supreme War Council . . . He gives full support to the game with Berlin, and is full of contempt for London . . . He says ten divisions would suffice to conquer England . . . They haven't got a single soldier . . . Krantz-Vientzov<sup>3</sup> reported at the time that in France too . . . He said the French were suffering from a state of complete passivity . . . They had no air force . . . no tanks . . . no strategy . . . Their defence was based on the ideas of the senile Pétain with his out-dated Verdun psychology . . . They want to bury themselves behind the Maginot line . . . They are going back from Napoleon to Vercingetorix . . . Of course, there is much truth in what Klim says, but one cannot take such a one-sided view. I fear they will offer no real resistance . . . (omission) . . .

We have received a report on the reorganisation of the German General Staff . . .

5th February. Ribbentrop has been appointed Foreign Minister . . . It means that soon . . .

22nd February . . . Things are moving at a fantastic pace . . . Eden's swan song in the House of Commons . . . He did not mince his words about Chamberlain . . . It's a shame for Britain. Hitler has openly declared in the Reichstag that he intends to raise the questions of Austria and the Sudetenland . . . He referred to the 10,000,000 Germans living in neighbouring countries . . . The implication is clear . . . Seyss-Inquart is already in the Government. It means that . . .

Austria is finished . . .

<sup>1</sup> TIMOSHENKO, Semyon Konstantinovich. Marshal of the Soviet Union. Commissar for Defence, 1940-1; C.-in-C. Southern Front, 1941-2; Commander of the Byelorussian Military District, 1954.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote on p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> KRANTZ-VIENTZOV. Soviet Military Attaché in Paris.

I met Vyshinsky again. He came to see me . . . at his own request . . . He talked for some time about the opening of the trial in two days' time . . . He spoke about Yagoda . . . He asked for details about Rakovsky,\* Krestinsky\* and Rozengoltz\* . . . He complained that he was tired of playing the part of Fouquier-Tinville.<sup>1</sup> He said again that he wanted to join the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs . . . He tried to run down Vladimir Petrovich [Potemkin].<sup>2</sup> It means that he is afraid of competition . . .

I saw Sasha [Wallakh] . . . He gave me details of the technique used in organising the trials . . . First they are passed through Ezhov\* . . . They are forced to sign statements containing evidence and confessions . . . Ezhov resorts to a variety of methods to obtain the confessions, changing his tactics from case to case . . . This is known as the 'individual approach' . . . He then reports to the Secretary-General the contents of statements made by prisoners . . . The Secretary-General sends Vyshinsky to check up . . . He reads out the statements to the prisoners in their cells. He then stresses that they must say only the truth and asks them to confirm their statements . . . The prisoners are requested to sign a second time in the presence of Shkiryatov\* and Mckhlis . . . Anyone who refuses to sign is sent back to Ezhov for further 'processing' . . . This is a second death . . . Hardly anyone survives it . . . Those who sign the second time are sent to Ulrich and Vyshinsky. Appearances are saved. In the event of something going wrong the blame can always be laid on Vyshinsky . . . It wouldn't take long to deal with him . . . He knows it, and tries his hardest . . . The Secretary-General keeps Vyshinsky's personal dossier with the record of his past . . . In Baku he was connected with the Mensheviks and right-wing Social Revolutionaries of the Funtikov group . . . He could be involved in the execution of twenty-six commissars . . . An association with Teague-Jones<sup>3</sup> could also be established . . . That must be why Vyshinsky is trying so hard to give up his job

<sup>1</sup> FOQUIER-TINVILLE, Antoine. Public Prosecutor of the Revolutionary Tribunal during the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution.

<sup>2</sup> POTEMKIN, Vladimir Petrovich. Soviet Ambassador in Paris and later Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>3</sup> TEAGUE-JONES – a British officer accused of complicity in the murder of the twenty-six Commissars during the War of Intervention.

of public prosecutor . . . He knows that sooner or later he is bound to fall . . . Joseph Vissarionovich despises him, and doesn't conceal it . . . Shortly before Petrossian's death Artemy Khalatov left . . . Petrossian was accusing Vyshinsky of . . .

A dreadful trial . . . I couldn't help shedding tears when Nikolai Nikolayevich [Krestinsky]\* . . . He had a nervous breakdown . . . He couldn't bear the accusation of having spied for Hitler . . . Bukharin's\* attitude was strange . . . He was calm and showed self-control . . . He was full of contempt for Vyshinsky and Ulrich and made no attempt to disguise it . . . He refused to admit the charges of espionage . . . Rykov\* behaved as if he simply didn't care . . . Pointing at Vyshinsky, he said to Bukharin in a loud voice, 'Confess – he won't leave you alone until you do'. Of course Vyshinsky was also risking his head . . . Strange prosecutor . . . If he fails it means . . . Rakovsky\* was in brilliant form . . . He wiped the floor with Vyshinsky, who had to act as if he liked it. He asked Rakovsky whether he used to have connections with the international bourgeoisie. 'You had an estate in Rumania,' he said . . . Rakovsky replied, 'I confirm my confession to the effect that I had criminal associations with the international bourgeoisie . . . I sometimes had to discount promissory notes, and I went into banks for that purpose . . . It is well known that banks are bulwarks of the bourgeoisie . . .' Vyshinsky was quick on the up-take. 'I ask that the defendant's admission should be placed on the record . . . He also confessed to associations with the Intelligence Service.' Rakovsky retorted: 'I have drunk whisky with Lord Vyer.<sup>1</sup> This Lord is a cousin of . . .' Vyshinsky asked that this statement also should be placed on the record. It is quite unbelievable that foreign journalists should not have noticed . . . If they had, the whole thing would have been branded as a farce . . .

My daughter was sitting next to us at the cinema . . . She heard our talk . . . I was thinking of Krestinsky's poor children . . . of Vera Moyseyevna [Krestinsky] . . . I forgot that I was watching a film at the American Embassy . . . It occurred to me that if my own daughter was in the hands of that drunken brute Zakovsky

<sup>1</sup> [Translator's note] This name cannot be identified from the Russian transliteration.

and his henchmen I would have signed anything to . . . If I was compelled to witness . . .

It is astonishing to read the most fantastic explanations in the foreign press . . . They speak of Raskolnikov . . . of Dostoievsky . . . of the Russian character and its inclination to repentance . . . So much rubbish and loose talk . . . If Zakovsky had his way in any other country the result would be the same . . . Even those who can personally endure anything could not bear . . . To see one's daughter . . . It's dreadful . . . What a disgrace for us . . . History will record all this . . . Future generations will wonder how we could sink so low . . .

There were several exceptions. Grigori Evseyevich [Zinoviev]\* was a physical coward . . . Bukharin\* is not quite normal . . . He is academic and a sectarian . . . A typical . . . He would not confess to espionage, but had no objection to the charge of having organised terrorism. This was just because it had been drummed into him – and he eventually accepted the fact – that objectively his policy led young people to adopt terroristic methods against the Secretary-General . . . And since this was the objective result, it meant that he was subjectively guilty. One must indeed be given to scholasticism and sectarianism to accept such a proposition seriously . . . Mekhlis passes this off as Marxism. In actual fact it smacks of the most abominable and nauseating Jesuitism . . . It is not in vain that the Jesuit Vyshinsky, of all people . . .

Rakovsky\* has been spared . . . I wonder why . . . The Secretary-General is said to have received a personal letter from London . . . It didn't pass through me . . . To be quite formal, this is against the rules of etiquette, but I am glad just the same . . . Rakovsky is a good friend of mine . . .

The letter from London was sent through the Comintern . . . Why should the Secretary-General have such regard for . . . I don't like this Labour Party man . . . He reminds me too much of Halifax . . . The same type of man . . . Obviously, Cripps is not . . . Reynaud made a statement in Paris on the trial . . . Just a lot of nonsense.

16th March. Hitler has formally announced the annexation of Austria . . . No one made the slightest move . . . What

terrible hypnotism is exercised by brutal physical force . . . It is now the turn of the Czechs . . .

Received a letter from Benes . . . He asks that we should immediately . . . The Secretary-General wouldn't hear of it . . . He doesn't want to compromise himself . . . Merekalov will be leaving for Berlin in two months . . . Astakhov is preparing an agreement . . .

There is much talk about Zhemchuzhina [Madame Molotov] . . . Her trust is marketing a new scent . . . 'Stalin's perfume' . . . It provoked a scandal . . . The technical director has been arrested on a charge of . . . Of course it's a genuine case of flattery . . . Tell a fool to pray to God and . . . Zhemchuzhina claims that she knew nothing about it. The question has been discussed in the Instantsia. As a result, they have postponed the report I was to make on the need to conclude an air pact without delay . . . Evidently 'Stalin's Perfume' is more important than little Czechoslovakia . . .

I read Claud Cockburn's article . . . He is very well informed on Germany . . . The 'neighbours' have sent, after much delay, a report from Perth<sup>1</sup> to Chamberlain . . . London is heading towards full agreement with Rome . . . And in Spain too . . . The Republican cause is obviously lost. We are beginning to drop out of the game . . . On balance we have made something out of it . . . We have been left with the Madrid Government's gold reserves . . . Franco will never get them . . . Nor will any other bourgeois government in Spain ever see them . . . A workers' government would renounce it of its own accord in favour of the first Socialist Republic in the world . . . Klim talked about it quite cynically, and laughed at his own witticism . . . He also mentioned the Rumanian gold fund . . .

The 'neighbours' have an excellent informer on Perth's staff . . . They receive photographic copies of all his reports . . .

Yesterday Perth and Ciano signed the Anglo-Italian Agreement . . . The Duce will receive a pittance from . . . The new

<sup>1</sup> PERTH, Sir Eric Drummond, 16th Earl of Perth. British diplomat; entered Foreign Office in 1900. Assisted Balfour at Paris Peace Conference. First Secretary-General of League of Nations, 1919-33. British Ambassador to Italy, 1933-9. Chief adviser on foreign publicity to British Ministry of Information during the last war.

French Government of Daladier has been in office only one week and already Bonnet wants to . . .

20th April . . . The 'neighbours' report that Halifax is preparing a statement to be made to the League of Nations recognising the annexation of Abyssinia . . . It means that things will now move even faster . . . Received a letter from Alvarez del Vayo asking us to back him at the May session of the League . . . The Instantia's decision was neither here nor there: on the one hand we must admit, on the other we must recognise . . . They are afraid of the Opposition . . . and also of Hitler . . . The 'far neighbours' report preparations for the English King's visit to Paris . . .

The 'neighbours' have supplied some interesting details on the struggle between two French *salons* – those of the Comtesse des Portes and the Marquise de Crussol. Both are margarine aristocrats, the daughters of rich businessmen. They incite Reynaud and Daladier against each other . . . Still, Reynaud doesn't want to . . . Palewsky<sup>1</sup> exercises a beneficial influence . . . He is a clever man . . . But these practices are very strange . . . The ladies' *salons* of the third Republic . . . It began with Juliette Adam<sup>2</sup> . . .

The 'neighbours' maintain that the Comtesse des Portes is closely connected with a German agent, Count Tierry de Loudre . . . If this is so . . . (omission) . . .

I can't forget the May session of the League . . . There were some dramatic moments . . . but we had lost the game before it started. The agreement of Daladier and Bonnet with Chamberlain and Halifax sealed the fate of the Spanish Republicans . . . The League refused to apply Article 16 of the Covenant.<sup>3</sup> By 1939 we shall have a fascist Spain. The Republicans cannot last out much longer . . .

<sup>1</sup> PALEWSKY, Gaston. French politician, who joined General de Gaulle in London and became one of the leading members of his party after the war.

<sup>2</sup> ADAM, Juliette, 1836–1936. French writer, *née* Lamber, married to A. E. Adam, a senator of the Third Republic. She established a literary and artistic salon, and in 1879 founded the *Nouvelle Revue*, which she largely directed for some twenty years.

<sup>3</sup> Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant provided for sanctions, including total economic blockade of a country recognised as an aggressor.

The 'neighbours' have sent in a more detailed report on the feud between the Paris *salons*, including a dozen photographs of the various ladies involved . . . The 'neighbours' propose to use these pictures for the purpose of blackmail and to help them recruit influential collaborators . . . They already have, in fact, some very aristocratic agents in the Paris *salons* . . . We cannot afford to lag behind . . .



Received another letter from Benes informing us of Mastny's<sup>1</sup> talk with Goering on the state of tension which developed on the frontier in March . . . Goering had stationed troops fifteen kilometres from the border . . . I can't understand why Benes didn't send these details earlier . . . Wouldn't it be Halifax's influence . . . or that of Georges Bonnet . . . I will write to Benes . . . If he . . . We dispose of sufficient means . . . Photographic copies of various . . . (omission) . . .

The Instantsia has examined the question of concluding a secret military alliance with Lithuania. During the March tension we threatened the Poles with the abrogation of our non-aggression Treaty with them if they invaded Lithuania. That scared them . . . But now one cannot exclude the possibility of their . . . I am against such a secret protocol and alliance . . . The Kaunas Government is very . . . The Secretary-General is of the opinion that we must play to the end this anti-Polish card in Lithuania . . . I don't believe in risky gambles . . . It's surprising how the Georgians like hazardous games . . . If the Secretary-General wasn't . . . Incidentally, Abel [Enukidze] told me once that Joseph Vissarionovich used to play cards a great deal at the time of his wanderings with the Kintos<sup>2</sup> in Tiflis. He even had knife fights with his partners . . . What a strange man he is . . . and how strange are the turns of history . . . If Georgia had never been annexed by Russia, where would he be . . . Now he is the ruler of all Russia . . . Undoubtedly he will become a world figure . . . When one is backed up by such a country as Russia it isn't difficult to become world-famous . . . It

<sup>1</sup> MASTNY. Czech diplomat.

<sup>2</sup> Romantic type of underworld character in Tiflis.

is sufficient to be reasonably intelligent . . . The rest comes by itself . . .

There are insidious rumours about Ezhov\* preparing a bloody purge of the army. Yakir is said to have threatened a military coup if Ezhov is not removed. Tukhachevsky<sup>1</sup> was no longer allowed to leave for London . . . Something strange is happening with Uborevich<sup>2</sup> . . . and also with Eideman,<sup>3</sup> Putna and Kork. Feldman<sup>4</sup> has been recalled from the Far East . . . A dance was held recently at the Army and Navy House. Tukhachevsky was surrounded by women, as usual . . . He is a first-rate dancer . . . But neither Budenny nor Klim nor Timoshenko was to be seen near him . . . Klim even walked away when Tukhachevsky came up to him and tried to open a conversation . . . These are ominous signs.

From time to time I read stories in the foreign press that Klim is supposed to be preparing a *coup d'état* . . . What a lot of rubbish all this is; how little they understand . . . Davies once asked me a question which made me think that . . . And he is trying to penetrate our secrets . . . My own view is that we need no security measures at all . . . Foreigners don't understand anything about our affairs in any case . . . except the Poles, who understand only too well all that is happening here . . . They have the only real information network in the U.S.S.R. . . . If Poland had some sixty million inhabitants, like Germany, we would be finished. Fortunately there are only twenty million Poles . . . the rest are Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Jews and Lithuanians . . . Poland is a second Austro-Hungary, but without even the *Ausgleich*.<sup>5</sup> A state still-born . . . The old Marshal

<sup>1</sup> TUKHACHEVSKY. He was expected to represent the Soviet Government at the Coronation of King George VI.

<sup>2</sup> UBOREVICH, General I. R. Commander of the Western Military District, regarded as one of the most capable young generals in the Red Army.

<sup>3</sup> EIDEMAN, R. P. President of the Central Council for assistance to the armed forces – the Soviet civilian defence organisation.

<sup>4</sup> FELDMAN, General B. M. Head of Administration of Commanding Personnel in the Defence Commissariat, Quartermaster-General of the Red Army.

<sup>5</sup> AUSGLEICH. Agreement concluded in 1867 between Austria and Hungary, which established the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy under the Habsburgs.

understood this . . . He himself was more Lithuanian than Polish . . . He belonged to the *Szlachta zasciankowa*.<sup>1</sup> Like Felix [Dzerzhinsky]\* . . .

Augur<sup>2</sup> continues his campaign . . . The *New York Herald Tribune* has warned the Czechs that no one, not even Russia, would defend them from Hitler . . . The article suggested that the Sudeten claims should be satisfied . . . Ribbentrop has also made some statement to Neville Henderson . . . Henlein<sup>3</sup> has received orders from Berlin to play for time . . . He has resumed negotiations with Prague . . . Lord Londonderry is expected to take a personal message from Chamberlain to Berlin shortly . . . It is possible that during the English King's visit to Paris Halifax and Bonnet will work out a common . . .

I am pressing the Instantsia to issue a public statement that we shall not let the Czechs down . . . We received an alarming, and sad, letter from Benes . . . He is a sort of Czech Kerensky . . . He himself doesn't know . . . Naturally he wants to put up a resistance; but under pressure from London he would agree to anything . . . Our Marxist ideas on the part played by personalities in the shaping of history can safely be filed away . . . If Masaryk were now in Prague and Pilsudski in Warsaw things would have taken a different turn . . . and if Clemenceau headed the French Government and Churchill the British . . . Hitler is extraordinarily lucky . . . Kaganovich\* once said, 'They are not even dogs – only puppies'. He said it in Ukrainian. Officially he has now become a Ukrainian . . . And Rosa Moyseyevna [Kaganovich] has become Georgian . . . She is learning the Georgian language . . . She still has that young student from Leningrad . . . He gets the stones and the Secretary-General [Stalin] gets the plums . . . It's like the fable of the crafty fox and the bear . . . But the Secretary-General is also shrewd . . . I don't envy the student . . . It won't be easy for him to avoid Ezhov's cellars . . . The Secretary-General has reintroduced the laws of

<sup>1</sup> SZLACHTA ZASCIAŃKOWA. Poor landed gentry in Poland, who in some cases were no richer than peasants.

<sup>2</sup> AUGUR. Pen-name of Polyakov, American political columnist.

<sup>3</sup> HENLEIN, Konrad (1898–1945). Leader of the Sudeten-German Nazis.

Peter the Great . . . Infidelity is regarded as treachery to the State . . . Of course, the adulterous wife or the lover can choose poison or . . . The return to Asiatic despotism also leads to a revival of . . .

Dreadful news . . . The trial<sup>1</sup> opens tomorrow . . . The flower of our army command . . . Misha Tukhachevsky – the pride of our Red Army, the author of our victories . . . the organiser of . . . Yakir – the man who defeated Petlyura . . . Uborevich – the hero of the capture of Odessa from Denikin<sup>2</sup> . . . Eideman – Frunze's most devoted comrade-in-arms . . . Putna – the hero of Vilna . . . Kork . . . Feldman – who beat the Japanese war-lords . . . The judges include men who themselves are doomed . . . Egorov<sup>3</sup> . . . Blucher\* . . . I am trying to understand for my own interest the need or the historical reason for these blood baths . . . But it isn't easy . . . One day when Mekhlis was drunk he said that if war came defeat would be inevitable in the first stages . . . There was a need, therefore, to get rid of all those who might take advantage of the situation to stage a military coup . . . But what then is the purpose of our islands in the Arctic ocean? . . . Why the physical extermination? . . . After every executed Marshal we must shoot several hundred officers of his staff . . . Blood calls for more blood . . . Where is the limit? Our military strength could be easily undermined . . . Mekhlis said complete political stabilisation of the regime was more important than the High Command . . . ‘We shall find commanders,’ he said . . . Klim said the Russian knows how to fight and likes fighting . . . This is true; but there was no need for him to say so publicly . . . (omission) . . .

The flower of our army command has been shot and Ezhov\* has already arrested half of the judges who passed the sentence on Misha [Tukhachevsky] and his unfortunate comrades . . . Executions were carried out in the courtyard of the Lefortovskaya Prison . . . at the break of day . . . They were tied to poles like deserters or bandits . . . Yakir went out of his mind before the execution . . . He was swearing and shouting ‘death

<sup>1</sup> See p. 12 of Introduction for reference to mis-dating of this event.

<sup>2</sup> DENIKIN, Anton Ivanovich (1872–1946). General of the White Armies in the Civil War. Distinguished himself in the Great War.

<sup>3</sup> EGOROV, A. I. Tsarist officer, who became a Soviet Marshal.

to the Petlyura White bandits!' . . . In 1921, near Novy Bazar, he had executed 376 prisoners from the Petlyura army . . . they were shot with machine guns . . . Tukhachevsky died in silence . . . He was told that his wife had received permission to change her name . . . on personal instructions from the Secretary-General . . . Zakovsky wanted . . . but he was prevented . . .

Ezhov is said to have boasted that he would soon arrest Klim and Budenny . . . He wants to play the part of Babeuf. He talks all the time of the need to destroy bureaucracy and inequality . . . to take away the cars of our responsible officials . . . to throw them out of their villas . . . He wants to send to concentration camps all the 'communist concubines', as he describes Rosa and others . . . He wants to banish or arrest all the ballerinas and actresses . . . Zakovsky is an anarchist with a criminal police record . . . But I don't think that he . . . Klim is not such easy prey . . . He is no Trotsky . . . He is said to have already demanded from the Secretary-General the removal and arrest of Ezhov . . . He threatened to shoot him personally, like a dog at the Party's Central Committee, if he . . . Ezhov knows it and fears him . . . He no longer takes the lift, in order to avoid meeting Klim . . .

The struggle in the Instantsia is said to take dramatic turns . . . The Secretary-General wavers . . . Beria has been called from Tiflis . . .

Ezhov has compiled a new list of 'traitors' – ninety-six persons, including most members of the Instantsia. Kaganovich's brothers have already been arrested on charges of embezzlement and bribery . . . It means that a new trial is being prepared . . . the old 'link' . . . From the brothers to Kaganovich . . . and from him to Molotov, Klim, Andreev,\* Zhdanov<sup>1</sup> . . . I am afraid such fresh developments may destroy confidence in our ability to oppose Hitler in the event of war . . . I will have to talk about this to Joseph Vissarionovich . . .

<sup>1</sup> ZHDANOV, Andrei Alexandrovich (1896–1948). Politbureau member and one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Prominent in the Cominform. Distinguished himself in the defence of Leningrad, 1941–3.

The awful summer of 1938 . . .

. . . (omission) . . . Several hundred outstanding army and navy commanders have been arrested . . . The executions never stop . . . Victorov, Orlov, Kozhanov, Egorov, Pavlov, Yermolayev . . . The navy has been left without . . . The General Staff deprived of its best brains . . . It's difficult to avoid the impression that this isn't Hitler's work . . . But perhaps . . . After all Ezhov . . .

The Instantsia has held a secret meeting. Beria submitted a document from the archives of the Rostov Okhrana . . . Ezhov was at one time a secret informer working for Colonel Vassilyev . . . How horrible . . . The chief purger, 'the glorious head of Soviet Intelligence,' is a former petty agent of the Tsarist Okhrana . . . It was decided to remove Ezhov without further delay and quietly . . . Such news cannot be announced to the country lest everything is compromised . . . Officially he is to be appointed People's Commissar for Inland Shipping . . . He will be completely removed later on . . . One must be patient . . . Meanwhile, he will be constantly shadowed and will not try to shake off . . . Zakovsky will be shot tomorrow . . . on a charge of rape . . . As if it had not been known before that he was guilty of rape . . . Still, one can breathe more freely now . . . Vyshinsky will be transferred . . . Later we shall get . . . He succeeded . . . (omission) . . .

The 'neighbours' have sent a report from Paris on the talks between Halifax and Bonnet . . . It is not clear whether it has been decided to hand over the Sudetenland to Hitler . . . The 'neighbours' paid 100,000 francs for the minutes of the talks . . . Henlein made a statement in Breslau . . .

5th August. Runciman<sup>1</sup> arrived in Prague yesterday . . . Chamberlain prepares for the rape of Czechoslovakia . . . Benes told me in a letter that he was placing much hope on the September meeting of the League of Nations . . . How guileless! I put the question before the Instantsia . . . There were long arguments . . . Molotov declared that our agreement with Czechoslovakia committed us to help only if

<sup>1</sup> RUNCIMAN, Walter, First Viscount. President of the Board of Trade, 1915-16 and 1931-7. Head of the British Mission to Czechoslovakia in 1938. Lord President of the Council, 1938-9.

France carried out her obligations under her Treaty of Alliance with the Czechs and gave them help . . . We cannot risk giving an impression in Berlin that we will pull chestnuts out of the fire for the benefit of plutocrats in London and Paris . . . These were his words . . . Evidently a big campaign is being prepared in the Instantsia on the theme of chestnuts and plutocrats . . . As usual, Mekhlis is the author of these catchwords . . .

The German Navy is holding exercises near Kiel and Heligoland . . . Hitler invited Horthy . . . obviously because he is an admiral . . . An admiral of the Hungarian fleet on Lake Balaton . . . They are trying to scare the British . . . It shouldn't be very difficult to frighten Chamberlain . . .

Received a new letter from Benes, who wants us to intervene in Berlin and Warsaw . . . The Instantsia has refused . . . They have only allowed me to promise that if the Poles attacked Czechoslovakia together with the Germans we would strike at Poland . . . We don't propose to touch the Germans . . . Moreover, the Germans will not defend the Poles . . . Thus, if the Poles are stupid enough to get involved in a war against Prague, we shall take Volonia, Podolia and Eastern Galicia from them in exchange for Teschen, which they want to seize from Czechoslovakia . . . Hence, indirectly, we shall gain from this . . . It's disgusting . . . (omission) . . .

Churchill has written a brilliant article . . . *The European Crisis* . . . What a pity he is not in Chamberlain's place . . . He would have stood up to the Germans . . . Hitler's violent speech in Nuremberg . . . The 'neighbours' report from Paris that Gamelin has submitted a survey of the situation at Bonnet's request . . . His view is that the French Army will not be able to resist for long in the event of war with Germany . . .

*Popolo d'Italia* has published a conciliatory article . . . It was written by Mussolini . . . A sensation: Chamberlain has flown to Berchtesgaden . . . Wilson<sup>1</sup> and Strang<sup>2</sup> went with him . . .

<sup>1</sup> WILSON, Sir Horace John, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.B.E. Chief Industrial adviser to the British Government, 1930-9, was seconded to the Treasury for service with the Prime Minister in 1935-8.

<sup>2</sup> STRANG, Sir William (later Lord), K.C.B., K.C.M.G., M.B.E., was Counsellor at the British Foreign Office from 1932 to 1939, when he became Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He had been acting counsellor at the British Embassy in Moscow, 1930-2.

The Quai d'Orsay have sent us a questionnaire. They want to know what our position would be if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia . . . We replied that we would help the Czechs only if France declared war on Germany . . .

19th September. Daladier and Bonnet flew to London yesterday to confer with Chamberlain, fresh from his trip to Germany . . . Runciman was recalled from Prague to attend the Conference . . . Chamberlain is reported to have agreed to all Hitler's demands . . . The thing now is to force France to accept them also . . . Bonnet is quite willing . . . As to Daladier . . . The matter has been settled: Czechoslovakia is to be left to her fate . . . delivered to the mercy of the Nazi terror . . .

It's amazing how easily our people decide to waste money on such rubbish . . . Roosevelt was offered 60 to 100 million dollars for the building of a ship which we hardly need . . . As if it couldn't have been built here . . . in Kronstadt or Nikolayev . . . Krylov<sup>1</sup> could have . . . He is a world authority, considerably superior to any American expert . . . When he lived in France the ship-building firms there made every effort to get him to work for them . . . His naval designs are said to be so outstanding that . . . Eventually, the 'neighbours' requested his recall from France on the ground that he used to visit the establishment in the Rue Chabannes . . . At his age this is . . . Instead of spending his time on . . .

Joseph Vissarionovich thought the 100 million dollar order would make Roosevelt very keen . . . especially in view of the unemployment in American shipyards . . . But it's all nonsense . . . The U.S.A. is working at full capacity because they expect war . . . I begin to think the whole affair was engineered by Zhemchuzhina [Madam Molotov] . . . And the 'far neighbours' also . . . They thought it could be a way of finding out all the secrets of United States naval construction . . . Roosevelt doesn't play our game out of sympathy for us . . . His moves are calculated . . . He is surrounded by a crowd of our rabid enemies . . . Bullitt, for instance . . . And also Harry Hopkins . . . and Averell Harriman . . . They are only waiting for . . . Molotov has

<sup>1</sup> KRYLOV. Professor at the Leningrad School of Naval Construction. Member of the Soviet Academy of Science.

only just given me details of the negotiations with Davies on the Kerensky debt . . . That childish diplomacy . . . It is surprising how our people regard all foreigners as complete fools . . . They don't understand that when foreigners let themselves be cheated by us it is because it suits them . . . Oumansky reports that . . . I am afraid Troyanovsky will burn his fingers . . . He was Rozmirovich's<sup>1</sup> first husband . . . But she and Krylenko . . . Troyanovsky's son wanted to marry Svetlana [Stalin] . . . but nothing came of it . . . Her father was opposed . . . Their escapades in Washington, however, caused a scandal . . . On 16th Street they found . . .

It's a pity that Coulondre is to be recalled . . . He is a clever man and favours collective security . . . The 'neighbours' planted a couple of phoney reports on him . . . He swallowed them whole and even paid cash . . . The gullibility of foreign diplomats is really surprising . . . But it is understandable considering that they have no real sources of information . . . That's why they swallow anything that . . .

Benes insists that we should make a public statement at once on our readiness to fulfil our obligations under the Treaty . . . He believes that if we made it the French would be forced to . . . Daladier is still wavering in spite of Bonnet's pressure . . . If we pressed him he might . . . I don't think these arguments, put forward by Benes, are really valid . . . After their London talks . . .

The Instantsia wouldn't even hear of it . . . Klim bluntly accused Benes of being an *agent provocateur* . . . He is in possession of a long . . . That rogue Gaida<sup>2</sup> (also a chemist) is a sham general . . . He sold himself to the 'far neighbours' for a handful of coppers and sent them a lot of rubbish . . . including some on Benes. He let them have a photographic copy of Benes' letter to . . . Benes affirmed that he was anti-Soviet . . . He mentioned the amount of his subsidies to Milyukov and various Russian anti-Soviet organisations. Benes was asking to be given the chance of continuing to play with us . . . He claimed that he could bring about a *coup d'état* in Moscow through . . . I thought the letter was a fake. Unfortunately it proved to be genuine . . .

<sup>1</sup> ROZMIROVICH. Krylenko's wife. See footnote, p. 142.

<sup>2</sup> GAIDA. Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak forces in Russia in 1918.

Benes can't be too clever if he writes black on white what he thinks, especially on such unsavoury subjects . . . He has the general habit of interfering in our affairs even when . . . His personal letter to Molotov about the plot of the pro-German group in our General Staff was . . . Cavalry Captain von . . . A double agent working for Nikolai<sup>1</sup> and for Canaris<sup>2</sup> . . . How could Benes believe . . . Sasha [Wallakh] told me that this officer had also been an agent of the 'neighbours' . . . A treble agent, not a double one . . . I felt from the start that the whole story smacked of provocation engineered by the 'neighbours' . . . They always did just what they liked with Benes . . . He handed them over Kassimov,<sup>3</sup> who is said to have . . . He was in possession of a list . . . The Prague Bureau of the Comintern . . . Benes saved us from a big scandal . . . And now Klim accuses him of being an *agent provocateur* . . .

It's now clear that Franco will soon be in Barcelona . . . some say in two or three months' time . . .

1st October. We have just received details of the Munich Agreement . . . Prague reports that . . . We are obviously no longer in a position to defend Czechoslovakia either from the Poles or from the Hungarians . . . Beck<sup>4</sup> is becoming insolent. He declared that if we attempted to . . . He threatened to mobilise . . . The Instantia is obviously scared . . . They are particularly afraid of the Ukrainians . . . It's ridiculous . . . A small group of . . . I think Hitler will hand them over to be gobbled up by Horthy . . . The 'neighbours' are denying . . . Astakhov has reported that in his last conversation with . . . He was told that the Ukrainians of Ruthenia will receive no support . . . It's strange how we fear any sign of Ukrainian irredentism . . . Joseph Vissarionovich more than anyone else since he . . . They would rather see the Ruthenians eaten up by the Hungarians . . .

<sup>1</sup> NIKOLAI. German Intelligence Chief in World War I. He was Chief of the East European Section of German Intelligence under the Weimar Republic.

<sup>2</sup> CANARIS, Admiral. German Intelligence Chief, who also served under the Nazi regime.

<sup>3</sup> KASSIMOV. An official at the Soviet Consulate in Prague, acting at the same time as liaison agent with the Prague office of the Comintern. He refused to return to the U.S.S.R. but was arrested by the Czechoslovak police and handed over.

<sup>4</sup> BECK. Polish Foreign Minister.

Hitler will not let the Hungarians get Ruthenia before they sign the Pact . . . We shall then be able to break off diplomatic relations with Budapest as a sign of protest . . . We shall pass off as defenders of the Ukrainians and at the same time have no irredentists in Ruthenia . . . It will possibly happen . . . But I don't know yet whether Hitler will want . . . As to Rosenberg, he will . . . But his influence is limited . . .

The Poles have also entered Czechoslovak territory . . . A rare example of political stupidity. Reynaud has published a violent article on 'The Criminal Poland' . . . This newspaper has long been known as . . .

The 'neighbours' have asked unexpectedly whether it wouldn't be advisable now to publish documents incriminating Beck . . . They are old stories . . . In 1921 Major Beck, who was then attached to the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff, sent to the U.S.S.R. diversionists belonging to the Savinkov organisation . . . One of them succeeded in getting himself a job as cook to . . . He was caught attempting to poison . . . The poison had been given to him by Beck personally before he left Warsaw . . . This resulted in Chicherin sending an official note to Philipovich on 10th September, 1921 . . . I replied to the 'neighbours' that I didn't think the publication was opportune . . . After all our trials public opinion abroad will not believe . . . It's a pity; for once the evidence was not fabricated by the 'neighbours' . . . Nevertheless, it has been decided to publish in the press an article on Beck's expulsion from France in 1924 at Foch's request . . . The article hinted that Foch had evidence of Beck's association with . . . The Second Bureau of the French General Staff had established that information given to Beck found its way to the Germans . . . It may well be, of course, that it was somebody in his entourage who was responsible for . . . One of the men on his staff committed suicide . . . The Instantsia is fulminating against Beck . . . They are even prepared to arrange a trial here to publicise the testimony of defendants arrested in the U.S.S.R. . . . I regard such a course as definitely harmful . . . Just now tension is high . . . It was Klim who said that vengeance is a dish best eaten cold . . . Joseph Vissarionovich agreed with me. He . . . The poor Lev Borissovich [Kamenev], who once discussed with him the subject of vengeance,

noted in his diary: 'To take vengeance and then to sleep peacefully . . . peacefully . . .' Even the ghost of the poor Abel [Enukidze] doesn't disturb him . . . This man has nerves of steel . . . It is what our country and our age need . . . He never loses his temper . . . When he decides to crush an enemy he always does it . . . (omission) . . .

I have been invited to the Instantsia for an exchange of views . . . Joseph Vissarionovich himself summed up the situation . . . He has obviously made up his mind already . . . He listened to the others merely as a matter of form. Molotov attempted to enlarge on something, as he put it . . . He too is shrewd . . . He never argues with the Secretary-General . . . He only enlarges . . . The Secretary-General looked irritated . . . Molotov was talking childish nonsense . . . While the other . . . It's amazing how quickly he catches on . . . Only a few years ago . . . One cannot deny his . . . He believes that Hitler is about to take serious decisions . . . Our fate depends on . . . The British will not defend us . . . Only they don't want Hitler to move south into the Danube Basin . . . Berlin-Baghdad – the old Danubian axis . . . Turkey . . . Asia Minor . . . Mesopotamia . . . Egypt . . . Suez . . . The lines of communication with India . . . The Empire's life-line . . . The old historical reflex of English policy . . . Chamberlain would like Hitler to move towards the Volga, the Urals and the Pacific Ocean . . . That would keep him busy for some time . . . But it would be a catastrophe for our regime . . . And for our country it would . . . Lord Londonderry is said to have inculcated in Goering the idea that Russia was Germany's India . . . Hitler can also . . .

The Secretary-General pointed out that Poland was now the focal point of all contradictions in the capitalist world . . . Without her co-operation it was impossible to move either along the Berlin-Baghdad axis – or along the Volga-Urals axis . . . And London would never agree now to such co-operation . . . It would be too dangerous . . . One cannot tell which way the Reich will move after achieving . . . It means that Hitler must be checked on the line of the Middle Danube . . . The reasoning of a child . . . Chamberlain has water on the brain . . . He wants to stop an avalanche as he would stop a ball on a golf course . . .

Only a military coalition could now . . . The Secretary-General regards it as dangerous . . . He believes that Hitler would return in despair to the old policy of *Mein Kampf*, the one that might have been edited by Lord Londonderry . . . He would plunge into it with the blessing of Chamberlain . . . France doesn't count . . . Bonnet's agreement with Ribbentrop was inspired by London on Chamberlain's initiative. The Secretary-General suggested we should continue the air pact negotiations with London until . . . and at the same time show the Germans that we are prepared to come to an agreement with them . . . and also render Poland harmless. The Germans are already on the Danube. They are now more likely to move on Baghdad than on Sverdlovsk . . . Rumanian oil . . . The Reich will soon . . . The Turks will double-cross London . . . The old tradition of von der Goltz<sup>1</sup> . . . A world war in Asia Minor, while we remain neutral . . . Our tanks can reach the vital German communication lines on the lower Danube within a day . . . It would be a war of continents . . . Roosevelt will help . . . He will not allow the British heritage to fall into Hitler's hands . . . We shall have the last word by 1950 . . . In 1952, on the thirty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution . . . A World Soviet Federation . . . It's strange . . . Even the Secretary-General vitiates his realistic analysis with daydreams of . . . Like a Komsomol youth from Poshekhon<sup>2</sup> . . . Why did I have to . . . I criticised him most energetically . . . The Secretary-General was obviously irritated, but he controlled himself . . . I said bluntly that no one could ever predict accurately which way Hitler would move if we pursued a policy of friendly neutrality . . . It was more likely that he would push along both lines . . . First in one direction and then in another . . . It was the logic of world expansion of a totalitarian state with a new philosophical doctrine . . . Universalism is inevitable . . . Hitler is not an Attila, but rather a motorised Mohammed . . . Blum talks nonsense . . . Attila had

<sup>1</sup> VON DER GOLTZ, Kolmar. German General who reorganised the Turkish Army at the turn of the century and had considerable influence at the Court of the Sultan. After serving as Military Governor of Brussels in 1914 he returned to Turkey and died on the Turkish front in 1916.

<sup>2</sup> POSHEKHON. An imaginary Russian town whose inhabitants typify provincial backwardness.

only military strength, without ideas . . . and military strength wears itself out after a number of conquests . . . Hitler can be stopped only by a world barrier, and not by a defence line on the Danube, the Vistula or the Niemen . . . or even a military alliance between Britain and the U.S.S.R. . . . The United States will join . . . and so will France . . . Then Hitler will either get scared and stop, in which case he will have to face economic crisis . . . or he will plunge into the war and get crushed . . . Germany cannot fight on two fronts . . . With the inexhaustible industrial might of the United States our victory is ensured . . .

The Secretary-General refuted my arguments . . . he spoke calmly, although he was obviously strongly opposed to my point of view . . . Nor did he seem to be very sure of . . . He said I was forgetting that Germany was not alone . . . Italy did not count, of course . . . But Japan . . . If we came out as the initiators of a world front against fascism . . . No one would really defend us . . . We should receive the first blow . . . Britain had no land forces . . . France had got everything she wanted in 1918 . . . She would not attack Germany to defend communism . . . The French would not take any risks . . . Not in vain had the ideology of the Maginot Line become France's official strategy . . . This coincidence was not fortuitous . . . Tactical principles and . . . And even if Germany was crushed as a result of a new world war there would be no Soviet regime in Russia by the time she was defeated . . . We would be the first to go under . . . He then recalled the pledge made on Lenin's grave: The duty of every Communist is to preserve the Soviet regime in Russia, whatever the cost . . . He told me bluntly that I was arguing like a friend of Baruch and not like a member of the All-Union Communist Party . . . It was a nasty dig . . . No one spoke to me as I left the room . . . It means complete ostracism . . .

27th January, 1939. Barcelona fell yesterday . . . Franco has won . . . Madrid will be . . .

Molotov made a most senseless speech at the third session of the Central Executive Committee . . . He offered Japan a non-aggression pact . . .

I have been called to the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be told that henceforth all instructions to Merekalov,

Astakhov and Babarin would be sent directly from the Secretary-General's office . . . It would appear they have already decided to remove me . . . I asked the Secretary-General whether I could . . . He refused, saying it was necessary that I should . . . He wants me to stay on as a smoke screen while the negotiations with Hitler are going on . . . I don't envy Merekalov, Astakhov and . . . Poor David Nikolayevich [Kandeliaki] . . . His friendship with the Secretary-General didn't help him . . . He has been deported to the Arctic climate . . . with his Georgian lungs . . . Even the Secretary-General when he was in Turukhansk . . . And he is as strong as a horse . . . it comes from his mother . . . He could live to eighty . . .

I am beginning to make preparations . . . I think it is dangerous to continue writing this diary . . . Who knows how they will get rid of me . . . They might arrest me and order my deportation . . . I shall have to keep them with . . .

The Secretary-General called me unexpectedly . . . He said there were certain things against me . . . He added, however, that he regarded me as a useful worker and that I could rely on him . . . His friendship . . . David Nikolayevich was also a friend . . . He said the negotiations with Britain and France would be held and that I would . . . It's preposterous and disgusting that I should be used as a puppet . . . My wife has again been allowed to return to Moscow . . .

The Secretary-General has given proof of his friendship . . . He wants me to conduct the negotiations with enthusiasm . . . Like a Komsomol who has been allowed to marry . . . Asiatic outlook . . . But nevertheless, he often gets what he wants with his methods . . .

Had a talk with Zhdanov in the presence of Andreev\* and Malenkov. I don't like this failure . . . He regards himself as an authority . . . He said I would have to . . . I refused . . . I can't change my point of view . . . I had been asked for the purpose of giving my opinion . . . I gave it honestly . . . As is the duty of a Party member . . . If I were just to approve the views of members of the Instantsia there would be no point in calling me . . . They could just send me the minutes to sign . . . And what do they need my agreement for? . . . I don't understand . . .

Malenkov and Andreev declared that . . . So what . . . I don't insist on remaining a member of the Central Committee . . . They mentioned the 18th Party Congress . . . But it makes little difference to me . . . If they want to exclude me from the Central Committee at the Party Conference, let them do so . . . But as long as I am left in charge of the negotiations with the British and French it would be hardly advisable to exclude me from the Central Committee . . . If I were, the western representatives would realise that I was being used merely as a screen or as a puppet of the Instantsia . . . Or perhaps they wouldn't . . . There is no limit to human stupidity and much less to that of diplomats . . . And there is also the psychological element . . . Those who want to be cheated do not see that they are . . . And they definitely want to . . . It's then clear that . . .

I have been informed confidentially by the Diplomatic Couriers' Department that Merekalov has been sent a voluminous parcel from the Secretary-General . . . He will have talks with Weizsaecker<sup>1</sup> . . .

The 'neighbours' are jubilant . . . Keynes has indeed published something against Chamberlain . . . But I don't think that she . . . Economists don't need the advice of ballerinas . . . Keynes is solely concerned with the interests of British oil companies in Rumania . . . For some reason the Instantsia wants us to issue another denial of the talks reported to have taken place at the time of the Munich agreement between Bonnet, Cadogan and Halifax and our Ambassadors in London and Paris . . . Tass denied them officially on 4th October last year. Why do it again? . . . It must be to help Merekalov in his negotiations with Weizsaecker . . . To show Hitler and be able to tell him, in effect: 'We couldn't come to an agreement until now, but now we can' . . . I don't find this manœuvre very profound . . . It was probably Molotov's idea and not a very subtle one . . .

There have been incidents at the villa of . . . The young people, the future generation . . . It's a shame . . . The 'neighbours' have arrested the girls . . . But somebody must have

<sup>1</sup> WEIZSÄECKER, Ernst von. Senior State Secretary at the German Foreign Ministry.

invited them . . . In theory we have no prostitution . . . They have been giving them a bath, like Junkers<sup>1</sup> in the days of Imperial Russia . . . Two of them were drowned. The Secretary-General is said to have demanded the execution of those involved. Klim defended them . . . That Georgian countess is worse than the actress . . . They read Pushkin's *Athenian Nights* in the Academy of Science edition.<sup>2</sup> It's an imitation . . . She is silly and ugly . . . Klim is in love like a . . . The son of an n.c.o. and himself a fitter . . . The mother was a level-crossing keeper . . . With the niece of a Field-Marshal and herself a countess in her own right . . . They have amateur dramatics in the park. The *Areapag* is staged . . . She appears in a kimono open at . . . Klim wears a Pericles type helmet . . . He is chairman of the Areapag . . . The Secretary-General was watching the fun and joking . . . They are now putting an end to this entertainment . . . The Secretary-General has ordered that the trees in the park should be cut down . . . It's a radical solution. The noble countess has been ordered to the Caucasus.

. . . (Omission.) . . .

The Hungarians have been informed of our decision to break off diplomatic relations. The Secretary-General was proved right this time . . . Horthy is ridding us of Ukrainian irredentism . . . Tomorrow, 3rd February, I must . . . Preparations for the 18th Party Congress are going on. I have not been asked to report on any aspect of the situation . . . The reports on foreign affairs will be given by Vladimir Petrovich [Potemkin], Dekanozov and Lozovsky\* . . . Everyone except me . . . Even Zhdanov has become an expert on foreign affairs . . .

28th February. Chamberlain has declared that Great Britain will recognise the Franco Government. Obviously, Madrid will soon be captured . . . The 'neighbours' have supplied an interesting report on Beck's talks with Hitler and Ribbentrop on 5th

<sup>1</sup> JUNKERS. Cadets of the Imperial Military School. One of the traditions was for new boys to be forcibly given a bath by the seniors who sometimes kept them completely submerged under water for a short time.

<sup>2</sup> *Athenian Nights*. This was one of Pushkin's most pornographic works, banned under the Tsarist regime. The Soviet Academy published a limited edition for the use of specialised students of literature. There has been controversy as to whether Pushkin was the real author.

and 6th January and on Ribbentrop's trip to Warsaw at the end of January . . . The 'neighbours' view is that the Poles will not agree to . . . Britain is giving them a substantial loan . . . All these colonels are in the hands of . . . After the suicide of the former premier . . . That bank decides everything . . . The City of London is now the control point . . . If Beck made a move he would get it in the neck, and he knows it . . . Perhaps it will turn out that the Secretary-General was right and that I was wrong . . . I am regarded as a stubborn man but I am willing to . . .

Klim told me that it was too late . . .

Hitler has not allowed the Hungarians to liquidate the Khust [Ruthenian] Government . . . But it is a matter of a few days. In principle Ruthenia will be . . .

Vladimir Petrovich [Potemkin] has been summoned to the Instantsia. They discussed the Secretary-General's report dealing in part with the international situation. I am no longer being invited as a matter of decency . . . It looks as if I shall not even be invited to attend the Congress as an observer . . . Why this insult? I was a member of the Central Committee with a Party record dating back to the days before the Revolution . . . All this is now forgotten . . . buried . . . I telephoned the Secretary-General. He replied curtly that . . .

Vladimir Petrovich told me confidentially that the Secretary-General would say nothing very definite in his report. There would be a friendly bow to Hitler . . . It will be developed by Molotov. He will take up Goebbels' theme on the plutocracy of Wall Street and the City. At least he will not mention the influence of the Jews . . . Vladimir Petrovich is right . . . The Secretary-General greatly respects him for his erudition . . .

11th March. The Secretary-General delivered his speech at the Party Congress . . . Everything is now clear . . . Molotov has completed the picture . . .

I saw . . . He told me my villa had already been allotted to . . . I am to be offered another . . . farther from Moscow . . . an honourable banishment . . . I am preparing for the move . . . I don't know what arrangements to make for the children . . . Will I be left with the Moscow flat . . . I am afraid that during the removal of my things the 'neighbours' will attempt to . . . I

must destroy everything . . . It would be advisable to burn my personal diaries . . . But I cannot . . . I hope that I will still be . . . I don't mean to be a prophet or a Cassandra but I think that Hitler might . . . I shall have to give all this for safekeeping to . . . I cannot and don't want to bear the historical responsibility for . . . (omission) . . .

I have made arrangements with . . . She will be staying in Stockholm for a long time . . . The Secretary-General likes her . . . It's a good observation point . . . She will be given the task of establishing some contacts . . . I showed her the diaries . . . She thought it would be of great interest to keep them . . . Who knows? . . . She had been a member of the Workers' Opposition<sup>1</sup> . . . Personally, she always supported the Secretary-General . . . I too feel no personal enmity towards him . . . But that isn't the point . . . Others would have settled accounts with me but for . . . (omission) . . .

18th March . . . The British have asked tentatively whether we would sign a declaration providing for joint consultations in the event of aggression . . . They said France and Poland would also sign . . . Vladimir Petrovich [Potemkin] went to the Instantsia, where it was decided to reply that such a declaration would serve no useful purpose . . . Merekalov and Astakhov are to inform . . .

Czechoslovakia no longer exists . . . The Slovaks have been given independence . . . Ruthenia has been taken over by the Hungarians . . .

April 1939. Sometimes I feel I haven't got enough air to breathe . . . The Nazi nightmare stifles me . . . How can one just sit back quietly and wait for developments? . . . I am not even a film extra any longer . . . I am just bound over . . . My only consolation is that they left me the Moscow flat for the children . . . It means the Secretary-General thinks I can still be of some use . . . and that he is not too sure of Hitler . . . He is more astute than Molotov, who believes that Hitler can be

<sup>1</sup> WORKERS' OPPOSITION. A group within the Communist Party which came into existence in 1920-1 on a platform of independence for the Trade Unions and was condemned at the party congress of March 1921 as a 'syndicalist deviation'. For detailed reference see E. H. Carr's *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. i (Macmillan, London, 1952).

played up as easily as . . . How naïve . . . Molotov quoted Heine for the statement that every man had the right to be stupid, but the Germans were abusing this right . . . But Hitler is no German . . . He is the product of a number of races . . . He has quite a lot of Czech blood . . . That may be why he hates the Czechs so much . . . And his anti-semitism is more Czech than German . . . It's enough to compare him with a real German like Goering . . . I once made this remark to Benes . . . He was offended . . . Products of the crumbled [Austro-Hungarian] Empire . . . After all, Beck is also an Austrian . . . Hitler was taught anti-semitism by that pompous swine Karl Lueger.<sup>1</sup>

I saw a photograph of Hitler bowing low before Hindenburg as he was shaking his hand . . . He had the attitude of a flunkey . . . The Smerdyakov-Chancellor<sup>2</sup> . . .

An about-turn . . . During Hudson's<sup>3</sup> stay here at the end of March it was decided to . . . But then they thought better of it . . . We can't afford to give the British such an open slap in the face . . . The Secretary-General reminded Molotov of an old Russian saying – Don't spit in a well: you may have to drink out of it . . . (omission) . . .

Memel has been annexed by the Reich . . . The Rumanians have signed a trade agreement . . . They will supply oil in exchange for . . . The Italians have seized Albania . . . The comic-opera King fled with his suit-cases, his sisters, his parrots and his country's gold . . .

I visited my new villa . . . It's a good way out . . . A wooden house with a cock on the roof<sup>4</sup> . . . An imitation of the old Russian style . . . No conveniences whatever . . . I met Klim . . .

<sup>1</sup> LUEGER, Karl. Mayor of Vienna in Hitler's youth and expounder of violent anti-semitism. He is said to be the model on which Hitler based his anti-semitic doctrine.

<sup>2</sup> SMERDYAKOV. A character from Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*; typifies the obnoxious, unscrupulous flunkey.

<sup>3</sup> HUDSON, The Rt. Hon. R. S. (later Lord Hudson). As Secretary to the Department of Overseas Trade, he headed the trade mission to Russia in March 1939.

<sup>4</sup> COCK ON THE ROOF. Common form of decoration on peasant houses in Russia. Originates from an old superstition that the cock chases away evil spirits.

He talked to me in a friendly manner . . . I asked him who would be my successor . . . He slapped me on the back and said no decision had yet been taken . . . It would appear that he also was suggested for the post . . . Klim to direct our foreign policy . . . But the Secretary-General turned down the idea . . . He thought it would be interpreted in the sense that we were preparing for war . . . They considered Zhdanov . . . It was no good . . . Klim said the appointment of Molotov was possible . . . It would be a catastrophe . . . He is completely lacking in suppleness, has little intelligence and is conceited. Lenin called this 'comconceit' [Communist conceit].

At any rate, Vladimir Petrovich [Potemkin] is to stay on . . . Vyshinsky will also . . . as well as Dekanozov and Lozovsky\* . . . Lozovsky can only be useful for talking to the Japanese . . . He has a provincial type of wit, talks in a mixture of Russian and French . . . told me that Lozovsky said to him, '*C'est une connerie*' . . . The Frenchman nearly fell from the chair . . . We can't get far with him . . . (omission) . . .

It's all over . . . I have been sacked like a maid caught stealing . . . without as much as a day's notice . . . On May Day I was still in the Red Square watching the parade . . . The Secretary-General smiled to me . . . I must get ready . . . The day after tomorrow I shall see . . . and give her this diary for safe keeping . . . If possible, from time to time . . . Perhaps I shall find means of sending it to her . . . I shall have to write less frequently and keep my notes in various places . . . My children feel sorry for me . . . They are afraid . . . I reassured them . . . The Secretary-General will not abandon me . . . True, I have enemies, but they will not dare if they know that . . .

Molotov was appointed after all . . . I shall hand over to him. I have been instructed to go quietly . . . without taking leave from my collaborators and the staff . . . Like a thief in the night . . . And what will the foreign diplomats say? . . . Molotov is supercilious . . . I am glad that it will be his job . . .



5th May. It's a sad feeling . . . All my life is in these notes . . . And my work . . . Some day history will pass its judgment . . . on all . . .

Summer 1939. How wonderful it is here in the country . . . I am having a real holiday after so many years of strenuous work . . . I play croquet, gorodki and bowls with the children . . . bathing and rowing . . . At night Turgenev comes to mind . . . It's only now that I begin to understand the secret of his success . . .

Before leaving Moscow I received the visit of . . . They asked me whether I kept secret documents at home and said they had come to check up . . . They apologised . . . The order was signed by Beria . . . It said . . . A game of politeness . . . I did well to hand over . . .

I am reading the newspapers . . . and realising how difficult it is for the man-in-the-street, even for a former Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to understand anything from our press . . . They speak of negotiations – of visits of British and French . . .

William Strang is mentioned off-handedly . . . They wanted to see . . . The devil only knows . . . A game at being a great power played by Mikoyan and Beria . . . Ridiculous . . . Where do they get that from . . .

. . . King George has returned from Canada. I met . . . He is familiar with all our negotiations with Germany . . . He said Astakhov and Babarin had already reached agreement . . . It only remains to . . . At the same time Klim is entertaining the mob from London and Paris . . .

. . . Of course, Beck helps our side by his stupidity and arrogance, typical of an Austrian Pole from . . . But for him it would have been more difficult to lead all those French and British generals by the nose . . . I should have loved to be present at one of Klim's interviews . . . He likes impromptus . . . In spite of instructions . . . (omission) . . .

. . . It has happened . . . What a disgrace . . . Who could have thought it possible? . . . Soviet Russia and fascist Germany dividing Poland . . . Illich must have turned in his grave . . . After all, this is no Brest . . . An immoral but essential peace . . . Nobody forced us to participate in Hitler's rape . . . There is no valid reason . . . If they think to come nearer to the Reich's strategic communications, then . . . I tried to speak to Klim . . . He was shooting not far from my villa . . . He smiled enigmatically . . . and evaded my questions . . . He said, 'Wait,

*Papasha*, we shall yet show this Hitler rabble what is what . . . Give us time . . . If they all think . . .

September. '*Finis Polonia*' . . . My heart aches in spite of Beck and the others . . . To defile such a fine country . . . A crowd of pitiful politicians . . . Ignorant and venal . . . The arrogance of card-sharpers . . . With a face like Beck's one can only be . . . but not a Minister for Foreign Affairs. And Lukasiewicz<sup>1</sup> with his pal, Bullitt . . . Lipski<sup>2</sup> who looked like a frightened crayfish when faced with Goering's porcine profile . . . The best soldiers in the world under the command of the house painter, Rydz-Smigly . . . Another house painter . . . An odd historical epoch: painters and chemists everywhere . . . Rydz-Smigly has described himself as an artist . . . Like the other one from Berchtesgaden . . . Compared to Beck even Molotov may pass for a Disraeli . . . As regards the Secretary-General it is another matter . . . he will yet devise some surprises. The trouble is he is foxing too much . . . He might outfox himself . . .

. . . Victor [Kopp] was telling me that the Japanese have a proverb, 'Even a monkey is apt to fall off a tree'. The Secretary-General should take care not to find himself in that position . . . (omission) . . .

. . . December 1939 . . . War with Finland . . . Our experience with Kuusinen<sup>3</sup> proves that our propaganda can do nothing with a country where there is . . . Finland is, in fact, a true democracy . . . The Secretary-General holds democracies in contempt. He always quotes Kerensky as an example . . . The Finnish democrats are no Kerenskys . . . Democracies differ . . . The essential of democracy is social discipline . . . Where there is no social discipline, democracy will not take you far . . . It requires a Beria to create an apparatus of compulsion and substitute it for conscious social discipline . . . The Finns are a remarkable people . . . The most remarkable people in the

<sup>1</sup> LUKASIEWICZ. Polish Ambassador in Moscow in 1939. Now exiled in England.

<sup>2</sup> LIPSKI, Joseph. Polish Ambassador in Berlin in 1939. Now exiled in the United States.

<sup>3</sup> KUUSINEN, Otto. Karelo-Finnish Communist leader. Former Chief of the Finnish Communist Party. Now a member of the Præsidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

world. I remember how Illich was telling us of his negotiations with Svinhufvud<sup>1</sup> . . . He laughed . . . He called him 'pig-headed' . . . At the same time he could not refrain from expressing his admiration for the Finns . . . (omission).

. . . May 1940 . . . Horror . . . I could have never imagined that the French Army could suffer such defeat . . . Nobody here, not even Krantz-Vientzov,<sup>2</sup> had predicted this . . . It was thought that . . . But what a catastrophic defeat . . . I still don't understand . . . Was there treason in the General Staffs? . . . If the Germans are really so strong, then . . .

. . . I saw . . . He said there was confusion in our ranks . . . are arguing about tactics . . . They consider it necessary to seize quickly everything that is not firmly secured and that can be taken conveniently . . . They want Bessarabia, Bukovina, part of Moldavia . . . To organise a revolt in Dobrudja . . . To get established in Varna. To seize all of the Baltic States as far as . . . To raise again the question of Finland . . . To penetrate into Persia . . . To annex Kars and Ardagan from the Turks . . . The question of the Straits . . . To penetrate quickly into the Balkans, so that the Germans should not be tempted to march south along the Danube Valley . . . Then they will fight in . . . It is difficult for me to judge . . . I am only afraid that such tactics will not yield the desired results . . . Could it be expected that Hitler would agree, at the height of his power? . . . Apparently they regret having given their friendly neutrality for so little . . . These hagglers from Khitrov Market . . .

It would have been a different matter had they adopted such tactics before France's rout . . . Hitler might have been afraid of a war on two fronts . . . But now . . . There can be no second front . . . How is it they do not understand that Hitler can do with us as he pleases? . . . Is it possible that the Secretary-General does not understand it . . . Mikhail Pavlovich told me Molotov is raving . . . He is urging speed . . . The Secretary-General has become pliable . . . He is like a lamb. Molotov knows no middle course . . . Either surrender all or seize everything . . . A hidden opposition has developed in the Instantsia . . . On the eve of such developments . . . And it's no longer possible

<sup>1</sup> SVINHUFVUD. Finnish Foreign Minister. Also Swedish for pig's head.

<sup>2</sup> KRANTZ-VIENTZOV, see footnote, p. 237.

to have executions . . . It would be dangerous . . . If a war started with executions, rumours of treason will spread . . . That would be the end . . . Schulenburg supports of course a policy of friendship with us to the end . . . Weizsaecker too. But it is not they who will decide the question . . . The Secretary-General, however . . . Asiatic passivity . . . A risk could be hazarded while the Germans are still busy in the West . . . It will be too late in a couple of months . . . (omission) . . .

. . . A gorodki party at the Secretary-General's is mentioned . . . General Zhukov is the new champion . . . Beria's wife had arranged a surprise party . . . I am reluctant to keep up these conversations . . . It may be a provocation . . . Mikhail Pavlovich is, after all . . . As was to be expected. Astakhov and Merekalov have been banished to . . . It is significant . . . They are hardly covering up their traces . . . (omission) . . .

August, September . . . Our press carries details of the German raids on London . . . The British are a fine lot . . . Churchill is no Chamberlain . . . It is amazing how he has maintained his dynamic driving power . . . He is the same as Rhodes during looting raids on the Transvaal . . . Statesmen of our era must have something of . . . Also brains, of course . . .

A disgrace in France . . . The victor of Verdun has become . . . I read the details of how the Germans entered France . . . There was no resistance . . . The Germans lost about 17,000 soldiers . . . In Holland, Belgium and in France . . . In two months of so-called battles . . . I do not understand how it could be . . . (omission) . . .

November . . . Molotov left for Berlin . . . I am thinking of . . . It is clear that this journey may bring only . . . Dekanozov left with him . . . He will become Ambassador in Berlin . . . The impression is that the Secretary-General is giving a free hand . . . There is a strong opposition in the Instantsia . . . Klim is on their side . . . (omission) . . .

April 1941 . . . A treaty with Belgrade . . . Too late . . . A spoon is welcomed only at dinner-time . . . Bulgaria is already in the hands of . . . Rumania is preparing to seize Bukovina and Bessarabia from us . . . The only good news: A treaty with Japan . . . At least we need not be afraid now of . . . I think the conclusion of this treaty means that the Japanese must envisage

the possibility of an early war with the United States . . . Otherwise this treaty would have been . . . A revolt in Iraq . . . The Turks will not budge . . .

. . . Occupation of Athens by the Germans. It would seem that the decisive moment is drawing near . . . I do not know what Molotov has been discussing with Hitler . . . Everything depends on the impression . . . Hitler is obviously neurasthenic . . . If Molotov has succeeded in frightening him with his appetite, he might (omission) . . .

May . . . The capture of Crete is only a matter of a few weeks . . .

The press reports the arrival of Hess in Britain . . . Odd . . . Hitler is obviously making an attempt to reach an understanding with London . . . It means that an attack on us is inevitable . . . One can understand nothing from the Press . . . Is Hess an emissary or is he merely half-demented . . . This Lord Hamilton . . . An admirer of Oscar Wilde's . . . Hess burnt his plane . . . For an emissary . . . It is a pity I have no British newspapers . . . I was not allowed to receive them . . . I saw . . . He is shooting near my *datcha*<sup>1</sup> . . . He told me of the transfer of German troops to our border . . . Therefore, there is no longer any doubt . . .

. . . 7th June . . . We had a real blizzard yesterday . . . A blizzard in June . . . The first since 1867 – in seventy-five years . . . A strange meteorological phenomenon . . . (omission) . . . An odd Tass dispatch about Stafford Cripps . . . I don't quite understand . . . It smacks of Molotov's blundering . . . Is it a way of telling Hitler that they are ready to side with him to the very end? . . . Or are they trying to induce him to offer some explanation? . . . Who could have devised this move? . . . Only Lozovsky\* . . . Or some other clever boy . . .

. . . Such stratagems are resorted to by gypsies to cheat Ukrainians at the Reshetikov Fair<sup>2</sup> . . . We have an Ambassador in Berlin . . . Schulenburg is in Moscow . . . If nothing can be done through them, how can they expect anyone to nibble at such crude bait? . . . If they are giving the signal, why should

<sup>1</sup> DATCHA. Russian country house or cottage.

<sup>2</sup> RESHETIKOV FAIR. A fair in the Ukraine made famous by Gogol's tales.

they give it for all the world to know? . . . If this is diplomacy, then how shall one describe stupidity? . . . All is quiet . . . Everybody is taking a vacation . . . Several responsible officials have arrived at a neighbouring villa . . . From the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade . . . They spoke of negotiations between Krutikov<sup>1</sup> and Schnurre . . . We are shipping oil to the Germans . . . They are sending us . . . It looks as if we were helping each other to get ready . . . There is no record in history of a similar situation . . . A contest of crooks and rogues . . . Chancellor Smerdyakov-Hitler – Bismarck's successor v. Chancellor Durashkin<sup>2</sup>-Molotov – Gorchakov's<sup>3</sup> successor . . . (omission) . . . I was summoned by 'phone to Moscow . . . We are at war . . .

. . . (omission) . . . August 1941 . . . I have again plunged into work . . . I have been appointed Ambassador in Washington . . . Will it be for long? The attitude towards me is very cool, particularly on the part of Molotov and Malenkov . . . The latter will outdo in anti-semitism even . . . I noted that a watch is kept on my personal contacts . . . On one occasion I even came under the observation system established for the benefit of Stafford Cripps . . . I telephoned Beria . . . He replied evasively . . . I shall have to be more cautious . . . My papers will probably be perused . . . For the time being I shall leave my notes with . . . I am giving interviews . . . I must show them to Molotov every time . . . An unpleasant procedure . . . Shcherbakov<sup>4</sup> is a down-right fool . . . On one occasion he attempted to censor my speech . . . I complained to Joseph Vissarionovich . . . However, it is almost impossible to reach him nowadays . . .

. . . September . . . The situation at the front is bad . . . If it becomes necessary to abandon Moscow we can't be sure that

<sup>1</sup> KRUTIKOV, A. D. Was in charge of Foreign Trade. Became later a Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

<sup>2</sup> DURASHKIN. A stupid and blundering character of the early Soviet film days.

<sup>3</sup> GORCHAKOV, Prince. A particularly cruel Russian statesman of the eighteenth century.

<sup>4</sup> SHCHERBAKOV, Alexander Sergeyevich. Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and prominent security official. He became a General and Head of the Political Administration of the Red Army during World War II. Died in 1946.

. . . In the Instantsia they are not quite sure either that . . . Joseph Vissarionovich stands for war to the end . . . While others . . . Brest-Litovsk is in the air . . . Our only hope is Hitler's stupidity . . . He is charging blindly at the goal . . . The Third Reich and its army are a powerful but brainless war machine . . . How fortunate for us that at the helm of this machine is Corporal Hitler, with his simple-minded philosophy and geo-political cretinism, and not some Bismarck or Bulow . . . Even Caprivi<sup>1</sup> or Bethmann-Hollweg<sup>2</sup> could have given Hitler's diplomacy a handicap of a hundred points . . . The army is strong, of course, but this has nothing to do with Hitler . . . It's the old Prussian militarism . . . He only spoils things with his pitiful strategy . . . I am beginning to believe in the Jewish God . . . When he wants to save us He deprives our enemy of reason . . .

The infamous, despicable and vulgar figure of the Fuehrer . . . The Austrian Consul in Moscow told me in 1937 that during his stay in Vienna Hitler tried to get a job as a salesman in a large shop in . . . The manager of the shop, a Jew by the name of Cohn, turned him out unceremoniously . . . Hitler then started saying something against the Jews. Thereupon the manager kicked him . . . Now this kick . . . The history of the world is affected by that kick in Hitler's seat . . .

It is reported that there have been cases of treason at the front . . . The Ukrainians are obviously unreliable . . . A conspiracy has been discovered in Kharkov . . . They were waiting for the Germans . . . and expecting them to proclaim an independent Ukraine . . . The cretins; the Germans will suck them as a spider sucks flies . . . They are maintaining the collective farms and are hanging the peasants who try to divide the collective farm land . . . They are not even allowing Hetman Skoropadsky<sup>3</sup> to return to the Ukraine . . . The Ukrainians will sober up soon . . . I was told of Malenkov's project for an evacuation . . . Shcherbakov, Zhdanov, Andreev and Molotov, too . . . If we withdraw to the Urals, then of course the Japanese

<sup>1</sup> CAPRIVI, Count von. German Chancellor, 1890-4.

<sup>2</sup> BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Theobald von (1856-1921). Succeeded Prince Bulow as German Chancellor in 1909.

<sup>3</sup> SKOROPADSKY, Hetman. Head of the Ukrainian Government under German occupation in 1918.

... The treaty with Matsuoka will not save us ... We must fight to the end ... We must crush them with our numbers ... We must get the peasant going and instil in him the hatred of the enemy ... What a brilliant order of Stalin's to the Army ... 'A fighter should not die without leaving the corpse of a German interventionist by his side. Kill him with a machine gun, a rifle, bayonet ... If you are wounded, sink your teeth into his throat and strangle him as you would a wild beast' ...

... Anti-semitism can be observed here, too ... The result of ... I was told that there was talk regarding my appointment in Molotov's entourage and in the Malenkov-Zhdanov group ... Malenkov is supposed to have said that I would not be left in Washington for any length of time.

Shcherbakov said: 'His task is to make a few speeches in Yiddish and to obtain everything we need ... When he has arranged this, we shall dismiss him ... Litvinov is unreliable'

... The pups ... They have forgotten everything I have done for the Party ... I risked my life ... I also risked ... I had a conversation with ... He is of the opinion that Roosevelt would not risk ... I believe he is mistaken ... Molotov invited me to see him ... He asked for my opinion ... I told him quite plainly that the Comintern must be dissolved ... Without this Roosevelt could not agree to ... He maintained a dull silence ... He even scratched his head as a peasant would do at a fair ... He then said suddenly: 'We can certainly dissolve it, but we must ask for a good price ... What is your opinion as regards the price we may ask? ...' I merely shrugged my shoulders ... It was a question of creating an atmosphere of complete confidence between two great countries and he is making ready to haggle ... You cannot go far with the likes of him ... Dekanozov was telling me that during the Molotov-Hitler talks, Molotov stuck so stubbornly to his demands that the Fuehrer immediately lost his temper and their simple exchange of views was immediately turned into a sharp conflict ... When in due course Dekanozov related this to Stalin and expressed surprise that so brainy a man as Molotov could commit such a grave mistake ... Stalin pressed his lips: 'Of course, Molotov is a man with brains, but his brains are stupid ...' An excellent definition ... (omission) ...

October 1941 . . . I am sailing for . . .  
1944 . . . I should have liked to write something about the past . . . I do not recollect it all . . . (omission) . . . I arrived on the day of the Pearl Harbour attack. When I first met Roosevelt he embraced me . . . I could not tell him that . . . I had an interview with Beria before I left for the United States . . . He told me that in the event of my . . . They will pay with their lives . . . As if I was not aware of it . . . He said it in such an outright, abrupt and rude manner . . . One has to be a professional member of the Cheka and not a . . . It was revolting to make such a statement to a friend who was going abroad as an Ambassador, especially at a time when our country was in mortal danger . . . Yet Beria has the reputation of being a humane member of the Cheka . . . What are the others like . . . What a disgrace to us . . . (omission) . . .

It was so unpleasant to press demands on Roosevelt . . . To threaten that if there is no second front . . . Moscow was putting pressure on me . . . I had a quarrel with Standley.<sup>1</sup> Our people were deliberately kept in ignorance of the extent of American aid . . . Truth is painful . . . If the people knew that we had been saved at the most difficult moment . . . One hundred thousand lorries from the U.S.A. decided the fate of the war in 1942, at the crucial moment . . . In all more than 400,000 lorries . . . The railways were paralysed by the German Air Force . . . The rivers were frozen during the decisive autumn of 1942 . . . Stalingrad . . . We had produced the guns and shells in sufficient quantities but we didn't have the lorries to move them . . . Roosevelt was telling me . . . I kept silent . . . He understood and he put his arm round my shoulder . . . Tears came to my eyes . . .

Molotov's visit in the summer in 1942 . . . He was elbowing me out of the negotiations . . . He tried to see Roosevelt and talk to him privately . . . He intrigued with Sumner Welles . . . Oumansky was also intriguing . . . I realised that my days as Ambassador were numbered and that they were only waiting for a big military victory to throw me out as a redundant . . .

<sup>1</sup> STANDLEY, Rear Admiral W. H. Was assigned to 'special duty' in the United States Department of the Navy in World War II, then U.S. Ambassador to Russia, April 1942 - October 1943 when he quarrelled with Litvinov.

The only bright reminiscence was 7th November, 1942 . . . The Congress of the American-Soviet Friendship Society at Madison Square Gardens . . . The noble figure of Senator Pepper . . . Thomas Lamont, of Pierrepont-Morgan's . . . Professor Ralph Barton . . . and particularly the speech made by Henry Wallace . . . I remember later he told me privately that Molotov had disappointed Roosevelt with his persistent demands that the U.S. should recognise the annexation of the Baltic States, the Bukovina and Bessarabia . . . When Roosevelt attempted to find a compromise and suggested that it should be worked out with me, as Ambassador, Molotov declared outright that 'Litvinov neither has nor will have the authority to conduct negotiations on this subject' and that the President of the United States must come to an understanding with him before he sailed . . . A stupid and unnecessary ultimatum . . . It's fortunate that Roosevelt is not a Hitler, otherwise . . . And all in the summer of 1942, before Stalingrad . . . It's clear that Molotov now . . . Fortunately Stalin understands this and restrains him . . . Otherwise this war would have ended in . . . Swiss newspapers said Goebbels had predicted a break up of our coalition . . . Had Molotov been in Stalin's place this break up would have occurred a long time ago . . . Hitler and Molotov – two peas in a pod . . .

1946. The Paris Conference has ended in a putrid compromise . . . Of course, a bad peace is better than a friendly quarrel, but nevertheless . . . I am beginning to fear that . . . I recently saw . . . He travelled a hundred kilometres in his 'Zis' to talk to me, an Ambassador in disgrace . . . He told me that Molotov was becoming increasingly uncompromising . . . But Joseph Vissarionovich was applying the brakes . . . Even from Sochi<sup>1</sup> . . . There was a quarrel . . . Molotov tried to intrigue in the Instantsia . . . He was given a stern warning . . . The sentence which Dekanozov had told me was passed on to him . . . He was greatly offended . . . Lately all Joseph Vissarionovich's personal instructions on foreign policy have been communicated to Vyshinsky directly . . . Molotov hates Vyshinsky . . . It is said that he has asked for his personal dossier from the office of the Party's Central Committee . . . Stalin had ordered that Vyshinsky's

<sup>1</sup> SOCHI. Russian Black Sea resort where Stalin was often resting in the latter years of his life.

dossier should remain at his disposal . . . A snub to Molotov . . . Malenkov, of course, was only too pleased . . . He took some documents from the dossier, over Molotov's head, and passed them to Beria to be destroyed . . . Malenkov is said to have started intriguing against his protector, Molotov . . . (omission) . . .

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

1950. My health has greatly deteriorated . . . I received permission to go to Moscow for a fortnight to consult specialists . . . They recommended Marienbad . . . I smiled . . . I would never be allowed to go abroad . . . not even to Czechoslovakia . . . Malenkov, unexpectedly, invited me to see him . . . He was very amiable . . . He said I could be admitted into the Kremlin's clinic, if I wanted to. I thanked him very politely but declined the offer. I would rather die in my own bed . . .

During my stay in Moscow I saw . . . He told me some interesting things about Mao Tse-tung's recent visit here. He fancies himself as a great Marxist theoretician . . . He read a paper at a closed session of the Marx-Engels Institute . . . All the members of the Instantsia were present . . . Joseph Vissarionovich took the floor and declared that Mao had a profound understanding of Marxism . . . Molotov is said to have nearly had a fit as Mao pulverised his famous theory of 'the third stage in the development of capitalism' . . . Mao's theory was quite simple . . . He noted the complete failure of the frontal attack against capitalism in its Anglo-Saxon citadel and in all its dependencies – in the Latin and Scandinavian countries, in Switzerland and Western Germany. He declared that this strategy of the frontal attack had led to a partial defeat in the loss of Yugoslavia by the 'anti-capitalist bloc', and to her adherence to the 'capitalist bloc'. He suggested opening an attack against 'the raw materials rear of the capitalist bloc and its markets', to take advantage of the national-social movement in the Asian and African countries and the urge for economic emancipation in the South American countries . . . He demanded for China and for himself the leadership in Asia . . . The leaders . . . supported him . . . But Marshal Choibalsan<sup>1</sup> is play-

<sup>1</sup> CHOIBALSAN, Marshal. Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic and leader of the Mongolian Workers (Communist) Party. An old friend of Stalin. Died in Moscow in 1951 following an operation.

ing an important part . . . Molotov and Malenkov hate him . . . He treats them in an off-hand manner . . .

Kim<sup>1</sup> and Ho-Chi-Min<sup>2</sup> also attended the session . . . The Japanese Communist Party was represented by . . . From Indonesia, the Philippines, India and Pakistan came . . . Generally speaking, a revival of the Comintern, but in a purely Asiatic edition . . . The leadership of this new attack on the capitalist bloc is said to have been taken over jointly by Stalin and Mao . . .

China has been promised a big loan as well as technical and military aid . . . We are staying in Manchuria, Mongolia and the Kwantung peninsula . . . Port Arthur and Dalny . . . and Harbin . . . It's a dangerous venture . . . We are speeding up the emergence of a powerful and dangerous competitor – China. We are also bringing nearer a new conflict for the re-allocation of raw materials and markets . . . Even an elementary student of Marxism knows that this cannot but lead to war . . . If Stalin imagines that he can force Mao to pull the chestnuts out of the fire . . . After all, Mao is also a . . . And China is not Yugoslavia . . . Mao is not a Balkan Chetnik with a party card in his pocket . . . We are raising him ourselves to the standing of a Marxist theoretician . . . It is said that the first step will be taken in Korea . . . Then Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines . . . Indochina, India and Pakistan . . . (omission) . . . Malenkov is reported to be entirely on Mao's side . . . Choibalsan is to be sacrificed . . . I do not like Molotov but, after all, his hallucinations were less dangerous than Mao's new Asiatic Comintern . . . (omission) . . .

The doctors are not very hopeful . . . So much the better . . . I shall not live to see a third world war . . .

<sup>1</sup> KIM – presumably Kim Ir-Sung, Prime Minister of the Korean People's Republic (North Korea).

<sup>2</sup> HO-CHI-MIN. Leader of the Vietminh.



## **APPENDICES**

## APPENDIX I

### BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

**ANDREEV**, Andrei Andreyevich, b. 1895. Began his career as a trade union specialist; Chairman of the Railway Workers' Union, 1920 to 1928, holding at the same time important Party posts. Served as one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee, 1924-25, and Secretary of the North Caucasus Party Organisation, 1928-29. Chairman of the Central Control Commission, 1930-31, and in the following year was promoted to full membership of the Politbureau, acquiring at the same time the reputation of an expert on collective farming. He then became Chairman of the Council for Co-operative Farms Affairs and later a Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. Reported to have fallen into disgrace in 1950 and at the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 it was revealed that he was no longer a member of the Politbureau. But in March 1954 he was again elected a member of the Supreme Soviet.

**BADAYEV**, Alexey Egorovich, b. 1883. A manual worker of peasant origin, he had been a Bolshevik member of the Fourth Duma. He sided with Stalin against the Trotsky opposition and used his popularity among some sections of the industrial workers to support him. Member of both the Central Committee of the Communist Party and of the Central Executive Committee. Received the Order of Lenin for building mechanised bakeries.

**BAKAYEV**, Ivan Petrovich, 1887-1936; joined Bolshevik Party in 1906. Secretary of the Petrograd Soviet during the Revolution. Political Commissar in Leningrad, 1920. Member of the Leningrad opposition at the Fourteenth Party Congress. Then joined the Zinoviev-Kamenev-Trotsky opposition group. Member of the Central Control Commission and of the Central Executive Committee, 1926. Expelled from the Party at the Fifteenth Congress, 1927. Arrested December 1934. Tried January 1935 and shot in 1936.

**BERZIN**, Ian Antonovich, b. 1881. Joined Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in 1902. Was arrested several times before the Revolution and lived in exile in Switzerland, Great Britain and the United States. In 1918 he became Soviet Envoy to Switzerland, but was declared *persons non grata* and expelled in the same year. People's Commissar for Education and Secretary of the Comintern, 1919–1920. After negotiating peace with Finland in 1920, was appointed Soviet Envoy to that country. From 1921 to 1925 was on the staff of the Soviet diplomatic mission in London and was then appointed Envoy to Austria. Later became Chief of RAZVEDUPR, the Soviet Intelligence Service abroad under the Commissariat for Defence.

**BLUCHER**, Vassili Konstantinovich, Marshal, b. 1889. Real identity not known. Fought against Kolchak and Wrangel, 1919–20. Held command in the Far East, 1921–22; drove the Japanese out of Vladivostok, 1922. Military adviser to the Kuomintang, 1924–27. (Known at that time as General Galen.) C.-in-C. of Canton Army when it moved North. Returned to Russia when Chiang Kai-shek repudiated communism and was appointed C.-in-C. in Eastern Siberia, 1929. Relieved of his command in 1938. Unheard of since.

**BORODIN** (Gruzenberg) Mikhail Markovich, b. 1884. Joined Russian revolutionary movement as a youth. Lived in the United States, Spain and Mexico, 1906 to 1918, and engaged actively in Communist propaganda in those countries. Became a leading member of the American Socialist Party and a prominent trade union official in Chicago. In August 1922, in Glasgow, arrested while on a mission for the Soviet Bolshevik Party; sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Sent to China in 1923 to help Sun Yat-sen. Became 'High Adviser' to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and representative of the Comintern in China. In 1927 escaped to Moscow through Mongolia and became editor of the Soviet English language newspaper *Moscow Daily News*.

**BUKHARIN**, Nicolai Ivanovich, 1888–1938. Published *Pravda* with Lenin in Austria and was later editor in Moscow. Member

of Central Committee of the Party from 1918, and of Politbureau from 1924 to 1929. Head of Third International 1926–29. Expelled from the Party in 1929 and readmitted the same year. Official posts after his readmission included membership of the Præsidium of the Committee for Heavy Industries, and Member of the Constitutional Commission set up to draft the text of the 1936 'Stalin' Constitution. Again expelled from the Party in 1938; tried and executed in the same year.

Regarded as a leading theoretician of communism as well as an economist and sociologist; was also a member of the Soviet Academy of Science. Author of *A.B.C. of Communism* (1920), *Economic Policy during the Period of Transition* (1921), and *The Peasant Question* (1923).

**CHICHERIN**, Georgi Vassilevich, 1872–1936. Russian aristocrat, who resigned from the Tsarist diplomatic service (1904) to devote himself to revolutionary agitation; was mainly a Menshevik until 1917. Soviet delegate at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs 1918 to 1930; retired because of ill health. Member of the Central Committee 1927–30.

**DOVGALEVSKY**, Valerian Savelayevich, 1885–1934. Lived in exile in France and Belgium before the Revolution. People's Commissar of the Russian Federation for Post and Telegraph, 1921. Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, 1924; later *chargé d'affaires* in Tokyo and Ambassador to France from 1927 to his death. Signed agreement with Arthur Henderson in London, October 1929, on the resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain and the U.S.S.R. Signed, with Herriot, the Franco-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1932.

**DZERZHINSKY**, Felix Edmundovich, 1877–1926. Polish nobleman. Took part in 1905 Revolution and was for many years a member of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania. Delegate to the Fourth and subsequent Congresses of the Bolshevik Party. Imprisoned 1912 to 1917. Became a member of the Central Committee, 1917.

From 1918 to his death was head of Cheka (Extraordinary Commission), later renamed—O.G.P.U. (Soviet political police and main espionage organization); also at times Commissar for Internal Affairs. As Commissar of Transport, 1921 (combined with post of O.G.P.U. chief), he reorganised and improved the railway system. February 1924, became also Chairman of Supreme Council of National Economy and was largely responsible for the development of Soviet heavy industry. His industrial development plans were adopted by the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 and he is also remembered as Chairman of the Commission for liquidating ‘homeless waifs’. Died of heart failure early in 1926.

**EVDOKIMOV**, Grigore Eremeyevich, 1884–1936. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1903. Arrested in 1908. From 1913 worked for the Party in St Petersburg, where he was re-arrested. Escaped and re-arrested in 1916. After the Revolution became Head of the Political Department of the Seventh Army. Took part in the defeat of Yudenich. Chairman of the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions, 1922. Secretary of the Leningrad Party Committee, 1925. Member of several Party Congresses. Official party speaker at Lenin’s funeral. Member of the Left Opposition bloc. Expelled from the Party and capitulated at the Fifteenth Party Congress, then held minor posts. Arrested December 1934, tried January 1935, executed in the following year.

**EZHOV**, Nikolai Ivanovich, b. 1895. Head of the Soviet political police from 1936, when he succeeded Yagoda, to September 1938, when he was replaced by Lavrenti Beria who had been appointed his deputy two months earlier. Until July 1938 he held consecutively the posts of Commissar for Internal Defence, Commissar for State Security, and Commissar for Internal Affairs. Between 1936 and 1938 he was also a candidate member of the Politbureau. After being replaced by Beria he served for a short period as Commissar for Inland Water Transport – a post from which he was reported to have resigned on health grounds. He disappeared from public life early in 1939 and was said to have been interned in a mental home. It was under his

direction that the *Great Purge* which had begun in December 1934 reached its climax of intensity in 1937–38 when it became known as the '*ezhovshchina*'.

**FRUNZE**, Mikhail Vassilevich, 1885–1925. One of the most gifted Soviet army leaders. Commanded the Red forces fighting Admiral Kolchak, 1919–1920, and General Wrangel, 1920. In December 1921, as a Plenipotentiary of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, he headed a Soviet Military Mission sent to Turkey to negotiate military assistance to the Kemal regime. Was elected a candidate member of the Politbureau at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 and shortly afterwards became People's Commissar for the Army and Navy and Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. Died in 1925 after an operation.

**KAGANOVICH**, Lazar Moiseyevich, b. 1893. Came of a working class family of Jewish Ukrainian origin. Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1911 and was active in the revolutionary underground. After the Revolution he served successively as head of the Nizhni-Novgorod Party committee, 1917; head of the Tashkent Government, 1920; member of the Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee, 1922; Head of the Organisation – Instruction Section of the Central Committee Secretariat set up to control the work of local Party organisations, 1923–24; Secretary of the Central Committee and Member of the Central Executive Committee, 1924; Secretary-General of the Ukrainian Party Organisation, 1925–28; Member of the Orgbureau, 1928; Head of the Moscow Party Organisation, 1930–35.

Known as the Party's 'trouble-shooter', he was largely responsible for the construction of the Dneprostroy (the giant hydro-power scheme on the river Dnieper), the building of the Moscow underground, the organisation of machine-tractor stations which made possible the collective farm structure, and the development of railways and heavy industry.

He has been a Member of the Politbureau continuously since 1930 and his official Government posts have included those of Commissar for Railways, 1935; Commissar for Heavy Industry and Fuel Industry, 1937; Deputy Chairman of the Council of

People's Commissar and Commissar for Railways, 1938; Member of the State Defence Committee (the Soviet War Cabinet), 1942-44; Deputy Commissar for Foreign Trade, 1945; Minister for Building Materials, 1946. Since the war Kaganovich has been a Deputy Premier and is now a First Deputy Premier of the U.S.S.R.

KALININ, Mikhail Ivanovich, 1875-1946. An early Party member, of peasant origin. He had been active in the underground movement. Elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1919, and in the same year he replaced Sverdlov as Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. He continued to perform the same functions in the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. after 1924 and became a Member of the Politbureau in 1926. In 1937, as President of the Præsidium of the Supreme Soviet, he became the official Head of the Soviet State, a rather ceremonial post which he held until his death. He established also a reputation as a Marxist theoretician.

KAMENEV, Lev Borisovich (Rosenfeld), 1883-1936. Joined Russian Social Democratic Party in 1901 as a student in Moscow. Arrested after a demonstration and emigrated to Paris in 1902. Joined Bolshevik faction after split of 1903. Returned to Russia and worked in St Petersburg, 1905-07. Re-arrested 1908 and again emigrated, but returned in 1914 to become editor of *Pravda* and guide work of the Bolshevik faction in the Duma. Arrested again and exiled to Siberia.

Member of Central Committee from 1917; Chairman of the Central Executive Committee at the Second All-Soviet Congress (replaced later by Sverdlov). Lenin's Deputy as Chairman of the Politbureau, of which he was a member from 1919 to 1925. Also President of the Moscow Soviet, 1918-26; Soviet delegate at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks; Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, 1922; Ambassador to Italy, 1927; Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence, etc. Formally expelled from the Party with Trotsky in December 1927; reinstated in 1928; again expelled and exiled in October 1932; recanted and returned to Moscow in May 1933;

again expelled and re-arrested with Zinoviev in December 1934 on suspicion of connection with the assassination of Kirov. Tried in January 1935 and July of same year. Re-tried in 1936 and executed. He is also known as the editor of Lenin's works.

**KARAKHAN**, Lev Mikhailovich, b. 1889–1937. Old Bolshevik of Armenian origin. Served as Chicherin's assistant at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and established a reputation as an expert on Far Eastern Affairs. His official posts included those of Envoy to Poland, 1921; Ambassador to China, 1924–27; deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1928–34; and Ambassador to Turkey, 1934–37. He opposed Stalin's policy in China and was executed in 1937 after a summary trial.

**KIROV**, Sergei Mironovich (Seryozha), b. 1886–1934. Active as an underground revolutionary before 1917, he was regarded as one of Stalin's earliest and closest associates. A former Secretary-General of the Azerbaijan Party organisation in 1921 and of the North-West Bureau of the Central Committee in 1925, he came into prominence as a national figure in 1926 when he became First Secretary of the Leningrad Party Committee – a post which he held until his assassination in December 1934.

In 1930 he became also a full Member of the Politbureau and in the following four years he often acted as official Party spokesman at congresses and meetings. His assassination by a Communist Party member called Nikolaev marked the beginning of the great purge. Nikolaev was alleged to have been a member of a terrorist organisation consisting of supporters of the Zinoviev opposition.

**KRESTINSKY**, Nikolai Nikolayevich. A lawyer and journalist who joined the revolutionary movement in 1903 and was closely associated with Lenin and Trotsky in the underground period. In 1917 he served as Chairman of the Ekaterinenburg and Ural regions party committees and in the following year he became People's Commissar for Justice. In the latter capacity he made the historical remark that 'as long as the Cheka exists the work of Justice must take second place.'

In 1919 he was elected one of the five members of the first

Politbureau set up in that year by the Eighth Party Congress as a policy-making body intended to deal with questions requiring immediate attention. (The other four members of the original Politbureau were Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and Kamenev.) At the same time he became a member of the Orgbureau and also the 'responsible Secretary' of the Central Committee – the post subsequently used by Stalin to gain control of the Party and State. Having sided with Trotsky against Lenin in the important controversy on the Trade Union question in 1920, Krestinsky was dropped from all his important Party posts at the Tenth Congress in 1921. In the following year he was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Germany and spent the rest of his career first in Berlin and later as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs under Litvinov.

Tried with other famous old Bolsheviks in March 1938 on charges of treason and conspiracy, he was the only defendant in the group to repudiate in court the confessions he was alleged to have made during the investigations of his case.

**Lozovsky**, Solomon Abramovich, b. 1878. Apprenticed to a blacksmith. Active revolutionary since 1901. Lived in Paris, 1901 to 1917. Secretary of the Soviet Committee of Trade Unions and later President of the Profintern – the Communist Trade Union International. Alternate Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1927. Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1939. Deputy Director of Soviet Information Bureau, 1941. Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1946. Chief of Soviet Information Bureau.

**MANUILSKY**, Dr Dmitri Zakharovich, b. 1883; educated at University of St Petersburg and the Sorbonne. Began revolutionary activity among Social Democratic students in St Petersburg; arrested in 1904 and 1906; exiled to Siberia for participating in Kronstadt uprising, 1906; escaped 1907; returned to Russia 1917 and took active part in Revolution. Head of Red Cross Mission to France, 1919; Member, All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Committee, 1920. Commissar of Agriculture in the Ukraine, 1920–21; participated in Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with Poland, 1920. Elected Member, Præsidium of the

Comintern, 1924; Member, Central Committee, Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. since 1923. Appointed Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R., 1944. Chief Ukrainian Delegation, Peace Conference, 1946; Chief Delegate of Ukrainian S.S.R. to United Nations General Assembly, 1946 and 1947.

**MENZHINSKY**, Rudolf Mechislavovich (or Vyacheslav Rudolfovich). Polish nobleman, b. 1874. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1895 and, after a short period of underground activities, lived in exile until 1917, when he was appointed to the People's Commissariat for Finance. In 1918 he was Soviet Consul-General in Berlin and took part in the negotiations which resulted in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Later he became head of the United States department in the Soviet Intelligence Service and a member of the Praesidium of the Cheka – the political police known as the Extraordinary Commission, then under Dzervzhinsky. He succeeded the latter on his death in 1926 as chief of O.G.P.U. – a post which he held until his own death in strange circumstances in 1934. (See also Yagoda.)

**MIKOYAN**, Anastasi Ivanovich, b. 1895. A member of the Baku Bolshevik Committee during the Revolution, he was active in Party activities in the Caucasus and his native Armenia until 1920. Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Party Committee, 1920–22; Secretary of the North Caucasus Party, 1922–26. In 1926 he became People's Commissar for Trade; in 1931, Commissar for Supplies; in 1935, Commissar for the Food Industry. From 1938 to 1949 he was Minister of Trade and has been Minister Home Trade and Deputy Prime Minister since March 1953. He has also been a member of the Politbureau since 1935.

**PIATNITSKY**, Joseph Aronovich, b. 1882. Joined the Communist Party in 1898, specialising in the smuggling of illegal literature from abroad. Later a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of the Comintern.

**RADEK**, Karl B., b. 1885 in Lwow, Poland. Joined the Polish revolutionary movement in the early years of the century and contributed to social-democratic publications in Poland and Germany from 1906 to 1914. After spending most of the World War I years in Switzerland he travelled to Russia with Lenin, Zinoviev and other leading members of the Bolshevik Party in 1917. He took part in the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and later, in 1918, was sent to Germany to advise the leaders of the German revolution and help reorganise the German Communist Party. He returned to Russia in 1920 and rose to the leadership of the Comintern, but having associated with the Trotsky opposition he was expelled from the Party in 1925. Re-admitted in 1930, he again rose to prominence as a journalist, propagandist and official Communist spokesman and in 1935 he was a member of the Constitutional Commission designated by the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets to draft the text of the new 'Stalin' Constitution, which is still in force. But in 1937 he was charged with treason and conspiracy and, after repudiating his former political associates at a public trial, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

**RAKOVSKY**, Christian Georgievich, b. 1873 in Bulgaria, of Rumanian-Ukrainian descent. Represented the Bulgarian Socialist Party at various international conferences and later, having joined the communist faction of the socialist movement, he founded and organised the Rumanian Communist Party. In 1919 he became Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian Premier) and attempted to secure a larger measure of autonomy for the Ukraine in the new Soviet State. (Proposals he had supported in this connection were opposed by Stalin and eventually defeated.) He also became a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party and was regarded as one of Trotsky's most intimate friends and supporters. In 1924 he was appointed Soviet *chargé d'affaires* in London and from 1926-27 served as Ambassador in Paris. After being expelled from the Party and exiled to Siberia he was charged with treason and espionage in March 1938 at the famous trial of the 21 and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.

**ROZENGOLTZ**, Arkadi Pavlovich, born 1889. Trained economist; joined the Bolshevik faction in 1905 and was arrested and exiled in 1907. After his release he acted as Party organiser in Kiev in 1913 and was the chief Party Treasurer in 1914–15. During the Revolution he became a member of the War Council of the Republic. His official Government and Party posts under the Soviet regime included: Member of the Præsidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, 1919; Member of the People's Board for Finance, 1922; Head of the Central Aviation Directorate (Minister of Civil Aviation), 1923–24; Trade Adviser to the Soviet Diplomatic Mission in London 1924–25; Member of the Party's Central Control Commission (elected at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927); Member of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (set up to control and co-ordinate the work of economic Commissariats and industrial enterprises), 1928. In 1933–36 he was People's Commissar for Foreign Trade and later acted for a time as Second Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs under Litvinov. Dismissed and arrested at the end of 1937, he was tried in March 1938 and sentenced to death at the famous trial of the 21 (Rights and Trotskyites) accused of having plotted to overthrow the Soviet regime and to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R. The particular charges against him included that of having personally attempted to commit a terroristic act against Stalin by repeatedly trying to secure an interview with him.

**RUDZUTAK**, Yakov E., b. 1889 in Lithuania. After a period in the underground movement he was sent to Turkestan in 1919 to report on conditions there. His mission resulted in Turkestan becoming a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1921. From 1921 to 1924 he was Chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Communist Party and in 1923 he became also one of the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Party. In the following year he was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Vice-Premier) as well as Vice-Chairman of the Council of Labour and Defence and also People's Commissar for Transport. He had been a candidate member of the Politbureau since the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925 and

was a full member from 1926 to 1932. He disappeared in the great purge of 1938.

**РЫКОВ**, Alexei Ivanovich, b. 1881. A member of the Communist Party's Central Committee, both before and after the Revolution, he became People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in 1917 and was a member of the Politbureau from 1922 to 1930. From 1924 to 1929 he held the posts of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation (R.S.F.S.R.), as well as that of President of the Supreme Economic Council. In January 1929 he was named by Stalin as one of the three leaders of the 'Right deviation' faction inside the Politbureau and within a year he lost his official Government posts and was dropped from the Politbureau. In 1937 he was expelled from the Communist Party and in the following year was sentenced to death and executed on charges of treason and espionage.

**ШКИРИЯТОВ**, Matvei Feodorovich, 1883–1954. Former garment worker, Member Central Control Commission from 1922. Became its Secretary and representative to the Politbureau and Orgbureau, 1928. Member of Central Executive Committee. Chairman of the Nineteenth Party Congress, 1952.

**СОКОЛНИКОВ**, Grigori Yakovlevich, b. 1888. Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1905 and, after escaping from detention, lived in exile in several Western countries from 1909 to 1917, when he worked in close association with Trotsky. After the October Revolution he directed the nationalisation of banks and in 1918 he headed the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks and signed the Brest-Litovsk treaty on behalf of the Soviet Union. His subsequent posts included those of Commissar for Finance, 1922–25; Deputy-Chairman of the State Planning Commission, 1926; Ambassador to Great Britain, 1929–1933; Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1934. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party from 1917 to 1919 and from 1922 to 1930. Arrested and expelled

from the Party in 1936, he was charged with treason and conspiracy as a Trotskyite in the following year and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

**SOLTZ**, Arnold Aaronovich, b. 1872 in Vilna. Joined the Party's Polish-Lithuanian group in 1898 and sided with the Bolshevik faction at the Second Party Congress in 1903. Was arrested several times for revolutionary activities before 1917. Edited *Pravda* for a short time in 1917. Elected in 1920 to membership of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In the following year, at the Tenth Party Congress, he was elected to the Praesidium (working committee) of the Party's Central Control Commission, of which he remained a member until 1934. After the Twelfth Party Congress (1923) he became a member of the Party's Central Committee.

A Stalinist stalwart since the early days of the feud with Trotsky, he served after 1934 as Soviet Deputy Prosecutor-General and then President of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

**VOROSHILOV**, Klementi Efremovich (Klim), Marshal, b. 1881, in Lugansk (Voroshilovgrad). Joined Bolshevik Party in 1908. A former n.c.o. in the Tsarist army, he organised the Fifth Ukrainian Red Army during the Revolution and led the historic march from Lugansk to Tsaritsin. Held various commands until 1925, when he became Commissar for the Army and Navy. Became Deputy Premier and Chairman of the Government's Defence Committee, 1940. C.-in-C. Far East, 1944. Member of the Politbureau since 1925. President of the Supreme Soviet (Head of State) since March 1953.

**YAGODA**, Genrikh Gregorovich, b. 1891, of Polish lower-middle class origin. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1907 and was arrested and exiled in 1911. After the Revolution he specialised in political security and espionage work and headed for a time the department dealing with intelligence and agitation in the United States. In 1924 he was appointed Vice-Chairman of the O.G.P.U. (political police, officially known as the State Political Directorate) and became also a member

of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. In 1934 he succeeded his chief, Menzhinsky (whom he was later accused of having murdered), as head of the N.K.V.D. – the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. In that capacity he directed the big purge, which began after the assassination of Kirov in December 1934, and organised the famous trials of prominent leaders of the Revolution. He was removed from office in 1936, arrested shortly afterwards and tried and executed in 1938, together with Rykov and other members of the 'Right Opposition' group, whom he is said to have secretly supported in the early 'thirties. He was officially charged at his trial with having engineered the murder of Menzhinsky, Maxim Gorki, and Kuibyshev, and with having attempted to murder his successor in office, Ezhov, and members of the Politbureau, having planned to overthrow the Government, and having deliberately admitted foreign spies into the N.K.V.D.

**YAROSLAVSKY**, Emilian (pseudonym of M. I. Hubermann). Professional revolutionary, historian, soldier and Marxist philosopher, born in 1878 in Chita, Siberia, where his parents had been exiled on political grounds. Delegate to the Fourth Party Congress in Stockholm (1906) and the Fifth Congress in London (1907), he took an active part in the organisation of the Bolshevik clandestine armed force. Commissar of the Moscow Military Region in 1918 and one of the founders of the Red Army and of the Godless Society. Elected a member and Secretary of the Party's Central Committee in 1923 and also of the Central Executive Committee and of the Præsidium of the Party's Central Control Commission. Lenin's biographer, editor of the official history of the Soviet Communist Party, author of works on atheism and Marxist doctrine.

**YOFFE**, Adolf Abramovich, b. 1883, of Jewish-Karaite origin. After establishing a reputation as a gifted doctor he abandoned medicine to become first an underground revolutionary and later a skilful Soviet Diplomatist. He headed the Soviet delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace talks with Germany and later the Soviet Diplomatic Missions in Germany (1918), China (1922–23), Austria (1924–25) and Japan (1925–26). A close

friend and political ally of Trotsky's, he committed suicide on 16th November, 1927, two days after Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Soviet Communist Party.

ZINOVIEV, Grigori Evseyevich, b. 1885. Joined the Russian Social-Democratic Party in 1901 as a student in Switzerland and sided with the Bolshevik faction on returning to Russia in 1905. Arrested in 1908, he emigrated and became one of Lenin's closest collaborators in exile. Returned to Russia with Lenin in 1917 and played a prominent part in the early years of the Soviet regime. He was Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, 1917; Head of the Comintern, 1919-26; member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 1907-27; member of the Politbureau, 1921-26. Expelled from the Party at the Fifteenth Congress in December 1927 for factional (left-wing) opposition, he was re-admitted in the following year; expelled again and exiled in 1932; returned and was re-admitted for the second time in 1933; in 1934 he was expelled for the third time and arrested; tried in the following year, he was sentenced to banishment. In 1936 he was tried again on charges of treason and incitement to terrorism and sentenced to death.

## APPENDIX II

### A LIST OF WORKS BY MAXIM LITVINOV

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION: ITS RISE AND MEANING. British Socialist Party, London, 1929.

MIRNAYA POLITIKA SOVETOV. Report at the 4th Session of the Central Executive Commission of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, Leningrad, 1929.

THE SOVIET FIGHT FOR DISARMAMENT. Martin Lawrence, London, 1932.

VNESHNYAYA POLITIKA SSSR (The Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.). Collected Speeches and Statements by Maxim Litvinov, 1927-35, Moscow, Sotsekgiz, 1935.

THE U.S.S.R. AND THE BREACH OF THE LOCARNO TREATY. Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, London, 1936.

BORBA ZA MIR (*The Struggle for Peace*). Moscow, 1938.

AGAINST AGGRESSION. Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1939.

## APPENDIX III

### CONGRESSES OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

I	1898	Minsk
II	1903	Brussels, London
III	1905	London
IV	1906	Stockholm
V	1907	London
VI	1917	Petrograd
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